
THE FRENCH STATE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF EXILES ON
THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER: HARASSMENT, EVICTION AND DISPERSAL

INVESTIGATION REPORT

ON 30 YEARS OF CREATING THE DETERRENCE POLICY

PIERRE BONNEVALLE



PLATEFORME DES SOUTIENS AUX MIGRANT.E.S (PSM)

**This report was produced with the support of a scientific committee
and in partnership with the CERAPS.**



Thus, we would like to thank the members of the scientific committee for their support and expertise throughout the research:

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- **Mathilde Pette**, sociologist, senior lecturer at the University of Perpignan and member of the ART-Dev laboratory.

My name is on this report, but it is above all the result of the mobilisation of the members of the migrant support platform, the advocacy commission, the associative partners and the scientific committee.

I would therefore like to thank the people present throughout this investigation who placed their trust in me, who gave me the opportunity to produce this report and who assured me of their full support from the initial thoughts until its publication.

Thank you to those who agreed to give their time to the production of this report, as interviewees, intermediaries or proofreaders.

Finally, thank you to Anaïs for her presence, support, advice and patience.

Pierre Bonnevalle.

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ACRONYMS

- ANAEM:** Agence nationale de l'accueil des étrangers et des migrations (National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration)
- ARPF:** Arrêté préfectoral de reconduite à la frontière (Prefectoral deportation order)
- CADA:** Centre d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile (Reception centre for asylum seekers)
- CAES:** Centre d'accueil et d'examen des situations (Reception and administrative situation examination centre)
- CAO:** Centre d'accueil et d'orientation (Reception and orientation centre)
- CCI:** Chambre de commerce et d'industrie (Chamber of Commerce and Industry)
- CEDH:** Cour européenne des droits de l'homme (European Court of Human Rights)
- CHRS:** Centre d'hébergement et de réinsertion sociale (Accommodation and social reintegration centre)
- CICI:** Comité interministériel de contrôle de l'immigration (Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control)
- CNCDH:** Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme (National Consultative Commission on Human Rights)
- CNDA:** Cour national du droit d'asile (National Court of Asylum)
- CRA:** Centre de rétention administrative (Administrative detention centre)
- CRS:** Compagnie républicaine de sécurité (Republican Security Companies)
- CUD:** Communauté urbaine de Dunkerque (Urban Community of Dunkirk)
- DPM:** Direction de la population et des migrations (Population and Migration Directorate)
- EELV:** Europe écologie les Verts (Europe Ecology - The Greens)
- HCR:** Haut-commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
- MDM:** Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World)
- OFII:** Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration (French Office for Immigration and Integration)
- OFPRA:** Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons)
- OQTF:** Obligation de quitter le territoire (Obligation to leave French territory)
- PAF:** Police aux frontières (Border police)
- PS:** Parti socialiste (Socialist Party)
- REH:** Réseau des élus hospitaliers (Network of hospitable elected officials)
- SSAÉ:** Soutien, solidarité et actions en faveur des émigrants (Support, Solidarity and Actions for Emigrants)
- UE:** Union européenne (European Union)
- UMP:** Union pour un mouvement populaire (Union for a Popular Movement)

NOTE ON LANGUAGE

This report reflects the original French by using the terms "exile" and "exiled people" throughout to describe all migrants, refugees, and people on the move.

The term usually used in France to refer to migrants, especially amongst migrants' rights activists and organisers, is "exilé.e" or "personne exilée," translating to "an exile" or "exiled person." This language was developed to move away from the terms "migrant" or "immigré," which have been appropriated by right-wing and far-right actors in France.

The term "personne exilée" emphasises the displacement of people that happens because of major geopolitical, environmental, economic, and socio-political crises, at both national and international levels.

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INTRODUCTION

DETECTING EXILES: THE HISTORY OF A POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS

INTRO

PREAMBLE

As I complete this report, two seemingly separate but nonetheless connected events help to illustrate what this report, on 30 years of public migration policies implemented at the Franco-British border, wishes to demonstrate.

On the one hand, the withdrawal of American troops in Afghanistan is raising concerns among the Afghan population. It is once again preparing to live under the yoke of the Taliban. At Kabul airport, Afghans are attempting to flee the country. Scenes that are making their way around the world of people trying to board planes bound for Europe or the United States reflect this fear. This crisis situation is the subject of a speech by Emmanuel Macron on 16 August 2021, explaining that “the destabilization of Afghanistan will likely also increase the flow of irregular migration to Europe”, specifying: “We must plan and protect ourselves against large irregular migratory flows that endanger those who are part of them and fuel trafficking of every kind¹.” These comments then gave rise to criticism from part of the parliamentary left, which was outraged by the “cynicism” of the head of state.

Furthermore, one after the other, two large-scale evictions took place in Nord and Pas-de-Calais.

On 24 September 2021, the sub-prefect of Dunkirk, Hervé Tourmente, was present at the Petit Prédembourg living space in Grande-Synthe. Around a hundred CRS officers were mobilised, a cleaning team from the company Ramery was present, demolition machines were used while tents, sleeping bags, blankets and personal belongings were destroyed and placed in skips. In just a few hours, almost 700 exiled people were evicted without any offer of accommodation, remaining on the streets, this time without their makeshift shelter.

On 28 September 2021, this time around 400 exiled people were evicted and subjected to forced “sheltering” in the name of “safety, health and peace”². The prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Louis Le Franc, in that case stated: “It is in our interest to regularly dismantle all these camps, otherwise they will become the realm of smugglers. These are areas where migrants live in disgraceful conditions and when they are dismantled, accommodation is systematically offered”³. During the operation, around a hundred police officers were mobilised to evict and get the exiled people onto buses. The tents, sleeping bags, blankets and personal belongings were also destroyed. The very next day, almost 1,100 exiled people were once again present in the same area of Calais.

These events are nothing new. They are merely the cyclical repetition of discourse and practices that have been in place since the late 1990s.

The same rhetoric is used to characterise situations that are framed as crises: “protection”, “control of migratory flows”, “closure of the border”. The same terms are used to justify evictions: “maintaining public order”, “peace for local residents”, “unsanitary living spaces”, “fight against smugglers”.

1. “Statement by Emmanuel Macron”, 16 August 2021.

2. “Camp de migrants à Calais : un énième démantèlement “forcé” évacue près de 400 personnes”, *Infomigrants*, 29 September 2021.

3. *AFP*, 28 September 2021.

For 30 years, we have observed a performative desire on the part of successive governments to show their strength as a way of reassuring public opinion and the local population regarding their ability to maintain law and order.

For 30 years, the same security-oriented approach has been initiated, with a certain continuity where each breakdown serves as a pretext for strengthening a security-oriented framework, where each failure justifies going ever further, in the stated hope of a different result.

For 30 years, the same policy seems to have been repeated, despite the failure observed by the current Minister of the Interior himself: "It is true, there is still this feeling of trying to empty something that is filling up, even if it is filling up less. This is the only way to avoid allowing unacceptable settlements in the Calais region⁴."

For 30 years, local elected officials have been constrained by the policy introduced by the State. Each alternative to managing the presence of exiled people is interpreted as a formal opposition to the State. The debate is reduced to a Manichean mindset: pro or anti exiled people.

I. INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION OF EXILED PEOPLE STRANDED "ON THE BORDER" BETWEEN FRANCE AND BRITAIN

This research examines the deterrence policy that, in turn, strands exiled people on and removes them from the Franco-British border. The aim here is to identify these public migration policies and the exiled people who are subject to them. What policy are we talking about? What does "stranded on the border" mean? Who are the exiled people concerned?

1. The fabrication of the irregular status of exiled people

For 30 years, the Franco-British border has "hosted", depending on the period, between 1,500 and 15,000 individuals. They may be identified in turn as "migrants", "refugees", "exiled people", "foreigners in an irregular situation" or "undesirables". The terminology used means something different depending on who is watching. It helps to illustrate a situation that is more or less restrictive, or rather stigmatising, to reduce a person to their lack of status, to the fact that they do not fall into any specific legal category.

It is difficult to identify them since these people may only stay for several days, a few weeks or even a few months. They may move from one living space to another, move from one city to another depending on the possibilities for crossing, their living conditions and the policies of the State. They do not all take steps to obtain legal status on French territory, by choice, through lack of knowledge, because the procedures are complex or obstacles are put in front of them, or because their fingerprints were taken in another European country meaning deportation proceedings if a new application is made in France. For people who have taken legal steps, they may be awaiting refugee status, housing in an accommodation centre, have been rejected or "dublined" – and therefore subject to deportation proceedings. They may also be waiting to cross to Britain or into another northern European country.

4. "Gérald Darmanin défend 'la seule manière de faire' de l'État", *La Voix du Nord*, 23 July 2021.

Given this diversity of situations, the term “refugee” seems too restrictive here, since it is a status governed by the 1951 Geneva Convention. The term “migrant” instils the idea of a choice made by people to leave their country to settle in another, a choice said to be made for strictly economic reasons, unlike refugees and asylum seekers, who are said to be forced for political reasons. Moreover, immigration policies – in France and in Europe – aim to distinguish between migrants and refugees, based on a gradation of constraints weighing on the individual and make their choice more or less legitimate. However, economic and political reasons are frequently confused.

Claire Rodier explains that, “there are porous lines between these categories, which are above all a way for the State to sort ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants in order to reduce the number of beneficiaries of asylum (...) It is increasingly difficult to distinguish between categorical criteria in this mix. We cannot rely on assumptions based on nationality or ethnicity” (RODIER, 2018, p. 18).

In this report, we have chosen to use the term “exiled people” to characterise the people stranded on the border. The aim is to focus on their (non-)status as closely as possible and help to understand their diversity. The majority of exiled people may legitimately seek asylum in Europe and therefore in France – or have already done so – and obtain it. They are only in an irregular situation because the public authorities fabricate their irregular status through a policy of deterrence and impediment, as shown by the statistics produced by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Indeed, in the first half of 2015, the UNHCR estimates indicate that one million people crossed EU borders (UNHCR, 2015). According to the UNHCR, 84% of these people came from the top 10 refugee source countries in the world. In detail: Syrians are the most numerous, with 49% of arrivals, followed by Afghans (21%) and Iraqis (8%). The other seven countries are Eritrea, Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia and Mali.

On the Franco-British border, there are the same populations, fleeing religious, ethnic and sexual persecution, situations of war or military dictatorships. The specific characteristics of these people is that they are young – often minors – and mainly men. The share of women and children in living spaces should not be overlooked, although their small number can be explained – marginally – by less complex access to emergency accommodation centres. In addition, women and children receive solidarity accommodation more often than men. Living spaces are organised by community, enabling the building of mutual assistance networks and the best possible organisation of daily life and protection in a situation experienced as temporary – even though it may last some time.

In this case, by “exiled person”, we mean a person – whether or not they meet the asylum criteria – who has been forced to leave their country for economic, political, religious, sexual-orientation or ethnic reasons, or to flee a situation of war, and therefore forced to leave in order to settle in another country in the hope of escaping a precarious situation, persecution or death.

As part of this research, we assess the direct and indirect consequences of the public migration policies implemented by the EU, on the one hand, and the French State, on the other hand, on the situation of exiled people.

We espouse here the idea that the EU and the French State institutionally co-produce “deterrence” in respect of exiled people: understood as the fabrication of their irregular status, prevention of access to the Schengen Area and French territory, while preventing them from leaving it to get to Britain. These two political levels contribute to “illegalising” them, as anthropologist Nicholas de Genova explains: “a migrant becomes “illegal” only when legislative or judicial measures make certain migrations or certain types of migration illegal, in other words when they “*illegalise*” them (2019).

This “illegalisation” relies on police, administrative and legal apparatus that contributes to depriving them of legal status and making them “non-citizens”. This mindset is combined with the production of political and media discourse that stigmatises them, which in turn justifies depriving them of their fundamental rights, as Nicholas de Genova again notes:

“All such officially “unwanted” or “undesirable” non-citizens are stigmatized with allegations of opportunism, duplicity and undeservingness. Furthermore, the compulsive denunciation, humiliation and exquisitely refined rightlessness of deportable “foreigners” supply the rationale for essentialising the legal inequalities of citizenship and alienage as categorical differences that may be racialized.”(2013)

Deprived of their fundamental rights, exiled people see “on the border” an opportunity to get to Britain or another country in northern Europe. Prevented from reaching it legally, they are then “stranded” on the border, waiting to cross or to obtain housing or legal status.

2. “Stranding” exiled people “on the border”

In political and media discourse, the presence of exiled people at the border is said to be driven by a premeditated desire to reach Britain that exists from the moment they leave their country. The State produces a simplistic discourse aimed at erasing the complexity of the journeys of exiled people, the attempts at living in other countries, the changes, the wait to be accommodated (GUENEBAUD, 2017). A narrative of the figure of the exiled person is created by the Ministry of the Interior and their life trajectory is taken from them. They are said to be suspicious and prey to networks of smugglers. This narrative construction downplays the responsibility of the State and the EU in their chaotic life trajectories and in the decision not to take care of them.

In opposition to the idea of a linear migratory journey, the work of certain journalists, researchers and associative activists, as well as organisations promoting the defence of human rights, helps to make it possible to re-complicate their migratory trajectories. Britain is, in most cases, a partly forced additional step than a choice made from the moment they leave their country of origin. It symbolises the migratory wandering produced by the public authorities.

Exiled people stranded at the Franco-British border do not fall into any specific legal category; they are in transit to Britain, waiting to obtain legal status in France and hindered in their movements by the French State. They have a diversity of profiles that are difficult to grasp. Although they do not have legal status in France, they also cannot be legally returned by the French State because their country of origin refuses to issue passes or because it is said to be “unsafe” due to the persecution they may face on their return, or because the country is mired in conflict.

Since 2008, the work carried out by researchers Karen Akoka and Olivier Clochard has made it possible to identify three main categories explaining the reasons that drive exiled people to “flee” their country of origin.

The first includes people who are “fleeing persecution”, who fear imprisonment or persecution because of their political activities or those of their relatives, or because of their ethnicity, or who are fleeing rebel militias or even enlistment in the national army.

The second includes people who are “fleeing widespread conflicts”, countries devastated by war, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Palestine, countries mired in ethnic conflicts, such as in Somalia or in Sri Lanka, and dictatorial regimes such as Iran or Eritrea.

The third category includes people “seeking a better life”, who are fleeing poverty or a lack of future prospects, and people undertaking a migratory journey in order to earn income to help family back in their country.

The decision to get to Britain is made during the migratory wandering of exiled people. Exiled people talk and share their knowledge about the reception possibilities and living conditions they can expect in the different European countries. From one setback to another, Britain appears to be an additional step, a choice made as a kind of last chance to settle.

Britain may be attractive due to prior knowledge of the English language, enabling younger people to study there and reduce the uncertainty caused by the idea of settling in an unknown place. The presence of family there is also a reassuring resource. The fact remains that the difficulties in obtaining family reunification force exiled people to attempt to cross illegally. Depending on the country of origin of the exiled person, they may benefit from the presence of the national community in Britain to reduce the cost of settling abroad, or from assistance with settlement or employment. The supposed attractiveness of the British asylum procedure or the expected ease of access to employment make Britain a hope for release from their personal and legal situations. In addition, according to François Gemenne, the choice of Britain is also constrained by the smuggling rings organising the crossings and, to a certain extent, choosing the country of destination for exiled people⁵.

Aside from the many aspirations and constraints of exiled people, and their respective migratory journeys, these exiled people are “stranded” on the border. This idea postulates that exiled people are forced to settle in a precarious living space, awaiting access to or enjoyment of their rights, or a crossing to Britain or other northern European countries. They are subject to a specific state policy, characterised by police harassment and daily hindrance of their movements. They are both prevented from settling in France and prevented from reaching Britain. They are “on the border”, neither really in France nor in Britain, and they are confined and marginalised by the French State in a lawless area, while not being tolerated there either.

We espouse here the hypothesis that the deterrence policy orchestrated by the EU and France has the effect of producing this situation of being stranded on the border. By preventing exiled people from accessing legal procedures on European soil, these two political levels force them to try their luck in Britain or northern Europe and await release from their legal situation. They are therefore indirectly responsible for the existence of precarious living spaces close to transit sites. Since the French State is bound by the

5. “Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air”, *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

bilateral treaties signed with Britain, it cannot organise the “flows” or allow exiled people to cross. Thus, it orchestrates the closure of the border and the control of migratory “flows” by harassing exiled people, deporting them and hindering their movements, and in this way prevents and delays their legal stabilisation. It also contributes to increasing the risks for people whose lives are regularly threatened.⁶

3. A “deterrence policy”: the role of local authorities “on the border” between France and Britain

For 30 years, a so-called “deterrence” policy has been observed on the coast. This doctrine has only strengthened despite its repeated failures according to the objectives pursued by the public authorities to prevent the presence of exiled people. The aim is to deploy an increasingly coercive approach in order to fill the gaps identified in the arrangements previously in effect. Deterrence is established by the EU, the State and sometimes municipalities to prevent the presence of exiled people on European territory, on French soil, near transit areas, but also in Britain.

The aim of deterrence is to notify exiled people that they have no place “here” through the fabrication of their irregular status. Its legal dimension is based on the inability to access asylum procedures and the organised lack of access to their fundamental rights. Its security dimension takes the form of a policy of harassment, detention, eviction and removal. The aim is to produce “unbearable conditions [to] make ‘those people’ leave” (FASSIN, 2014, p. 45). Through the physical dimension, the State also “protects” the border by erecting walls and barbed wire, as well as by deploying new surveillance technologies (cameras, CO2 detectors, thermal cameras, drones, etc.).

The presence of exiled people in Calais since the 1990s has contributed to making it a city symbolising the closure of the border and the site of expression of the deterrence policy deployed by the French State. There are also measures combining proclamations of “humanity” and “firmness” in a mindset of “maintaining public order” and with the stated objective of removing exiled people from the Calais region. Successive governments have deployed substantial police and security resources there. When the number of exiled people remains “marginal” according to the public authorities, a policy of systematic deterrence can be observed there. When their numbers increase and become too visible, measures taking the form of house arrest are deployed, as in the case of the Sangatte camp from 1999 to 2002, the Calais slum from 2015 to 2016 and the La Linière camp in Grande-Synthe from 2016 to 2017, designed to be “half-security, half-humanitarian” measures (CARRERE, 2003).

Since the city of Calais has become a symbol and because the State is omnipresent there, it attracts the attention of the media. The crossing issue is reduced to the geographical proximity – 30 kilometres of maritime strait – between Calais and Britain, while failing to mention that if Calais has become a “border”, it is above all due to growth of sustained cross-border trade that takes place there. In a combined manner, the construction of the Channel Tunnel and the development of maritime links from the port of Calais make it a transit space that multiplies the opportunities for exiled people to “cross” into Britain.

⁶As of 5 December 2021 and since 1999, at least 336 exiled people have died at the Franco-British border, according to Calais Migrant Solidarity, a group that keeps track of the victims.

In this report, however, we do not wish to reduce the migration issue to the city of Calais alone. Where maritime flows to Britain are organised, exiled people attempt to cross. There are a disproportionate number of informal living spaces located there. Observing what is happening outside Calais means examining the differentiated (or otherwise) treatment of the application of a state doctrine in the management of the presence of exiled people. It means understanding its strict application and political appropriations by local elected officials and local state representatives. As Pierre Grémion (1976) shows through the concept of “peripheral power”, local authorities have room for manoeuvre and are able to participate in the implementation of national public policies, to influence them and to oppose them.

We will examine, in turn, the living spaces located along the border or nearby (Grande-Synthe, Loon-Plage, Steenvoorde, Tétéghem, Angres, Norrent-Fontes in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Cherbourg, Ouistreham and Dieppe in Normandy). These territories have been studied over a long period of time, in contrast to the Calais situation. Calais is viewed here as both a political and media symbol, with a question: what happens when the presence of exiled people is viewed by the public authorities as marginal and not requiring specific intervention? Conversely, when their presence has become too visible, at what point is it portrayed by political and media actors as a “public problem”? In this context, what role do local elected officials play both in putting this “public problem” on the agenda and in its political handling? What framework does the State impose on local elected officials and how can they free themselves from it?

As a result of this research, we developed a typology of the ways in which municipalities manage the presence of exiled people, ranging from opposition to support, even if marginal and occasional. Although imperfect, this typology facilitates consideration of the role that local elected officials can play, but also the evolution of their discourse and practices.

A municipality can provide water, food, access to showers (Dieppe from 2008 to 2014) or provide grants to associations without tolerating the presence of living spaces (Cherbourg from 2002 to 2008). It can “tolerate” a living space (Cherbourg from 2008 to 2014, Grande-Synthe from 2005 to 2008, Angres from 2009 to 2019), “municipalise” it by creating “permanent” buildings (Grande-Synthe from 2008 to 2016, Tétéghem from 2008 to 2015, Steenvoorde from 2008 to 2014), or even produce emergency reception facilities (La Linière in Grande-Synthe from 2016 to 2017) regarded as areas of respite from eviction practices and spaces of solidarity.

This reception is part of a restricted framework for exiled people and their supporters. Indeed, the rules of the game are set by the municipality and may change without notice depending on:

- the number of exiled people present and the fear that a space will be established on a long-term basis;
- elections;
- political shifts;
- compliance with the objectives pursued by the State;
- changes in the presence of exiled people nearby.

In addition, reception can coexist with a policy of eviction sponsored by the State (Norrent-Fontes in 2012), the owner of the occupied premises but also by the municipality (Grande-Synthe since 2017), even if the latter may provide support, however minimal, to exiled people. On the other hand, it can be terminated at any time, preventing any long-term establishment of a living space.

By assessing these situations chronologically, this report helps to show their diversity while examining the room for manoeuvre of local authorities vis-à-vis the State. By studying the territories over a long period of time, it can be seen that the different forms of reception (or animosity) with respect to exiled people are not unequivocal. A specific policy is not specifically associated with a municipality, mayor or a partisan label. It depends, on the one hand, on the local political configuration, on the balance of power with associations, government departments, the municipal team and citizen involvement or on media coverage and, on the other hand, on the presence of exiled people, their volume and their visibility.

This research teaches us that European, national and local policies intertwine to confine and marginalise exiled people in deliberately precarious living spaces, such as an instruction to stay “on the border”, neither outside nor inside, but a space in-between, as Camille Guenebeaud notes: “The migrant condition is not a shared human condition, it produces suspended existences, i.e. constantly removed, separated, invisibilised, but still present and resistant” (GUENEBEAUD, 2017, p. 472).

Here we espouse two hypotheses regarding the management of exiled people “on the border”:

On the one hand, the management of the presence of exiled people is based on the preponderance of the “maintaining of public order” and the Ministry of the Interior among the government departments concerned. For this ministry and local elected officials, the aim is to prevent the emergence of neighbourhood disturbances, the politicisation of their presence and the “insecurity” that exiled people are said to represent. When there are too many exiled people and evictions contribute to them wandering in towns and cities, their visibility calls into question the objectives pursued. To counter this, both the State and some municipalities place and concentrate exiled people in restricted spaces to ensure “public peace”.

On the other hand, we espouse the hypothesis that this policy is based on the “showcasing” (BROWN, 2009) of the strength of the State. Daily and widely spaced evictions, repeated violence against exiled people as well as the deprivation of their fundamental rights are all practices aimed at encouraging people to self-deport and demonstrating its power in order to better conceal its failures. These repeated displays of force are ways to reassure public opinion and the local population regarding the State’s ability to “control migratory flows” and the border. In other words, the State declares the impermeability of the border and the walls are there to make it known. But exiled people continue to cross. The state declares that it is clamping down on living spaces and evictions are overdramatised to show that the State “controls migratory flows”. But exiled people are still present.

II. EXAMINING THE CONTINUITY OF AND BREAKS WITH PUBLIC MIGRATION POLICIES AT THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER

What is happening at the Franco-British border has been in the making for 30 years. What is happening there is based on policies cobbled together that have gradually been established in a political doctrine. It has been produced by the Ministry of the Interior and applied by the political actors who have headed it. The Ministry of the Interior says very little, but what it produces is extremely visible and makes it possible to analyse how it “deters”. We present here the methodology that we use in this research, in order to review how we obtained a certain number of results.

1. The doctrine of deterrence: continuity in the break

“There has been atavism in migration policies for some time and even more so since the Ministry of the Interior has been in charge since 2010, which is deterrent atavism. There are breaks when you eventually convince a political authority that doing things differently is better for everyone. And I think the trigger for this was actually the scale of the arrivals in 2016. Then there is a political authority that says to itself, “Well, Calais is fine, but we’re not going to do it again” (Pascal Brice, Director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018).”

The observation of the public migration policies implemented at the Franco-British border for nearly 30 years has revealed a state doctrine embodied in self-reinforcing rhetoric and measures. Each alternative policy, which appears to be a break, only reinforces the previously established policy.

The continuity is marked by constant recourse, regardless of the presidential and parliamentary majority, to the same rhetoric and measures, like a doctrine imposed on leaders. In each case, the government announces a desire to prevent exiled people from:

- settling legally in France by preventing them from accessing or enjoying their rights;
- remaining at the border through a policy of harassment, eviction and dispersal;
- leaving France to reach another northern European country – like Britain – through the erection of walls and border protection and surveillance systems.

To understand the trajectory of these public migration policies, we use the concept of *path dependence*. This concept helps to “highlight the influence of past choices and that of political institutions on current decisions” (PALIER, 2019, p. 446).

This concept, which comes from economics, is mobilised by historical neo-institutionalist approaches, “which seek to describe the continuity of public policy trajectories” (PALIER, 2019, p. 446). In the case of public migration policies, *path dependence* helps to analyse their continuity based on the idea that deterrence traces a path, departure from which brings uncertainty regarding the alternatives and a “learning cost”:

“Change would mean losing the amortisation and increasing returns of initial investments, and having to invest again; it would also mean resuming learning processes, maintaining coordination with other institutions and changing expectations, and being able to plan the appropriate new behaviours” (PALIER, 2019, p. 447).

In other words, at the Franco-British border, deterrence is based on the same actors (essentially police forces and therefore the Ministry of the Interior) and common practices that have only been cemented and made police forces indispensable in the execution of this doctrine. Changing the doctrine of deterrence would require producing a new public policy, training police forces differently and reconsidering their monopoly in dealing with the border.

7. Interview conducted on 3 June 2021.

Proposing an alternative to the management of exiled people would mean opposing the Ministry of the Interior, which acts as the guardian of this so-called doctrine. By providing expertise on migration and maintaining public order, it strengthens its place in the system: “once established, the basic political positions are generally tenacious and promote continuity versus change” (PALIER, 2019, p. 448). In this context, “it is becoming increasingly costly, if not impossible, to not comply with the rules and standards laid down by previous political choices and to seek to revisit past institutional options (PALIER, 2019, p. 449).

Moreover, proposing alternatives gives rise to political, media and institutional uncertainties for governments. As American political scientist Paul Pierson explains, “the political outlook of an elected official is usually short-term and shaped by the electoral agenda, which will almost always make them choose the least politically costly solution in the short term” (PALIER, 2019, p. 450). Simply put, for a political actor, acting in the same way as their predecessors – even if this policy proves ineffective – means avoiding the costs inherent in forming an alternative policy that may be subject to opposition criticism or perceived as a failure.

These various factors foster the stability of public policies. Since this deterrence policy works by means of “incrementalism” (step-by-step), it is strengthened by following the same path, making turning back or changing direction increasingly uncertain. This idea is based on “incentives that encourage individuals to act in such a way that subsequent policies are thereafter confined to a particular development path” (PALIER, 2019, p. 450) through a lock-in effect.

Neo-institutionalist approaches nevertheless struggle to understand the change and the contexts in which it takes place (DESAGE, SIBILLE, 2011). At the border, the breaks that we examine in this report occur when the deterrence policy aimed at the invisibilisation of exiled people is no longer effective. With the appearance of the Sangatte camp in 1999, the Calais slum in 2015 and the La Linière camp in Grande-Synthe in 2016, exiled people were perceived as too many and deterrence as ineffective in preventing their visibility.

In each of these three cases, concentration and invisibilisation measures emerged and were based on “half-security, half-humanitarian” measures (CARRERE, 2003). Here too, these experiments followed a set path where the “Sangatte precedent” initially acted as a system used in times of crisis. Measures emerge in an emergency, as a way of resolving a “crisis” regarded as a one-off. When the State or a fire – in the case of La Linière – puts an end to these experiments, it creates a narrative surrounding their existence. On the one hand, they are framed as “failures” signifying “the impossibility” of accommodating exiled people. On the other hand, it symbolically marks the end of the “crisis”, and with it the return to an ever-more intense policy of deterrence.

In their book *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (1999) show how capitalism feeds on criticism to continually strengthen itself while marginally transforming itself. By analogy, the breaks in the deterrence policy mobilised in France for 30 years appear to constitute criticisms of that doctrine. These breaks, framed as “crisis” situations, appear to be necessary to strengthen it, since by concentrating exiled people in the same place, they contribute to making visible that which deterrence claims to prevent. When these breaks end, the reproduction of the doctrine of deterrence legitimises it as the only effective policy for managing exiled people on the border. To prevent the emergence of a new “crisis”, deterrence requires new human and financial resources, and has been scaled up since the closure of the Calais slum in 2016.

At the end of the investigation, we will therefore espouse two hypotheses. On the one hand, the deterrence policy has been constructed through incrementalism and is based on a set path from which no government can deviate for fear of the uncertainty that an alternative would represent. On the other hand, emergency measures are not so much alternatives to the doctrine of deterrence as continuity or rather one-off events that contribute to strengthening it.

2. Investigating the Ministry of the Interior: an institution that is a challenge to understand

These hypotheses stem from field research that took place from March to June 2021. The period studied is between the 1980s and the present day, involving a historical approach based on public archives: institutional, associative, academic and press, as well as semi-private archives, such as reports of inter-association meetings and meetings with public authorities.

In addition, we conducted 34 semi-structured interviews with non-profit, academic and institutional actors. The aim was, on the one hand, to fill in certain gaps in the documents consulted and, on the other hand, to understand the positioning of the various actors.

Since the reports of NGOs and researchers largely mobilise associative sources or exiled people, this report aimed to seek out institutional views. Our approach was to seek to balance points of view, to understand the underlying principles and operating methods of the institutions and to go beyond the statements they formulate for the public.

We therefore, on the one hand, approached the prefects and sub-prefects of the different territories investigated, the police forces at the borders, the Ministry of the Interior via the Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France (DGEF), in charge of coordinating the actions carried out by the State at the border as well as former Ministers of the Interior. On the other hand, we approached local elected officials and the offices of municipalities where exiled people are present.

The topic of immigration has been on the agenda since the 1970s and has become a politically sensitive subject (LAURENS, 2006). Our requests to the prefectures of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, and to the border police of Nord and Pas-de-Calais went unanswered. The former Ministers of the Interior refused or ignored our requests. We approached several DGEF departments, all of which referred us to the director of the office of the DGEF Director General, who declined our request.

To carry out this research, we contacted nearly 80 people from state institutions and local authorities, getting only 20 positive responses. Apart from actors who were retired or have changed ministry, we were not able to officially gather the views of state representatives on the management of exiled people. All of them requested anonymity for fear of repercussions on their future assignments, which also speaks volumes about the suppression of debate around migration issues and the treatment of exiled people. The people interviewed repeatedly requested confirmation that their name and title would not be published.

For Franck Esné, coordinator for Doctors of the World in Hauts-de-France, the departments have been "briefed, everyone is focused on the 2022 elections, the message is: no waves." A senior official in the Ministry of the Interior explains to us "that we are in an increasingly closed-minded system in which people are scared. There is pressure to comply, people

are afraid to express themselves, to say what they think." The pressure on government officials forces "compliance", says the same senior official:

"The system is really locked down, with a very Darwinian approach from Macron: "in any case, if you don't do the job, there will be someone else who will do it instead." So people are terrified (...) and some are in an uncomfortable position."

This blockage raises questions about the opacity of institutions vis-à-vis the academic world (COHEN, 1999; AÏT-AOUDIA et al., 2010) and, in this case, the Ministry of the Interior. This "blockage" is also encountered by associations working at the border or, more broadly, on migration issues at national level. Contacts are patchy at best and at worst non-existent, as Pascal Brice confirms to us: "We have a Ministry of the Interior that is not a discussion partner, i.e. the terrible thing is that the Ministry of the Interior has taken on all these policies (...) but the Ministry of the Interior does not discuss."

3. A chrono-thematic plan

The theoretical scope of this research aims to understand how the deterrence policy was shaped step-by-step and how and in what context it has been strengthened. The aim is to analyse the continuity of public migration policies carried out on the Franco-British border via a chronological and thematic approach.

Each part of this report analyses a political dynamic linked to a government or a political actor – thus the period 2002-2012 is examined in the light of Nicolas Sarkozy's involvement in the topic of immigration, first as Minister of the Interior, then as President of the Republic. On the one hand, it is a question of addressing how a political framework is developed and established, and, on the other hand, of demonstrating that despite political shifts, coercion against exiled people is only increasing.

The idea is not so much to personify public migration policy but, on the contrary, to understand how this deterrence policy is not strictly the work of a government or a partisan majority, but of institutions and administrations that make political actors and officials endorse recurrent measures. The presence of exiled people at the Franco-British border has been framed as a strictly security issue because it has mainly been put on the agenda by actors from the Ministry of the Interior.

This agenda-setting is understood as the set of processes that lead a social fact acquiring the status of "public problem", in other words, a problem requiring the attention of the public authorities. Here, the agenda-setting concept aids consideration of the genesis of the handling of the presence of exiled people at the border, its supporters – in particular, the Ministry of the Interior – and the forms public policies take, namely deterrence, harassment and evictions.

This report is based on a chronological approach, which helps to understand the pressure of the national level on the local level, but also how local situations, alternative policies or so-called "crisis" contexts can influence the national level. Moreover, the presence of exiled people in a territory encounters specific local and political dynamics, and influences them in return. Local actors are not passive with respect to the central State and the deterrence policy it deploys; they can be active with respect to it, either by participating in it or – more rarely – by opposing it.

Our report is structured around four main parts, which give an account of four major historical phases.

The first part focuses on the establishment, from the 1960s to 2002, of a discourse of closure and the practice of erecting barriers to “undesirables”: legal, political and physical barriers. The placement of the “control of migratory flows” on the agenda was effected alongside the construction of the Schengen Area and the signing of treaties between France and Britain. The increase in the number of exiled people stranded at the Franco-British border in the late 1990s was the result of a “crisis” in the Balkans and, above all, the closure of European states to exiled people. From this time onwards, Britain emerged as an option in the face of asylum restrictions in France and other European states. By stranding exiled people at the border and forcing them to gather there, the French State contributed to making them visible, paving the way for a policy of harassment, eviction and dispersal.

In the second part, we will focus on the period 2002-2012, which saw Nicolas Sarkozy, first as Minister of the Interior (from 2002 to 2004 then from 2005 to 2007) and then as President of the Republic (from 2007 to 2012), take a particular interest in the topic of immigration, and in particular that of exiled people stranded at the border. During his 10 years in power, he maintained a strictly security-oriented framework for managing their presence in French territory. A political-administrative structure dedicated to the production of deterrence was then put in place. Following the trial and error of the 1990s, the period from 2002 to 2012 saw the development of a state doctrine that was continuously enhanced. Some local political actors proposed alternatives for managing the presence of exiled people in their respective territories, opposing the State by proposing humanitarian alternatives, while others aligned with the objectives it pursued.

The third part focuses on analysing the way in which the Socialist Party, in the midst of uncertainty, favoured commonly used solutions from 2012 to 2017 rather than coming up with new measures or alternatives. François Hollande’s term of office was thus marked by the contradictions of the Ministry of the Interior, caught between a desire for dialogue and the pursuit of a strictly security-oriented framework. The increase in the number of exiled people on the border ushered in a measure inspired by the Sangatte camp and the Calais slum, via house arrest combining “humanity” and “firmness”. The state slum in Calais was seen as a break in the policy implemented at the Franco-British border. However, its closure was followed by the strengthening of the deterrence policy introduced previously.

The fourth and final part develops the idea that the deterrence policy developed by Emmanuel Macron since 2017 is nothing new. It is a scaled-up form of security policies already in effect, regarded as its intensification and routinisation. We see the emergence of a quadriptych: the EU deploys a policy aimed at preventing exiled people from accessing the Schengen Area; the French State prevents exiled people who have managed to enter the EU from legally settling in France by fabricating their irregular status; the French State prevents them from settling, encouraging their self-deportation and their desire to exile themselves in Britain; the French State prevents them from reaching northern Europe through increasing protection of the border.

PART 1

SANGATTE, WHEN THE BARRIERS GO UP: FROM INDIFFERENCE TO THE GROUNDWORK OF A DETERRENCE POLICY (1972-2002)

This first part helps us to understand how, at the same time, the French State, successive governments, Britain and the European Union (EU) restricted immigration access routes through the erection of legal and political barriers, which were refined and enforced by an administrative and police structure. The period 1972-2002 was a time when the topic of irregular immigration was put on the agenda with the closure of European states. A mainly security-oriented framework was needed as a means of dealing with “undesirables” (Chapter 1).

In France, while the political discourse justifying European integration is based on the opening of borders, trade and economic relations, the opening of the Sangatte camp is, conversely, the embodiment of its closure and the construction of borders as a means of managing migratory flows. Between the 1980s and the early 2000s, migratory phenomena in Calais – a place of transit for reaching Britain – were initially barely visible and the public authorities paid them little attention. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Balkan War created a “crisis” situation, in which the influx of exiled people stranded on the Franco-British border or pushed back by the English led to an emergency facility that invisibilised and concentrated the people present on the coast: the Sangatte camp (Chapter 2).

This facility was the result of a “compromise” between Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior, and Martine Aubry, Minister of Employment and Solidarity. However, it did not withstand the gradual imposition of a security-oriented framework around the centre and continuing migratory flows, embodied by the strengthening of the means of control at the border. The groundwork for a policy of deterrence was laid when Nicolas Sarkozy was appointed Minister of the Interior in May 2002, and was based on three principles: closure of the Sangatte camp and the borders, harassment and removal of people, of which the increasing number of living spaces along the Franco-British border was the direct result (Chapter 3).

CHAPTER 1:

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BARRIERS

“In the 1970s, against a backdrop of an ‘oil shock’ and ‘economic crisis’, the handful of men in power decided to put a stop to labour immigration. A century after the emergence of the modern notions of nationality and the modern foreigner, governments thus gave substance to ‘irregular immigration’ and soon to the ‘management of migratory flows’ carried out at European level” (PARROT, 2019, p. 7).

In the early 1970s, the stagnation of economic growth was accompanied by the questioning of the presence of foreigners in France. While at the end of the Second World War, employers organised the arrival (and return) of foreign workers, the State gradually took back control, before deciding in 1972 and 1974 to stop labour and family immigration.

From 1972 to 2002, successive governments – on both the right and the left – restricted access and residence for foreigners by legislating continuously (32 laws and circulars between 1972 and 1999). A consensus was built among the so-called governing parties: “we must stop immigration and fight illegal immigration.”

In the 1980s and 1990s, France’s entry into the Schengen Area and the construction of the Channel Tunnel were centred around a security-oriented framework that strengthened the control of migratory flows. These controls created the internal and external borders of the EU, producing an “us” and “them” divide between people entitled to move freely within this space and those stranded by these political, administrative and police borders. By erecting these barriers (via 12 European directives and Franco-British treaties between 1986 and 2002), in addition to limiting foreigners’ access to European and French territories, they call into question access to asylum procedures.

In this first part, we want to focus on 30 years of French and European legislation, 30 years of restriction of legal immigration (I) and the construction of an administrative and police structure to fight against “irregular immigration” (II). This constructed concept had the consequence of strengthening the apparatus of the State. Initially a strictly French concept, this fight was escalated as European barriers were put in place (III). It can then be seen that the stricter the control of migratory flows – both in its presentation and in its practical application – the more irregular immigration is visible. The more visible it is, the more the control of migratory flows is legitimate and justified.

I. THE CREATION OF “ILLEGALS”: WHEN THERE IS CONSENSUS ON “IMMIGRATION CONTROL”

“Irregular immigration” is first and foremost a concept constructed politically by the parliamentary right and the far right, seeing the cessation of immigration as a prerequisite for the economic recovery of the country and the building of the nation-state (1). Initially contested, this concept was gradually shared among the ranks of the government left (2) before the foreigner became a “repulsive” figure and the fight against irregular immigration a consensual policy (3).

1. When the right “stops” legal immigration

In France, the fight against irregular immigration and the restriction of access to legal status in the territory stem from the construction of the nation-state around the nationality of resident persons. Emerging in the early 20th century, modern French nationality clearly aims, on the one hand, to distinguish individuals present in the territory according to the community they belong to and, on the other hand, to meet the economic and demographic needs of the state in contexts of crisis.

In August 1927, the demographic issue was highlighted in order to increase the national population and address the gaps in the French economy. However, during parliamentary debates, the concept of “selective immigration” emerged in the words of the radical socialist MP and High Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalisation, Charles Lambert: “A good naturalisation policy must be supplemented by an immigration policy. It is not enough to naturalise, it is first and foremost necessary to naturalise good elements. To do this, it is necessary to sort through the foreigners living in France” (PARROT, 2019, p. 24).

This instrumental association with immigration can be observed when the economy is in turmoil. In the years following the First World War, labour immigration – controlled by employers – followed the increase in production needs. When they decreased, lay-offs affected foreigners, residence permits were not renewed and new applications were refused. Foreigners were deported and sent back to the border to avoid “public disorder”.

A similar phenomenon was observed at the end of the Second World War, when labour immigration and family immigration arrived to “power the automotive industry”, as Jacques Toubon⁸, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020, tells us and continues: “In Marne-La-Vallée and in Flins, we brought in Moroccans, Algerians and Senegalese. And from 1972 to 1976, we said: ‘The immigration policy we have been pursuing since 1945 is over!’

From the 1970s, the topic of immigration was taken up by the parliamentary right and the far right. Immigration became a political “marker” seen as a resource in the partisan game against the left. The objectives that the right was pursuing are clear: to put an end to regularisation (Marcellin-Fontanet circulars of 1972), to restrict labour immigration (circular of 13 June 1974) before putting an end to it while combating irregular immigration from 1977 with the policy implemented by the Secretary of State responsible for manual workers, Lionel Stoléru and by Christian Bonnet, Minister of the Interior.

These two men – under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – symbolically “stopped” immigration while encouraging the deportation of foreign populations. Police operations and mass arrests aimed at returning foreigners in an irregular situation to the border were deployed. The Bonnet Law of 10 January 1980 provided for irregular entry or residence to become grounds for deportation and detention, while the Peyrefitte Law legalised identity checks as a preventive measure, making it possible in practice to identify and arrest foreigners in an irregular situation. These circulars and laws laid the foundations for a police and administrative structure for controlling migratory flows. On 14 October 1980, Lionel Stoléru declared that there was “no longer any question of receiving a single foreigner in France.”

As Karine Parrot points out, “since this period in the 1970s, the dogma has remained unchanged: only a hand-picked minority of foreigners are to be allowed to remain in France. In other words, it is not only labour immigration that the State wants to stem,

8. Interview conducted on 22 May 2021.

but all immigration" (PARROT, 2019, p. 104). Thus, there is a "gradual criminalisation of immigration" (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 58), which is developing in France and Europe:

"These policies for the illegalisation of migrants, the progress of which can be tracked, law-by-law, measure-by-measure, in most northern states since the early 1970s" (CHAMAYOU, 2010, p. 197).

2. Initially challenged by socialists, the fight against irregular immigration becomes consensual

"We cannot host all the misery of the world. France must remain what it is, a land of political asylum (...) but no more" (Michel Rocard, 3 December 1989)⁹

François Mitterrand's rise to power in 1981 opened a window of opportunity for some 130,000 people who were granted a residence permit as part of a regularisation operation. The new socialist leaders repealed the Bonnet Law: people in an irregular situation could no longer be deported by administrative means and had to be referred to the criminal court, while minors could no longer be returned to the border or deported.

However, several measures were retained: forcible return to the border and detention prior to deportation. The socialist government did not challenge the mindset of controlling migratory flows and at the same time strengthened border control from 1983. A differentiation was made between foreigners in a regular situation whose inclusion was to be encouraged, and those in an irregular situation who were to be deported.

During the municipal elections in March 1983, the rise of the far right brought renewed attention to immigration. In 1984, a decree reviewed family reunification: spouses and children had to be in their country of origin at the time of their application to obtain a residence permit, and simply put, no regularisation was possible if the person was already on French soil.

The victory of the right in the 1986 parliamentary elections saw the appointment of Charles Pasqua as Minister of the Interior. He took up the topic of immigration, placing on the agenda the reform of the law on the entry and residence of foreigners in France. Through the law of 9 September 1986, he revised the conditions for entry into France, the granting of the residence permit, return to the border and deportation. Through this law, Charles Pasqua strengthened:

"The forced enforcement of decisions for removal from the territory and the possibility of keeping foreigners awaiting departure in administrative premises – detention centres. (...) Despite official statements on the need for better integration of immigrants, it is clear that the real aim of the new provisions was, on the contrary, to facilitate the exclusion of foreigners, and that there was a shift towards increased arbitrariness. The foreigner was more than ever an a priori suspicious individual, distrusted by the administration" (GISTI, 1987).

In 1989, one year after the return to power of the Socialist Party (PS), the Pasqua Law was repealed while the Joxe Law of 2 August 1989 reinstated the procedures previously in force regarding legislation concerning foreigners and the framework for deportation procedures, while establishing a foreigner residence committee.

9. "Interview with Michel Rocard", *Sept sur Sept programme*, 3 December 1989.

On 3 December 1989, the National Front (FN) won in the parliamentary by-elections in Dreux. That evening, Michel Rocard, then François Mitterrand's Prime Minister, stated: "We cannot host all the misery of the world. France must remain what it is, a land of political asylum (...) but no more." On 10 December 1989, François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, stated: "that the tolerance threshold of the French towards foreigners was reached in the 1970s."

These statements, made seven days apart, symbolise, on the one hand, the ideological conversion of the PS to a right-wing understanding of migration issues and, on the other hand, the completion of an approach to immigration that would go beyond political divisions. For Claire Rodier, a well-established consensus was emerging:

"Foreigners are a problem for our society (...) The ideological background of the far right was, in this way, gradually enshrined and accepted as the right basis for a "responsible" policy from which it originates" (RODIER, 2018, p. 77-78).

These statements made by political representatives of the PS acted as a constant reminder to the political actors who would follow about the propriety of stopping immigration. Moreover, public policies to combat irregular immigration were less and less contested, and had a lock-in effect. Indeed, the public policies put in place prevented backward steps through the creation of "incentives that encourage individuals to act in such a way that subsequent politicians are thereafter locked into a particular path of development" (PALIER, 2019, p. 447).

An approach to "foreigners" emerged in which they were viewed as a whole: exiles, workers, families of foreigners settled in France, as shown by the political measures taken immediately afterwards.

3. "Overdose", "Invasion": the foreigner framed as a repulsive figure

Statements and speeches on "foreigners" were growing in number. On 19 June 1991, Jacques Chirac, then President of the Rally for the Republic (RPR), spoke of the "overdose" that foreigners represented. On 8 July 1991, Édith Cresson, François Mitterrand's Prime Minister, called for the creation of charter flights to deport people in an irregular situation. On 21 September 1991, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing spoke of "invasion" to characterise the presence of foreigners in France.

While labour and family immigration were being questioned, from the late 1980s asylum became a last resort for exiled people, but access to this status was also gradually being compromised. In France, asylum applications went from 85% acceptance in 1973 to 85% refusal in 1990. The following years saw the strengthening of measures against asylum. Thus, in September 1991 and July 1992, the socialist government legislated on the right to asylum, on the one hand, by preventing asylum seekers from working and, on the other hand, by providing the option of keeping foreigners not admitted to the territory and asylum seekers in the "waiting areas" of ports and airports for a maximum period of 20 days.

After the victory of the right in the 1993 parliamentary elections, the Méhaignerie Law restricted access to French nationality, while the Pasqua Law of 1993 strengthened the control of foreigners and prohibited "partial" or "fragmented" reunifications. Simply put, a foreigner was required to undertake reunification of their family in full, while having "stable and sufficient resources".

As Karine Parrot explains, “thanks to these financial requirements, the right to family reunification is now only a privilege” (PARROT, 2019, p. 106). In 1997, the Debré Law authorised confiscation of the passports of foreigners in an irregular situation, the fingerprinting of foreigners applying for a residence permit and restricted the power of the courts relating to detention.

In 1997, after the victory of the PS in the parliamentary elections and the arrival of Lionel Jospin at the head of the government, a procedure to regularise undocumented immigrants was put in place, enabling 80,000 people to be issued residence permits. Despite some amendments, the Pasqua and Debré Laws remained in force, maintaining a restrictive approach to immigration – both family and labour – and to combating irregular immigration.

Under the impetus of the National Front and the parliamentary right, the foreigner was framed as a repulsive figure. The conversion of the PS to this outlook contributed to making combating irregular immigration a consensual objective. The successive reforms contributed to the “fabrication of the irregular status” (GUENEBAUD, 2017) of foreigners once admitted to the territory via a political and administrative structure, which also involved a series of policing and legal measures for controlling foreigners and internal and then external borders.

TIMELINE– 1972-2002: IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN FRANCE

24 January 1972 - 23 February 1972: The Marcellin-Fontanet circulars regulate and codify the entry of foreign workers into France and their residence through control and restriction of entry into French territory.

13 June 1974: The government decides to suspend labour and family immigration from outside the European Community.

30 May 1977: Introduction of assisted voluntary return: a person who gives up their residence permit receives 10,000 francs (i.e. allowing for inflation, approximately €5,400 today).

1 March 1978: Establishment of a mechanism for the organised and forced return of foreign workers settled in France.

10 January 1980: Bonnet Law on the prevention of illegal immigration, which makes conditions in the territory more strict, and makes irregular entry and residence grounds for deportation. The law provides for the detention and return of deported foreigners to the border.

2 February 1981: The Peyrefitte Law legalises identity checks.

17 May 1981: Gaston Defferre, the new Minister of the Interior, suspends deportations.

11 August 1981: Exceptional regularisation of undocumented foreign workers under two conditions: they entered France before 1 January 1981 and are able to prove stable employment (with or without an employment contract).

27 October 1981: The Bonnet Law is repealed. Some measures are retained, such as deportations, but are placed within a framework: they have to be ordered by a court, minors may no longer be deported, while people proving their attachment to France may only be deported in the event of “public disorder”.

16 September 1982: End of the exceptional regularisation procedure; 105,000 foreigners were regularised during this period.

17 July 1984: Law on the single residence and work permit.

10 October 1984: Border surveillance is strengthened by increasing resources for the air and border police, the centralising of data and the imposing of a ban from the territory in the case of irregular residence.

19 December 1985: Jean-Pierre Chevènement announces measures in favour of children from migrant backgrounds via “success streams”.

9 September 1986: Pasqua Law on the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners. It restricts access to a residence permit and reinstates the possibility of deporting all foreigners in an irregular situation.

2 August 1989: Joxe Law on the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners. It allows people subject to deportation to seek legal redress.

1 December 1989: Joxe circulars relax the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners.

19 April 1991: The Council of State states that immigrants should benefit from the Geneva Convention if it is more liberal than French law, while the use of deportations is limited.

19 July 1991: Circular for exceptional regularisation of 25,000 asylum seekers with rejected applications.

6 September 1991: Decree strengthening the conditions for issuing accommodation certificates required by foreigners to enter the French territory.

1 October 1991: Asylum seekers are no longer permitted to work.

31 December 1991: Combating of illegal work by obtaining new rights for undeclared foreigners.

26 February 1992: Marchand Law on the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners, in the context of the application of the Schengen Agreement. Carriers are sanctioned for transporting people in an irregular situation.

25 March 1992: The Ministry of the Interior is found guilty by the Court of First Instance of the illegal detention of asylum seekers.

6 July 1992: The Quilès Law permits the detention in “waiting areas” of foreigners not admitted to the territory.

11-13 May 1993: Reform of the nationality code, which abolishes the automatic acquisition of French nationality at the age of majority and extends the time periods before obtaining French nationality.

10 August 1993: Identity checks are made easier.

24 August 1993: The conditions for issuing a residence permit are made stricter.

30 December 1993: Identity checks permitted in the areas surrounding the internal borders of the Schengen Area.

31 December 1993: Extension of the period for the detention of foreigners from 7 to 10 days.

14 October 1994: Creation of the Central Directorate for Immigration Control and the Fight against Illegal Employment.

27 December 1994: The law on conditions of entry and residence extends the penalties for people directly or indirectly assisting in illegal entry into the territory and extends waiting areas to railway stations and ports.

24 April 1997: The Debré Law allows for the confiscation of the passports of foreigners in an irregular situation, authorises the recording of the fingerprints of foreigners wishing to obtain a residence permit and limits the powers of the courts with respect to detention.

1 June 1997: Partial regularisation of undocumented immigrants.

19 January 1998: Circular that authorises prefects to organise the return of foreigners in an irregular situation to their countries.

11 May 1998: The Chevènement Law on the entry and residence of foreigners in France imposes the grounds for refusing a visa for foreigners under the age of 21, enshrines refugee status for “freedom fighters”, reaffirms the competence of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in the processing of asylum applications, replaces the accommodation certificate with a reception certificate while extending the maximum period of administrative detention to 12 days.

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II. CONTROLLING AND DEPORTING FOREIGNERS

Alongside the implementation of restrictive policies towards foreigners, the State implemented administrative and policing measures leading to the checks on foreigners, their detention and their return to the borders – first internal and then external – of the French territory. First of all, “arbitrary” practices and “self-deportation” phenomena were used as a means of managing undesirables (1) before the strengthening of legislation and the Ministry of the Interior legalised and systematised the practices of detention and removal (2).

1. Until the 1960s: “arbitrary” practices and “self-deportations” against “undesirables”

The law of 3 December 1849 permitted the Ministry of the Interior and prefects to take measures to remove foreigners from the territory in the case of “public disorder”. Karine Parrot highlights that in the late 19th century, two initial texts administered the control of foreigners: a decree of 1888 and a law of 1893. These texts concerned labour and internal movements, simply put: “Foreigners residing in France – originating at this time from a neighbouring country – in principle had to be registered with their town hall (to be authorised to work), but nothing was put in place at the border to control their entry. [However,] irregular entry was until this time largely tolerated” (PARROT, 2019, p. 50).

In the early 1930s, the State and employers organised the deportation of foreign workers, considered to be “too many”. “The number of police raids targeting them increased” (PARROT, 2019, p. 190). There were already forms of “self-deportation” (FASSIN, 2014), as Karine Parrot explains: “if foreigners did indeed leave France, it was therefore often of their own doing, driven by misery and/or fear of imprisonment” (PARROT, 2019, p. 190).

It was in 1932 and 1938 that irregular entry was grounds for deportation measures, while border controls were tightened. Foreigners were required to present a passport and obtain the appropriate visa. This was in a context in which “hundreds of foreigners were fleeing persecutions by Nazis, fascists and then Franco. No general policy or principle of protection was adopted with respect to them. On the contrary, their treatment falls under restrictive common law, applied in a discretionary manner on a case-by-case basis” (PARROT, 2019, p. 53).

The decree-laws of 2 May and 12 November 1938 – foreshadowing the order of 2 November 1945 – “created more intense police surveillance than ever around each foreigner (...) and represented the first attempt to regulate all aspects of the entry and residence of foreigners in France” (Revue Plein Droit, 1995): foreigners had to be in possession of their papers at all times, a person housing a foreigner had to report it to the police station, a change of residence had to be notified to the authorities, people in an irregular situation were subject to a fine and imprisonment, house arrest and internment and assisting in irregular residence was a criminal offence.

The order of 2 November 1945 included the elements contained in the 1938 texts. Nevertheless, in a period of growth, there was little enforcement of the legislation with respect to labour, as the Revue Plein Droit states: “Until the late 1960s, the fact is that labour requirements were such that regulations were barely complied with, with the implicit consent of the public authorities” (Revue Plein Droit, 1989).

The fight against foreigners was particularly exemplified with respect to Algerians, as Karine Parrot points out:

“In the early 1950s, “sweep” operations made it possible to arrest several thousand “North Africans” simultaneously. Picked up and taken to a police station, under the pretext of the “usual checks”, they were sometimes locked up for an entire night and day. (...) In 1963, they were subjected to “health checks” and those deemed “unfit” were “stopped” and locked up for one or two days, which is the time it took to organise their return to Algeria” (PARROT, 2019, p. 197).

2. The fight against immigration as strengthening of the Ministry of the Interior

From the 1960s, when unemployment was on the rise and labour immigration was being challenged, the State organised and bolstered administrative and police resources for the deportation of foreigners: control, detention, deportation. Created in 1944, the air and border police – which became the border police (PAF) in 1999 – was responsible for the control of foreigners. Initially under the authority of the Directorate of General Intelligence, it was in the 1970s, when the fight against irregular immigration was intensified, that it had “real human, legal and material resources for its border screening mission” (CASELLA COLOMBEAU, 2017). By producing statistics on migration and by making a specific occupation for clamping down on people in an irregular situation, the PAF expanded: “Populations deemed undesirable were subject to police treatment that contributed to the very expansion of the police institution” (BABELS, 2019, p. 10). The PAF gradually became “an element of migration control at national borders and its jurisdiction was strengthened, (...) clearly linked to border control” (CASELLA COLOMBEAU, 2017).

The laws of 10 January 1980 and 2 February 1981 “legalised administrative and policing practices that were irregular or of questionable legality” (PARROT, 2019, p. 198). Simply put, the Ministry of the Interior was granted the option of deporting a foreigner in an irregular situation, the detention of foreigners awaiting deportation was legalised and police forces could carry out checks on people. The Questiaux Law of 29 October 1981 legalised CRAs, organised detention and its management by the National Police. During this period, administrative detention centres (CRAs) grew in number and the State clearly expressed an objective of the mass deportation of foreigners.

While the 1986 law required foreigners to have a visa to enter French territory, it gave instructions to the PAF to control, on the one hand, people in an irregular situation and, on the other hand, foreigners who had a visa but could become “candidates for irregular immigration”. The law aimed to ensure that foreigners had “sufficient means of subsistence for their stay”. Karine Parrot explains that “the police was put in a position to exercise at the border “real power to assess the individual situations of foreigners and their true motivations (...), in particular for travellers from countries that were sources of irregular immigration” (PARROT, 2019, p. 81). Here, this law undermined the Geneva Convention, since it involved requiring “travel documents from people seeking protection” (PARROT, 2019, p. 81).

At the same time, the State set up detention facilities, notably in Roissy – initially outside of any legal framework – to prepare for the deportation of foreigners in an irregular situation. After being found guilty of arbitrary detentions by the Paris Court of First Instance in 1992, then by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 1996, the State institutionalised waiting areas in 1992 by creating and formalising 78¹⁰.

The fight against irregular immigration contributed to the gradual strengthening of the Ministry of the Interior and the police apparatus. The PAF was entrusted with missions for the control, detention and removal of people in an irregular situation. This policy specifically targeted North African people, originating in particular from the former colonies of the French State. Although not directly applicable – at least initially – to asylum seekers, the organisation and control of migratory flows helped the development of expertise in this area by police forces, which were constantly being strengthened in a context of the construction of the EU and the Schengen Area, as well as in the legal construction of the Franco-British border.

III. EUROPEAN BORDERS. FRANCO-BRITISH BORDERS: A SECURITY-ORIENTED APPROACH

The construction of the EU relied in part on the free movement of people and goods within its borders. The aim was to foster the integration of the various Member States in order to promote trade and the establishment of a European identity. The Schengen Agreement – signed in 1985 and entering into force in 1990 – embodied these objectives. This integration was nevertheless based on the exclusion of “undesirables”, requiring a security-oriented approach to border management (1). By staying outside of the Schengen Area, Britain contributed to the construction of the Franco-British border, which was created by European and bilateral agreements (2).

1. Schengen: a security-oriented approach

“In France, the legislator has ensured, since the 1990s, that these [European] provisions would not affect the ability of police forces to ensure the screening of people at internal borders” (BABELS, 2019, p. 30).

10. “Les zones d’attente aux frontières, ces lieux de non-droit où les étrangers sont désormais soumis au flair policier” [Waiting areas at borders, lawless places where foreigners were now subject to police intuition], *Infomigrants*, 29 September 2020: in 1999, there were 122 waiting areas and 96 in 2019 in railway stations, airports and seaports.

Alongside the opening up and removal of common borders, Member States strengthened the surveillance of external borders and promoted police and judicial cooperation in the fight against crime and people in an irregular situation.

On 10 August 1993, France passed a law implementing the so-called Schengen zones, which allowed police forces to carry out identity checks without prior justification in an area 20 kilometres around the borders:

“In border areas, no judicial authority could invalidate a process initiated by a police officer following an identity check. Not only did the implementation of the Schengen Agreement not put an end to internal border controls, but it provided legal means to continue the work of border screening” (BABELS, 2019, p. 30).

As a result of the Schengen Agreement, the police forces and the Ministries of the Interior of the various Member States were strengthened, becoming key actors in European negotiations, thus imposing a security framework and successively releasing corresponding budgets for the control of external borders.

As Karine Parrot explains, the Schengen system has had a dual effect: on the one hand, national legislation “reduced the right of foreigners to settle permanently in the territory of states” and, on the other hand, “the Schengen system prohibited the poor from accessing European territory for a short stay. It is essentially through the visa mechanism that the EU orchestrated this distancing of undesirables” (PARROT, 2019, p. 63).

In addition to closing itself off to labour immigration, by signing the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU orchestrated the distancing of asylum seekers via the visa, developed as a “remote policing” mechanism:

“The visa code specifies that the review of an application involves ‘particular consideration [...] given to assessing whether the applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the Member States’” (MIGREUROP, 2017, p. 78).

Member States require “multiple supporting documents concerning the applicant's travel (letters of invitation, identity and address of the person or organisation hosting the applicant) and their socio-economic status” (MIGREUROP, 2017, p. 78). In this context, this visa is difficult to obtain for people fleeing persecution or whose state of origin does not have the standard documents requested by EU countries.

This system comes on top of the Dublin Regulation (which we will discuss at greater length in Chapter 4) implemented in 1990 and the creation of the Eurodac file in 2000. On the one hand, a person seeking asylum cannot request asylum in more than one Member State and, on the other hand, the introduction of fingerprinting allows for “effective application” of this policy.

Through these measures, each Member State has access to applicants' visa applications, enabling the detection of multiple applications, refusals and residence bans, while organising their identification and traceability within EU borders:

“In their own way, the division and closure of areas are an illustration of class relations, insofar as it is the decision-makers of the richest states who constrain the movements of people from the poorest countries [and] force them to put themselves in danger when they want to exercise their right to emigrate” (MIGREUROP, 2017, p. 22).

2. The creation of the Franco-British border

In addition to this organisation and control of migratory flows at European level, there is the creation of the Franco-British border. As Britain is not a member of the Schengen Area, its border with France is considered an external border of the EU, which means that France has to control it. The particularity here is that European agreements in this area are supplemented by bilateral agreements between France and Britain discussed since the mid-1980s.

With a view to the opening of the Channel Tunnel – which opened in 1994 – France and Britain signed the Treaty of Canterbury in 1986. Meeting at Canterbury Cathedral, Roland Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the government of Laurent Fabius (PS) and Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the government led by Margaret Thatcher (Conservative Party) drew up a treaty to organise and control flows between the two states. Even before the opening of the Channel Tunnel, the leaders set out here the security structure for the border and the measures stemming from it, of which Article 4 is the cornerstone, since it states:

“Provisions for the exercise of police, immigration, customs and health controls, including animal and plant health controls, and of other controls which might appear necessary, will be the subject of a supplementary Protocol or other arrangements [that] will make provision to enable public authorities to exercise their functions in an area in the territory of the other State where controls are juxtaposed.”

The construction of the Channel Tunnel and France’s entry into the Schengen Area acted as a window of opportunity for the imposition of border controls. Indeed, the various treaties and arrangements that followed strengthened this agreement and the construction of a common border. In 1987, Britain passed the Carriers Liability Act, which aimed to put pressure on shipping companies that transported people in an irregular situation, before the law was extended to road hauliers in 1999 and then rail carriers in 2001, via a fine of £2,000 per person discovered.

In 1991, as work on the Channel Tunnel progressed, the “protocols” envisaged from the signature of the Treaty of Canterbury were discussed by the two governments. They led to the signature of the Sangatte Protocol in 1991, which entered into force in 1993. This protocol provided for “the permanent assignment by each State of liaison officers to the authorities of the other State”, the establishment of “juxtaposed national control bureaux in the terminal installations situated at Fréthun [...] and at Folkstone” and for the possibility for both states to extend their control zones to Paris and London.

While the number of exiled people present in Calais was on the increase (as we will see in the next chapter), the Sangatte Protocol was extended. Thus, in 2001, an Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol came into force, which enhanced the juxtaposition of controls and acted as a safeguard against exiled people attempting to cross the border.

More specifically, this Additional Protocol put in place “control bureaux, for persons using through trains” in the stations of London, Paris, Calais and Lille Europe, and provided that the requests of people submitting an asylum application be “examined by the authorities of the State of departure”, except if the request is made after the train doors have closed, in which case it is to be processed by the state of arrival. In other words, this protocol, which aimed to control all people using the Eurostar, “is above all intended to bring about a reduction in the number of illegal entries by non-Community foreigners into English territory” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 18).

The Schengen Area, combined with the Franco-British agreements, meets two seemingly contradictory objectives: the opening of borders and their strengthened control. More precisely, the borders were constructed to enable both the fluidity of flows – of individuals and goods – and a safeguard against “undesirables” – meaning here people without a residence permit or without the material and financial circumstances deemed sufficiently solid to be admitted.

As Camille Guenebeaud points out, the creation of borders, their invention, “does not belong to the ‘order of Nature’ but to the ‘order of Time’, i.e. history” (Louis George Tin, quoted by: GUENEBEAUD, 2017, p. 43). In other words, the European borders are constructed politically in order to produce a “we” and a “them”, a way of distinguishing the people on the inside and on the outside, and, for exiled people stranded at the border, to be “on the border” (GUENEBEAUD, 2017).

The Franco-British border is embodied by the cities where links between the two countries exist: port and maritime links, then road and rail links when the Channel Tunnel opened. Due to their geographical proximity to Britain, Calais and Sangatte symbolise and amplify this border, which was once strictly maritime in nature and has become a “land” border, and a crossing point for exiled people wishing to – or forced to – get to Britain.

TIMELINE – 1985-2002: EUROPEAN AND FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENTS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATORY FLOWS

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14 June 1985: Signature of the Schengen Agreement (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), the aim of which is to phase out common border controls in exchange for increased surveillance of external borders.

12 February 1986: Signature of the Treaty of Canterbury with a view to the opening of the Channel Tunnel. Signed by France and Britain, in Article 4 this treaty provides that “Provisions for the exercise of police, immigration, customs and health controls, including animal and plant health controls, and of other controls which might appear necessary, will be the subject of a supplementary Protocol or other arrangements” and that “Such a Protocol or arrangements will make provision to enable public authorities to exercise their functions in an area in the territory of the other State where controls are juxtaposed.”

15 May 1987: Entry into force of the Carriers Liability Act, which introduces a fine for companies transporting people in an irregular situation of £1,000 per person concerned. The fine was doubled in 1991.

29 July 1987: Entry into force of the Treaty of Canterbury.

19 June 1990: As a follow-up to the Schengen Agreement, it provides for the transfer of controls at external borders, the development of a common policy on visas and the right to asylum and the strengthening of police, customs and judicial cooperation.

1 September 1990: Establishment of the Dublin Convention which aims to prevent exiled people from seeking asylum in several Member States.

25 November 1991: Signature of the Sangatte Protocol with a view to the opening of the Channel Tunnel, which provides for “the permanent assignment of each State of liaison officers to the authorities of the other State”, the establishment of “juxtaposed national control bureaux in the terminal installations situated at Fréthun [...] and at Folkestone” and for the possibility for both states to extend their control zones to Paris and London.

2 August 1993: Entry into force of the Sangatte Protocol.

6 May 1994: Opening of the Channel Tunnel.

26 March 1995: Entry into force of the Schengen Agreement.

20 April 1995: Signature of the “Gentleman’s Agreement” in Paris between France and Britain, which permits the return within 24 hours of persons refused entry by one of the two states to the other state. This agreement specifies that it will be superseded by the Dublin Convention, once implemented (i.e. 1 September 1997).

1 November 1997:Entry into force of the Dublin Convention, which aims to identify the Member State responsible for receiving an asylum application.

1 May 1999: The Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force, affirming the “principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights”. In practice, it specifies that the entry, transit and movement of persons who do not hold European citizenship are covered by the common visa policy.

11 November 1999: The Immigration and Asylum Act provides that a driver of a private vehicle and a shipping company or road transport manager can be fined £2,000 for assisting in irregular entry and residence.

29 May 2000: Signature of the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol, which jointly establishes “control bureaux for persons using through trains” in the stations of London, Paris, Calais and Lille Europe, provides that the requests of persons submitting an asylum application be “examined by the authorities of the State of departure”, except if the request is made after the train doors have closed, in which case it is to be processed by the state of arrival.

11 December 2000: Regulation on the establishment of the Eurodac system “for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention.”

As of 25 March 2001: 15 countries are signatories to the Schengen Agreement: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden.

5 June 2001: Entry into force of the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol.

28 June 2001: European directive aimed at air, sea and land carriers, which aims to financially sanction carriers transporting people with no valid documents to the EU with a fine of up to €5,000.

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CHAPTER 2: THE SANGATTE CAMP: A “HUMANITARIAN”

RESPONSE IN THE FORM OF “HOUSE ARREST”

“We were dealing with a global phenomenon located in Calais. Because in addition to being a normal border, Calais is a natural border. If we had the Himalayas, it would be the same, it is impassable. And so we prevent people from dying during the day and at night we try to prevent them from crossing. (...) The Calais problem is getting out of the control of Calais, Pas-de-Calais and France.”

The reality is that we have a global exodus, international migrations that are increasing in number, these are people who are fleeing for political reasons, who are dying of hunger, a climate migration, a demographic migration. (...) Calais has become the point of tension or the point of exacerbation, it could have been any other place but it so happens that geographically it is the place on a border, a natural border, where there is only 30 km to cross.” (Yannick Imbert, sub-prefect of Calais from 1998 to 2000¹¹)

“There are no natural borders, they are all built. By being visible in the media, we believe it and it becomes rational.” (GUENEBEAUD, 2017)

As a result of Schengen and the opening of the EU's internal borders, economic, trade and human flows grew in the strait area. This space, which separates Britain from France by 30 kilometres, saw trade intensify and made the Port of Calais a cornerstone of Franco-British trade. Alongside this openness, the locking down of this space has been planned since 1986 and the Treaty of Canterbury. It targeted “undesirables” who were growing increasingly numerous as conflicts caused exiled people to wander and the Franco-British border was established (I). Calais, through its intense and daily connections with Dover, symbolised and embodied this creation of the border. Until 1997, there was a kind of indifference on the part of the public authorities towards the exiled people present on the coast, where, even though arbitrariness prevailed, no official doctrine for managing the flows had yet been established (II). The increase in the number of exiled people made them visible and forced the local authorities and the government to address migratory phenomena, with respect to which there was hesitation about what to do next. Framed as a “migration crisis”, this “influx” resulted in the creation of a humanitarian emergency facility combining “humanity” and “firmness”: the Sangatte camp. This was the groundwork for a socialist approach to the management of migratory flows (III).

I. WHEN CALAIS BECAME A BORDER

“The problem with Calais is its proximity to England. Today, similar things are happening at the Italian border and the pushbacks from Nice or Menton to the Italian border.”¹² (Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001)

France and Great Britain are geographically separated by 30 kilometres by the Pas-de-Calais strait. This space fluctuates between separation and connection, enabling, in particular, the growth of economic and port activities. This maritime space was gradually appropriated by both states, resulting in the sharing of territorial waters equidistant from the two shores at the time of the signature of the so-called Montego Bay Convention in 1982.

The legal reason for the creation of this maritime border was to separate the economic issues it represents, since it enabled the growth of maritime trade in the North Sea and the

11. This interview was part of Camille Guenebeaud's work on her doctoral dissertation: Dans la frontière, Migrants et luttes des places dans la ville de Calais, geography doctoral dissertation, 2017.

12 Interview conducted on 12 June 2021.

Baltic Sea. This strait, which is a major space for international maritime trade, is heavily used, shallow and the weather conditions are often poor. Nevertheless, the dangerous nature of the strait has not prevented the growth of trade by ship between the two countries.

For several decades, the ports of Boulogne-sur-Mer, Calais and Dunkirk have grown on the French side, intensifying maritime links with Dover, Folkestone and Ramsgate on the English side. These daily and sustained connections have reduced the crossing time (75 minutes by ferry) and therefore brought the two shores closer together. The opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1994 contributed to bringing the two countries closer together geographically, enabling London and Paris to be located just over two hours apart.

In a context of open borders established by Schengen and European integration, the challenge was to boost flows and reduce barriers between the two countries, which used this proximity to promote travel and make it an argument for trade and economic relations.

This openness was nevertheless selective. Both states imposed controls on migratory flows in order to prevent exiled people from benefiting from this proximity and the growth in traffic. As Britain was not part of the Schengen Area, the Franco-British border acted as an external border, while bilateral agreements relocated the border to French territory. Calais embodied the border, on the one hand, because it became the access point for leaving the Schengen Area and getting to Britain and, on the other hand, because it was represented by the presence of exiled people.

Until the opening of the Channel Tunnel, crossings were made by boat, from the ports of Boulogne-sur-Mer, Calais and Dunkirk. When the Tunnel opened in 1994, maritime operators favoured the port of Calais in order to “remain competitive”, increasing the number of links¹³ and new opportunities for exiled people to cross. The Tunnel became a new option for crossing the Channel. The entrance to the Eurotunnel Terminal is located in Coquelles, a few kilometres from Calais. This geographical proximity makes Calais a strategic location for exiled people seeking passage.

The Franco-British border, far from being natural, is a political and legal construction based on the organisation of maritime, and then rail and road, flows. As cross-Channel traffic was organised and concentrated in or near Calais, the city became “the symbol of the closure of the Franco-British border. (...) In the 1990s, the city of Calais experienced both a concentration of cross-Channel links and the settlement of people pushed back by England” (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 86).

The gradually increasing visibility of people stranded in Calais embodied this border, as a symbol of the legal impossibility of crossing and the inability of the English and French States to deal with the situation of people stranded on the border.

II. THE MATERIALITY OF THE BORDER

Since the 1980s, exiled people have been stranded on the coast of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Few in number and not very visible, they gathered together and settled in makeshift spaces before attempting to cross.

13. In 2021, there were 50 crossings per day between Dover and Calais.

Initially, no associations were specifically mobilised on the issue of exiled people. Assistance was therefore provided by residents, before Amnesty International attempted to organise it in 1986: “volunteers began to take an interest in foreigners in an irregular situation who had been pushed back from England and attempted to provide social and legal assistance to exiled people” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 14).

In the late 1980s, a collective – which foreshadowed the Belle Étoile association officially created in 1994 – provided legal advice, temporary accommodation and attempted to politicise the issue by alerting the public authorities and “appeared to be ignored by the various departmental public authorities and services” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 14).

During this period, voluntary and associative assistance was structured in a context in which the French State was indifferent towards exiled people. Few in number and not very visible, their presence appeared to the State and local elected officials to be a one-off phenomenon, not requiring specific intervention. It was the port and customs services of both countries that were responsible for managing the situation of people attempting to reach Britain.

From the moment the Berlin Wall fell, attempts to cross increased and the presence of exiled people became more visible. Although immigrants from the former Soviet bloc did not require visas, they were either prevented from crossing or sent back by boat from Dover.

In 1990, on several occasions, the Calais ferry terminal was besieged by Polish immigrants in particular. In October 1997, the ferry terminal was occupied for one month by Roma families from the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

It was at this time that Collectif de soutien d’urgence aux refoulés (C’Sur) was formed, which brought together a number of associations supporting exiled people¹⁴. On this occasion, a retirement home was requisitioned to house pushed-back Czech Roma. A former sub-prefect of Calais explains that these situations “were more or less resolved without too much difficulty [and that they were] fairly isolated episodes.” At this time, it was already interpreted as the maintaining of public order and not as a political issue related to the situation of the people present.

This visibility of exiled people and, consequently, of the border only increased due to the political instability in the Balkans. The local state representatives intervened erratically, with the responses oscillating between hospitality and maintaining public order. On 6 March 1998, as the Kosovo war broke out, the increase in the number of people present on the coast was documented by the statistics produced by the PAF, which stated that it had arrested 1,450 Yugoslavs, 500 Sri Lankans, 300 Somalis, 200 Turks, 180 Albanians, 170 Romanians and 150 Algerians¹⁵.

During the winter of 1998-1999, families from Kosovo occupied the terminal. Helped by members of Collectif C’Sur, they were provided with blankets and food. Under pressure from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) – operator of the Port of Calais – the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Daniel Cadoux, issued an order dated 23 April 1999 prohibiting their entry: “Any use of the public parts of the cross-Channel terminal of the Port of Calais for purposes other than passenger traffic is prohibited.” Since the accommodation and social reintegration centres (CHRS) “were increasingly reluctant to host them” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 14), families found themselves on the street and were scattered throughout the city of Calais.

14. In 1997, they included the Association la Belle Etoile, Secours Catholique, the Ligue des droits de l’Homme, La Cimade, Emmaüs, the Mission Ouvrière and the Pastorale des Migrants.

15. *Nord Littoral*, 19 February 1999.

Under pressure from associations, the public authorities agreed to open a reception centre. It was located in the Bore Hangar in Calais – owned by the CCI – a night shelter run by the Belle Étoile association. While the facility was intended to accommodate 80 people, some evenings there were up to 200 people: Kosovars, Iraqi Kurds, Sri Lankans and Somalis. A doctor and nurse worked there and hot meals were served in the evening. A little more than a month after its opening, the site was closed on 4 June 1999 by the sub-prefect of Calais, Yannick Imbert, with no solutions for rehousing the 200 people who had settled there. He justified the closure by the presence of “smugglers and other traffickers [seeing in this] a real danger to the safety of the volunteers.”

In the aftermath, and with the help of the associations, the families settled in Saint-Pierre park, building a real slum. This site, located opposite the town hall of Calais, was at this time already used by support associations to organise food distributions. Jacky Hénin, communist deputy mayor of Calais and future mayor of the city, explains¹⁶ that the exiled people “collected materials that were not solid, that did not keep the rain out”. Seeing in this occupation the increased visibility of their situation and living conditions, forcing the municipality to acknowledge the phenomenon: “With the municipal majority, we found ourselves having to manage a crisis, without any particular knowledge.”

The fact remains that the situation was known to the public authorities from the early 1980s and Jacky Hénin himself, who grew up in Calais, explains that he “was familiar with the phenomenon and the successive ferry occupations [...] We called them the Koso [Kosovars].” But before occupying Saint-Pierre park, exiled people were for a long time confined to hidden spaces, far from the realm of the town hall. By settling in the city centre of the municipality and close to the town hall, they placed their situation on the municipal agenda.

III. OCTOBER 1999-OCTOBER 2002, ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SANGATTE CAMP: THE STORY OF A SOCIALIST COMPROMISE

While the presence of exiled people on the Pas-de-Calais coast continued until 1998, the increase in the number of people as well as the occupation of Saint-Pierre park embodied the border because they were stranded, prevented from crossing by the intervention of the police forces on both shores. This visibility now became a political problem, requiring the intervention of the public authorities. This was the context for the appearance of the Sangatte camp, which was, on the one hand, a means of distancing exiled people from Calais city centre (1) and, on the other hand, a compromise between Martine Aubry and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, between “humanity” and “firmness” and between emergency reception and repression (2).

1. The Sangatte camp: the distancing of exiled people from the city centre

In August 1999, the month-long occupation of Saint-Pierre park by nearly 200 exiled people drew the attention of the media, the public authorities and that of Abbé Pierre, who then went to Calais. The communist mayor of Calais, Jean-Jacques Barthe, urged

16. Interview conducted on 1 June 2021.

the sub-prefect of Calais, Yannick Imbert, to find a solution. The latter observed a tense situation: "There was an outcry from the municipality that they [exiled people] could not be left there in the middle of the tourist season, that these camps had to be gotten rid of." When the exiled people were within the perimeter of the Port of Calais, Yannick Imbert explains that "the town hall had not come forward on these issues, considering that this was the problem of the State and the Chamber of Commerce."

A disused Eurotunnel factory located in Sangatte – a municipality of 4,700 inhabitants just a few kilometres from Calais – but on land owned by the State was then requisitioned by Sub-Prefect Imbert. Claiming to be "overwhelmed" by a large-scale phenomenon, the Red Cross emergency service was brought in, which then deployed a humanitarian emergency measure. Within several days, a humanitarian emergency accommodation and reception centre (CHAUH) was established in a 12,000 m² area, in which prefabricated structures were set up, containing several beds and sanitary facilities provided by the army. It was funded by the Population and Migration Directorate (DPM), at the time attached to the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity.

The location of the site appeared to be both a limitation and a favourable configuration. Indeed, despite the criticism of the mayor of Sangatte, the sub-prefect explains that the reception possibilities were limited:

"I didn't choose Sangatte, I chose a place where things were possible, and all the more so because the land was state land (...) I was on familiar ground, on state land in this matter."

The choice of Sangatte "resolved" the occupation of Calais city centre, as Yannick Imbert explains:

"The mayor had migrants in Calais and, from one day to the next, I accommodated them there and, for the most part, they no longer went through Calais, it was sorted (...) We agreed I would ensure that there were no problems in Calais and he would not make it a point of controversy."

The relationship with residents was also favourable with respect to the Sangatte camp:

"There was an outpouring of solidarity. (...) There was a kind of objective or passive public sympathy. And that helped me."

Jean Dussourd, then prefect of Pas-de-Calais (from 1999 to 2001) also saw in the Sangatte camp a way of avoiding "phenomena of rejection by the public" because "there were no migrants on the streets of Calais and Dunkirk."

2. "Humanity" and "firmness": a socialist compromise

Built as an emergency centre and not as an accommodation centre, the Sangatte camp was intended to be temporary. It was the result of a political compromise between Martine Aubry, Minister of Employment and Solidarity, and Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of the Interior. The first asked the prefect to prevent people being found lifeless in the street, while the second gave the order to pursue the closure of the border via the mobilisation of mobile CRS units. Here we see the deployment of a combination of two watchwords: "humanity" and "firmness", on which we would like to focus.

First of all, "humanity" here took the form of an agreement signed between the Ministry of Employment and Solidarity and the Red Cross, which managed it, headed by Michel Derr. The rules were then laid down by its director, with the approval of the sub-prefect, but, explains Yannick Imbert:

"The Red Cross was not subject to my orders. And I had no interest in it being so. Yes I wanted to focus on the topic of communication of: 'I wanted a humanitarian emergency centre', I had every interest in letting the Red Cross flag fly and for it to be managed by Red Cross people."

The ongoing dialogue between Michel Derr and Yannick Imbert enabled the latter "to be informed in order to put forward arguments that obstructed his own prerogatives, so that they did not create things inside that could cause me problems on the outside." The Sangatte camp was politically sensitive and the message for the sub-prefect to stick to was as follows:

"The government position was 'we are closing the border and we also have a humanitarian emergency reception centre, in other words we are providing minor assistance, we are enabling people to take a shower, to eat, but in no way are they hosted.'"

The structure of the camp was based on the demarcation of two spaces: one for exiled people and the other for the Red Cross teams. Two daily meals were distributed, along with clothing and shoes, while exiled people received emergency medical care. There were numerous queues to access meals, while the accommodation conditions were limited.

As the crossing points became better protected, the number of people in the camp increased, reducing the available space. Some people slept on the floor or on camp beds in the corridors. Spaces were dedicated to access to information about asylum procedures, but were criticised by the associations:

"Local associations considered that the legal support offered at the centre was insufficient and did not ensure that migrants could exercise their rights" (PETTE, 2019).

The services provided in the camp by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) aimed to convince exiled people that "crossing to England was risky and that the reception on the other side of the Channel was not what one might expect, etc. Information on obtaining refugee status in Britain was provided, however, while instructions had been given by the Ministry of the Interior not to provide it with respect to France" (CARRERE, 2003).

To fill in the gaps, "the Belle Etoile association regularly distributed leaflets at the entrance to the hangar, written in several languages and aimed at informing migrants about their rights and the possibilities of applying for asylum in France" (PETTE, 2019).

From 120 people initially, the site accommodated up to 2,000 people. To take care of them, the number of Red Cross employees quickly increased from around 30 in 2000 to around a hundred in late 2002. Between 24 September 1999 and December 2002, the Red Cross reported that 67,611 people passed through the Sangatte camp. The people received were Afghan, Iraqi, Iranian, Kosovan, Kurdish, Albanian, Indian, Romanian, Turkish and Sudanese.

As for "firmness", it took the form of the mobilisation of CRS officers and the PAF around the Sangatte camp and the crossing points – Port of Calais and Coquelles station. This police mobilisation was justified by Yannick Imbert in order to "fight against smugglers" and to prevent people from crossing the Channel.

The initial work to increase security around the Port of Calais aimed at making crossings more difficult, but they continued all the same:

"We measured the impact: before Sangatte, three days to cross, with Sangatte, three weeks to cross. But they continued to cross. Ninety per cent of people who were at Sangatte crossed, because when you have a lorry in the Port of Calais for 23 seconds, that is 23

seconds for people to hide on it. (...) Even if we placed police officers every 10 metres, it would not be enough. And it's not the solution" (Yannick Imbert).

In retrospect, the former sub-prefect summarises his mission as follows: "I fixed people up so that they could get going again in the evening." This firmness was also demanded by the representatives of the English State, as Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001, tells us:

"I was in touch with my English colleagues, the state representatives in Kent. I went there several times, they came here and they themselves were demanding a policy of clamping down and control for the same reasons as what we wanted to do in France with our borders."

Local elected officials on the coast were also pushing for a policy of firmness, putting pressure on the prefect of Pas-de-Calais: "On the French side, things went fairly smoothly, even though a growing number of elected officials were telling me: "Mr Prefect, you are too kind. We need to close Sangatte." In December 2001, when Cyrille Schott replaced Jean Dussourd as prefect of Pas-de-Calais, he was also under pressure from local elected officials who wanted to take advantage of his arrival to put an end to Sangatte.

By endeavouring to make the Sangatte camp a humanitarian emergency facility, the socialist government met two objectives: "humanity" and "firmness", receiving while fighting irregular immigration. These pledges were aimed at quelling the criticism from the opposition at the time and from the National Front, while remaining within the framework of the bilateral agreements signed with Britain. The site, built as a temporary one – the Red Cross employees were initially hired for six months – prevented both its institutionalisation and the recognition of the status of the people passing through it. Michel Derr, director of the Sangatte camp, saw it as "a lawless place for lawless people":

"[This place was] intentionally precarious because people were not supposed to actually settle there, because the people there, while not locked up, were stranded (...) By the director's own admission, in any case, it was important not to risk, by offering better living standards, 'creating a pull factor' (...) It was a half-humanitarian, half-policing measure. Not a prison, therefore, but a kind of house arrest" (CARRERE, 2003).

Indeed, the concentration of people in the same place also met a dual objective: to invisibilise people while preventing "public disorder" that their presence in the city centres of neighbouring municipalities, and in particular in Calais, would cause for local elected officials:

"Police forces informed exiled people of the existence of the camp and even regularly drove them to the camp, sometimes more than once, when they were found wandering in Calais or in the port facilities" (CARRERE, 2003).

While the English insisted on border control, the Sangatte "emergency facility" was a means by which the French authorities "played for time". Indeed, by concentrating people in the same place, the objective for the French State was to control flows to Britain as effectively as possible while gradually securing the crossing points.

In 2002, the victory of Jacques Chirac and the appointment of Nicolas Sarkozy to the Ministry of the Interior saw the exploitation of Sangatte for political ends, in which its closure seemed "inevitable". Then, a strictly security-oriented management of migratory flows was revived, combining harassment and dispersal.

CHAPTER 3: CLOSURE, HARASSMENT, DISPERSAL: THE CREATION OF DETERRENCE

"I have not come across anyone who has told me that keeping Sangatte is the right solution (...) I wanted to send a signal to the world that we would not take any more new refugees at Sangatte, we will not open a second or third camp"
(Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, 5 November 2002)

On 5 November 2002, access to the Sangatte camp was prohibited for new arrivals. On 14 December, the last people sheltered left the premises, before its destruction began in the days that followed. On 31 December 2002, the camp was razed, as if it had never existed. However, its closure did take place during those few weeks. It had been prepared for almost a year, when a new prefect arrived in Pas-de-Calais and the political and media spotlight was turned on Sangatte. A few months before the presidential election (April-May 2002), Sangatte became a sensitive issue, considered "bedlam" by the public authorities. In this context, a security-oriented framework was needed, fast. Indeed, Lionel Jospin's socialist government was under pressure from the English government and local elected officials to put an end to Sangatte and migratory flows, while the right-wing opposition accused him of laxity. The victory of Jacques Chirac and the appointment of Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior spelt the end for Sangatte. A security crackdown followed (I), combining practices of "harassment", "detention" and "removal". In this context, there were phenomena of dispersal and self-deportation, the objective of which was to "empty" Pas-de-Calais of exiled people (II). This resulted in an increase in the number of living spaces along the Franco-British border (III).

I. WHEN THE SANGATTE CAMP BECAME A SECURITY ISSUE

In early December 2001, Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais, left his post and was replaced by Cyrille Schott. There were two opposing views about the Sangatte camp; the first was favourable towards it: "Sangatte was working very well, it was managed by the Red Cross. (...) There were no major difficulties, it was necessary to check the legal conditions under which people could leave, by train, by boat, but there was acceptance on the part of the public", while the second did not see closure as "a bad thing": "I was divided, but frankly when the decision was made to close Sangatte it did not bother me because it had become unmanageable¹⁷."

The first visit to the camp by Cyrille Schott aimed to "gauge the reception centre's numerous flaws: the difficulties of cohabitation between different groups, the overcrowding of residents, the fighting between smugglers and migrants" (CHABAUTY, 2015, p. 120). This perception of the centre was notably reflected by different political contexts, in which a security-oriented framework was needed, from autumn 2001, as Cyrille Schott tells us:

"In the autumn of 2001, Sangatte really made headlines. Violent clashes that police forces had great difficulty in controlling. On television, in the evening, you could see Iraqi Kurds and Afghans fighting."

17. Interview conducted on 4 June 2021.

As the crossing points were closed, others were taken over by exiled people. In particular, attempts were made at the Channel Tunnel, explains Cyrille Schott:

"Ten days after my arrival [on the night of 25 to 26 December 2001], there was an attempt to overrun the tunnel with people getting 12 kilometres into it and the police managing to push them back. But in front of the entrance there were also several hundred people who clashed with police."

Faced with the increasing number of clashes between exiled people, smugglers and the police, a policing operation was established: "When there was a clash, a group of police had been organised. They intervened immediately and separated them." Cyrille Schott points out the lack of police personnel in Calais: "around twenty police officers for the Calais district."

The prefect then saw in the protection of crossing points a solution to the shortages of police personnel to suppress the crossing attempts:

"At the Fréthun freight station, the locomotives were changed and the migrants passed under or over the railings, everything was completely damaged. I told the SNCF: 'Make solid railings!' The SNCF did not want to. I had to convene a meeting in Paris with the Ministry of Public Works to get the railings installed."

This strengthening of the border went hand in hand with an increase in the length of stay of exiled people in the camp, thus worsening their living conditions as new people arrived and also stayed longer themselves.

With a few weeks to go before the presidential elections, there was one controversy after another and the opposition and local elected officials regularly criticised the existence of the Sangatte camp, and "the pull factor" that it represented. Cyrille Schott agrees, stating that "Sangatte had become a magnet as far as the depths of the Afghan mountains" (CHABAUTY, 2015, p. 120).

Jean Dussourd, while still prefect, was regularly questioned by local elected officials: "Mr Prefect, why are you persisting with this? There is a pull factor!" Disagreeing with this idea of a pull factor, he says:

"Since the closure of Sangatte, I have seen that flows have continued. If people came to Sangatte, to then cross to England, it was not for the pleasure of being well accommodated and well fed in Sangatte, but because they wanted to cross to England by any means. That's why we went on to have the Great Jungle. (...) The pull factor phenomenon is absurd."

Smaïn Laacher, who distributed a questionnaire to the people sheltered in the camp, explained that of the 284 people asked, only 30 "had heard of Sangatte in the country of origin [mainly through] word of mouth" (LAACHER, 2003).

Jacques Chirac's victory in the presidential elections in April and May 2002 resulted in the appointment of Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior. The latter then seized the "Sangatte problem" and made it a political marker. He very quickly appeared in the media following, most notably, a visit to the territory in the Calais region on 23 May 2002. Seen by *Le Monde* as a "publicity stunt"¹⁸, the newspaper then ran through the visit by the new Minister of the Interior:

18. "M. Sarkozy opposé à la fermeture immédiate du centre de Sangatte", *Le Monde*, 25 May 2002.

“Five short minutes to visit the Red Cross refugee centre (...) A helicopter flight over the tunnel site and a whirlwind visit to the SNCF freight station, where illegal immigrants recently attempted to force their way onto trains bound for England.”

Nicolas Sarkozy then stated that he was “aware of the seriousness of the situation and the exasperation of the public”, stressing that the closure of the centre should be “an objective and not a prerequisite”, decided today, “it would create more security problems for the local population than it would solve”. Cyrille Schott organised this “lightning visit” by Nicolas Sarkozy, explaining that at that very moment, “Nicolas Sarkozy got in touch with the British and announced to them: ‘We’re going to close Sangatte!’”

As a result of a security-oriented framework, pressure from the English and local elected officials, as well as the exploitation by Nicolas Sarkozy for political ends, the closure of the Sangatte camp appeared to be “inevitable”, as Jacky Hénin, the new mayor of Calais at the time, explained after the fact:

“Why is Sangatte closing? Because no one is in control any more. It is the mafias who make the law inside the camp. (...) CRS officers are outside, they do not intervene unless there are huge fights, because there are guys who rebel against the smugglers.”

II. WHEN NICOLAS SARKOZY “SOLVED THE SANGATTE PROBLEM”

“I have to say that under Jospin, we left things alone a bit in Sangatte, Sarkozy had the merit of taking things in hand. And then I think that closing Sangatte was not a bad thing” (Cyrille Schott, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 2001 to 2004)

“What really changed things was the arrival of Nicolas Sarkozy, it was the beginning of a much tougher policy. At the request of the English, they asked us to limit migration.” (Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001)

The closure of the Sangatte camp took place in a few months and was based on Franco-British negotiations regarding the arrangements for the distribution of the exiled people present in the camp, and the plan then relied on their control and identification (1). In the aftermath, it was a question of preventing the presence of exiled people and moving them away from the coast, and a policing operation was established: Ulysses (2).

1. Controlling and identifying: the Franco-British distribution of exiled people

While the Sangatte camp was designed as an “open” site, in the sense that people did not have to give their identity, on 12 July 2002, when Nicolas Sarkozy announced the closure of the camp, a system for identifying exiled people was put in place, Cyrille Schott tells us: “One of the first things that Sarkozy did was the registration of people when they entered the centre, because we had to identify them, we needed to have a record of the people being sent to England and kept in France.” At that time, people had to have a badge to enter the premises, while entrances and exits were controlled.

Within the framework of the agreement signed between the two countries, there was a plan for the distribution of the exiled people accommodated in the centre. Jacky Hénin, mayor of Calais, participated in a meeting with Nicolas Sarkozy, and shares:

“Nicolas Sarkozy wanted to use strong-arm tactics and not back down. When Nicolas Sarkozy said: ‘I’ll let everyone through,’ I was taking part in a discussion with Jack Lang (the then PS MP for Pas-de-Calais), ‘It is either done with their agreement, or without it.’ Was there an element of bluffing? Probably.”

Cyrille Schott, prefect of Pas-de-Calais, explains that “the English were more than happy for us to close Sangatte, so they took most of the people who were in Sangatte (...) I tried to negotiate for them to take others, they did not want to.”

Within the framework of the Franco-British agreement, the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) intervened to clarify the situation of the people present in the camp. From September 2002, messages in several languages were then broadcast in the hangar, before the UNHCR mission officially began on 14 October 2002. It set itself up outside the camp, advising and registering the accommodated people. This work made it possible to identify the most vulnerable people, such as unaccompanied minors, single women, the sick and people with disabilities. On 28 September 2002, a tripartite agreement was signed between Afghanistan, France and the UNHCR. It was a plan for assisted voluntary return for Afghans of €2,000 per person, plus €500 per child.

The closure of the camp, scheduled for April 2003, was brought forward. On 5 November, only people already accommodated could remain on the premises. Thus, new arrivals were forced to sleep in the surrounding area, in bushes and abandoned blockhouses. On 2 December 2002, despite the UNHCR mission not being completed, the two countries announced the closure of the Sangatte camp on 31 December 2002.

As part of the bilateral negotiations, Britain agreed to receive a share of the people accommodated, who were subject to certain constraints: a work permit limited to four years and a written commitment not to apply for asylum in Britain. In the end, of the 1,268 people accommodated and who received support from the UNHCR, 1,032 people were able to reach Britain, 200 were placed in accommodation centres in France, 35 were (re-) admitted to other European states and 11 people accepted the plan for voluntary return to Afghanistan.

2. Operation Ulysses: harassing and removing exiles from Pas-de-Calais

“Through the wiping off the map of the Sangatte camp, which had become a visible monument to what it wanted to hide, the government had mechanically placed exiled people back in the situation before the camp existed. However, to ensure that this case of back to square one was not immediately obvious, it endeavoured to disperse them outside the Calais region with extremely dense policing coverage” (CARRERE, 2003, p. 34).

A few weeks before the closure of Sangatte, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais experimented with a plan combining the “harassment” and “dispersal” of exiled people, before its systematisation through Operation Ulysses.

From 9 to 14 November 2002, 99 Iraqi Kurds and Afghans who had been refused entry to the Sangatte camp occupied the Church of Saint-Pierre-Saint-Paul in Calais. They demanded that their situation be addressed and access to the camp. At the request of the mayor of Calais, Jacky Hénin, the president of the court of Boulogne-sur-Mer ordered its evacuation. Cyrille Schott oversaw it:

"I was able to manage the calm evacuation of the church. All the Afghans and Iraqi Kurds that I brought out of the church were put on buses and removed some distance from Calais, they were taken to centres inland. They agreed to go there... a bit of force was needed to get them out of the church, after which they agreed to be taken to centres

- Did they have other options?

- An option... actually, no. Well, yes, they had the option of saying: 'We don't want to go to the reception centre.' We would have examined their situation to see if we could deport them. It is clear that it was in their interest to go to a reception centre. We looked at their situation more closely inland."

The management of the occupation of the Church of Saint-Pierre-Saint-Paul and the removal practices foreshadowed Operation Ulysses that Cyrille Schott put in place with the Ministry of the Interior when the Sangatte camp was closed. The initial version of the operation "only provided for the sheltering of the most vulnerable people [but] I got Sarkozy and the Ministry of the Interior to agree to shelter all the people that could be intercepted", says Cyrille Schott. He tells us the principle of the new operation called "Ulysses":

"Ulysses, if you like, we didn't let people settle, so legally, I needed at least three mobile units of CRS officers or guards to cover the entire sector between Sangatte and Calais, and so we needed to arrest people. So, there was a small share for deportation, not many, 10-15%, because they were people coming from countries that are in such a state that you could not deport them. So we put these people on buses, with food, drinks and several interpreters, and we took them to reception centres inland, several hundred kilometres from Calais so that they would not gather in Calais. And we examined their situations."

As soon as Sangatte was closed, a deterrence policy was established through, on the one hand, police omnipresence and, on the other hand, the displacement of populations to other regions using accommodation facilities or forced removal practices, a prerequisite for their cases being considered, as Cyrille Schott admits.

Anne de Loisy puts the cost of this operation at €600,000 per year and which mobilised up to ten police units daily¹⁹. In Calais, the policing coverage was focused around parks and bunkers and other military structures along the coast where exiled people were trying to shelter. These spaces were bricked up or razed, or, at the very least, rubble was dumped on them. In stations with a link to the coast – Gare du Nord in Paris, Lille stations, Dunkirk station – foreigners, even those with transport tickets, were prevented from boarding trains. Those arrested and likely to be returned to their country of origin were sent to the Coquelles CRA, which opened in 2003.

The others were transferred to reception centres: CHR, reception centres for asylum seekers (CADA), hostels and hotels. In the centres, their cases were examined by the ANAEM²⁰ which offered voluntary return, while applying for asylum was not an option "that was always spontaneously offered to them" (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008). In addition,

19. "Dans la jungle des clandestins", *Politis*, 14 December 2006.

20. National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration, which became the OFII in 2009.

for those wishing to apply for asylum, “admission to an accommodation centre outside the department of Pas-de-Calais had become a prerequisite for submission of an asylum application” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 86).

When places for exiled people ran out, “some of them were taken several tens of kilometres away by the police, to the surrounding countryside; others received safe conducts with no legal basis bearing the words: ‘must not be within 60 kilometres of the coast within 48 hours of notification’” (BABELS, 2019).

However, Operation Ulysses was “ineffective”: “most people quickly returned to Calais” (BABELS, 2019). In retrospect, Cyrille Schott acknowledges the operation's shortcomings:

“We have to recognise that many did not want this [to go to the accommodation centres] because they absolutely wanted to cross into England, and then we also have to recognise that with respect to granting asylum we were – in my opinion – not open enough on the French side.”

Through these practices, the public authorities aimed to remove exiled people from Pas-de-Calais and to disperse them while encouraging their self-deportation. In other words, through increased pressure on exiled people, police omnipresence and removal procedures that were doomed to fail, the accommodation centres were only marginally intended to enable people to regularise their situation in France.

The aim of the plan was threefold: to empty Pas-de-Calais to meet the demands of local elected officials, to prevent crossings to Britain to meet the expectations of the British government and to invisibilise people through dispersal and self-deportation. This strategy led by Nicolas Sarkozy would have the direct effect of increasing the number of living spaces along the Franco-British border.

III. AFTER SANGATTE: THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LIVING SPACES ALONG THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER

“In 2008, the number of exiled people present in all of these spaces [along the Franco-British border] today was approximately the same as the number of foreigners present in the Sangatte camp during 2001. [...] Since the closure of the camp, the number of exiled people has not really fallen despite the significant policing operation established along the entire coast”
(AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 33)

The embodiment of the Franco-British border did not stop at the Calais region, and at the crossings via the Ports of Boulogne-sur-Mer, Calais and Dunkirk, and the Channel Tunnel. The media, political and police focus on the Calais region gave rise to strategies for crossing in less visible and less protected areas. From the 1990s, port cities with regular – or ad hoc – maritime links with England and Ireland were places where living spaces were established. Through these links with Britain, these crossing points were also covered by the bilateral agreements signed since the 1980s, placing carriers under pressure there too.

“Operation Ulysses” had the effect of dispersing exiled people along the Franco-British border, making visible spaces already taken over, or establishing new ones. At the turn of

the 21st century, crossings were being made in the ports of Normandy and Brittany, where exiled people revived strategies for crossing from less visible locations (1). However, their presence in Nord-Pas-de-Calais continued. They attempted to cross to Britain from less secure ports and inland, near certain motorway rest areas (2). Some of these living spaces still exist today. At this point, we would like to recount the several months that followed the closure of Sangatte (before dealing with them at greater length in Chapter 6). The closure did not put an end to migratory flows, but amplified a phenomenon of switching between crossing points depending on the “protection” of the border.

1. Moving away from Nord-Pas-de-Calais: the revival of a less visible crossing strategy

“Zero impermeability is an illusion (...) It is unthinkable, due to the situation in their countries of origin, to send back 80-85% of the foreigners who come to Calais. (...) Increasing the impermeability of the port of Calais will de-concentrate crossings and spread them out along the coast. There will be some in Dieppe, Le Havre, then in Belgium and Holland. We may one day see small boats attempting crossings”²¹ (Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001)

The opening of a daily ferry service between Portsmouth and the port of Caen-Ouistreham in 1986 was accompanied by the setting up of a PAF office. It transported 300,000 passengers and 15,000 lorries in the first year. In 1992, a second link was established. As of 2016, one million people are transported each year. The port is located in Ouistreham, a municipality of 9,000 inhabitants, located 15 km from the city of Caen, in the department of Calvados.

The commercial growth of the service was accompanied by crossing attempts made by exiled people. However, little information was available before the early 2000s: “their low profile combined with the novel nature of this phenomenon meant that little trace was left in local coastal communities” (THOMAS, 2012).

The initial information concerning their presence dates back to 2000, when nine Kosovars were arrested²². In 2001, the majority of immigrants there were from Iraq and Iran. Many people “only came for a few hours to attempt the crossing” (THOMAS, 2012), which maintained their invisibility.

In 2002, for several months, they settled near the cross-Channel terminal, where residents came to provide them with food, but no collective or association had yet been formed. In autumn 2003, they were forced to leave the site due to preparations for the 60th anniversary of the D-Day landings.

Port facilities were initially permeable, and were “more of a deterrent signal than a real obstacle” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008) enabling an easier crossing than in the Calais region. Exiled people climbed onto lorries upstream of port facilities or climbed the railings. The closure of the Sangatte camp significantly increased crossings, as shown by customs

21. “Inimaginable de renvoyer 80 à 85 % des étrangers en raison de la situation dans leur pays d'origine” [Unthinkable to send back 80-85% of the foreigners due to the situation in their countries of origin], *CCFD investigation*, 13 October 2000.

22. “La côte manchoise exposée à tous les flux”, *Libération*, 10 August 2002.

figures (in charge of cross-border controls since the departure of the PAF in 2001): in 2002, 417 exiled people were arrested, 1,000 in 2003, before returning to a lower level from 2004: 91 arrests, 70 in 2005, 47 in 2006 and 50 in 2007 (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008).

The port of Cherbourg-en-Cotentin is in the city of Cherbourg-Octeville, located at the northern end of the Cotentin Peninsula, in the department of Manche. A city of 35,000 inhabitants, it has a long history of immigration. Indeed, from the early 20th century, Germans, Jews and Eastern Europeans passed through on their way to the United States.

Before the closure of the Sangatte camp, it was mainly immigrants from Eastern countries, particularly Romanians, who attempted to cross, without any occupied sites being identified – they were in transit. Exiled people attempted to reach England (Southampton, Portsmouth, Poole) and Ireland (Rosslare), while between 6 and 10 crossings were organised in summer and 3 to 5 in winter.

Since the port was becoming less permeable, the difficulty of crossing increased. The first squats were built in the summer of 2002: “There were then between 30 and 40 people living during the day in a disused business premises of the Urban Community of Cherbourg” (THOMAS, 2012, p. 275). In 2002, there were more than 1,000 crossing attempts, including 334 in August (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008). Other spaces were occupied that year, followed by evictions, “but the presence of immigrants in the city would continue” (THOMAS, 2012). As evidence of this, there were 582 arrests in 2006 and 650 in 2007.

The town of Dieppe is located in the department of Seine-Maritime, 170 kilometres from Paris and just under 200 kilometres from Calais. With its 28,000 inhabitants, the city is home to a port where, since 1847, a ferry has been travelling to Newhaven in England, which today makes two daily crossings. There is little data on the presence of exiled people in Dieppe prior to the closure of the Sangatte camp.

Arrests only started being recorded in 2002: “The first illegal immigrants coming from Calais were arrested in the Port of Dieppe on 13 November 2002” (THOMAS, 2002). Mostly Iraqi Kurds, back then they occupied the hull of a grounded vessel, the Saint-Germain, and concrete blocks on the port jetty. With the closure of Sangatte, “the number of migrants increased to several dozen” (THOMAS, 2002).

The port of Bloscon in Roscoff has had a link to the city of Plymouth in England since 1973, and to the city of Cork in Ireland since 1978. A small town of 4,000 inhabitants, Roscoff is located on the northern side of Brittany, in the department of Finistère. There are few links to Ireland and England (in 2021, 1-2 departures per day to Cork and Plymouth) “where it is difficult to go unnoticed” (THOMAS, 2012).

Nevertheless, there had been a presence of exiled people since the 1990s, with an increase in press articles concerning crossings in 2000, when “six people in an irregular situation, including three children, were arrested”²³. Since the number of links is low and the work to enhance the impermeability of the port was rapid, the number of attempts appeared low²⁴, as revealed by the number of arrests: 51 in 1999, 50 in 2000, between 50 and 100 in 2001, 83 in 2002, 30 in 2003, then dropping to less than 20 in the subsequent years (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008).

23. “La côte manchoise exposée à tous les flux”, *Libération*, 10 August 2002.

24. “Appeared” since the number of arrests primarily reflects police activity.

They were mainly people from eastern countries: Armenians, Georgians, Moldovans, Russians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Romanians, Kosovars and people from Asia. People in transit found refuge in blockhouses and huts near the port and in disused buildings, the entrances of which were quickly “bricked up or blocked with soil” (THOMAS, 2012).

Work to protect crossing points on the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast revived crossing strategies in other regions with links to Britain. However, the closure of the Sangatte camp amplified this phenomenon, in which many exiled people tried their luck elsewhere. In Brittany and Normandy, exiled people were initially barely visible, since the crossing is swift. As ports carried out work to prevent crossings, living spaces and non-profit structures supporting them appeared, as people waited to cross, as we will see in Chapter 6.

Nord-Pas-de-Calais, however, remained a transit area. Since Calais was particularly protected and subject to “policing coverage”, exiled people tried their luck in other coastal cities, but also inland, taking advantage of heavy goods vehicles making stops in rest and service areas to get on board.

2. Staying in Nord-Pas-de-Calais: focusing on other ports and moving away from the coast

The Dunkirk area is 30 minutes from Calais. It has a port where up to 11 daily crossings are made to Dover, in England. The port is located between Loon-Plage (6,000 inhabitants) and Gravelines (11,000 inhabitants), as well as near the towns of Grande-Synthe and Tétéghem, where exiled people settled near port facilities or rest areas.

In Loon-Plage, as soon as Sangatte was closed, some exiled people (mainly Afghans, Iraqi Kurds and Iranians) attempted to get into the lorries at night, before the departure of the ferry. During the day, they settled in tents and huts near the Loon-Plage terminal belonging to the Autonomous Port of Dunkirk. Three associations were mobilised to provide food, care and clothing: Secours Catholique, the Éclaireurs de France and Emmaüs. Soon after, the Association Salam Dunkerque was created, providing support to exiled people.

In Grande-Synthe (22,000 inhabitants), located six kilometres from Dunkirk, connected to Lille via the A25 motorway and to Calais via the A16 motorway, exiled people settled on the edge of the town, in a surrounding wood, with their presence being barely visible until 2005: “Migrants occupied a wooded area of the town. The land was large enough to accommodate different communities. Kurds, Afghans and Vietnamese shared this space located near a service station in which heavy goods vehicles park before heading towards the ferries or the Eurotunnel site” (THOMAS, 2012).

In Tétéghem (8,000 inhabitants), exiled people (mainly Afghans initially, then Vietnamese) settled around Lac de Tétéghem, close to a rest area. Their presence was initially barely visible and interest from the public authorities was low until 2007.

In order to cross to Britain, exiled people adopted a new strategy and moved away from the ports. Indeed, while areas close to the coast were gradually protected, making access more difficult, new strategies were emerging²⁵: getting on board lorries heading towards Dunkirk and Calais via motorway rest areas and toll stations where heavy goods vehicles park along the A26 motorway.

25. They appeared to be “new” because they were more visible. These practices may have been used before, but we do not have any information on this.

Thus, between 2002 and 2003, exiled people first occupied an abandoned house in Saint-Omer (14,000 inhabitants), where the companions of Emmaüs brought food, clothing and mattresses. They then settled in a wood near the Wisques motorway rest area (200 inhabitants).

Before the closure of Sangatte, in Norrent-Fontes (1,400 inhabitants), located 50 kilometres from Calais, there was a similar situation: people were getting on board heavy goods vehicles from the Saint-Hilaire-Cottes motorway rest area. Little information exists about the people present until 2006, when “an initial squat was identified, and it was from that moment that the presence of migrants in the local area was recorded” (THOMAS, 2012).

In Steenvoorde (4,000 inhabitants), a municipality located 40 kilometres from Dunkirk, a motorway rest area was used as a place for crossing on board heavy good vehicles parking there since 2002: “They came episodically to the vicinity of the municipality, and settled in a wood located between the motorway rest area and the village” (THOMAS, 2012).

This non-exhaustive inventory of the places settled by exiled people post-Sangatte nevertheless makes it possible to draw two lessons.

On the one hand, the strategy of removal and dispersal carried out by the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, did not make it possible to stop migratory flows to Britain, but increased the number of transit areas along the Franco-British border as well as inland where motorway rest areas enabled people to board heavy goods vehicles. As Cyrille Schott explains, with the “closure of Sangatte, we managed the ‘stocks’ and not the flows”, which continued to attempt to cross to Britain.

On the other hand, the strategy adopted by people in transit was to find inconspicuous spaces that were not very visible – squats, woods, disused premises, blockhouses, huts – close to crossing points. This low profile enabled them to carry on, to not alert the public authorities of their presence and to therefore avoid police checks. Each news item about arrests or the discovery of sites contributed to putting their presence on the agenda. Consequently, the public authorities responded to this by mobilising the police, carrying out work to reduce the permeability of transit sites and closing certain rest areas, while clearing, bricking up or razing the shelters found.

This first part has helped to understand the national and European structure for the fight against irregular immigration. As the nation-state and the EU came into being, they organised trade and economic flows, and flows of people by constructing legal, administrative and political barriers to “undesirables”. Borders are not natural, they are built. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the Balkan War materialised these borders, as the number of exiled people stranded on the Franco-British border increased, prompting an “emergency” response. This took the form of emergency reception thought to be temporary: the Sangatte camp. This facility appeared to be a response cobbled together in the face of a new phenomenon. The State had already passed legislation concerning the deportation of undesirables and the prohibition of entry into its territory, but not to prevent people from leaving it. Sangatte was a compromise between two government views, between two ministries and between “humanity” and “firmness”: reception to avoid public disorder, reception to secure crossing points, reception while a political response was being formalised. When Nicolas Sarkozy arrived at the Ministry of the Interior, he made France the “policing arm” of Great Britain. He established a deterrence policy combining the harassment, removal and eviction of exiled people from transit areas. As we will see in the following parts, since 2002, the methods of this doctrine have been perfected and imposed on local actors, associations and exiled people. Despite resistance and occasional challenges, the deterrence policy has been nothing but strengthened to become the “only” policy in effect.

PART 2

**MIGRATORY FLOWS,
MANAGEMENT BY THE
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
(2002-2012)**

PART 2

WHEN the Sangatte camp was closed, Nicolas Sarkozy established a deterrence policy, combining the harassment, detention and removal of exiled people from the Franco-British border. The aim for the French State was to prevent them from staying “on the border” and reaching Britain. This policy, initially cobbled together, was strengthened as international and bilateral agreements required security-oriented handling of the border. The EU and Britain drove a race to the top in security, coupled with legal and administrative barriers. The aim was to “trace” exiled people, while preventing them from accessing the Schengen Area and asylum procedures, while, on the Franco-British border, France was preventing them from leaving it (Chapter 4). This security-oriented focus contributed to the strengthening of European Ministries of the Interior, as a result of which the Ministry of the Interior in France gradually pre-empted immigration powers, controlling the entire migration circuit while perfecting the political doctrine of deterrence, combining policing and legal practices (Chapter 5). The dispersal organised from Calais had the effect of increasing the number of living spaces along the Franco-British border, near ports and upstream, near rest areas. Local elected officials learnt a “new political occupation”: the management of exiled people present in their territory. Under pressure from the State and through trial and error, there was an emergence of (in)visible support for exiled people, of living spaces that were tolerated or even brought under municipal control, but also of forms of co-production of deterrence. The local creation of migration policies revealed the relative autonomy in which local elected officials operated vis-à-vis the State and its local representatives (Chapter 6).

CHAPTER 4:

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE IMPOSITION OF SECURITY-ORIENTED HANDLING OF THE BORDER

Amid increasing migratory flows to the EU and Britain, the closure of Sangatte was framed by Nicolas Sarkozy – recently appointed Minister of the Interior – as a “symbol” aimed at putting an end to the “pull factor” it was said to represent. Franco-British negotiations on the “distribution” of the people accommodated continued in the following months, culminating in the signature of the Touquet agreements in 2003. The latter were in the same vein as those previous (Treaty of Canterbury, Sangatte Protocol, Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol), and provided for increased border protection and juxtaposed controls aimed at ensuring that France prevented exiled people from entering British territory. The Franco-British administrative arrangements that followed over the period did not depart from this security-oriented approach to the border (I). At the same time, the EU was placing the subject of “irregular immigration” on the agenda and was developing a legal and policing arsenal aimed at European coordination and harmonisation of this issue. Member States were called upon to fight against irregular immigration, provided with financial and legal support to carry out their missions and were part of a race to the top in security aimed at “stopping migratory flows” to the Schengen Area (II). At the same time, France was deploying new means of protecting the Franco-British border, the aim of which was to prevent exiled people from reaching Britain (III).

I. WHEN FRANCE BECAME THE “POLICING ARM” OF GREAT BRITAIN: UNPREPAREDNESS AND SCOPE OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE TOUQUET AGREEMENTS

“This terrible situation [for exiled people present in the Calais region] is largely the result of the conclusion, between France and the United Kingdom, of several treaties and bilateral administrative agreements of which the complexity of implementation results in practice in the prohibition of migrants from leaving France and in making Calais and its surrounding region an area for the concentration of exiled people with the security issues and humanitarian risks that this entails. This entanglement of different treaties and administrative provisions, largely in contradiction with European Union law, is extremely worrying insofar as it results in making France the ‘policing arm’ of British migration policy.”
(Opinion of the CNCDH of 2 July 2015)

Signed on 4 February 2003 by France and Britain, the Touquet agreements form part of a series of bilateral agreements introduced in 1986 with the Treaty of Canterbury. These agreements constitute a straitjacket criticised since their signature by exiled people and their supporters, the police and political actors from all sides (local and national elected officials). Numerous arguments were used: unbalanced agreement, delegation to France of the control of the border for the benefit of Britain, means of preventing asylum seekers from accessing the procedures on the English side, creation of a situation of stranding

the people present on the border, the cost in human and financial resources, etc. These agreements gave rise to various administrative arrangements that perpetuated a strictly security-oriented approach to the Franco-British border. The funding provided by the British appeared to be a way of mitigating some of the criticism of these agreements and an assurance that France was effectively controlling the border.

Olivier Cahn is a lecturer in private law and criminal sciences at the University of Cergy-Pontoise. In 2006, he defended a thesis entitled “La coopération policière franco-britannique dans la zone frontalière transmanche” (Franco-British police cooperation in the cross-Channel border area), in which he demonstrated that Franco-British relations were often “outside any legal framework”, before the construction of the Channel Tunnel ushered in a desire to legally manage their common border. In his view²⁶, the main objective “assigned to the cooperation is fighting against immigration to the United Kingdom”, which is “determined solely by British interests”. For his research, he focused in particular on the Touquet agreements, the scope of which he deemed “incredible”:

“The situation that we are experiencing in Calais, at least since the closure of Sangatte, is a situation of outsourcing the border and the migration issue. This is typically the policy that the British have asked the EU to impose on Morocco, Libya and Turkey. So we pay, they manage. What is interesting is that the British have also imposed it on France, which is not in the position of economic dependence that Turkey or Morocco may have with regard to the EU, and that France accepts this kind of treatment”.

The Touquet agreements were negotiated without any real preparation on the French side, Olivier Cahn tells us. He explains that the negotiations were managed by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of the Interior, via his diplomatic adviser David Martinon. Olivier Cahn tells us about how these negotiations unfolded:

“David Martinon gathered together the few police officers and gendarmes who were working in the border area, he met with them for a few hours to be briefed and then after that he negotiated. Except that opposite them in the negotiation were about twenty police officers from Kent who were competent and knew what they were talking about”.

These negotiations resulted in the “outsourcing” of the English border to French soil. This took the form of “juxtaposed national control bureaux” in the Channel and North Sea ports. These agreements created a legal framework enabling French and British officers to carry out checks in both countries, where each applied its own legislation in the legally created enclaves. Simply put, if British officers deemed that people wishing to enter British territory did not meet the conditions, they would remain in France.

As *Le Monde* states, “applicants going through Britain to come to France are much rarer”²⁷, making the French State “the policing arm”²⁸ of British migration policy.

Furthermore, these agreements provided for the processing of asylum applications to be shared between the state of departure and the state of arrival from the departure of the ferry along the following lines: if the asylum application was made after the checks, but before departure, its processing would be the responsibility of the state of departure. If people without residence permits were refused entry to the country of arrival, they would be readmitted to the country of departure.

26. Interview conducted on 24 May 2021.

27. “Tout savoir sur le traité du Touquet”, *Le Monde*, 24 June 2016.

28. “Avis sur la situation des migrants à Calais et dans le Calaisis”, CNCDH, 2 July 2015.

These agreements moved the administrative border between the two countries to French shores. Unlike previous agreements, these were conditional on financial and material assistance from Britain – making it possible to imagine that Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Interior, had anticipated the imbalance for France from the outset.

During our discussions with interviewees about the Touquet agreements, numerous people struggled to justify them, but there were several conflicting theories.

The first sees these agreements as a way for the Sangatte chapter to be “brought to a close”. France is said to have promised, in exchange for a distribution of the exiled people accommodated in the Sangatte camp, to give in “to a British demand: the establishment of juxtaposed controls in Calais”, confides Matthieu P.²⁹, a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior. He goes on to explain: “why do the British want these juxtaposed controls? To ensure that France effectively controls the border and to be able to intercept, if necessary, migrants who may have slipped through the net.” He continues:

“Le Touquet was negotiated at the request of the British, with a simple deal: the British authorities accepted migrants who were in Calais and, in return, France accepted the presence of members of the Border Force in Calais to carry out controls in addition to the French authorities.”

Thus, these juxtaposed controls allow Britain to mobilise English police forces on French territory, and to ensure that France effectively controls the border. This is an outsourcing of the border, in which the financier (Britain) supervises the operations of its subcontractor (France).

The second theory sees the Touquet agreements as a means of fighting “the pull factor”, as Nicolas Sarkozy states:

“The French border is located at the entrance to the tunnel. If there were no more controls on the French side, we would create a considerable pull factor, resulting in even more migrants, but even less police and customs cooperation with the British. Both sides would lose.”³⁰.

Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020, agrees, seeing these agreements as a “cynical” solution:

“Let us manage this flow, and so let us set up the entrance gate to Britain in France. Nicolas Sarkozy’s argument is to say: ‘You, the English, have an extremely broad reception policy, you have regulations that are less strict, but you will understand that this is not convenient for us.’”

Simply put, by managing migratory flows for the English, France would ensure a reduction in the number of people on its soil by making it more difficult for exiled people to reach Britain.

The third and final theory is that of a “humanitarian” policy on the part of France via this management on the French side of the border. Olivier Cahn explains that he has regularly interviewed successive Ministers of the Interior to understand the principles behind these agreements:

“In 2020, I finally got an answer. Before, what I had was at best vague and, at worst, I was told that I could not be told what was given in return. In the end, it was Bernard Cazeneuve who gave me a surprising answer: ‘There is no compensation other than the financial compensation. If France does it, it is in order not to be complicit in what the British would do, i.e. let people drown.’”

29. Interview conducted in May 2021. We preserved his anonymity at his request.

30. “Sarkozy sur Calais, je me rendrai à Londres dès le lendemain de la présidentielle”, *La Voix du Nord*, 4 September 2016.

Even today, the vagueness that persists around these agreements prevents the wholehearted backing of one of these theories. What can be seen are their effects on exiled people who are prevented from accessing their rights by crossing the Channel.

The other, more surprising effect is that concerning the role assigned to the police, who were very critical from the outset, as Olivier Cahn explains to us:

"These agreements have regularly attracted criticism from the police: 'We do the dirty work, which is not a cop's job, i.e. to harass migrants.'"

Cyrille Schott, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 2001 to 2004, agrees:

"It is clear that France has agreed to place the border on its territory (...) and that, I heard it on the spot from police officers and gendarmes, who said: 'We are Her Gracious Majesty's back-up border guards,' and I can tell you none of them particularly appreciated this role."

This account on border control recalls the work of Franck Enjolras (2012) about the CRAs and the police officers called upon to intervene. He explains that they did not receive any "specific recognition" there, especially in a context where the "controversies surrounding these places (...) also gives them a very controversial public image." The work of the police constitutes "dirty work" (HUGHES, 1958), as Emmanuel Blanchard explains regarding the "raids", seen as "police measures for the mass control and arrest of vulnerable and stigmatised populations [where] where many officers feel they are doing 'dirty work'" (BLANCHARD, 2009).

Also within the framework of these agreements, on 24 November 2003, France and Britain signed an initial "administrative agreement" aimed at the deployment of technology provided by the British army: the scanning of heavy goods vehicles passing through the Channel Tunnel. The aim here was to detect "human presence" in "goods transport vehicles [while] providing for the initial training of instructors and personnel assigned to use the equipment."³¹ In addition, this agreement "paves the way for the extension of these arrangements to other French ports, beyond Calais."³²

On 6 July 2009, a second "administrative arrangement" was established, which provided for the creation of a joint coordination centre for border surveillance and "the implementation of advanced technologies to strengthen the security of the common border."³³ The Ministry of the Interior then specified that the equipment was funded by Britain, while its use by customs services was funded by the French State.

Finally, on 2 November 2010, a third "administrative arrangement" strengthened – again – border surveillance via new technologies in the ports of northern France, in particular Dunkirk and Coquelles.

Thus, the scope of the Touquet agreements was only increased, supplemented by new agreements providing for ever stricter control of the border. Beyond the reasons for the signature of these agreements, they constitute a straitjacket from which none of the successive governments managed to free themselves (as we will see in the following parts). Despite opposition from the police on the ground, these agreements strengthened the Ministry of the Interior's grip on migration issues through additional policing resources and equipment budgets for new technologies. Moreover, these agreements created a strictly

31. Response from the Ministry of the Interior dated 11 August 2011 to MP Michel Sergent.

32. Communiqué by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, 24 November 2003.

33. Response from the Ministry of the Interior dated 11 August 2011 to MP Michel Sergent.

security-oriented framework, failing to address – or only marginally addressing – the situation of people. The latter remain confined to an “irregular” status and remain stuck “on the border” (GUENEBAUD, 2017), neither on one side of it or the other, but inside it. This lack of status is heightened at the whim of European directives, legislation and deliberations in which the fight against irregular immigration remains one of the priorities of the Member States.

TIMELINE – 2002-2012: EUROPEAN AND FRANCO-BRITISH POLICIES

1 May 2002: EU Ministers of the Interior consider the possibility of creating a European Border Police force.

21 June 2002: Illegal immigration is the key focus at the Seville European Council.

26 September 2002: Trilateral meeting (England, Belgium, the Netherlands) to extend cross-border controls.

4 February 2003: Signature of the Touquet agreements which extend the Sangatte agreements. These agreements aim to “facilitate the exercise of border controls in the maritime ports of the Channel and North Sea located in the territory of the other party” and “to establish juxtaposed national control bureaux in control zones. (Both countries) allow the officers on duty of each State to carry out their mission in the territory of the other State”. The agreements specify that when a person makes an asylum application, it is considered by the state of departure, except if the person is in transit to the country of arrival. As the CNCDH points out, this agreement “makes France the policing arm of migration policy in the United Kingdom.”³⁴

18 February 2003: Implementation of the Dublin II Regulation, which stipulates that only the first country reached by the asylum applicant is authorised to process the application.

19 June 2003: At the Thessaloniki European Council, European countries decide to create a structure to coordinate cooperation projects at the EU's external borders, train border guards, harmonise their equipment and set up common procedures for repatriating illegal immigrants.

6 November 2003: The EU Council approves a text organising charter flights at Community level with a budget of €30 million over two years. The associations launch a petition on these “charters of humiliation”.

24 November 2003: Signature of a Franco-British administrative agreement, which provides for the deployment of new British technology in the area of human detection.

1 February 2004: The European Commission proposes that EU Ministers of the Interior contribute financially (€30 million over two years) to charter flights.

19 February 2004: European regulation creating a force of “immigration liaison officers”. These officers are seconded to “assist” their colleagues at airports in emigration countries.

26 October 2004: Creation of the Frontex agency, whose mission is to monitor EU borders from October 2005.

1 December 2005: The EU's “Asylum” Directive provides that Member States may confine asylum seekers in “special premises” and that an asylum application does not constitute a right to remain in a country. It also provides for the rejection of “manifestly unfounded applications and for accelerated and priority procedures”. This Directive introduces the

34. “Avis sur la situation des migrants à Calais et dans le Calaisis”, CNCDH, 2 July 2015.

concepts of “safe country of origin”, “first country of asylum” and “safe third country”. The remedies provided for have no suspensive effect.

15 December 2005: The “global approach to migration” is approved by the European Council, which establishes partnerships with third countries on combating illegal immigration, notably through co-development.

10 July 2006: Action plan for the readmission of emigrants who have entered Europe illegally, the strengthening of judicial and police cooperation and the establishment of financial and tax incentives for African diasporas to participate in the development of their countries of origin.

11 July 2007: “RABIT” (Rapid Border Intervention Team) Regulation, which provides for the emergency mobilisation of border guards in the event of a “mass influx” of migrants.

9 December 2008: European Return Directive, which defines the conditions for the preliminary detention and removal of foreigners. It is dubbed by associations as the directive “of shame”. It harmonises the rules for deportation of people in an irregular situation in the EU. It aims to encourage “voluntary return”, in the event of refusal, and a person may be detained for up to 18 months in the case of “lack of cooperation” by the person or his or her country of origin until his or her effective deportation, accompanied by a ban on entry to European territory of up to five years.

18 June 2009: European Employers Sanctions Directive prohibits the employment of people in an irregular situation.

6 July 2009: A Franco-British administrative arrangement that provides for the creation of a joint coordination centre for border surveillance, the development of new detection systems on the port and Eurotunnel sites before the extension of these systems to the localities of Boulogne-sur-Mer, Coquelles and Dunkirk.

30 October 2009: The Brussels Summit raises the possibility of joint return flights financed by the Frontex agency.

2 November 2010: A Franco-British administrative arrangement that aims to strengthen border surveillance using new technologies in ports in northern France, in particular Dunkirk and Coquelles.

25 October 2011: New resources given to the Frontex agency and expansion of its role. Frontex can now acquire its own equipment.

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II. DUBLIN, FRONTEX, EUROPEAN DIRECTIVES: A RACE TO THE TOP IN SECURITY

“There is indeed a European policy on immigration and asylum, in place and applied since the 2000s, based on the surveillance of external borders and their closure to irregular immigration, respect for the principle of the right to asylum according to the Geneva Convention, the solidarity of the member countries in financing this surveillance and in the reception of refugees (...) In most cases, there is criticism of the ‘hot potato’ game played by the Member States of the European Union, as the countries most ‘invaded’ by migrants feel victims of the laxity of others” (RODIER, 2018, p. 56-57)

In 1951, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Geneva Convention established the status of “refugee”, which became a legal category in its own right. This Convention aims to protect any person fleeing their country “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” However, the signatory states remain free to define their own rules regarding the granting of asylum in their territory. Although Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state” and that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”, the Schengen Area was built around the refusal of the host country to allow a person to “enter” its territory. Jean-Yves Carlier, a Belgian lawyer specialising in migration, summarises “the reality of international law: while I have the right to leave a country, I do not have the right to enter another country” (2009, p. 389). The Dublin Regulation (and its successive updates) as well as the European directives that followed give concrete form to this asymmetric application of the right to asylum (1), with the creation of the Frontex agency as its “strong arm” (2).

1. Dublin procedure: a “traceability” tool at the service of the Member States

“European leaders and their judges harp on pedantically that international law in no way requires them to receive and protect endangered people who are not (yet) in their territory, which is precisely what permits European law to block their access to European territory” (PARROT, 2019, p. 70-71)

The “Dublin system”, created in the late 1980s at the same time as the Schengen system, supplemented in 2003 by Dublin II (Dublin III, signed in 2013, only marginally changes the way it operates). Dublin “compensates” for the end of controls at the internal borders of Member States. At the time of signature of the Dublin Convention in 1990, legislators described themselves as:

“Aware of the need, in pursuit of this objective [the harmonisation of asylum policies], to take measures to avoid any situations arising, with the result that applicants for asylum are left in doubt for too long as regards the likely outcome of their applications and concerned to provide all applicants for asylum with a guarantee that their applications will be examined by one of the Member States and to ensure that applicants for asylum are not referred successively from one Member State to another without any of these States acknowledging itself to be competent to examine the application for asylum.”

However, this accountability of the different states and this desire to ensure that asylum seekers have an effective examination of their application have unforeseen effects. Indeed, by designating a single European state as responsible for a single asylum seeker, the state through which the foreigner entered European territory is designated to process the application. Thus, countries with borders on the external border of the Schengen Area are accountable and urged to exercise strict control over their borders. In return, they enter into a race to the top in security and suspicion of asylum seekers:

“At no time in the Dublin mechanism are people truly taken into consideration, except through the prism of their presumed desire to circumvent the rules” (PARROT, 2019, p. 170).

Indeed, the principle behind the Dublin mechanism is as follows:

“Asylum seekers should not be able to take advantage of this to try their luck again, and indefinitely, elsewhere in this area of free movement, once they have been rejected in an initial country” (PARROT, 2019, p. 170-171).

The EU's desire is to move towards the harmonisation of asylum procedures; however, European legislation does little to protect exiled people and places few constraints on Member States. Each Member State retains its own legislation on the processing of applications. There is therefore no equivalence from one country to another: in the 2000s, a person seeking asylum in Greece had a 1 in 1,000 chance of obtaining it and a 1 in 2 chance in Sweden.

The Dublin system has been gradually perfected, notably through the creation in 2000 of the Eurodac biometric file, which has been in operation since 2003. This system collects the fingerprints of all asylum seekers and foreigners arrested when they irregularly enter the Schengen Area. This database enables Member States to view the migratory trajectory of people seeking asylum and to “organise the traceability of people based on characteristics intrinsic to their very bodies” (MIGREUROPE, 2017, p. 86).

The EU organises the traceability of exiled people, which Member States use against them. In the case of France, the prefect, who is responsible for registering asylum applications, collects the fingerprints of the applicants in order to cross-check them with the Eurodac file. If the fingerprints have been registered in another Member State – as part of an asylum application or after being arrested in an irregular situation – the Dublin procedure is triggered, justifying the issuance of an obligation to leave the territory (OQTF) and an application to the “responsible” state for a transfer. In the event that the asylum seeker refuses to give his or her fingerprints, “he or she is presumed to be a fraudster and his or her application is processed and refused according to the accelerated procedure” (PARROT, 2019, p. 176).

At the same time, the EU has produced a series of directives supplementing – or legitimising – the legislation of each member country through the creation of a legal framework for the detention of people in order to process asylum applications (the “Asylum” Directive of 2005), transfer to another European country, return to the country of origin (the “charters of humiliation” of 2003 and the Return Directive of 2008) and sanctions against employers hiring people in an irregular situation (the Employers Sanctions Directive of 2009).

The increasing amount of legislation was aimed at reducing irregular immigration and the presence of exiled people already present on European soil. At the same time, the EU was developing tools and instruments to prevent exiled people from accessing European territory through the increased control of external borders in the form of the Frontex agency.

2. Frontex: the “strong arm” of the EU

Although the European states on the external borders of the EU are sovereign, the EU developed its own expertise and dedicated funding through the Frontex agency, in addition to the arrangements put in place by the European states, to ensure that work was actually carried out.

The foundations for Frontex were initially laid in 2003, when the European Council decided to create a structure to coordinate cooperation projects at the EU's external borders, train border guards and harmonise their equipment. In 2004, the EU decided to create a body of immigration liaison officers: officers seconded to "assist" their colleagues at airports in emigration countries. In October 2004, Frontex was created to monitor EU borders. The creation of this agency was a compromise between the states most exposed to "entry" in the south and east of the EU, and the states fearful of losing sovereignty. On its official website, the EU presents the role of Frontex as follows:

"Frontex coordinates operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of the EU's external borders; assists Member States in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; carries out risk analyses; follows up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; assists Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders; and provides Member States with the necessary support in organising joint return operations."

This presentation makes Frontex the "assistant" to the police forces of each Member State. In reality, it is the "strong arm" (RODIER, 2012, p. 153) of the EU in terms of controlling migratory flows, a kind of European equivalent of the US Border Patrol. In 2020, it had a budget of €460 million, 700 people working directly for the agency as well as 1,500 people made available by the various Member States and a rapid reaction reserve (RABIT: Rapid Border Intervention Team) mobilised "as a matter of urgency in the event of a mass influx of migrants" consisting of 5,000 officers (10,000 officers in 2027). While for the period 2007-2013, the EU had budgeted €285 million, the budget increased to €5.14 billion for the period 2021-2027.

This ramp-up is based in part on the "firefighter/arsonist technique: It produces migration 'risk analyses' in its offices and intervenes at the borders to 'deal with management of the risks' thus identified" (PARROT, 2019, p. 76):

"The avalanche of data packed into its annual reports suggests, implicitly or explicitly, the essential nature of its interventions: in particular, they provide detailed accounts of illegal border crossings, the detection of smuggler activity and the use of false documents, situations of irregular residence, refusals of access to the territory or even deportations of migrants that it has identified during the period covered" (RODIER, 2012, p. 154).

Frontex's operations are organised in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular. They "close" the migratory routes taken by exiled people, before they take new ones, ultimately moving migratory routes.

To refine the system, the EU has been organising the outsourcing of border control since the early 2000s. Agreements are signed with third countries to prevent exiled people from accessing the Schengen Area. These agreements take the form of "neighbourhood agreements" or "co-development" agreements. The EU grants access to trade markets, development aid and visa quotas in exchange for work to make borders impermeable. Examples include Sudan, which received €200 million to "better manage its borders", Turkey receiving €6 billion and Libya (amounts not disclosed).

European regulations developed since the late 1980s have found in Frontex an enforcement tool for an integrated European fight against irregular immigration. The aim is to prevent people from entering the Schengen Area through direct action or by ensuring that Member States apply EU directives. In this way, it is a question of reducing the presence of the

majority of exiled people in European territory awaiting legal status, while organising the deportation of people whose applications are rejected or of people in an irregular situation. Conversely, at the Franco-British border, France “bunkerised” it to prevent exiled people from leaving the Schengen Area.

III. THE “BUNKERISATION” OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER: PREVENTING EXILED PEOPLE FROM LEAVING THE SCHENGEN AREA

“With the strengthening of controls, this concentration of stranded people, the establishment of formal and informal camps and their media coverage have multiplier effects in the perception of a crisis: they make these migrants visible at the same time as they are targeted by the police” (BABELS, 2019, p. 32)

“I’m going back to Calais today, I’m going back immediately. There is barbed wire everywhere, it’s military barbed wire with razor blades.”(Jacky Hénin, mayor of Calais from 2001 to 2008)

Compared to the EU’s deployment with regard to the protection of external borders, the situation at the Franco-British border appears to be atypical. While EU Member States were preventing exiled people from entering the Schengen Area, at the Franco-British border, France and Britain were aiming to prevent exiled people from leaving. As we have seen previously, this “protection” of the border stems from bilateral agreements, but also from pressure exerted by Britain on French carriers, “forcibly” enlisted into the control of transit sites (1). This “protection”, although embodied by infrastructure to prevent exiled people from crossing, is “staging” closure: each “closure” leads to new crossing points (2).

1. When Britain subcontracted border control to French carriers

The bilateral agreements signed since the late 1980s conceal a subcontracting process undertaken by Britain involving all carriers, particularly French ones. The English put pressure on French carriers to fight against irregular immigration through fortification of their infrastructure and security technologies or face sanctions. In the early 2000s, the context of the fight against terrorism prompted new security measures to supplement the requirements imposed on carriers.

Indeed, from 1987, the Carriers Liability Act was introduced in Britain and imposed a fine on sea carriers of £1,000 per person in an irregular situation transported, and the fine increased to £2,000 in 1991. The Act was then extended to road hauliers in 1999 and then rail carriers in 2001.

Until the late 1990s, France did little to manage the common border. Through these sanctions, “the English authorities put pressure on road hauliers as well as on the Eurotunnel group [via] the criminal liability of carriers and financial penalties in the event of the discovery of migrants on board” (GUENBEAUD, 2017, p. 104).

Under legal and financial threat, carriers were effectively delegated the control of the Franco-British border. The role of sea carriers and of their security departments is then to perform policing functions, by preventing crossings on the one hand and, on the other hand, by detaining people before the arrival of the police.

Britain implements the Code of Practice included in the Immigration and Asylum Act passed in 1999, which is a "Check List" of obligations for carriers before crossing the Channel. In the event that an exiled person is discovered, to avoid a sanction, it is specified that the carrier must prove that:

"he did not know, and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting, that a clandestine entrant was, or might be, concealed in the transporter; an effective system for preventing the carriage of clandestine entrants was in operation in relation to the transporter; and that on the occasion in question the person or persons responsible for operating that system did so properly."³⁵

The effect of this – forced – enlistment of carriers was an increase in their security costs and time cost involved in controlling heavy goods vehicles. Dissent then arose within transit sites. Some were subject to the Code of Practice while others were not.

The English Code of Practice was supplemented in 2002 by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) imposed new security measures on sea carriers, which culminated in the ISPS:

"This code aims to prevent any malicious acts against ships and port facilities, in particular any act of terrorism. It provides that ships and ports draw up a local 'security plan' to assess the risks and threats incurred and to ensure the application of appropriate measures. The state issues ships with an international security certificate and port facilities with a declaration of conformity valid for five years" (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 112-113).

The aim of these measures is to prevent the penetration of ports. However, no distinctions are made: all individuals entering the area are effectively "malicious" and illegal immigration is then associated with terrorism.

Through the Touquet agreements, the State agreed to also encourage protection of the border by means of policing measures and secure infrastructure – partly through British funding. France then committed to "control 100% of heavy goods vehicles travelling to Britain." However, the enlistment of the French State in this initiative was subject to pressure from the English and sea, rail and road carriers.

2. The "staging" of a closed border

In this context, at the turn of the 20th century, there was a process of the "bunkerisation" of the border. Areas around ports and railways saw the appearance of fences, entry badges, approvals, personnel authorisations, video surveillance devices, private security, drones, detectors, sensors, etc. A security structure that "saw a whole series of private companies specialising in security and interested in strengthening border controls spring up" (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 98).

35. Section 34(3) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.

The securing of these areas aligned with contradictory principles: on the one hand, it had to foster legal flows by transporting goods and individuals in order to remain competitive in a competitive market and, on the other hand, controls had to be a sufficient deterrent and strict enough to prevent access to exiled people. Initially reluctant to get bogged down in an "all-about-security" approach, carriers framed the security issue as a commercial consideration. The aim here was to guarantee their customers secure and intact transport of their goods and compliance with deadlines.

We have tried to document the expenditure on security (see the timeline at the end of this chapter). We obtained this data through academic research, press articles and activity reports. While not exhaustive, this list demonstrates the impact of the legislation on securing the border, and the role assigned to carriers. Here we focused on the following sites: on the one hand, the Ports of Calais, Boulogne-sur-Mer, Dunkirk, Ouistreham-Caen, Roscoff, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Dieppe and, on the other, the railway areas of Coquelles (Eurotunnel) and Calais-Fréthun station.

Thus, between 1998 and 2012, at least €38 million was spent on the purchase of equipment, the installation of fences and infrastructure dedicated to controlling the areas and the use of private security guards. We estimate operating expenses over the same period to be almost €500 million, including the salaries of officers involved in security on the sites. It remains unclear how much money was spent and where the money came from: local government and state subsidies, British and European funding and own funding. The message from carriers was to inform the public authorities of the cost of this work to reduce border permeability, without specifying the source of the funds.

However, this deployment of security measures did not prevent exiled people from crossing to Britain. In their research, Olivier Clochard and Karen Akoka show that the investments made had the effect of extending the waiting time before crossing the Channel, from one week in the early 2000s to three months in 2008:

"It therefore appears that, while Franco-British control policies have undeniable consequences on the lives of many of these exiled people temporarily stranded at the border, the deployment of the most sophisticated technological resources fails to undermine the plans of many of these men and women determined to save their lives or achieve their dreams" (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 40).

Like the visa and Dublin systems, and the operations carried out by Frontex, the closure of crossing points only "moves and slows down trajectories, but does not reduce the overall pressure. Migrants get through anyway, they make detours, spend more money with smugglers for increasingly dangerous routes, but they get through" (RODIER, 2018, p. 68).

These restrictions had the effect of strengthening the role of smugglers, as noted by Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020: "It is clear that the more difficult it is to cross the Channel, the more the smugglers in Kabul charge for their assistance."

The extension of the transit time resulted in the establishment of informal living spaces that remained in place and therefore made the presence of exiled people in territories more visible. Consequently, this visibility drove the State to strengthen border security in order to depict its control of the border. As Claire Rodier explains, "the walls and their equivalent measures largely underpin "chin-stroking" strategies (Rodier, 2018, p. 69). The State's aim here was to send a dual message:

“The first is aimed at the local public who are being invaded, or feel invaded, or are told they are under threat, to show them that something is being done to protect them from excessive disorder. The other message is obviously aimed at potential migrants who are being told that they belong beyond the border” (RODIER, 2018, p. 69).

This depiction was also a reassurance from the French authorities to the British authorities that France was doing everything possible to prevent crossings. It was partly a duplicitous game. While Britain applied the Dublin Regulation, which permits it to return asylum seekers to their country of entry into Europe, France, in the early 2000s, did not register in the Eurodac database the fingerprints of the 70,000 people who were staying at the Red Cross centre during its three-year existence: “This violation of European rules was still practised in 2008 in various port cities” (MIGREUROPE, 2009, p. 67). In other words, by not registering the fingerprints of exiled people, if they did actually cross into Britain, the British could not deport them to France, and would then actually have to review their asylum applications.

The legislation introduced in the 1990s and 2000s led to a “bunkerisation” of the border, which took the form of a series of technical measures and security infrastructure. These were put in place under the pressure of a context of fighting terrorism and under pressure from the English through the carriers. Reducing the permeability of the border proved to be an ineffectual objective and was above all a depiction not without consequence for exiled people, who saw their situation become more precarious as crossing times were extended. As we will see in the next chapter, the emergence of the concept of “irregular immigration” and the security focus that it entails resulted in the strengthening of the Interior Ministry's grip on the management of migratory flows and immigration.

TIMELINE – 1998-2012: THE BUNKERISATION OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH – €540 MILLION

INVESTMENTS – WORK TO ENSURE THE IMPERMEABILITY OF TRANSIT AREAS FROM 1998 TO 2012: €38 MILLION.

5 August 1998 (Port of Cherbourg): The international area is enclosed and a video surveillance system is installed. Cost: €912,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

1 January 2000 (Port of Calais): First security programme, which fences off the port, installs a video surveillance system and builds a security building. Cost: €6 million.

22 August 2001 (Port of Calais): “Zero Tolerance Plan” that strengthens internal fences with steel, installs gates in ports and hires 60 security guards. Cost: €4.5 million³⁶.

22 August 2001 (Ports of Dieppe, Cherbourg, Roscoff): Installation of fencing, detection systems and the putting in place of lorry inspection protocols. Cost not disclosed.

19 May 2002 (Calais-Fréthun station): Installation of a 4.5 km double fence and barbed wire and purchase of infrared surveillance equipment. Cost: €7.3 million³⁷.

4 February 2003 (Channel Tunnel): The British Army provides a scanner for checking heavy goods vehicles.

36. “Eurotunnel veut faire fermer le centre de Sangatte”, *Libération*, 22 August 2001.

37. “La sécurité encore renforcée”, *Le Parisien*, 19 May 2002.

23 January 2004 (Port of Dieppe): Purchase of a heart rate detector for checking heavy goods vehicles. Cost not disclosed.

1 January 2005 (Port of Calais): Second security programme that installs 48 fixed and mobile video surveillance cameras. Cost: €7 million (BERSON, 2011).

1 January 2005 (Port of Cherbourg): Reinforcement of fencing and upgrade of the video surveillance system. Cost: €100,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

1 June 2007 (Port of Dieppe): Doubling of the fence around the port. Cost not disclosed.

11 July 2007 (Port of Cherbourg): Expansion of the control area, installation of 2.5 metre fencing, installation of a video surveillance system, obligation to have a badge to access the area. Cost: €850,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

1 January 2008 (Port of Calais, Coquelles Eurotunnel Terminal, Port of Dunkirk): Use of detection dogs. Cost: €6 million from 2008 to 2012³⁸.

28 February 2008 (Port of Roscoff): Erection of a kilometre of fencing, installation of around 15 video cameras, purchase of two CO2 sensors. Cost: €500,000³⁹.

18 November 2008 (Port of Calais): Purchase of two thermal cameras. Cost not disclosed.

1 January 2009 (Port of Cherbourg): Increased security for the northern car park and the international area. Cost: €1.3 million (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

24 February 2010 (Eurotunnel): Installation of a network of 340 cameras. Cost not disclosed.

24 March 2010 (Port of Calais): Establishment of a joint Franco-British operational coordination centre.

15 June 2010 (Eurotunnel): Provision by Eurotunnel of a 600 m² building to accommodate the military. Cost: €600,000⁴⁰.

31 December 2011 (Port of Calais, Port of Dunkirk, Coquelles Eurotunnel Terminal): Signature of a 5-year contract with a private security company that provides for the searching of freight and the search for, detention and escorting of exiled people. Cost: €3.06 million in 2012.

OPERATING EXPENSES - 1998 TO 2012: €498 MILLION

Port of Cherbourg: €400,000 per year⁴¹, or €6 million over the period.

Port of Calais: €12 million per year⁴², or €180 million over the period.

Port of Dieppe: €300,000 per year⁴³, or €4.5 million over the period.

Port of Ouistreham-Caen: €500,000 per year⁴⁴, or €7.5 million over the period.

Channel Tunnel: €20 million per year⁴⁵, or €300 million over the period.

38. "Entreprises collabos", *Calais Research* [online].

39. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

40. "Communiqué de presse", *Getlink*, 15 June 2010.

41. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

42. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

43. "La sécurité du transmanche coûte cher au syndicat mixte de Dieppe", *Paris Normandie*, 12 May 2016.

44. "Menace terroriste et afflux de migrants : le port de Caen-Ouistreham renforce sa sécurité", *Actu*, 5 February 2017.

45. "Eurotunnel se dote de drones 'militaires' de surveillance", *20 minutes*, 29 June 2016.

NB: To create this database, we relied on press articles, academic work and activity reports from the companies concerned. On the one hand, this list is not exhaustive and, on the other hand, the amounts obtained do not always specify what they are made up of (in particular, whether or not operating costs are included), and therefore this is an estimate. Finally, the security measures put in place since 1998 are not solely intended to control migratory flows and exiled people, but they are regularly justified in the name of the fight against illegal immigration.

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CHAPTER 5: THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AS A MIGRATION TOUR OPERATOR: “THE MINISTRY HAS ALL THESE POLICIES, BUT IT DOES NOT DISCUSS” (PASCAL BRICE)

In 2010, Patrick Weil declared that Nicolas Sarkozy’s “dream” when he was Minister of the Interior was “to lead on all immigration, from visas to naturalisation, previously falling within the jurisdiction of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Social Affairs.”⁴⁶ In this chapter, we want to explain how this pre-emption of migration issues was established over a long period of time and resulted from the involvement of a series of senior officials from the Ministry of the Interior who framed immigration as a public problem. By promoting the concept of “selective immigration”, Nicolas Sarkozy placed “endured immigration” on the agenda, which requires the setting in motion of the administration and the police to lock up and remove “undesirables” (I). In three strokes, the Ministry of the Interior excluded the Ministries of Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Housing from migration policies, and the “social” handling of immigration was replaced by a mainly security-oriented framework (II). By taking over the OFPRA and strengthening its grip on the French Office for Immigration and Integration (OFII), the Ministry of the Interior made them instruments for combating irregular immigration. These two institutions aligned with the expectations of their supervisory authority, turning the right and access to asylum into a deterrence policy against exiled people (III).

I. “SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION” AGAINST EXILES

“In France, the right to asylum must be reformed immediately. (...) It is something essential that is absolutely part of our culture and history. But today, when someone applies for asylum, the decision takes 18 months, it is absurd and pointless. It is simply because we have not given ourselves the means to do so. Today, it is necessary to implement the means to handle the right to asylum in a very short time. (...) There are countries where many immigrants apply for asylum and for whom we know there are no political or personal safety grounds to justify it, and that it is simply an economic transfer. Donc la réforme du droit d’asile est tout à fait essentielle » (Intervention de Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, le 14 juillet 2002).

46. “La fin du ministère de l’Identité nationale, un leurre ?”, *Le Monde*, 15 November 2010.

“For too many years, France has been without a migration policy. The issuance of visas does not follow a sufficiently deliberate policy. The stream of legal immigration is entirely made up of flows that we endure, such as family reunification and asylum seekers. Less than 1 in 10 immigrants is selected based on criteria that meet the needs of our economy and our integration capacities. Overwhelmed by illegal immigration, France cannot increase the number of its immigrants in a regular situation. (...) I want our country to expand its room for manoeuvre to remain a country open to immigration, but within a controlled framework” (Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy of 3 July 2003, Minister of the Interior, concerning immigration control and the residence of foreigners in France).

By focusing on the topic of immigration, Nicolas Sarkozy placed on the agenda the concept of “selective immigration”, which is deployed according to two principles: a fight against irregular immigration and the reconsideration of legal immigration. In this chapter, the aim is to understand the placement of “selective immigration” on the agenda and how it was implemented against exiled people. In other words, the “selection” of “desirable” foreigners did not mean increasing their number, but reducing the number of people whose arrival was not desired (1). This strengthened a policy of deterrence against exiled people by fabricating their irregular status while strengthening measures for detention and removal based on targets (2).

1. The placement of “selective immigration” on the agenda

The concept of “selective immigration” has been promoted since the 1970s by “part of the senior administration, haunted by the fantasy of invasion and fascinated by the idea of operational control. It tirelessly gathered ‘objective’ evidence for ‘necessary’ immigration control” (PARROT, 2019, p. 58) by developing statistics on migration.

This had three effects: firstly, this part of the senior administration, initially dominated in the administrative spheres of the state, became legitimised there. Secondly, it defined the migratory flows, which it established as a “public problem”. Lastly, it placed the issue of the control of migratory flows and their management on the agenda (LAURENS, 2006).

From the late 1990s, “leaders fuelled discourse around France's ‘economic attractiveness’ and attempted to encourage the immigration of graduate workers” (PARROT, 2019, p. 122). In 2002, Nicolas Sarkozy became one of the political sponsors of these demands for greater control of immigration, which he first established as Minister of the Interior from 2002 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2007, and then as President of the Republic from 2007 to 2012. He framed the topic of immigration as a political marker.

PORTRAIT

PATRICK STEFANINI, IMMIGRATION EXPERT

The development of the concept of “selective immigration” is very directly linked to the involvement of a series of senior officials who were “experts” in immigration, such as Patrick Buisson and Patrick Stefanini. The latter, a graduate of the National School of Administration (ENA), was Chief of Staff to the Deputy Minister of Security, Robert Pandraud, from 1986 to 1988, before becoming Deputy Director of Foreigners and Cross-Border Traffic at the Directorate of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs from May 1988 to March 1991. In 1995 (then in 2002), he managed Jacques Chirac’s campaign before subsequently becoming deputy director in the office of Prime Minister Alain Juppé from 1995 to 1997. In 2005, he headed (at the request of Nicolas Sarkozy) the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control (CICI), responsible for coordinating the ministries working on immigration. He was one of the architects of the creation in 2007 of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, before becoming its Secretary General until 2009. More recently, he managed François Fillon’s campaign in 2017 and published a book in 2020: “Immigration, ces réalités qu’on nous cache”.

He describes himself as an “immigration specialist”, as Jean Godfroid, director of the OFII from 2006 to 2012, points out⁴⁷: “He has spent almost his entire career in the immigration sphere, he knows it inside out because he has done it his whole life”, who continues: “Objectively, Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy is largely inspired by Mr Stefanini.”

In 2009, presenting “the strands of government policy”, he stated that “in the early 2000s, France had lost control of migratory flows to its territory. First example: the number of asylum seekers. In 1995-1996, France received 15,000 to 16,000 asylum seekers per year. In 2002, their number (...) reached 80,000. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a source of immigration had been created over which the government had lost all control” (STEFANINI, 2009, p. 70-71).

With “selective immigration”, “public discourse on immigration was no longer based on the idea of stopping flows of economic immigration and the channelling of other flows (family immigration, student mobility, asylum), but on the substitution of so-called ‘endured’ immigration, i.e. based on the exercise of a fundamental right (right to lead a family life, right to asylum, etc.) for ‘selective’ immigration that is strictly economic and directed towards sectors with labour shortages” (VIPREY, 2010, p. 150).

Nicolas Sarkozy made increasing numbers of speeches distinguishing between “good” and “bad” foreigners, calling legal immigration into question:

“The stream of legal immigration is entirely made up of flows that we endure, such as family reunification and asylum seekers.”⁴⁸

47. Interview conducted on 18 June 2021.

48. “Statement by Nicolas Sarkozy on the immigration law”, 3 July 2003.

He spoke of controlling migratory flows, explaining that “France is overwhelmed by illegal immigration” and that it had to “better” control its borders and “better” control its immigration. “Selective immigration” aimed to “meet the needs of our economy and our integration capacities”, he explained.

This political rhetoric is illustrated by the concepts of “endured immigration” and “selective immigration”. The first sees irregular immigration, family reunification and asylum seekers as a population that has no place in France, while the second sees the selection by the State of workers who meet the needs of the economy as the key to better control of immigration. Nicolas Sarkozy maintained this opposition and the assimilation of “asylum” with endured immigration, stating to *Le Monde* on 12 July 2005:

“[From 1997 to 2002] legal immigration increased by 70%, while illegal immigration, fuelled by the explosion of asylum applications and the abdication of responsibility by the State in matters of deportation, reached levels never equalled in the past.”⁴⁹

“Selective immigration” took shape in the stepping up of the fight against irregular immigration, as evidenced by the law of 26 November 2003, which provides for: an extension of detention periods (from 12 to 32 days), the creation of a fingerprint and photo file (in relation to Eurodac) and stricter sentences for assisting irregular entry and residence. In addition, this law sets out requirements for integration before a residence permit is issued. This stricter approach “came at the expense of the fundamental rights of foreigners who found themselves in an irregular situation due to a refusal by the administration to regularise their situation or renew their residence permit” (VIPREY, 2010, p. 156-157).

Subsequently, on 10 December 2003, the law on the right to asylum aimed to address the time frame for obtaining a response to an asylum request. In order to reduce the time frame, the law provided for an acceleration of asylum application procedures through a stricter approach to the different stages of the asylum application and its examination, as well as the possibilities for obtaining refugee status.

The law of 24 July 2006 on immigration and integration enshrined the concept of “selective immigration”. The law stipulated that the resumption of labour immigration must meet the needs of the French economy, in which a structural labour shortage has been identified. The aim was also to “attract highly qualified foreigners” and “serious students” (STEFANINI, 2009, p. 71).

The concept of immigration quotas emerged, prompting criticism from the opposition and unions over “disposable immigration”. For Jean Godfroid, Director of the ANAEM (which became the OFII in 2009) from 2006 to 2012, the challenge “is to open the doors, but in a targeted way rather than having people working illegally.” This law essentially provided for a stricter approach to of possibilities for family reunification, the regularisation of foreigners in an irregular situation and the granting of a residence permit according to integration requirements.

Once he became President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy renewed this concept via the law of 20 November 2007, by restricting access to a residence permit and introducing a “family reception and integration contract”. This policy was based on the introduction of quotas for foreign people admitted by way of economic immigration.

The law of 16 June 2011, known as the “Besson/Hortefeux/Guéant” law, put the finishing touches to this structure for combating irregular immigration. It provided for the

49. “La politique d’immigration en question”, *Le Monde*, 12 July 2005.

transposition into French law of three European directives: the "Return", "European Blue Card" and "Sanctions" directives. It went even further, establishing new measures such as "administrative house arrest" and "electronic tagging". It also increased the maximum duration of administrative detention from 32 to 45 days, limited access to legal aid in the context of appeals to the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) and revised removal measures (the prefectural deportation order - APRF - became the OQTF) by removing time frames for return and reducing the time limits for appeals from one month to 48 hours.

2. The "target-based policy" serving "selective immigration"

In July 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy sent the Minister of Immigration⁵⁰, Brice Hortefeux, a mission statement asking him to set "immigration caps each year (...) and you will aim for the target for economic immigration to account for 50% of the total flow of entries (...) through the drastic reduction of family immigration and asylum applications as well as the increasing, on the basis of quantified targets, of the number of effective removals of foreigners in an irregular situation from the territory" (VIPREY, 2010, p. 163).

To meet the quantified targets, there was an increase in the number of financial mechanisms and incentives. The newly created Ministry of Immigration implemented two specific policies aimed at "regulating" immigration: the introduction of quotas for people admitted and co-development actions. These two policies were nevertheless conditional on the signature of readmission agreements, which were supplemented by an assisted voluntary return scheme.

First of all, regarding quotas, "the word is not spoken because it was contested before the administrative court. They are not quotas... but in reality they are quotas", explains Jean Godfroid. The aim here was to establish "joint agreements for the management of migratory flows" with third countries; "we have had agreements with Senegal and Tunisia in particular (...) So we have a contingent of employees, Tunisian workers authorised to come and work in France in sectors of activity recognised as being under pressure."

In exchange, readmission agreements were signed:

"We accept 8,000, 10,000 foreign workers every year from your country but in return, you have to take back the irregular immigrants who came to our country (...) So Tunisia undertook to readmit, to deliver consular passes for all people in an irregular situation" (Jean Godfroid).

These readmission agreements were supplemented by assisted voluntary return:

"It is a pecuniary payment that is given to foreigners in an irregular situation who, rather than going to a CRA and being forced to board a plane in handcuffs, return voluntarily with a pecuniary payment. In that case, OFII officers, at the end of the gangway, distribute a small pecuniary payment for the person who has decided to return home and who is received in their country of origin by an OFII representative who supplements this small pecuniary payment, and will ensure that the procedures decided in Paris are properly implemented for the development of projects that the foreigner in question will effectively lead. Because, obviously, the person is returning and the intention is not for them to fly back in the other direction tomorrow." (Jean Godfroid)

50. To make it less cumbersome, we will shorten the "Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development" to the Ministry of Immigration.

The objective here of “joint management agreements” was complemented by deportations organised in agreement with third countries in order to increase the number of removals, as Jean Godfroid explains: “any method avoiding readmission that requires the agreement of the country of origin is a good one, hence our idea to make these joint management agreements, including for them to accept their nationals without causing problems.” He goes further, and provides an example of this pressure on the state’s representatives:

“I knew a police prefect in Paris who couldn’t get the embassy to readmit his irregular immigrants, he blackmailed them by saying, ‘Your parking space there for your consular cars, you’ll see, ticket after ticket, they’ll be removed and impounded.’ Suddenly, he received consular passes.”

Finally, the State implemented co-development actions through cooperation credits: “We will focus more specifically on the regions in your country that are regions where there is a problem of increased unemployment”, explains Jean Godfroid. This policy was very directly inspired by the agreements that the EU has negotiated with around 20 third countries since the early 2000s. “Cooperation” enables third countries to access commercial markets, obtain development assistance or even visas. In return, they must commit to readmitting their nationals.

In other words, the aim was to do everything possible to effectively remove exiled people from French territory. To perfect the system, Nicolas Sarkozy introduced a real “target-based policy” by setting quantified targets to be met by his ministers and officers. This policy involved two mechanisms: “the results-based culture and the merit bonuses, aimed at compelling police officers to refocus their action on the hunt for migrants without a residence permit” (BABELS, 2019, p. 42).

Police work was changing and, in order to obtain individual and collective “exceptional performance bonuses”, police “ideally” targeted people in an irregular situation and people that could be deported: “the arrests of these people in an irregular situation help to push up the statistics for police stations (BABELS, 2019, p. 43).

While the number of people in an irregular situation remained stable in France over the period (between 400,000 and 500,000), the number of deportations, detentions and people taken into custody increased significantly.

Number of evictions between 2001 and 2012 (Source: Ministry of the Interior – DCPAF [Central Directorate of the Border Police] and OFII)												
Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Evictions	9,277	10,067	11,692	16,850	19,841	23,831	23,196	29,796	29,332	28,026	32,912	36,822
Of which “assisted returns”	644 (7%)	761 (8%)	947 (8%)	675 (4%)	647 (3%)	1,419 (6%)	3,311 (14%)	10,075 (34%)	11,910 (41%)	11,729 (42%)	13,584 (41%)	14,981 (41%)

Between 2001 and 2012, the number of annual deportations increased from 9,277 to 36,822 (see table above), and was mainly based on “statistical arrangements”, namely “a policy of encouraging return in exchange for financial payments and a concentration of removals on EU nationals (mainly people identified as Roma)” (BABELS, 2019, p. 43). Indeed, between 2001 and 2007, assisted returns accounted for a maximum of 3-14% of total deportations carried out. From 2007 until 2012, they accounted for 34-42% of the total.

Number of people "held" in CRAs between 2002 and 2012 (Source: Court of Accounts 2005-2008 / CICI 2002-2004 + 2009-2012)											
Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Mainland France	25,131	28,155	30,043	29,257	32,817	35,246	34,542	30,270	27,401	24,544	23,394
Abroad	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown	8,726	16,906	16,831	17,376	27,699	32,880	24,009	16,595
Total	25,131	28,155	30,043	37,983	49,723	52,077	51,918	57,969	60,281	48,553	39,989

The number of people arrested for entry and residence offences rose from 47,246 in 2001 to 111,692 in 2008. There were 40,000 people taken into custody in 1995, and 80,000 in 2007, for the same reasons. Lastly, the number of people "held" in CRAs increased from 14,260 in 1999 to 48,553 in 2011.

By pressuring the police to "make the numbers", Nicolas Sarkozy demonstrated both his effectiveness in the fight against irregular immigration, while embodying it. By arresting and removing exiled people, on the one hand, he proved that his policy was necessary and that these people were effectively "misusing" the system and, on the other, he established the existence of the immigration problem, justifying dedicating ever more human and financial resources to it.

In other words, the State placed the public problem of irregular immigration on the agenda, framed it according to a security-oriented mindset, with the production of objective statistics, and attempted to resolve it through a policing remedy and restrictive immigration legislation that reinforce the placement of the problem on the agenda, its framework and the solutions provided previously: it goes full circle.

The approach to migratory issues here was a security-oriented one, which coincided, as we will see in the next section, with their pre-emption by the Ministry of the Interior.

TIMELINE – 2002-2012: MIGRATION POLICIES IN FRANCE

29 August 2002: Internal security guidance and planning law, which provides for the stepping up of the fight against illegal immigration through increased mobilisation of police forces.

26 November 2003: Stricter migration policies, with an extension of the period for detaining foreigners (from 12 to 32 days), the creation of a fingerprint file for visa applicants, stricter control of reception certificates and, in particular, stricter conditions for obtaining residence permits.

10 December 2003: "De Villepin/Sarkozy" Asylum Law, which provides for an acceleration of asylum application procedures and a stricter approach to the different stages of the asylum application and its examination, as well as the possibilities of obtaining refugee status.

26 July 2004: Law on the conditions for the deportation of the persons concerned, which increases the cases in which a foreigner can be deported.

10 June 2005: Establishment of the CICI, chaired by Patrick Stefanini, architect of the Ministry of Immigration.

24 July 2006: Law on immigration and integration: commitment to move from "endured immigration" to "selective immigration".

14 November 2006: Law on controlling the validity of marriages.

20 November 2007: Law on immigration, integration and asylum making access to legal status more difficult.

28 July 2010: Government commitment to dismantle more than half of the 300 Roma and Traveller camps in France.

16 June 2011: The “Besson/Hortefeux/Guéant” law on immigration, integration and nationality, which provides for increased repression of people in an irregular situation by speeding up removal procedures, house arrest with electronic tagging, the possibility of creating virtual waiting areas and a ban on returning to French territory.

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II. IN THREE STROKES, IMMIGRATION MOVES TO THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

“We had an interministerial approach, it was a multidisciplinary approach, we had a social angle, through the Populations Directorate at the Ministry of Social Affairs, we had a diplomatic angle with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we had the right of residence and therefore the Ministry of the Interior. There was still a multidisciplinary approach and capacity for action, including the ability to rely on social actors, in particular the non-profit sector. All this effectively disappeared in 2010, since everything was put into the Ministry of the Interior and you have an over-determination of these policies by the Ministry of the Interior. (...) This is one of the problems, i.e. as long as we stay there, we will not get out. (...) We have a Ministry of the Interior that is not a discussion partner, i.e. the terrible thing is that the Ministry of the Interior has taken on all these policies (...) but the Ministry of the Interior does not discuss.” (Pascal Brice, director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018)⁵¹

As a result of the placement of the fight against irregular immigration on the agenda, the preponderance of European interior ministries increased. Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister of the Interior, was part of this dynamic and helped to make it the only ministry with responsibility for migration. This pre-emption was carried out in three strokes. The creation in 2005 of the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control (CICI) proved to be as much a space for coordination and control as a space for conversion to the fight against irregular immigration, with which each ministry had to comply (1). The CICI foreshadowed the organisation of the Ministry of Immigration, which, from 2007 to 2010, assumed the powers relating to migration policies previously assigned to other ministries (2) before becoming a fully-fledged directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (3).

1. The CICI: the watchful eye of the Ministry of the Interior

The creation of the CICI on 26 May 2005 ushered in the indirect takeover of migration policies by the Ministry of the Interior. The CICI is chaired by the Prime Minister or by the Minister of the Interior, who jointly appointed its General Secretary – Patrick Stefanini – and

51. Interview conducted on 3 June 2021

which has its own resources and staff (five officials in 2005). This body brings together all ministers and departments dealing with migration issues. It establishes the direction of the government's policy on controlling migratory flows concerning visas, asylum, the right of residence, integration, co-development and irregular immigration.

In 2005, after an initial "audit" resulting from its preparatory work, it set itself three priorities: reducing the time frame for the examination of asylum applications, fighting irregular immigration by tackling "abuses of procedure" and strengthening the CADA arrangements.

The aim of these priorities was to reduce the number of exiled people entering or already present in French territory via three main strands.

Firstly, this body fostered a results-based culture within the different administrations and ministries. It therefore produced statistics on migratory flows and gave quantified targets to the different ministries and departments. As Patrick Stefanini explains⁵², its actions involved the production of a "monthly dashboard (...) that enabled the various administrations concerned, first and foremost the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also the Ministry of the Interior, to check, month by month, that there was no divergence in the number of visas issued by a particular consular post."

The CICI acted as a watchdog, a space for monitoring the actions of the various departments in order to ensure the implementation of the fight against irregular immigration. For the Minister of the Interior at the time, it was a case of proving its effectiveness "based on targets".

Subsequently, it introduced monitoring practices through the presence of officials from the Ministry of the Interior within the functions of other ministries or new measures.

On the one hand, training was organised by PAF officers with consular and prefectural services to combat document fraud.

On the other hand, it required the "modernisation" of visa processing services via the trialling of the "biometric visa" and the transmission of information (photographs, fingerprints) in order to "better" combat irregular immigration. In this context, the body decided "to step up the equipping of prefectures with Eurodac terminals (...) to ensure very quickly that asylum seekers who arrived in France in a prefecture were not already known in another EU country that was a signatory to the Dublin Convention."⁵³

Thirdly, the aim was to enable the removal of rejected asylum applicants by reducing the time frame for the examination of asylum applications. Indeed, for Patrick Stefanini, if the time frame was "one or two years (...) it goes without saying that during this period, an asylum seeker has the opportunity to start settling in France and then it becomes extremely difficult, even though their application has been definitively rejected, to remove them from the national territory."⁵⁴

In particular, this involved the establishment of a list "of twelve countries considered to be safe countries of origin, the nationals of which now have their asylum applications processed according to the priority procedure, which means they have the opportunity to make an asylum application to the OFPRA but they are not granted residence in national territory."⁵⁵

52. Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Illegal Immigration, 2006.

53. Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Illegal Immigration, 2006.

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The CICI, through its composition, its missions and its supervisory authority – the Ministry of the Interior – acted as a body where the topics addressed and the statistics produced socialised the directorates involved in the fight against irregular immigration. By fostering a results-based culture through monthly reporting, the body ensured that the services aligned themselves with the expectations of the Minister of the Interior. For Patrick Stefanini, the CICI enabled him to understand the different ministerial competencies relating to immigration, which, as of 2007, were largely brought together within the Ministry of Immigration.

2. The Ministry of Immigration: the Ministry of the Interior's Trojan horse

The CICI – still in existence in 2021 – foreshadowed the creation of the Ministry of Immigration in 2007. Nicolas Sarkozy, the new President of the Republic, placed Brice Hortefeux at its head, who presented this ministry as “innovative (...) Its field of competence covers the entire journey of a potential foreign immigrant to France – from reception at the consulate to integration in our country and access to French nationality, or the return to the country of origin. [And] ambitious (...) We will be firm with immigrants who do not comply with the laws of the Republic.”⁵⁶

From the outset, the focus was on the fight against irregular immigration and on the action taken by Nicolas Sarkozy as Minister of the Interior during the previous term:

“Since 2002, a total of almost 100,000 foreigners in an irregular situation have been returned to their country of origin. (...) We are protecting our borders more effectively [by deporting] 35,000 illegal migrants. (...) A foreigner in an irregular situation is not, as a matter of principle, entitled to stay in France. He or she is entitled to return to his or her country, voluntarily or against their will.”⁵⁷

The target set was to deport 25,000 foreigners each year. At the time, the implementation of this “target-based policy” represented a cost of €27,000 per person deported, i.e. €687 million in 2007⁵⁸.

For Jean Godfroid, Director of the OFII from 2006 to 2012, behind the creation of this ministry, there was the aim of having “a coherent migration policy and one that was not divided between the responsibilities of several ministries. We were not in a phase in which we were going to block immigration; on the contrary, we wanted to manage immigration, which, at the time, we called selective immigration.”

This new ministry took over competencies previously assigned to the Ministries of the Interior, Labour, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs. It assumed the competencies of immigration (naturalisation, statistics relating to immigration and integration, preparation and implementation of rules relating to the conditions of entry, residence and exercise of a professional activity), integration (reception of foreigners, family reunification), national identity (memory and promotion of citizenship and of the principles and values of the Republic) and solidarity development (development assistance, assisted return).

These transfers of competencies entailed a transfer of staff and services, enabling the ministry to have a budget of €638.6 million (excluding shared policies). The new ministry became the supervisory authority of the OFPRA and ANAEM (which became the OFII in

56. “Statement by Brice Hortefeux”, 18 September 2007.

57. “Statement by Brice Hortefeux”, 18 September 2007.

58. “Immigration irrégulière : forte hausse du budget des reconduites à la frontière en 2007”, *Les Échos*, 28 September 2006.

2010), and saw the incorporation of the Population and Migration Directorate, whereas it was previously in the Ministries of Labour and Social Affairs. In addition, the young ministry had joint authority over certain directorates of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the Civil Liberties Directorate and the National Police – via a transfer of staff from the PAF.

In December 2007, the administrative structure set up by Patrick Stefanini was born. Various departments from other ministries were absorbed or disappeared – in particular, the Population and Migration Directorate – in order to form the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration – which, in 2013, would become the Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France (DGEF), as we will see in the third chapter. This Secretariat organised and coordinated the actions of the Ministry of Immigration.

During the first two years, there were administrative and governmental struggles concerning the transferred and shared prerogatives. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to retain control over the granting of visas and over co-development policies. Similarly, officials from other ministries remained within the jurisdiction of their original directorates.

This ministry appeared, above all, to be a coordinating actor, as Céline Burban notes: “according to former members of the ministerial cabinet, the aim was to create a “general staff” administration tasked with coordinating migration policies by having authority over the major directorates with responsibility for these issues” (BURBAN, 2009, p. 31).

As a result of the “General Review of Public Policies” (RGPP), on the one hand, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Labour were sidelined on the issues of immigration and integration, and, on the other hand, the Ministries of Immigration and of the Interior aligned, and had a series of ministerial decisions go their way:

“Two years after its creation, the Ministry of Immigration has therefore succeeded in asserting its position on immigration by implementing policies mainly dealing with “policing” management of immigration, focused on combating illegal immigration and promoting ‘selective immigration’” (BURBAN, 2009, p. 33).

These alignments can be explained, in particular, by the profiles of the directors and deputy directors in the Ministry of Immigration, for the most part senior management officials “from the Ministry of the Interior and the prefectural corps, in the image of Patrick Stefanini, General Secretary from May 2007 to April 2008 (...) and his successor, Stéphane Fratacci” (BURBAN, 2009, p. 33).

From the outset, this common ground with the Ministry of the Interior anticipated “the next move”, as Matthieu P., a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior explains:

“It was in three stages: in 2005, a period of foreshadowing, in which administrations were brought together in an interministerial framework, in 2007, a dedicated ministry with a dedicated administration, and in 2010, the integration of the entirety into the Ministry of the Interior. (...) It was a grouping of all immigration missions within a single ministry, the Ministry of the Interior.”

He continues:

“The addition of the concept of national identity, with a political declaration of intent, a subject that is very controversial politically... intentionally. This was probably not conducive to the sustainability of this Ministry of Immigration, which was immediately too political to be sustainable.”

The Ministry of Immigration drew criticism from its inception. During its three years of existence, it took over a large share of the immigration competencies of the Ministries of

Foreign Affairs, Housing and Social Affairs. In 2010, following its demise, the opposition and some members of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) welcomed this, seeing in the expression of “national identity” a controversial and politically costly subject. However, the administrative structure and its political scope remained, becoming a directorate of the Ministry of the Interior.

3. The Ministry of the Interior: the sole ministry responsible for migration

“The celebration of the demise of the Ministry of Immigration and National Identity can only be short-lived, when we see that the entire immigration sector is coming under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. I think it was a dream of Nicolas Sarkozy when he was in this post, to lead on all immigration, from visas to naturalisation, previously within the jurisdiction of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Social Affairs. Immigration policy needs perspectives other than those of the police and prefects.”⁵⁹ (Patrick Weil, director of research at the CNRS and migration specialist)

In 2010, the Ministry of Immigration was dissolved, while the missions carried out by the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration became a directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. With this “three-cushion billiards shot”, the Ministry of the Interior became the only ministry responsible for migration in 2010.

Three lines of argument are used by the actors interviewed to justify this pre-emption of migration issues by the Ministry of the Interior.

The first argument would be for increased resources for immigration and greater legitimacy within the government, as Matthieu P., a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior, explains: “The advantage of being within the Ministry of the Interior is being in a large ministry and so decisions often go your way”, and he goes further:

“Having a single ministry still gives us greater negotiating power when it comes to requesting additional accommodation spaces and additional budgets.”

Lucie P.⁶⁰, a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior, agrees: “The move to the Ministry of the Interior gives greater legitimacy to what is said in the Council of Ministers.” This greater “legitimacy” is coupled with a lower permeability to demands from associations, she says: “There is less pressure from the non-profit sector on the Ministry of the Interior than on the social ministries, which are more sensitive to this.” She also explains that the balance of power with local elected officials is in favour of the Ministry of the Interior, particularly when it comes to finding accommodation spaces:

“When you need to create additional centres, do you think that local elected officials agree to put them in their areas? No one wants them! When it comes to finding places, the Ministry of the Interior says: ‘Each department, you will give us this many spaces. You sort it out, you will give us this many spaces!’”

The second argument relates to greater effectiveness in dealing with migratory issues, as Jean Godfroid says:

“Integration was social affairs, immigration, on the one hand, residence permits,

59. “La fin du ministère de l'Identité nationale, un leurre ?”, *Le Monde*, 15 November 2010.

60. Interview conducted in June 2021. We preserved his anonymity at his request.

the Ministry of the Interior, on the other, visas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so three institutional contacts (...) For labour, the officials of the Ministry of Labour who dealt with work permit procedures for foreigners, they were under the authority of the prefect (...) If there was an authorisation, the visa was issued by the consul who also examined the application (...) and when a person arrived in France, it was the prefecture that issued the residence permit. (...) In short, a lot of time was lost."

Matthieu P. explains that "when you are the Minister of the Interior, you have a direct line to the prefects", and he continues: "[this grouping together] has enabled greater synergy, between the asylum seeker accommodation issues and asylum seeker residence issues, between residence permit issuance issues and integration issues (...) Most of the gain is in the processing of asylum applications, where we have had much more integrated processing than in the past."

The third and final argument is "European benchmarking". The French State is said to import a model driven from "above" via a phenomenon of "mimetic isomorphism", in the sense that in an uncertain context, institutions take external references in order to reform themselves. Lucie P. agrees:

"The landscape is somewhat aligned with European systems, in Germany, it is the Ministry of the Interior that does it all", while nevertheless specifying that from one country to another, the image and competencies of the Ministry of the Interior differ: "In Germany, the Ministry of the Interior does not have the same image as in France because, in fact, it is the Ministry of Internal Affairs, we are not only the ministry of law and order, but also of the territories, citizenship and elections."

This mimetic isomorphism is coupled with coercive isomorphism through the influence of European directives, explains Matthieu P.:

"In terms of asylum, this is the organisation that prevails throughout Europe, with public institutions in each case, a bit like the OFPRA or the OFII, a fairly strong integration towards which the directives push us."

Here, the three lines of argument used complement more than they oppose one another. This structural reform, considered for a long period of time, affirmed the preponderance of the Ministry of the Interior, giving it "substantial power", explains Matthieu P., not without effect depending on the political inclination of the Minister of the Interior in place, he says:

"From an administrative point of view, it is quite a good reform, from a political point of view, the reform is neutral. It is the politicians who will make more or less different speeches on immigration issues, according to their own sensibility and according to the political majority to which they answer."

For Jacques Toubon⁶¹, this reform reflects "a complete shift, migration policy is no longer, or almost no longer, a social and human policy, it is a public order policy." He thus notes the preponderance of the Ministry of the Interior, even on subjects that are not directly within its remit, such as the list of countries that qualify for asylum:

"The officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs establish the list of countries that can qualify for asylum, but it is predominantly the Ministry of the Interior, through its information, that influences asylum decisions!"

61. Interview conducted on 22 May 2021

Pascal Brice, Director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018, regrets that since the movement of immigration to the Ministry of the Interior there is no longer a “multidisciplinary approach”: “we had a social angle, through the Populations Directorate at the Ministry of Social Affairs, we had a diplomatic angle with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we had the right of residence and therefore the Ministry of the Interior.” He goes further, pointing out the lack of dialogue with associations:

“There was still a multidisciplinary approach and capacity for action, including the ability to rely on social players, in particular, the non-profit sector. All this effectively disappeared in 2010, since everything was put in the Ministry of the Interior and you have an over-determination of these policies by the Ministry of the Interior (...) Today, the Ministry of the Interior does not discuss.”

In three stages, the Ministry of the Interior took ownership of all migration policies: on the one hand, the creation of the CICI forced interministerial working in order to ensure – through the establishment of a “target-based policy” – departments and ministries conformed to the objectives of combating irregular immigration; on the other hand, the creation of the Ministry of Immigration justified the creation of a central organisation made up of the immigration departments of the various ministries; and finally, the Ministry of Immigration became a fully-fledged directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, which has since continued to increase its human and financial resources as well as its prerogatives.

The emergence of the Ministry of the Interior as the single actor on migration strengthened a security-oriented mindset of maintaining law and order, and combating irregular immigration, which it then instilled in the OFII and the OFPRA. These two institutions are accountable to the Ministry of the Interior and became actors in the policy of deterrence. As a result of these developments, asylum, which is based on a mindset of protecting persecuted people, became a flow of immigration “like any other”, against which the State and its departments fight to reduce irregular immigration.

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR’S PRE-EMPTION OF THE IMMIGRATION SECTOR

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
1926	Creation of the association Soutien, solidarité et actions en faveur des émigrants (SSAE), which helps migrants and their families in France and informs foreigners of their rights.			
1945	Creation of the National Office of Immigration (ONI), which is responsible for the recruitment of foreign labour and the regularisation of foreign workers. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Public Health and Population.</u>			

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
1946		Creation by the UN of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to manage the migratory flows resulting from the Second World War. It is independent of the states.		
1952		Dissolution of the IRO, which is replaced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).		
1952		The French government, critical of the autonomy taken by the IRO, decides to create its own organisation to manage refugees: the OFPRA. The Office hires some of the former staff of the IRO. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</u>	Establishment of the Refugee Appeals Board (CRR). This court rules on appeals concerning OFPRA decisions on asylum seekers. <u>Under the authority of the OFPRA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</u>	
1958	Creation of the Social Action Fund (FAS) for Muslim workers from Algeria in mainland France and their families. It is responsible for the integration of immigrants. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs</u>			
1966				Creation of the Population and Migration Directorate, responsible for the organisation of migration, reception, integration and naturalisation. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</u>
1988	The ONI is replaced by the Office for International Migrations (OMI). <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour.</u>			
2001	The FAS becomes the Integration and Anti-Discrimination Assistance and Support Fund (FASILD), thereby expanding its target population. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs.</u>			

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
2005	The OMI and part of the SSAE merge to create the French National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration (ANAEM). <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs</u>			Establishment of the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control (CICI), chaired by Patrick Stefanini, architect of the Ministry of Immigration.
2006	The FASILD is replaced by the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities (ACSÉ). <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Immigration.</u>			
2007		<u>The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the OFPRA.</u>	The National Court of Asylum (CNDA) replaces the CRR.	Establishment of the Ministry of Immigration, which takes over the areas of Immigration (previously the Ministries of Labour, Foreign Affairs and the Interior), Integration (previously the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Solidarity Development (previously the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
2007				The Population and Migration Directorate is dissolved and its responsibilities are taken over by the Ministry of Immigration.
2007				Creation of the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration (SGII) to organise the administration of the Ministry of Immigration.
2007			<u>The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the CNDA.</u>	
2008	The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the ANAEM.			
2009	The ANAEM and ACSÉ merge to create the OFII. This institution receives and supports asylum seekers, processes applications for legal immigration (family, professional), organises assisted voluntary return and gives medical advice. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Immigration.</u>		<u>The Council of State becomes the supervisory authority of the CNDA.</u>	

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
2010	The SSAE is dissolved.			The Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL) for homeless or poorly housed people is created. <u>It falls within the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Administration.</u>
2010	<u>The Ministry of the Interior becomes the supervisory authority of the OFII.</u>	<u>The Ministry of the Interior becomes the supervisory authority of the OFPRA</u> , which issues opinions to the Ministry of the Interior on applications requesting access to the French territory in the context of asylum procedures.		The Ministry of Immigration is dissolved and becomes the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.</u>
2013				The Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France (DGEF) is created. It replaces the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration. <u>It remains a separate directorate of the Ministry of the Interior.</u>

III. THE OFII AND THE OFPRA: THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR'S ORGANISED DETERRENCE POLICY

“Technically, the OFII and the OFPRA are answerable to the Ministry of the Interior. This is not the case for the National Court of Asylum, which is answerable to the Council of State.” (Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001 and today an assessor at the CNDA⁶²)

In 2010, as a result of the abolition of the Ministry of Immigration, the Ministry of the Interior became the supervisory authority of the OFII and the OFPRA. Thus, the Ministry of the Interior controlled the asylum chain: access to the territory and procedures, support for asylum seekers, the granting of refugee status, integration and the fight against irregular immigration. Among the state institutions, only the National Court of Asylum (CNDA) retained its own autonomy, even if it was contested and subject to constraints. In this part, we want to revisit the institutions in charge of asylum as well as the way in which the Ministry of the Interior domesticated them in order to make them its enforcers of its restrictive policy towards exiled people and of the fight against irregular immigration. We will revisit the origins of the OFII. Initially competent in the recruitment of foreign workers

62. Interview conducted on 12 June 2021

and their regularisation, the OFII developed and then took charge of the reception and supporting of asylum seekers, while organising assisted voluntary return (1). For its part, the OFPRA was tasked with examining the asylum applications (2) before becoming a tool of the Ministry of the Interior to reduce the number of asylum seekers present in French territory (3).

1. The OFII: an agency serving the fight against immigration

The creation of the OFII in 2009 was based on a series of name changes (ONI then OMI) and mergers with no fewer than five institutions (SSAE, FAS/FASILD, ACSÉ, ANAEM). Its current form results, in particular, from administrative reforms given impetus in 2007 with the General Review of Public Policies (RGPP), which aimed to create government “agencies”, perceived as more flexible and efficient by the legislator since they were intended to become single points of contact. In practice, these agencies enabled the State to reassert its power over them through direct control, via the appointment of their representatives and direct authority over a single structure. As Frédéric Pierru notes in the field of health, the agencies were “decision-making levers to the detriment of all checks and balances, whether political (local elected officials), medical or by trade unions” (PIERRU, 2010, p. 32). Here, the form taken by the OFII enabled the State – and therefore the Ministry of the Interior – to reassert its authority. The Ministry of the Interior made it a tool for promoting “selective immigration” by combating irregular immigration.

The precursor to the OFII was the National Office of Immigration (ONI). This body was created in 1945 in the post-war period to organise the recruitment of foreign workers to help rebuild the country. By virtue of its missions, it was initially under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and of the Ministry of Health and Population. The ONI, which had a monopoly on the recruitment of foreigners, opened centres abroad – particularly in Italy – in order to recruit, while also organising the regularisation of undocumented immigrants in France and the deportation of foreigners who were ill. In the 1960s, new centres opened abroad, in Spain, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, Morocco and Turkey. The aim was to target seasonal workers, permanent immigration and the regularisation of undocumented immigrants. Through its missions, the ONI “selected profiles according to their physical and intellectual abilities” and “conducted medical check-ups”, controlling migratory flows through its practices.

In the 1970s, the calling into question of labour immigration changed the missions of the ONI, which got involved, on the one hand, in the organisation of family immigration, in particular through the control of the resources of foreign workers residing in France and, on the other hand, in assisted voluntary return. In 1988, the ONI became the Office for International Migrations (OMI) and came under the sole authority of the Ministry of Labour. It took on new topics, such as expatriation.

In the early 2000s, the IMO then had a “real war chest”, explains Jean Godfroid, through its monopoly in the recruitment of foreign workers, which expanded its missions: “Due to its own resources, the Budget Directorate and the interministerial said: ‘Let's use these own resources to fund integration actions that we are already carrying out, rather than paying the Fund for Aid and Support for Integration and the Fight Against Discrimination (FASILD) out of our budget resources, let's ask the ONI to take care of managing the integration procedures for foreigners arriving in France.’” There were three reasons why the ONI was interested in the reception of foreigners, not just asylum seekers.

On the one hand, in 2005, the OMI absorbed part of the Support, Solidarity and Actions for Emigrants (SSAÉ) association, in charge of helping migrants and their families, giving rise to the National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration (ANAEM), under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs.

On the other hand, the FASILD, under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs, was abolished in 2006 and replaced by the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities (ACSÉ). This agency then focused its missions on equal opportunities in the territories, under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Immigration.

Lastly, the merger in 2009 of the ANAEM and part of the ACSÉ resulted in the creation of the OFII, initially under the authority of the Ministry of Immigration, before switching to the Ministry of the Interior in 2010.

A FEW WORDS ON THE FASILD:

The FASILD came out of the Social Action Fund for Algerian Muslim workers (FAS). "The FAS was about integrating families, immigrants and their families, it was taking the key moments of arrival and putting everything into training them. But very quickly, we took care of the second and third generations, and the third generation were essentially French and the question was how to ensure that society accepted them and that they fully played their part. So this was not about integration, but about discrimination, equal opportunities, rights and the fight against discrimination, hence the FASILD."⁶³

According to Matthieu P., a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, two reasons explain the abolition of the FASILD in 2006: on the one hand, by funding itself directly out of Family Allowance Fund (CAF) budgets, "the FASILD had become, from the point of view of the government at the time, too autonomous. The Minister of Social Affairs did not like the autonomy taken by the FASILD, which, it is true, had the culture of a public institution, which did not account much for the use of its budgets." On the other hand, "the minister at the time wanted to create a Reception and Integration Contract via training provided by the FASILD, but the FASILD resisted, no doubt a little too much (...) The abolition of the FASILD was linked to the intentions of the Minister of Social Affairs at the time."

The abolition of the FASILD in 2006 left a series of missions unfulfilled by the creation of the ACSÉ, such as the fight against discrimination and "much less funding for associations": "Many major associations disappeared with the demise of the FAS", explains Jean Godfroid, who continues: "The FAS actually financed social integration and language training actions, and finally actions contributing to the integration of workers." Today, integration is led by the OFII, but, as we are informed by a former director of a FASILD office, "they do the minimum", and she continues: "They do a lot of work on nationality, on European programmes, on research, on funding language training... but not on integration like the FAS did."

63. Interview conducted in May 2021 with a former director of a FASILD office.

Jean Godfroid, who headed the ANAEM from 2006 to 2009 and then the OFII from 2009 to 2012, tells us about these two mergers.

The first merger concerned the OMI and the SSAÉ, which gave rise to the ANAEM, with the aim being to “integrate 400 employees from the SSAÉ”, then the second between the ANAEM and the ACSÉ in 2009 with the integration of “around a hundred with the employees of the FASILD, who did not really want to return to the OFII, many left.”

According to Jean Godfroid, these mergers “were painful (...) There was a real problem of very different common cultures...”, and he continues: “There were social workers and trainers, who had to work with people who were more like managers of administrative procedures.” Of the 400 employees from the SSAÉ, “many left the institution to pursue other vocations... They were social workers basically specialising in migration, in this association, they took care of Spanish refugees who fled Mussolini or Nazism, a very specific culture of the inter-war period that continued for a very long time (...) These social workers had this culture of providing assistance to asylum seekers, which was not at all the job of the Office for Immigration, subject to exceptions.” The message sent to former SSAÉ employees was then as follows:

“You social workers of the SSAÉ, you no longer have to manage assistance to asylum seekers, your job is to help with the integration of legal immigrants who have papers and who must complete a training course on the values of the Republic and to learn French.”

The agency's project was evolving and was moving towards the establishment of a reception platform and of the reception and integration contract, two measures perceived as “a plan to systematically cut foreigners off from social services combined with a desire to domesticate the population concerned, with knowledge of French as the key element (...) Now the task is to ‘inform’ migrants, not about their rights and the possibilities available to them any more, but about the rights of the State with respect to them” (MORICE, 2007).

At the same time, the OFII was developing its assisted return policy in order to encourage the departure of people in an irregular situation but also of foreigners settled in France in order to meet the targets of the Ministry of the Interior to reduce the number of people in an irregular situation.

Thus, from the ONI in 1945 to the OFII in 2009, a series of reforms, mergers and name changes resulted in the taking over of the missions of the abolished structures or even in their disappearance. The new priorities of the OFII focused on “integrating” asylum seekers whose applications had been accepted and people in the context of family reunification or labour immigration, while organising the assisted voluntary return and reintegration of foreigners whose entitlements had ended or who were in an irregular situation in their country of origin. The disappearance of structures, of the missions they carried out and of the associated funding had a direct impact on access to asylum procedures. Indeed, there was a lack of information for exiled people, as the OFII only provided marginal support to those seeking the procedures to be followed in French territory.

During the same period, the OFPRA also saw its missions and supervisory authority change, until it too became an “agency” of the Ministry of the Interior with relative autonomy, which had to meet quantified targets.

2. The OFPRA: the origin of an institution that moved to the Ministry of the Interior

After the Second World War, asylum applications were processed by the International Refugee Organization (IRO). This body had the authority to recognise or otherwise the refugee status of people fleeing persecution. Its staff were mostly former refugees, prompting criticism

of their “political activism”. In a context of rising unemployment, political actors challenged the prerogatives of the IRO: “asylum” and “labour” (AKOKA, SPIRE, 2013) were confused. A form of consensus then emerged “that the country already had too many refugees, that it was therefore essential to prevent any risk of a new influx” (NOIRIEL, 2012, p. 144).

Very quickly, there was a desire to regain control over the handling of asylum. The law of July 1952 gave rise to the OFPRA, “nationalising” the authority to grant asylum. At that time, the legislator chose to link the OFPRA to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order “to separate the issue of refugees from the public order issues placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior” (BERNARD-RAYMOND, FRÉCON, 2010).

The Office employed consular officials from third countries who were responsible for supporting their compatriots in their asylum procedures. The legitimacy of the consular officials was in this case based on “their in-depth knowledge of the situation in the countries of origin” (AKOKA, SPIRE, 2013). Until the early 1980s, officials were recruited according to criteria of cultural proximity with asylum seekers, but when the number of asylum applications increased in 1984 and 1988 (from 21,714 to 34,352) and then “exploded” in 1989, with 61,422 applications, the State recruited new younger, more qualified officials of French origin. There was a move from “legitimacy based on an in-depth knowledge of a language, a country or the experience of exile, to legitimacy based on qualification by diploma” (AKOKA, SPIRE, 2013).

In the early 1980s, leaders “declared the first asylum crisis” (PARROT, 2019, p. 151). For Claire Rodier, “for some time, the typical profile of applicants had changed: less intellectual, less white, thrown into exile for more complex reasons than those who had driven out their predecessors, victims of the Cold War and clearly identified dictatorships. And, above all, these asylum seekers were coming from everywhere and in ever greater numbers” (RODIER, 2002, p. 110). In this context, the rate of refusals to grant asylum increased: 15% in 1980, 56% in 1985 and 85% in 1990.

In the early 1990s, the OFPRA became one of the government's actors in its policy for controlling migratory flows. As proof, in 1993, the Ministry of the Interior imposed a new intermediary between asylum seekers and the OFPRA: the prefecture, while asylum applications were conditional on a residence permit:

“An application for recognition of refugee status may only be submitted to the OFPRA after the state representative in the department or, in Paris, the prefect of police, has registered the asylum seeker's application for a residence permit” (ALAUX, 2004).

Human and financial resources increased in order to reduce the time frames for examining applications, while the steps towards a results-based culture started being taken. There was a move from a granting of asylum mindset to one of control. For OFPRA officials, “whereas, up until that point, their mission had consisted of implementing integration and selection, they were now, for the most part, only dealing with selection and, in this context, no longer came into contact with recognised refugees” (AKOKA, SPIRE, 2013).

There was then a professionalisation of agents, in which the granting of asylum was based on control and investigation of the situation of applicants. Officials were put under pressure and had to keep count of the cases examined:

“The records were given to line managers who reprimanded or congratulated them, accordingly. At the same time, bonuses are awarded to those who ‘make their numbers’” (AKOKA, SPIRE, 2013).

These transformations had perverse effects: on the one hand, officials preferred “easy” cases in order to reach their targets more quickly, and, on the other hand, the examination of cases was shortened in order to keep up the pace.

Evolution of the number of initial asylum applications (excluding accompanying minors) (Source: OFPRA/Ministry of the Interior/2013 Review)												
Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2002-2012
Initial applications	50,969	52,526	50,501	42,487	26,215	23,757	26,993	33,036	36,771	40,308	41,132	38,609
OFPRA grants	10.7%	10.4%	10.9%	9.1%	12.1%	15.8%	18.5%	15.3%	13.4%	11.1%	11.9%	12.65 %
CNDA grants	10.3%	10.9%	12.7%	16.1%	19.8%	19.6%	18.0%	15.0%	14.5%	13.2%	12.6%	14.79%
Grants	10,703	11,188	11,918	10,707	8,363	8,410	9,852	10,010	10,259	9,795	10,077	10,596

Over the period 2002-2012, there was an average of 38,609 initial asylum applications each year, with 10,596 recognitions of status (asylum and statelessness). This recognition remained stable, even when the number of asylum applications increased (as in 2003, with 52,526 applications with 11,188 recognitions and 2012, with 41,132 applications with 10,077 recognitions), suggesting a cap implicit in the number of statuses that officers could grant, thereby strengthening their “discretionary power”. For Jean Godfroid, this fluctuation in asylum applications can be explained in two ways.

On the one hand, according to him, it was the result of poor organisation of the reception of asylum seekers” as well as the influence of associations: “associations are paid according to their turnover, they were inclined to promote asylum applications in their territory.”

To combat this phenomenon, he explains that Patrick Stefanini, at the head of the CICI, “refocused all the procedures prior to asylum application examination at regional level to control the call for asylum applications resulting from the activism of a certain number of departmental structures.”

On the other hand, Jean Godfroid sees the asylum application as “a backdoor means of entry into the territory, less restricted than somewhat regulated procedures such as family reunification or labour immigration.” He illustrates his point:

“A person applies for asylum, they have no basis for it, their case is reworked by France Terre d’Asile or Forum Réfugiés or another association, and it becomes a case that is submitted to the OFPRA... But the OFPRA is not designed to deal with 120,000 asylum applications as is the case today, and the CNDA even less so.”

The increase in the number of cases was said to clog up the system, extending the length of stay of asylum seekers:

“Behind this, there are delays, guys have been settled in France for three years before obtaining a refusal of their application, even though they are completely settled... He works, the family, the kids, local associations such as Secours Catholique, La Cimade, take care of their integration, we give them free French lessons... With all this work, how do you expect the prefect to return a rejected asylum applicant who is fully integrated? So it doesn't work, that's why you have so many illegals.”

In other words, through a process of the disorganisation of non-profit structures, the aim was to make access to information for asylum seekers more complex. Jean Godfroid, at the head of the ANAEM and then of the OFII during this period – and therefore responsible for the integration of people – held the associations responsible for the increase in the

number of asylum seekers or for “misusing” the system by integrating people awaiting recognition (or otherwise) of their status.

Moreover, the increase in the number of asylum applications was detached from the political contexts and conflicts that exiled people were fleeing. There was a mindset of accounting and public action efficiency. For the State, recognition of status took precedence over the integration of people; an efficient and rapid system appeared to be aimed at preventing people from settling long-term. The underlying objective was to meet the expectations of the government: fewer asylum applications and the effective removal of people who had been rejected.

Until 2003, the OFPRA was subject to UNHCR supervision and had to cooperate with it. The 2003 Asylum Law “nationalised” the OFPRA, which was only answerable to the French State for its practices. The Ministry of the Interior’s control over the Office was increased since the law specifies that the Director of the OFPRA is appointed by decree on a joint proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior.

In addition, the OFPRA and the Refugee Appeals Board had to “participate in the removal of rejected asylum applicants by providing the authorities concerned with relevant information on civil status and nationality” (AL AUX, 2004).

In other words, these two institutions rejected and then took part in the removal of exiled people immediately afterwards: “as a result of the reform, the Ministry of the Interior is imposing its preoccupation with repression on institutions dedicated to protection” (AL AUX, 2004). For Jean-Pierre Alaux, behind this asylum reform, the aim was to “deter the persecuted from coming to take refuge in its territory and, on the other hand, rejecting the most persistent among them” (AL AUX, 2004).

In 2007, this mindset of deterrence was strengthened when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost control of the OFPRA to the Ministry of Immigration. The OFPRA then had to align itself with the expectations of its new supervisory authority: the reduction of irregular immigration. The priority procedure – introduced by the 2003 Asylum Law – became the norm; officials were asked to maintain suspicion with respect to “false refugees”, in particular, via the 2011 asylum law in which foreigners who have altered their fingerprints have their applications processed in the priority procedure, involving faster examination and more frequent rejections.

At the same time, the list of safe countries – introduced in 2005 – grew longer, enabling, on the one hand, use of the priority procedure and, on the other hand, increased suspicion with respect to “false refugees”. According to Jean Godfroid, former Director of the OFII, “barely 10 or 15% of applications result in protection, which means that there are 85% false asylum applications.” The more the State restricted access to asylum procedures, the more refusals increased, as did the suspicion of “fraud” that a refusal was said to illustrate.

In 2010, the abolition of the Ministry of Immigration and its incorporation into the Ministry of the Interior put the OFPRA under its control. While OFPRA specifies on its website that “This is a financial and administrative supervision, which in no way affects the functional independence of OFPRA”, the fact remains that it has to meet the quantified targets of the Ministry of the Interior and that the latter has influence over the list of so-called “safe” countries, while some of its missions are subject to the agreement of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the asylum procedure at the border, as the Office explains: “OFPRA gives an opinion to the Minister of the Interior on the manifestly founded character or not of a request for authorization to enter French territory for asylum purposes.”

This subordination of the OFPRA (and of the OFII) to the Ministry of the Interior is in contrast to other institutions, such as the CNDA. Jean Dussourd, today an assessor at the CNDA, asserts this independence: "Technically, the OFII and the OFPRA are answerable to the Ministry of the Interior. This is not the case for the National Court of Asylum, which is answerable to the Council of State."

The CNDA was created in 1952, initially under the name of the Refugee Appeals Board at the time of the creation of the OFPRA. This court rules on appeals against OFPRA decisions, thus enabling rejected asylum applicants to have their applications reviewed. Jean Dussourd explains the missions of the CNDA:

"We process cases following a refusal by the OFPRA, it is a kind of cassation, and we grant asylum when it we deem it necessary."

Initially under the authority of the OFPRA and therefore of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2007, it became the CNDA and came under the authority of the Ministry of Immigration, before moving to the Council of State on 1 January 2009. For the legislator, this subordination to the OFPRA "was an institutional anomaly. Indeed, the Board's material subordination to the public establishment subject to its oversight called into question the principle of impartiality of the court."⁶⁴

The history of the OFII and the OFPRA is that of their domestication by the Ministry of the Interior. These two offices served in the fight against irregular immigration through the preponderance of a results-based culture. Regarding the processing of asylum applications, how does OFPRA institutionally produce the refusal to grant refugee status?

3. The OFPRA: The institutional production of refusal

"To sum up, the OFPRA's job is to say no. This year [2020] it has had to manage around a hundred thousand asylum applications, less because of COVID, they have to approve 20% of the applications. We receive around 30,000 applications at the CNDA, we grant asylum to 30% of the people that OFPRA has refused." (Jean Dussourd, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001, today an assessor at the CNDA)

Since 1951, France has been a signatory to the international Geneva Convention, which defines refugees as any person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality". However, France – like other states – does not consider membership of a "group" to be sufficient to obtain asylum:

"Asylum applicants must also establish that they are being personally targeted and, even if the reasons for persecution refer to collective membership (race, nationality, social group, etc.), the Convention de facto ushered in the era of the case-by-case examination of individual situations" (PARROT, 2019, p. 150).

Simply put, through this interpretation, the OFPRA individualises the processing of asylum applications. Coupled with being subject to the results-based culture established by the Ministry of the Interior and its enlistment in the fight against irregular immigration, the OFPRA's practices are characterised by the institutional production of refusal, a form

64. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Jean-Claude Frécon, La CNDA : une juridiction neuve, confrontée à des problèmes récurrents, Information report of the Finance Committee of the Senate, 6 October 2010.

of deterrence policy organised to prevent exiled people from accessing procedures, and when they do access them, suspicion is cast on them in which each error becomes an obstacle to obtaining a residence permit. We want to revisit here the way in which this system fabricates the irregular status of persons and, ultimately, their deportation or “self-deportation” from the territory.

The deterrence policy organised via the OFPRA is embodied in the little information it disseminates to asylum applicants regarding procedures, and in access to procedures made more complex by the closure of the prefecture counters where applicants have to register their asylum application. Without this registration, people cannot pick up a file for the OFPRA and in this way obtain a provisional residence permit. They have to make an appointment and wait several months.

Since 2015, reception platforms managed by non-profit service providers have handled appointments at the prefecture, resulting in saturation in access to the service from the outset and no reduction in waiting times, as Jean Dussourd explains:

“For 18 months, with digitisation, which was not only technical, but also very political, it has been extremely difficult to get an appointment, only online. We are in a very particular phase, which is getting much tougher.”

This is an additional obstacle to obtaining a file, extending their irregular status and the risk of being checked by the police and, therefore, of being expelled. Furthermore, people cannot, during this period of time, benefit from the rights granted to asylum seekers: accommodation, benefits, access to the labour market after one year. In 2004, Jean-Pierre Alaux was already characterising this “impediment” as “homelessness”: “It is the secret weapon of deterrence against asylum” (ALAUX, 2004).

Without a residence permit, even a provisional one, asylum seekers may be issued an obligation to leave the territory (OQTF), which can lead to their detention for the purpose of organising their “removal”:

“While in most cases deportation does not occur, the order to leave the territory remains valid and places its holder in an accelerated procedure if he or she eventually manages to file an application for international protection (...) This is a constant in the legislation concerning foreigners: combining pernicky and absurd rules with illegal administrative practices and, in doing so, forcing a foreigner to make a mistake, while at the same time setting up a strict system against fraudsters and liars” (PARROT, 2019, p. 170).

If a person actually manages to submit an application, his or her fingerprints are taken at the prefecture and, if they have been recorded in the Eurodac system – for an asylum application made in another European country, for example – the person will be subject to the Dublin procedure. The same applies if a person refuses to have his or her fingerprints taken or if the latter have been destroyed. The submission of the asylum application appears to be an initial filter for limiting numbers and like “procedural tools suited to the mass and rapid rejection of asylum seekers” (PARROT, 2019, p. 160).

If a person manages to register their application at the prefecture, they have less than one month to submit their application to the OFPRA via an account written in French in which they explain why they left their country, and the risks they face. This “test” sorts people between those who are on their own and who do not understand French and those who can benefit from support. The OFPRA does not provide any legal assistance, help with writing or interpretation.

An oral examination follows the written test, in the form of a one-hour interview with a protection officer. The aim here is to convince the officer that the person faces death or ill-treatment if they are returned to their country:

“To obtain refugee status, a person must be lucky, be able to match the profile of the “good refugee” and convince the officer” (PARROT, 2019, p. 153).

For the officer, “the asylum seeker is a potential fraudster and the OFPRA officers are trained to see each person as an economic migrant who has sold a “stereotyped” story of abuse” (PARROT, 2019, p. 155).

There are many reasons for refusal: if a person does not match the typical profile of the “good” refugee, if they do not fully meet the criteria of the Geneva Convention, if they are not able to prove they “specifically” are facing the risks – in particular, via proven facts or evidence – if inconsistencies appear in their account or if the person comes from a country said to be “safe”.

The individualisation of the procedure and the provision of an account strengthen the discretionary power of the officer who makes a judgement, based on their knowledge of the country of origin and their perception of the individual and their journey. This discretionary power is understood in law as the legal space in which competent officials can make choices. In sociology, it is how administrative officials play with the rules of the game in order to implement public policies. It is also a “way for administrative officials, including when they occupy junior positions, to make decisions and not just enforce” (DUBOIS, 2012, p. 4). However, having been put under pressure, officials have limited room for manoeuvre.

Indeed, since the 1990s, asylum reforms have put pressure on officers to reduce response times. The 2003 Asylum Law introduced the “priority” procedure – now called “accelerated” – which means that an official has to provide a response 15 days after the submission of the application, compared with six months for a “normal” procedure.

In the event of refusal – on average, in the accelerated procedure, 90% of decisions taken by the OFPRA, 50% in the “normal” procedure – rejected asylum seekers can appeal to the CNDA. The appeal enables a person to rework their file and potentially receive assistance from an association or a lawyer. The president of the court ruling on a person's application has additional room for manoeuvre here to that of an OFPRA official, who is answerable to their hierarchy. However, the suspicious mindset is still present, especially as the processing time is limited. In a normal procedure, the judge has five months to rule and five weeks in the context of an accelerated procedure. For Karine Parrot, these shortened time frames have a dual objective:

“The aim is to legitimise sloppy work – as evidenced by the use of sorting orders – while minimising the time taken to examine asylum applications” (PARROT, 2019, p. 166).

In order to minimise time frames, the CNDA uses “rejection orders”, which make it possible to reject an application without a hearing. If the appeal before the CNDA is unsuccessful, the case may be referred to the Council of State, then, in rare cases, to the European Court of Human Rights, where the costs of access are even greater: the person must be supported, have financial resources and tangible evidence of their situation.

The figures for asylum applications between 2002 and 2012 (see table in the previous part) show that, on average, one in eight people obtain asylum from the OFPRA and one in seven people following an appeal before the CNDA. In total, over the period, one in four people was granted asylum. However, these figures do not take into account people who were “prevented” from submitting an application by this organised policy of deterrence.

The successive transformations of the OFPRA have made it a structure organised so as to refuse access to asylum to people who wish to obtain the protection of the French State. The development of a legal arsenal legitimises this refusal when the results-based culture accelerates it by putting pressure on officials. Through the fabrication of an irregular status, the refusal rate is in line with the increase in the number of asylum applications, reinforcing the political rhetoric of misuse of the system. This “mass” of rejected asylum seekers is dealt with by police forces, who lock up and remove people with the help of the OFII. This makes the “assisted return” measure the cornerstone of the Ministry of the Interior’s target-based policy. By coming under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, these two offices have aligned themselves with its expectations: deterring asylum seekers from making their application in France while producing the institutional rejection of asylum seekers.

The State, via its local representatives, attempts to impose this framework on the municipalities affected by the presence of exiled people on their territory. Despite relative autonomy, some local elected officials contribute to the local creation of migration policies, despite or in opposition to the State.

CHAPTER 6: THE LOCAL CREATION OF MIGRATION POLICIES. RELATIVE AUTONOMY

In territories where exiled people are in “transit”, the Minister of the Interior and then of Immigration impose, via the prefects and sub-prefects, a predominantly security-oriented framework. State departments and police forces apply a deterrence policy combining harassment, arrest, evictions and destruction of living spaces and removal. Local elected officials are under pressure and have to comply with the orders of the State. Every action in favour of exiled people – from access to sanitary facilities to tolerance or the bringing of a living space under municipality control – is perceived as a potential “pull factor”. There is a continuous call to order. The State mobilises the Sangatte precedent as the risk that reception can constitute an “untenable” fixation point.

At municipal level, there are several dynamics at work that depend on local configurations: support from residents, the development of a network of associations, the number of exiled people present, partisan label of the current mayor, the owner of occupied land, etc. These configurations change over time. In Calais, there has been successive movement from indifference towards exiled people to the co-production of the deterrence policy orchestrated by the State (I). Even though municipalities have no specific authority regarding the management of exiled people – except in terms of public sanitation and access to drinking water – some municipalities challenge the State’s authority over immigration. The emergence of local immigration policies is evident. In Norrent-Fontes, as a result of the election of a new mayor, there was a move from tolerance towards exiled people to the bringing of a living space under municipal control. Acting in favour of or against exiled people is a matter of political choices (or a lack of them) on the part of the municipal team in place, but also of emergency decisions that may be lasting, as in the Dunkirk area (II). In Cherbourg-Octeville, the period was characterised by the rhetoric of “humanity” and “firmness”, a policy of tolerance that combined with the co-production of deterrence with an active anti-squat policy. The failure of this policy evolved into the bringing of a living space under municipal control (III).

I. MAYOR OF CALAIS: BETWEEN ROLE EXPECTATIONS AND CONSTRAINED EXERCISE

The city of Calais has become a place symbolising the border between France and Britain through the presence of exiled people, the creation and closure of the Sangatte camp and the deployment of human and financial resources to ensure the impermeability of the border. In fact, the media and political attention that it represents makes it a testing ground for the deterrence policy implemented by the State. Being mayor of Calais – a place symbolising the border – means role expectations in a space where the room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the State is limited. From a sequence of indifference and passive participation in state policy (1), there was a move towards the co-production of the deterrence policy as a result of the election of Natacha Bouchart in 2008 (2). In this context, the development of the non-profit sector appears to be the only recourse for exiled people, and acts as a remedy for the failures of the State and the municipality (3).

TIMELINE (NON-EXHAUSTIVE) – 2002-2012 OPENING, EVACUATION AND DESTRUCTION OF LIVING SPACES IN CALAIS

- 5 November 2002:** The Sangatte camp is closed to new arrivals.
- 2 December 2002:** Nicolas Sarkozy and David Blunkett, French Minister of the Interior and British Home Secretary, respectively, announce the permanent closure of the Sangatte camp before the end of 2002.
- 30 December 2002:** Permanent closure of the camp, followed by its destruction.
- Summer 2003:** Emergence of the Pashtun “Jungle” in Calais.
- 2003:** Opening of the Socarenam squat, Quai de la Moselle in Calais.
- 24 October 2006:** Destruction of the Socarenam squat, Quai de la Moselle in Calais, containing Somalis, Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians.
- October 2006:** Opening of a new squat in the former Pagniez sawmill in Calais, named “Africa House”.
- 21 April 2009:** Arrest of 150 exiled people in a Calais squat.
- 22 April 2009:** Arrest of 44 exiled people in motorway rest areas between Calais and Saint-Omer.
- 23 April 2009:** Éric Besson, Minister of Immigration, states that “it is out of the question to allow a centre like the one that existed in Sangatte to be recreated. The opening of such a centre would lead to the arrival of an even greater number of illegal immigrants and networks, and would only make the humanitarian situation worse.”
- June 2009:** Several hundred “No Border” activists from all over Europe set up a camp in the Beau-Marais district of Calais to denounce the treatment of exiled people by the authorities.
- 3 July 2009:** Evacuation of a building belonging to the French rail network in Calais.
- 20 August 2009:** Evacuation of the Hazara Jungle in the name of scabies control.
- 22 September 2009:** Closure of the Pashtun “jungle” in Calais, sheltering 1,000 exiled people. Arrest of 278 people, with 132 of them stating they are minors.

- 29 September 2009:** Hunger strike by exiled people in Calais begins.
 - 30 September 2009:** Destruction of the Hazara Jungle in Calais.
 - 30 September 2009:** Evacuation of a lock keeper's house occupied by Eritreans since November 2008.
 - 2 October 2009:** Destruction of the Eritrean squat: 150 Eritrean and Ethiopian exiles sheltering in three terraced houses.
 - 7 October 2009:** Evacuation of the Port Jungle, where exiled people have been living for a year.
 - 15 January 2010:** After being re-built, the Hazara Jungle is destroyed once again.
 - 7 February 2010:** Eviction of the Kronstadt hangar, an autonomous space for exiled people.
 - 28 May 2010:** The Hazara Jungle is destroyed once again.
 - 14 June 2010:** Evacuation of the "Africa House" squat located in the former Pagniez sawmill.
 - October 2010:** Opening of two new squats in the former Thélou factory, in Calais city centre and the former Dentelle Noyon factory, located right next to the former Pagniez sawmill.
 - 27 June 2011:** The squat located in the former Thélou factory is evacuated and then destroyed.
 - November 2011:** Evacuation then destruction of the Noyon squat in Calais.
 - 16 March 2012:** Evacuation then destruction of the new "Africa House", located on Avenue Blériot, in the buildings of the University of the Littoral Opal Coast. The destroyed space sees the creation of an "eco-neighbourhood" in the years that follow.
 - 25 May 2012:** Evacuation of the Darquer squat in Calais.
-

1. 2001-2008, a communist in power: between accountability of the State and (in)action

"Immigration and border control is a responsibility of the State and under no circumstances of local authorities. The same applies to the monitoring of highly vulnerable immigrant populations. On numerous occasions over the past 5 years, mayors have asked the government to assume its responsibilities because these refugees are not asylum seekers in France and because they are often fleeing a country at war and cannot be deported, the state ignores their situation and does not take care of them. Thus, it chooses to dismiss the very real problem being experienced by border towns and cities. Mayors therefore expect answers from the State" (Open letter to the government dated 20 September 2007 from the mayors of Calais, Cherbourg and Dunkirk)

Since 1971, the city of Calais has been in the hands of the PCF. Following the resignation of Jean-Jacques Barthes in 2000, his deputy for sport, Jacky Hénin, replaced him, before being elected in his own right in the 2001 municipal elections. The start of his term was marked by the closure of the Sangatte camp, which he welcomed: "Why is Sangatte closing? Because no one is in control any more. It is the mafias who make the law inside the camp."⁶⁵

65. Interview conducted on 1 June 2021.

At the same time, while the Church of Saint-Pierre-Saint-Paul in Calais was occupied by 99 Iraqi Kurds and Afghans, Jacky Hénin referred the matter to the court in Boulogne-sur-Mer, which ordered its evacuation on 14 November 2002. During his term, the mayor, who did not wish to get involved in this sensitive issue or to help the associations supporting exiled people, allowed the State to deploy its strategy of the harassment and dispersal of exiled people embodied by Operation Ulysses.

As soon as the Sangatte camp closed, between 200 and 500 people were counted on the streets of Calais. They took over doorsteps, window sills, blockhouses, the bilge of a boat, but also informal camps. In the summer of 2003, a Pashtun "Jungle" was set up in the Dunes industrial area. Exiled people built huts and set up tents there, but the living conditions were particularly challenging: without water and electricity. The space had the advantage of being close to the crossing points and not very visible to residents.

At the same time, in early 2003, a squat appeared on the Quai de la Moselle in a disused warehouse of the Socarenam shipbuilding company, near the Port of Calais. On 24 October 2006, during its evacuation, followed by its demolition, the exiled people found refuge in a new location: the former Pagniez sawmill, creating the "Africa House" squat. These "living spaces are temporarily tolerated by the authorities" (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p 34) but remained subject to evictions and arrests, as on 9 September 2003, when around a hundred exiled people were detained following an operation in the Socarenam building.

When associations wanted to open reception day centres or services – in particular sanitary facilities – they found little support from the mayor of Calais who wanted to avoid "the pull factor". Responding to associations who requested the opening of a day centre, he explains:

"I will not be a spokesperson for extremism. I regret that some idiots, and I am weighing my words, have corrupted the cause for refugees. There are people who think only of themselves while pretending to support people in distress. These people have chosen a road to nowhere. I am not in favour of opening a premises supported by the City. The State must assume its responsibilities and it has done so."⁶⁶

When we asked Jacky Hénin about the forms that migration policies can take at local level, he set out two arguments against the development of reception policies. On the one hand, he explained that he has "never been in favour of the occupation of municipal buildings" so as not to set "indigenous peoples against those who come from elsewhere", and stated:

"Just because we have occupied a sports hall does not mean that we're going to advance the cause of those who are in great difficulty. On the contrary. We turn people who are sympathetic to people who are suffering into adversaries."

On the other hand, when he wanted to help exiled people, he was constrained by the State: "I've always advocated for reception, that everyone should receive decent food, be cared for and have access to toilets, wash themselves, that's a minimum... However, we were constantly told that we couldn't do this, that it would give out a signal that we are an open bar."

There are several contradictory orders in Jacky Hénin's words. Being a mayor involves role expectations and constraints. Releasing funds or requisitioning a premises for exiled

66. *La Voix du Nord*, 3 April 2003 (CLOCHARD, 2007).

people represents the risk, on the one hand, of setting your constituents against you, or at least stirring up criticism of your right-wing opposition in Calais town hall, and, on the other hand, of being pressured by the State regarding the “pull factor” that this would give rise to. These are the fears of local elected officials regarding NIMBY movements⁶⁷: local residents who are mobilised and politicise a local issue.

In this context, his (in)action is then based on policies that are not very visible in order to balance the two aspects: making the state accountable responsible for the situation experienced by their residents and the situations of exiled people while developing forms of tolerance towards the premises they occupy. In a 2011 report, No Border described Jacky Hénin's position: “Although he did not make any explicitly anti-migrant remarks, he did not oppose the measures of the central government either.”

These “measures” are characterised by Operation Ulysses. As we saw in Chapter 3, Operation Ulysses managed by Cyrille Schott, prefect of Pas-de-Calais until 2004, aimed to arrest exiled people, lock them up and remove them from Pas-de-Calais. Police forces were under pressure to “make the numbers” while the prefect obtained accommodation places outside Calais – or even the department. Thus, in 2003, 18,000 arrests were made by the Pas-de-Calais PAF, some of which involved the same people. In the first six months of 2004, the number of arrests was 9,000. According to Cyrille Schott, when the number of exiled people fell, “Sarkozy considered that the prefect was effective and able to manage things on his own (...) I no longer had the security companies to manage the coast.” In fact, in 2006, 530 police officers were exclusively dedicated to the fight against irregular immigration in Calais, for a little over 200 exiled people, i.e. an average of two officers per person, for a city of 75,000 inhabitants⁶⁸.

Cyrille Schott no longer had a direct link to the Ministry of Social Affairs to obtain places, undermining his strategy of removal: “I had to fight like a lion to sometimes have 30-40 places for people to be taken to centres inland.” He explains that when he left in 2004, “there were 100-150 people... before the situation got out of hand.” At the end of Operation Ulysses, in 2007, transfers to CADAs and CHRS decreased, “we went from 1,171 places in CHRS in 2006 to 0 in 2007, and from 3,106 places in CADAs in 2006 to 1,185 in 2007” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 86). Operation Ulysses lost its “organised dispersal” component via accommodation, while the number of police officers remained substantial.

The demise of this operation can be explained in two ways: on the one hand, the policy was financially costly (mobilisations of police forces, custody costs, interpreter costs) and, on the other hand, it was not very effective, since people returned to Calais.

Despite the policing pressure, the presence of exiled people was increasingly visible in Calais. Living spaces were set up, namely squats. Natacha Bouchart, UMP candidate for mayor of Calais in 2008, campaigned on evictions from living spaces.

At the same time, given the increase in the number of exiled people in the city, Jacky Hénin changed his position. He brought together different associations in order to design a day centre project to facilitate the work of volunteers, particularly during food distribution, while planning to install five showers and four toilets in a space of 200 m². The chosen location was on the outskirts of the city, near Garenne wood, where a camp was already

67. NIMBY: “Not in my back yard” aims to characterise the mobilisation of local residents who reject the setting up near their homes of a facility considered to be a “nuisance”.

68. “Dans la jungle des clandestins”, *Politis*, no. 929, 14 December 2006.

set up. In the local press, Jacky Hénin stated that “there is no question of creating an accommodation centre.”

This proposal nevertheless appeared to be strategic in two respects: on the one hand, a similar project supported by associations at the same time was rebuffed by Jacky Hénin, and, on the other hand, it was a way of distinguishing himself from his right-wing opponent in the context of the upcoming municipal elections.

The project then gave rise to opposition from the French and English governments, so much so that a joint communiqué from the two Ministers of the Interior was released on 16 April 2007, and recalled that “the United Kingdom and France have been most effective in dealing with illegal immigration by working together (...) These joint efforts have been successful and must continue. The British and French governments remain opposed to any type of centre in Calais that could encourage the trafficking of illegal immigrants.”

In April 2008, Natacha Bouchart became the new UMP mayor of Calais, and prevented the project from being implemented, while a day centre project supported by Secours Catholique was rejected on the grounds that the prefect considered the site unbuildable. The British ambassador to France stated at the time: “We don’t want this reception centre for migrants. They should not be encouraged to come to Calais. We are reassured that the new mayor of Calais does not approve of the idea.”⁶⁹

Jacky Hénin explains in retrospect that he “lost part of the municipal election because of that”, and says:

“We put a two-hectare project on the table, with buildings, so that everyone could take a shower, go to the toilet, be able to eat, be received, have care at any time.”

This project emerged when he realised that the closure of the Sangatte camp had “not fixed anything, that there were again many people on the streets”, he says, while criticising the pull-factor rhetoric:

“We were told: ‘We cannot produce decent reception because it will encourage people to come.’ This is what is still told to elected officials today, we have been saying this for 20 years, and people have been arriving for 20 years.”

This episode is interesting in more than one respect.

On the one hand, the idea for a project emerged at a time when the presence of exiled people was increasing and they were more visible in the city. The mayor reassured residents at the time by explaining that no accommodation was planned, while the site chosen was located on the outskirts of the city, near the Port of Calais, thus invisibilising the exiled people.

On the other hand, the project provoked criticism from the English and French governments, which put pressure on the mayor and reminded him of the previous episode of the Sangatte camp, a lasting political “symbol” of the pull factor that any institutionalised living space would represent, which was also close to the crossing points.

Finally, he was part of an electoral context in which his opponent was campaigning on the abolition of living spaces, which she implemented as soon as she was elected mayor. At that time, there was a deployment of the co-production of public migration policies, in which the national and local levels came together on the way forward.

69. “Entretien avec l’ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne”, *Nord Littoral*, 17 May 2008.

2. Natacha Bouchart: co-producing deterrence

“From 2008, Natacha Bouchart pursued an active policy of evicting squats by relying on the image of “angry residents” and making her services available to the prefecture. By putting at stake the very possibility of the existence of these living spaces, i.e. primary loyalty to the city, the municipality came into congruence with the government policies that were working to get migrants out of Calais” (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 244)

In April 2008, Natacha Bouchart's victory moved the city to the right. In a context in which the number of exiled people was increasing, Natacha Bouchart's term of office was characterised by two aspects: the organisation of a – closed – dialogue with support associations and an active fight against squats and informal camps. The new mayor produced a local immigration policy, which came “into congruence with the government policies that are working to get migrants out of Calais” (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 244).

First of all, Natacha Bouchart set up a new body: the “Migrant Council”. It was a technical body bringing together political and non-profit actors who were involved in the cause of exiled people, without the latter being present in it. This body was intended to be technical and three to four times a year addressed the issues of meal distribution, water points and the number of exiled people present in Calais, but also eviction operations.

For the associations present, this “technical” body was a space of “monologue” rather than “dialogue”. The aim was to make it a depoliticised space, in which dissenting associations were punished through their exclusion from the Council. For those that played the game, rewards came in the form of grants, as the activist newspaper *Courant alternatif* noted:

“Natacha Bouchart has understood the numbing effect of speaking to those who had complained for years about not being listened to. An increased grant was therefore paid to two of the main associations and promises of funding for toilets were made” (Issue 187, February 2009)

Through this space, Natacha Bouchart neutralised the debate around the presence of exiled people by enlisting certain associations in her anti-squat policy.

Indeed, the new mayor of Calais actively fought against squats and informal camps. The municipality was in direct contact with police forces and the prefecture in order to identify the occupied premises, take legal action, enable eviction operations before mobilising its services in order to clean up, seize, brick up or demolish living spaces. The aim was to prevent exiled people from moving back into sites. In this context, a team of volunteers from the municipal departments was formed and tasked with accompanying the PAF during operations, who received time off in return.

At the same time, the town hall pursued a policy of searching for and assisting owners in order to evict exiled people. Thus, appeals were launched – in particular, by Natacha Bouchart via social networks – for residents to report squatted premises to the municipality for it to intervene within 48 hours and avoid longer procedures. When the occupied premises belonged to private owners, the municipality offered its assistance to the owners in order to support them in the eviction procedure and to fund bricking up work. If the owners did not cooperate, the municipality put pressure on them, reminding them of the risks they faced in the event of an accident.

This policy resonated with the deterrence policy orchestrated by the State. In an effort to document the violence suffered by exiled people in Calais, in 2011, the collective No Border published a report entitled "La Frontière tue"⁷⁰, which was seized upon by the Defender of Rights at the time, Dominique Baudis. This report presented numerous incidents of police violence: beatings, gassing, destruction of tents and equipment, as well as "raids" during which many arrests took place. This non-exhaustive report showed that action by the State was continuing, despite the end of Operation Ulysses. It was based on police mobilisation that aimed to encourage "self-deportation" of the exiled people present (17,000 arrests in 2007) by creating a "hostile" environment for them, as the No Border report noted:

"These numbers refute the argument that identity check and arrest practices in Calais are part of an eviction process. On the contrary, these are 'weapons of deterrence' which are part of a harassment programme, discouraging migrants from coming to Calais."

In 2008-2009, despite police pressure, between 1,000 and 1,200 exiled people were counted in Calais, and around 2,000 on the northern coast. Due to border protection work, crossings became increasingly difficult: "people are taking between three and five months, compared to about one month" in 2008 (MIGREUROP, 2009, p. 69-70).

The Pashtun "Jungle" located in the Dunes area sheltered up to 800 exiled people, prompting the state to open an "asylum" counter in the prefecture of Calais in May 2009 in order to reduce this "influx". In addition, the UNHCR and France Terre d'Asile opened a local office to disseminate information about asylum to people. In two months, 170 asylum applications were submitted, but as France Terre d'Asile noted: "In the absence of adequate procedural guarantees and appropriate reception conditions (...) there are still many asylum seekers leaving for England" (Les migrants et le Calais, 1999-2014, France Terre d'Asile).

In 2009, political discourse was developed around this "jungle", in preparation for its dismantling. Following a mass operation carried out on 21 April 2009 in a squat in Calais, where 150 people were arrested, Éric Besson, Minister of Immigration, stated, regarding the Pashtun "Jungle":

"It is out of the question to allow a centre like the one that existed in Sangatte to be recreated. The opening of such a centre would lead to the arrival of an even greater number of illegal immigrants and networks, and would only make the humanitarian situation worse."

The public authorities used the argument of "smugglers" and of "hygiene conditions at the origin of a scabies epidemic", to justify its evacuation in September 2009, followed by its destruction: "The objective, which was to destroy an unsanitary camp and a hub for illegal channels to England, has been achieved."

This operation was particularly publicised by Éric Besson, indicating a desire to revive the discourse engaged in by Nicolas Sarkozy at the time of the closure of the Sangatte camp. In the press release following the dismantling, Éric Besson "rules out any establishment near Calais of an accommodation centre for foreigners in an irregular situation based on the model of the one in Sangatte." The aim here was to dismiss, ahead of time, any political or associative desire to set up an institutionalised living space.

During the operation, 278 people were arrested, including 132 minors. Carried out without a court agreement, "almost all the arrest procedures were cancelled and the

70. No Border de Calais Migrant Solidarity, Calais : cette frontière tue, June 2011.

majority of minors placed in centres far from the department very quickly disappeared from the reception centres" (Les migrants et le Calais, 1999-2014).

Following the "spectacle" that was the dismantling, Éric Besson declared that "this operation is an important step in a broader plan to dismantle all the squats and camps used by illegal immigration networks in the Calais region." In fact, other dismantling operations took place in the same year (in Calais and other municipalities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais): on 3 July 2009, a building belonging to the French rail network was evacuated; on 20 August 2009, the Hazara Jungle was evacuated, followed by its destruction; on 30 September 2009, the lock keeper's house was evacuated, followed by its destruction; while on 7 October 2009, the Port Jungle was also dismantled. In June 2010, the "Africa House", a squat located in the former Pagniez sawmill housing around a hundred exiled people, was destroyed. This was a coordinated action by the political authorities, at the initiative of the town hall. The operation was justified by the "unsanitary nature" of the site.

The pressure exerted by police forces during this period was documented in the data provided by the PAF. In the first half of 2009, 18,922 arrests took place – as many as in 2007 – resulting in 5,865 people being held in custody⁷¹.

This series of dismantling operations contributed to the reduction in the presence of exiled people in the Calais region, where, in October 2009, there were 400 people, a figure that decreased again in May 2010. By publicising these operations, the government demonstrated the effectiveness of its actions, nevertheless setting aside exogenous factors. Indeed, at the same time, new routes were opening up for Afghans towards Scandinavia, as Jean-Michel Centres (2010) observes. Moreover, for many other people of various nationalities, there was the strengthening of security between Libya and Italy, driven by Frontex, via Operations Nautilus and Poseidon. In fact, an agreement was signed in 2008 between the two countries, with Libya agreeing to joint patrols in its territorial waters.

The deterrence policy orchestrated by the State was carried out with the support of the city of Calais, which shared its objectives: to get exiled people out of Calais. No alternative to this security-oriented policy emerged from the municipal or state authorities, while access to the rights of foreigners was very difficult – submitting an asylum application involved travelling to the prefecture of Arras (and not the sub-prefecture of Calais) – and therefore risking police checks. In this context, the non-profit sector was gradually structuring itself, with the support of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

3. Structuring the non-profit sector as a remedy for the organised failure of the public authorities

"I am not in favour of camps, for me a camp is an admission of failure. The simple question is: what happens to the people who are there? That is, if it's a question of dispersing them, making their lives a misery, it's just intolerable. On the other hand, what I would like is for us to avoid setting up camps by taking care of people in administrative procedures and through accommodation and social support, which is what we need to do. And it's not at all the overriding one." (Pascal Brice, director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018)

71. The number of arrests is only a reflection of police activity, while the same person may have been arrested more than once.

The situation of exiled people – and in Calais in particular – was characterised by the systematic prevention from benefiting from common law. Every measure put in place by local authorities or by the State was seen as driving the pull factor and the risk of creating a new camp like the one that existed in Sangatte.

Emergency accommodation was a particular symbol of this fear. Indeed, while not subject to a condition of regular residence, the CHRS were – in theory – accessible to all, and were based on unconditionality, if not that of being “in a situation of distress”. However, on a daily basis and during evacuations, exiled people were not offered care in a CHRS.

In their research, Karen Akoka and Olivier Clochard highlighted that the different CHRS in Calais applied a separate policy according to the status and origin of people seeking shelter, while the Samu Social did not have an office in Calais. Few places were reserved for exiled people, but sometimes efforts were made in the case of families. However, people who accepted assistance for voluntary return had easier access to the scheme. Some centres made their mission known to only “receive local homeless people”, while pointing out the “risk of assisting irregularity in the case of accommodating people in an irregular situation.” This was contrary to the law and the principle of the unconditionality of emergency accommodation.

The General Council of Pas-de-Calais, which was responsible for emergency accommodation, did not provide for the reception of exiled people in its 2007-2012 Reception, Accommodation and Integration Plan, on the grounds that exiled people “do not relate to the needs of the population of Pas-de-Calais” and that they “put their presence down to plans to settle outside the department.” Commenting on this choice, the General Council of Pas-de-Calais stated: “The desire to remove illegal immigrants in Calais from the department is a cynically welcome general policy because Pas-de-Calais can only deal with them in a marginal way.” The General Council of Pas-de-Calais, while criticising the deterrence policy implemented by the State and the town hall of Calais, complied with it.

During winter periods, the cold weather plan of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs of 19 October 2007 provided that, depending on the severity of the weather conditions, “all persons who so wish benefit from reception and accommodation regardless of their administrative situation.” However, the exiled people in Calais rarely benefited from these arrangements, even if the town hall was, occasionally, able to open up a hall for a few nights.

By coordinating with each other, the town hall, the General Council and the state organised the “homelessness” (ALAUX, 2004) of exiled people, who wandered from one place to another, depending on policing operations. Asylum seekers, who were legally entitled to a place in CADAs, did not always receive one, as Migreurop notes:

“While their number is growing and could potentially be much higher, no new CADAs have been established, either in the Calais region or in Paris, and the lack of accommodation in these specialised structures to receive and support asylum seekers contributes to discouraging potential asylum applicants” (2009, p. 71).

In addition, until 2009, exiled people wishing to submit an asylum application had to do so at the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais, located in Arras, i.e. 120 kilometres from Calais, and not in the sub-prefecture of Calais.

The challenge for the public authorities was to remove exiled people from the Calais region, as shown by the practices of the ANAEM (precursor to the OFII), with respect to the application of assisted voluntary return. As Karen Akoka and Olivier Clochard note,

outside Calais, “only people in an irregular situation who have been subject to a removal measure are eligible for assisted voluntary return.” In Calais, anyone in an irregular situation could benefit from it. In that case, the scheme was proposed during placement in custody:

“When an exile in custody accepts the proposal of assistance with voluntary return from ANAEM officials, the latter report this to the PAF in order to suspend custody and initiate the procedure” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 65).

Faced with the organised deficiency of the public authorities, it is residents and associations that get involved to support exiled people. As Mathilde Pette notes, from 2003, “the successive creation of associations under the 1901 law attests to the strong structuring of the local non-profit sector working with migrants” (2016, p. 48). Salam Calais was created that year, as was Aida (Emmaüs); in 2005, Doctors of the World launched a “Migrants” mission in Nord-Pas-de-Calais; and in 2009, L’Auberge des Migrants was created.

Two non-profit clusters were emerging: one that did not “challenge the established order in terms of migration policies”, the other one more dissenting, “which demands the right to emigrate, the regularisation of all undocumented people” (PETTE, 2015, p. 23). Interactions with the public authorities (through the prefect or sub-prefect) were confrontational at best and, at worst, non-existent.

The actions of associations were present in the context of emergencies: “it is a question of managing the eternal emergency and certain situations are likely to put all ongoing activities on hold” (PETTE, 2015, p. 23). They became the leading actors in helping exiled people, with the State deliberately relying “on the non-profit sector to fill the gaps in its own public policies” (PETTE, 2015, p. 25), even with their funding being mainly (if not exclusively) based on donations, food collections and voluntary work. The associations got involved in access to drinking water, access to care and hygiene, the construction of makeshift shelters, the distribution of food, clothing, shoes, blankets and legal support.

Since these associations were intervening in emergencies, dissenting arguments reduced to a minimum:

“These local associations thus have the particularity of limiting themselves to social action and humanitarian action, and do not develop certain modes of action that are nevertheless common in activist action with foreigners, such as the defence of rights, literacy or protest struggles” (PETTE, 2016, p. 48).

Assistance to exiled people was repeatedly prevented by the State, which put pressure on volunteers, through arrests, convictions, fines, prison sentences, as reminders that they may be put in jeopardy by their action at any time:

“The distinction between failing to help a person in danger and the offence of assisting irregular residence can be blurred all the more easily when helping goes against government action” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 97).

This fear of conviction, coupled with a permanent emergency that prevents people from taking a step back, also produces “burnout” among activists and tensions between volunteers and associations, between humanitarian assistance and political assistance, as Karen Akoka and Olivier Clochard note:

“The response provided to exiles by associations is therefore essential but more individual than collective and more about charity than advocacy. The flyers, once distributed to exiled people to inform them about their rights, have disappeared. On a daily basis, the eminently political issue of exiles in transit in Calais or elsewhere becomes a secondary one when there is a health and medical issue, which seems to require more urgent intervention” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, p. 98).

At the same time, the publication of the Coordination française pour le droit d'asile (CFDA) report produced by Karen Akoka and Olivier Clochard in 2008, "La Loi des Jungles" and the involvement of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region in migration issues contributed to structuring the non-profit sector and the development of a common political discourse. The objective was to get out of the emergency and take a step back.

On the one hand, there were publications on the situation of exiled people on the coast, via, in particular, press articles. Comments were made in the media by association and political leaders, and there were appeals from political actors. Lastly, awareness-raising actions for residents were carried out.

On the other hand, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region, led by the socialist Daniel Percheron, had in his majority a number of environmentalist elected officials wishing to focus on the subject of immigration. Majdouline Sbai, environmentalist Vice-President for Citizenship and International Relations, notably took up the subject, in a threefold approach.

From 2007, the regions had a new remit: port management. The Nord-Pas-de-Calais region took advantage of this to convert port infrastructure in 2009 to create a space for distributing meals, investing €1 million.

In October 2011, the "Platform of Migrant Support" (PSM) was set up on the initiative of the Coordination Française pour le Droit d'Asile (CFDA⁷²) and thanks to financial support from the region. This creation was based on the observation made in the report "La Loi des Jungles" of a lack of coordination between associations working on the coast. A second report funded by the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development (CCFD) demonstrated the usefulness of networking, with the following objectives: coordinating, training and supporting volunteers. The funding obtained in 2012 enabled the creation of a salaried position, followed by a second in 2013.

In 2012, also via regional funding, the "network of hospitable elected officials" (REH) was created, which aimed to coordinate the local political actors concerned by the presence of exiled people on their territory, while producing political advocacy, as Majdouline Sbai said:

"We will make a petition and the elected officials will sign and it will constitute a network of people, in which the mayors will say: 'I am a member of a network of hospitable elected officials and I consider that the arrival of migrants in the municipality is a source of enrichment and not a problem.'"⁷³

To support the approach and reception, the region set up an emergency response fund for the municipalities via a framework decision called "Nord-Pas-de-Calais Land of Refuge", which also involved the General Councils of Nord and Pas-de-Calais.

This structuring of the associative space, the involvement of the REH and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region contributed to the emergence of political alternatives to the management of exiled people, but mainly outside the city of Calais. The city remained a highly symbolic place in which the State was particularly involved and where the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, co-produced a policy of deterrence. In the next section, we will examine the spaces of exiled people, their management by local political actors and the involvement of the State outside Calais. We will see that opposing the State and its policy is a constrained exercise.

72. Founded in 2000, today the CFDA has around 40 members and associates.

73. This interview was part of Camille Guenebeaud's work on her doctoral dissertation: *Dans la frontière, Migrants et luttes des places dans la ville de Calais*, geography doctoral dissertation, 2017.

II. BETWEEN TOLERANCE AND THE BRINGING OF LIVING SPACES UNDER MUNICIPAL CONTROL, THE STATE CONTINUES ITS POLICY OF DETERRENCE

The organised dispersal from Calais and the protection of crossing points led to an increase in the number of living spaces along the border, from Belgium to Brittany. The focus of the public authorities on the Calais region did not imply disinterest on their part concerning the more distant territories. The guideline remained the same: prevent fixation points, arrest, lock up, remove. However, there was less pressure there, while the room for manoeuvre of local elected officials and the local government was increased. In Norrent-Fontes, located 50 kilometres from Calais, the management of exiled people fluctuated first between indifference and tolerance before the intervention of the State contributed, in spite of itself, to the bringing of a living space under municipal control (1). In the Dunkirk area – near Calais – the State deployed its policy until mayors seized responsibility for immigration via emergency measures, which were long-lasting, in which tolerance and the bringing of living spaces under municipal control came in succession (2). The aim here is to examine the political configurations conducive to the emergence of alternatives that ignored the pressure from the State or that worked with it.

1. Norrent-Fontes: the political history of the “municipalisation” of a living space

The Saint-Hilaire-Cottes service station is located about 50 kilometres from Calais. It was a strategic location for exiled people attempting to get onto lorries. While awaiting the crossing, exiled people sheltered in the town of Norrent-Fontes (1,400 inhabitants) in the fields of Vallée de Fontes located about 30-minutes walk from the service station. They arrived from Lillers station, located around one-and-a-half hours away on foot. Little information exists on the initial attempts to cross, but the closure of the Sangatte camp in 2002, the securing of transit sites around the port and the violence suffered by exiled people made it a more accessible and less costly crossing point (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 120). Support for exiled people by the non-profit sector was organised from 2006, initially around the parish before opening up to more political volunteers (a). In 2008, following the election of a new mayor, Marc Boulnois, a municipal and associative dynamic was established to receive exiled people in municipal spaces (b). In 2012, there was a shift from a tolerated space to a space placed under municipal control when huts were set up on the initiative of the town to accommodate exiled people in more “dignified” conditions (c).

TIMELINE – 2002-2012 – EVICTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LIVING SPACES IN NORRENT-FONTES

20 December 2007: Destruction of the Afghan camp in Norrent-Fontes.

March 2008: Marc Boulnois (EELV) becomes mayor of Norrent-Fontes.

April 2008: Norrent-Fontes town hall provides exiled people with municipal land.

September 2008: To end conflicts with the neighbourhood, Marc Boulnois grants a new piece of municipal land, which becomes the “La Marlière” camp.

December 2010: The prefect of Pas-de-Calais issues a formal notice to Norrent-Fontes town hall to destroy the “La Marlière” camp. Marc Boulnois refuses.

29 January 2011: A demonstration of support is organised, bringing together nearly 200 people.

29 January 2012: The prefecture of Pas-de-Calais destroys the "La Marlière" camp, without the agreement of the town hall.

March 2012: The town hall has built four huts with the support of Doctors of the World, Terre d'Errance, the REH and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

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a. Until 2008: associative structuring against the mayor and State

"The previous mayor chose to support the State's policy, i.e. to ensure that there were no camps, no places of fixation. During an eviction, he made available the resources of the municipality and of the intermunicipality." (Marc Boulnois, EELV mayor of Norrent-Fontes from 2008 to 2014)

In Vallée de Fontes, exiled people were living in unsanitary and barely visible conditions, as Lily Boillet, one of the founders of the association Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes, explains: "Initially, they settled in the fields, but we didn't know exactly where, we saw people walking and we wondered why they were there."⁷⁴

Between 2003 and 2006, there were between 10 and 30 exiled people, depending on the period. Asked by the press about the presence of exiled people in Norrent-Fontes, its mayor, André Delgéry, referred the question to the State, declaring: "I have no opinion. For me, this matter is beyond the scope of the municipality."

It was in 2006 that assistance was organised, at the instigation of Abbé Michel Delannoy and members of the parish of Norrent-Fontes: they brought water and food. From July 2007, new volunteers became involved, on a less religious and more political basis. An informal collective was set up to organise the provision of water, clothing, food and to bring tents and tarpaulins. Faced with the impassibility of the mayor of Norrent-Fontes, volunteers obtained access to showers once a week from the town hall of Ham-en-Artois. In September 2007, the socialist town hall in Isbergues also agreed to make showers available in a sports hall. The space also made it possible to serve tea and coffee, as well to collect towels and clothing, which volunteers washed and dried for the next shower.

Initially, this collective was not intended to be formalised in an association, "some volunteers were already involved in the parish, in the social network, and did not want to go further", Lily Boillet informs us. Nevertheless, several factors encouraged them to form an association, to reflect on their organisation and to politicise the situation of the exiled people present in Norrent-Fontes.

First of all, Abbé Michel Delannoy took the members of the collective to Calais to participate in humanitarian actions. Volunteers were impressed by the number of people present, "between 400 and 500". "The race was on, everyone had to shower, we had to fill the cars", says Lily Boillet, who continues:

"We also learnt about food distribution, on waste ground, with a queue like never before, people were gathering in order to get food, a fight started with stones."

74. Interview conducted on 18 May 2021.

This event forced the collective to reflect on its practices, on how to organise distributions, leaving exiled people to self-organise, rather than forming distribution lines.

Then, the accumulation of waste in the Norrent-Fontes camp forced the volunteers to think about how to improve their living conditions. At that time, there were 80 exiled people present in the camp. Lily Boillet explains that the people in the camp were "self-sufficient":

"There was a collective tent, a fire, they cooked on-site, they were self-sufficient with respect to food... except on waste management."

Waste accumulated in a pit, posing health risks and conflicts with nearby farmers. Volunteers distributed bin bags and organised the collection of waste themselves. One member of the collective "got annoyed", she tells us, asking the mayor to intervene, who replied: "Migrants? What migrants? I don't know anything about it." The lack of intervention by the mayor prompted the collective to speak to the Lys-Artois Community of Municipalities, headed by André Flajolet (UMP), who did not resolve the situation.

Lastly, the collective attempted to politicise the issue of exiled people via the press and calls for donations, provoking reactions from the sub-prefect of Bethune, René Bidal. Media coverage of the presence of exiled people forced the sub-prefect to summon the members of the collective to the prefecture in late November 2007. One person present recounted the scene:

"We were received and we got hit with 45 minutes of paternalism, he talked non-stop, we were polite but I'd had enough. He made paternalistic, colonialist comments, saying to us: 'They don't wash in their country, I don't know why they would come and take showers in ours... OK, they're starving, so you can give them some food, but they shouldn't hang around.'"

During this meeting, René Bidal told them that "the camp was going to be destroyed" while threatening volunteers with fines for assisting people in an irregular situation.

Despite René Bidal's promise that there would be no eviction before Christmas, this took place on 20 December 2007. The sub-prefecture highlighted the risk of death due hypothermia and public disorder. The camp was subsequently destroyed with the assistance of the Artois-Lys Community of Municipalities. During the operation, 5 people were arrested, 7 placed in a CADA and 10 others received an OQTF. The people still there and new arrivals saw their precarious situation deteriorate. They wandered into nearby fields and sometimes found refuge in barns.

During the operation, the sub-prefect stated that he would do whatever was necessary to "not facilitate the resettlement of refugees in the municipality of Norrent-Fontes." Therefore, every time a camp was set up again, a policy of systematic destruction was put in place. Marc Boulnois, future mayor of Norrent-Fontes, said that "the prefect was pressuring the owners to file a complaint. It was destroyed seven times."⁷⁵

Lily Boillet explains to us that "hunts" were organised, during which the gendarmes and the PAF attempted to arrest the exiled people present in the fields. The mayor, who considered that the issue of migration was a matter for the State, allowed it to deploy its deterrence policy, which was also applied in Calais.

75. "La municipalité a fait le choix de ne pas les laisser sans abris", *La Voix du Nord*, 14 November 2013.

The destruction of the camp and police practices “revolted” the parishioners, says Lily Boillet, “just before Christmas too, it was not acceptable at all.” In January 2008, the association Terre d’Errance Norrent-Fontes was formed, attempting to structure assistance to exiled people, obtain recognition from the public authorities and collect donations.

b. The election of Marc Boulnois: “a dynamic of solidarity and hospitality”

In March 2008, following the municipal elections, the newly elected mayor of Norrent-Fontes, Marc Boulnois, changed the local understanding of the presence of exiled people in his territory. A member of EELV, he explains that when creating the municipal list, “this issue of migrants is inevitably one of the subjects to be addressed because it is part of the everyday life of the village”, and says: “we are very clear that we will seek to find solutions that promote hospitality and solidarity.”⁷⁶

When he took office, Marc Boulnois requested a meeting with the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, at a time when the prefect positions were vacant in the sub-prefecture of Béthune and the prefecture of Pas-de-Calais. He then met the general secretary of the prefecture, to whom he explained his position:

“It’s out of the question for us to be in permanent trench warfare, with police buses coming in the middle of winter to drive people out. We want to have a spirit of solidarity and hospitality.”

In May 2008, the new sub-prefect was appointed: Jean-Michel Bédécarrax. Marc Boulnois recounts his meeting with him:

“He tried to find out if I was an alter-globalist, who didn’t want borders, if I still accepted a republican setting, if I accepted the rules of the State... there you go... we discussed political philosophy.”

During the meeting, the new sub-prefect told him “that he will not force people to leave and that a solution must be found.” Pascal Barois, the new PCF president of the Artois-Lys Community of Municipalities – also mayor of Lillers – supported Marc Boulnois, stating that he would not make the services of the municipality available to the prefecture with a view to the dismantling of camps. An “entente cordiale” was established, making it possible to put an end to systematic evictions and to the practices of the PAF, as Lily Boillet notes:

“The sub-prefect left us alone, even the gendarmes were shocked by the behaviour of the PAF. It should be recalled that during the winter of 2007, the PAF came to slash the tents. We managed to get the gendarmes to come. Things were quiet all summer. The gendarmes went to the car park of the motorway rest area and got people out of the lorries, but they were not arrested.”

Alongside the election of Marc Boulnois, there were still conflicts between farmers and exiled people (and their supporters). In order to resolve these conflicts, Marc Boulnois showed the volunteers a place where exiled people could settle. Lily Boillet tells us it was an old municipal road annexed by farmers, close to the motorway rest area:

“Marc Boulnois showed me the place and said: ‘take it, get set up, I’ll have nothing to do with it and I wouldn’t ask for them to be evicted.’”

76. Interview conducted on 10 May 2021.

In April 2008, volunteers and exiled people set up the camp, with the tolerance of the public prosecutor, who welcomed Lily Boillet on behalf of the Terre d'Errance association, for whom the camp constituted "a solution for maintaining public order and that there is therefore no reason to consider destroying the site." Nevertheless, new tensions arose with one of the farmers who claimed that his fields were damaged by the traffic.

To put an end to this conflict, a new location was proposed in September 2008: "we changed space, closer to the motorway rest area, and which was accessible by car, so there was no need to walk in the fields", explains Lily Boillet. For Marc Boulnois, the concern was to find a place "close to the rest area" and that it be "municipal". At the time of the move, the town hall provided the technical services and a tractor, in order to move the pallets and mattresses, while the mayor's office and the community of municipalities got involved in managing the camp, providing water and managing waste. This new space became the "La Marlière" camp, and sheltered exiled people for a little over three years.

It can be seen here that the search for a site for exiled people must meet several conditions: prevent public disorder, foster invisibility, be close to the crossing point and belong to the municipality. The aim is to avoid any tensions and prevent aggrieved owners from taking legal action in order for an eviction to take place.

c. The huts of Norrent-Fontes. When the State reluctantly encourages the municipalisation of a permanent living space

However, conditions remained precarious in the camp. Every winter, the town hall made a church hall available, where reception was managed by Terre d'Errance. In 2010, even though the Pas-de-Calais prefecture awarded €100,000 in aid to the town of Calais for the "Cold Weather Plan", Marc Boulnois requested a contribution from the State for other municipalities facing similar difficulties. In response, the Prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian – director of the office of the Minister of the Interior since then – sent him a letter dated 24 December 2010 giving notice to destroy the camp "for reasons of public disorder and unsanitary conditions". While there was a friendly understanding between the sub-prefect and Norrent-Fontes town hall, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais took back control, wishing to apply the policy that was in force in Calais.

Norrent-Fontes town hall, owner of the land, was opposed to the destruction of the camp. Political actors supported the decision of the town hall, while a demonstration of support was organised on 29 January 2011. Faced with the mobilisation, the prefect temporarily abandoned putting the eviction process into action. But "targeted operations" were carried out every month by the gendarmes to remove "so-called smugglers", says Lily Boillet.

In November 2011, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais repeated his formal notice to dismantle the camp, which the town hall continued to refuse to do. On 29 January 2012, the prefect took advantage of the occupants being accommodated in a community hall to carry out the destruction of the camp, ignoring the fact that the municipality, which owned the land, had consented to the camp. The State's challenge here was to demonstrate that it was "controlling the migratory flows" and "preventing public disorder". Following the eviction, the prefect sent a bill for €21,270 for the demolition of the camp to the town hall. The town hall refused to pay, arguing that the dismantling had been carried out illegally. The courts ruled in favour of the municipality.

ANGRES, A COMMUNIST MAYOR AND MEMBER OF THE NETWORK OF HOSPITABLE ELECTED OFFICIALS

Angres (4,600 inhabitants) is a municipality located in the Pas-de-Calais department. Maryse Roger-Coupin (PCF) was mayor from 1992. The Angres motorway rest area is located on the A26, one hour from Calais, where exiled people attempted to board heavy goods vehicles. The first mention in the press was in November 2003, when around thirty exiled people were arrested near the motorway rest area and in a nearby wood in which they were sheltering. Until 2006, the exiled people were barely noticeable, but the visibility of their situation led residents, during that year, to bring them food, water, tarpaulins and blankets. At the end of December 2008, the association Fraternité Migrants was created to support them.

On 8 September 2009, the Angres "Jungle" was "razed to the ground and burned" by the authorities, who arrested 85 exiled people. This eviction was justified by the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, as "a hunt for smugglers and it involved dismantling the squats", and he explained that the "private land belongs to a farmer from Angres (...) He has asked the police to intervene."⁷⁷

In response, on the same day, the volunteers from Fraternité Migrants set up a camp in front of the town hall for the people who had been released, mainly Vietnamese. Around twenty volunteers and some thirty Vietnamese (then around sixty) slept there in tents. This action mobilised residents, who brought blankets, tarpaulins, mattresses, clothing and food. The Mayor of Angres, Maryse Roger-Coupin, lent her support to the camp, stating: "We are faced with the absurdity of the system. People are arrested, the camp is demolished and then they are left to fend for themselves again. We're just shifting the problem. At our level, we can only act from a humanitarian point of view."⁷⁸

On 11 September, a new camp was created, close to the previous one. But the exiled people remained under pressure from the police, who regularly came to arrest them. On 18 November 2009, Fraternité Migrants denounced the pressure being exerted by the police on the six owners of the plot where the Vietnamese were located: "all of them have been contacted by the police to file a complaint."⁷⁹ One of the people summoned was threatened: "As I refused to file a complaint, I was then told that assisting unlawful residence was an offence." The town hall subsequently provided them with municipal land, in order to prevent eviction proceedings.

In September 2010 and November 2011, arrests were made at the camp, under the pretext of "combating smugglers". During the final operation, a volunteer was arrested, prompting criticism from the mayor of Angres: "The volunteer was arrested for assisting people in danger, since it is above all else humanitarian to help people who have been on the road for years and who have health among other problems."⁸⁰

In early 2011, when the Norrent-Fontes camp was threatened with eviction, Maryse Roger-Coupin took part in the support campaign. When the camp was effectively dismantled in early 2012, she helped to create the REH (network of hospitable elected officials).

77. "Pierre de Bousquet de Florian, préfet du Pas-de-Calais", *La Voix du Nord*, 9 September 2009.

78. "Interview de Madame le Maire", *Journal Municipal de la Ville d'Angres*, October 2019.

79. "Vietnamiens à Angres : Fraternité Migrants dénonce des 'pressions' policières", *Ouest-France*, 18 November 2009.

80. "Migrants : une élue nordiste dénonce la garde à vie d'une bénévoles", *AFP*, 24 November 2011.

The dismantling of the camp and the related bill put the focus on the situation of exiled people in Norrent-Fontes and the policy of destroying living spaces implemented by the state. In response, Marc Boulnois “appeal[ed] to all mayors and all networks of elected officials to come and express their dissatisfaction.” The elected officials concerned by the presence of exiled people then met, says Marc Boulnois:

“I saw that there were elected officials who had the same problem, who were asking the same questions and so we decided from there to better organise ourselves, which is why the network of hospitable elected officials was created.”

Maël Galisson⁸¹, a member of GISTI and former coordinator of the PSM from 2012 to 2015, explains what the REH is:

“It was a defence network, in the sense of: ‘We’re going to support this mayor who is threatened by the State.’ There were elected officials who said: ‘If there are exiled people in our municipality, we’re not going to evict them, we’re not going to hunt them, we’re going to try to improve their living conditions.’”

Marc Boulnois explained that before the destruction of the camp, “we were already looking at how to improve the camp, we had to find something, because there had already been tent fires, the space had been rebuilt multiple times.” The decision by the prefecture accelerated the reflection on the new living space to be built for the exiled people present in Norrent-Fontes.

With Doctors of the World, the town hall and Terre d’Errance considered the idea of building permanent shacks in the form of cabins: “MDM had already conducted a trial, near Grande-Synthe, and had come to show us the plans”, says Marc Boulnois. To launch the operation, he looked for funding and received financial support from the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council, the Lys-Artois Community of Municipalities and the recently formed REH. The project took shape during the 2012 presidential elections, which saw François Hollande (PS) defeat Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP). This electoral situation created a window of opportunity to successfully complete the project, as Marc Boulnois saw it:

“There was a change of government. There was therefore less pressure from the Prefect because he had to wait for instructions from the new government, for the policies that would be followed. The Prefect was therefore not going to be zealous at that moment and, in any case, he had no particular directives.”

The choice was made to build four cabins, two for men, one for women, and one serving as a shared space. The space could accommodate up to 20 people. The number “has always been an issue”, explains Marc Boulnois, who continues:

“If we built more, we couldn’t keep up in terms of logistics. Volunteers had to really get involved in a major way, and then, in terms of space, something else had to be found.”

The number of people present in the camp was based on a cap agreed between the gendarmes, the town hall and Terre d’Errance Norrent-Fontes, according to Marc Boulnois:

“There were long discussions between the exiled people in the camps and the associations, to say: ‘there’s no point bringing too many people here at once, you’re putting yourself in danger and on top of that the number of lorries crossing to England is limited. We managed to have some type of dialogue on regulation, even though sometimes there were significant influxes, particularly during one summer, when there were several hundred.’”

81. Interview conducted on 20 April 2021.

For the construction of the huts, the town hall then provided the site as well as the technical services, but the work was mainly dependent on volunteers and the exiled people. For Marc Boulnois, this set-up “was safer than tents, canvases and candles... The standard was improved even if it remained unsanitary. There was no access to water, it was dry toilets. It remained precarious, but it was a solution.” By “stabilising” people, the “migratory flows, which existed in any case, and which the State was unable to manage, were organised and secured”, he says, concluding: “The issue was not how to prevent people from crossing, but how to accommodate them during this period of time.”

We can see here how the State’s intervention had the consequence of mobilising political and non-profit actors at local level, and contributing to the advent of a network of exchange and mutual assistance. While these actions did not put a stop to the precariousness of living spaces between 2008 and 2012, there was a form of municipalisation of the management of the camp of exiled people. This process led to the construction of permanent shacks reflecting the active involvement of the municipality.

The levels of reception varied from one municipality to another between tolerance, protection and a jointly created space, but the borders remained porous, as the example in Dunkirk shows.

2. In the Dunkirk area, between tolerance and active solidarity: Grande-Synthe, Tétéghem, Loon-Plage... and the Urban Community of Dunkirk

From 2002 to 2012, the situation of exiled people in the towns of Grande-Synthe, Tétéghem and Loon-Plage was linked to the closure of the Sangatte camp. The three municipalities were confronted with the settlement of exiled people in their territories and the implementation of a state policy combining dismantling and invisibilisation. Municipalities were gradually getting involved in the issue of managing exiled people, swinging between tolerance, a cap on numbers and the active municipalisation of living spaces. These different levels of hospitality had very direct effects on police practices. Here, we examine this involvement by the municipalities in order to understand how local elected officials were able to oppose the State and the pressure from security measures.

TIMELINE – 2002-2012 – CREATION, EVACUATION AND DESTRUCTION OF LIVING SPACES IN THE DUNKIRK AREA

- 10 January 2006:** The Loon-Plage camp is destroyed.
- 29 July 2008:** The Steenvoorde camp, where 60 exiled people live, is evacuated by the police.
- 9 September 2008:** Operation to evict the camp located around Lac de Tétéghem.
- 16 December 2008:** Destruction of a camp of exiled people in Loon-Plage.
- 17 June 2009:** Destruction of the Loon-Plage camp.
- 17 November 2009:** Destruction of the Loon-Plage camp, where 60 exiled people live.
- 30 June 2011:** Operation to dismantle the Lac de Tétéghem camp.
- January 2012:** The Urban Community of Dunkirk finances two projects led by Doctors of the World to install huts at Basroch (Grande-Synthe) and Tétéghem.
- 13 April 2012:** Dismantling of part of the Lac de Tétéghem camp.

a. Expulsions without solutions, local elected officials under pressure from the State

The town of **GRANDE-SYNTHÉ** (22,000 inhabitants) is located 6 kilometres from Dunkirk, connected to Lille via the A25 and to Calais via the A16. Grande-Synthe is historically left-leaning, with René Carême (PS) its mayor from 1971 to 1992, followed by André Demarthe, also PS, until 2001. From 2001 to 2019, Damien Carême (PS then EELV in 2015) was mayor. From 2019, the town became socialist again. When Damien Carême became an EELV MEP, he handed over to his deputy Martial Beyaert (PS), elected in his own name in 2020, against an EELV list.

Between 2001 and 2004, residents in Grande-Synthe noticed the presence of exiled people in the town or the woods, without any living space being identified. As Damien Carême tells us:

“We saw them arriving in 2002. And we weren’t necessarily aware because they set up residence on a site on which there was nothing and to which nobody went. And so, it was more the associations that alerted us to the situation. We worked with the associations to see how people were doing. But at the time, like until the end, for that matter, they stayed for a maximum of 24 hours and left, they crossed the next day.”⁸²

During this period, the exiled people took shelter in the town’s parks, particularly in Parc du Moulin. They were gradually pushed by the police towards the wooded area of Basroch, located on the outskirts, enabling their presence to be made invisible.

Basroch is an area of almost 21 hectares, originally made up of hedges and trees, which was intended to be used for “a subsequent development as an eco-neighbourhood” according to Laurent Pidoux, director general of services for the city of Grande-Synthe (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008). The exiled people then settled in the centre of Basroch, where the ground was uneven, muddy and exposed to the weather. The location had the advantage of being close to the Grande-Synthe rest area, located on the A16, where heavy goods vehicles parked up before heading towards the ferries and the Eurotunnel site.

As early as 2006, there were between 20 and 80 exiled people in Basroch amidst “a relative indifference”, explains Damien Carême, with a supply of wood in winter to avoid cutting down nearby trees, and water and food. Health screening was also provided via a visit by a nurse and, where necessary, treatment in the municipality’s polyclinic. However, no signs of any political support appeared, due to pressure from the Nord prefecture, “which allegedly feared another Sangatte”, telling the local authorities: “If you welcome them and they settle, you will bear sole responsibility for them, without the support of the State” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, p. 134).

The State was present via police operations every five or six months⁸³, ordered by the Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk, Jean-Régis Borius, or the Prefect of the Nord department, Daniel Canepa, newly appointed during the summer of 2006. These interventions led to the destruction of the camp, where tents were torn, blankets put into water, while property and food were confiscated. Each operation involved around fifty police officers. For the director of the office of the mayor of Grande-Synthe at the time, “during the 2 or 3 raids that took place, with about twenty police vehicles, it created a wave of panic”, explaining:

82. Interview conducted on 15 June 2021.

83. Despite our research, we were unable to find the exact dates.

“The town hall no longer wanted to see CRS units coming to arrest migrants on its territory. Whenever they did, they put the municipality into a state of siege. It was a serious mistake to send them into the camp, there was no public order issue with the exiled people” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 37).

There were two conflicting views on the presence of exiled people up to 2008. On the one hand, the town hall, which saw the Basroch camp as a way of settling people, to avoid their dispersal in the town and therefore managing them, and on the other, the State, which combated the fixation points and wanted to avoid the emergence of a “new Sangatte” through regular mobilisation of the police.

LOON-PLAGE is a town of 6,000 inhabitants located several kilometres from Dunkirk. The town hall was socialist from 1985 to 2001, before the Radical Party of the Left took over with the victory of Eric Rommel. Like Grande-Synthe and Tétéghem, the municipality is a member of the Urban Community of Dunkirk (CUD). The town is home to the ferry terminal and has been a crossing point for exiled people since at least 1998 and the Kosovo war.

In Loon-Plage, the situation of exiled people was more precarious. Once the Sangatte camp was closed, living spaces were created less than three kilometres from the terminal, on land belonging to the Autonomous Port of Dunkirk, under the authority of the State. Some associations organised support: Emmaüs, Secours Catholique, Éclaireurs de France and even healthcare staff. Between 2002 and 2006, little information was available on the exiled people present (Sudanese, Somali, Kurdish, Iraqi) other than the existence of squats and the camp near the port, regularly bricked up and respectively destroyed by the police.

The history of exiled people in Loon-Plage is marked by their invisibility and the omnipresence of police authorities, who intervened regularly – whether or not at the request of the Autonomous Port of Dunkirk. The media coverage of the site was mainly from the angle of arrests and destruction and rebuilding of their living spaces.

Even though the “Cold Weather Plan” had just been launched, an initial eviction was recorded on 10 January 2006, during which “bulldozers covered migrants’ personal belongings with soil and sand”⁸⁴ while “they were at the police station”. This eviction remobilised the associations, which attempted to politicise their situation. The camp was subsequently rebuilt, and around fifty people were recorded, “in shelters of worn tarpaulins and branches”⁸⁵. Other “razings” followed, such as on 16 December 2008, when some fifty migrants from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan were “sheltered” in state reception centres. The associations then denounced “the brutality and violence of these shameful operations”⁸⁶, which only “resolved” the “problem” for a few days, with the camps being rebuilt each time.

84. “Un camp de migrants rasé dans le port de Dunkerque, trois gardes à vue”, *AFP*, 10 January 2016.

85. “La grande misère de l’après-Sangatte”, *Le Monde*, 24 February 2006.

86. “La police détruit un camp de migrants”, *AFP*, 16 December 2008.

The town of **TÉTEGHEM** (7,000 inhabitants) is located a few kilometres from Grande-Synthe and Dunkirk, and is part of the CUD, headed by the socialist Michel Delebarre. Franck Dhersin (UMP) was its mayor from 1991 to 2001, and again from 2005 to the present. Michel Delebarre and Franck Dhersin are long-standing political rivals in legislature and the CUD. This rivalry was played out in this arena where the two players regularly passed the buck back and forth regarding responsibility for the management of exiled people, especially as their living space was on CUD land.

In Tétéghem, pressure from the police was less intense than in Grande-Synthe and Loon-Plage. Exiled people had been making attempts to cross since the early 2000s from the Tétéghem rest area, located on the A16 and therefore in the direction of coastal ports and the Eurotunnel. In 2005, living spaces were reported around Lac de Tétéghem – owned by the CUD – which was less than a 30-minute walk from the rest area where they attempted to board heavy goods vehicles. Initially, aid was organised by the parish, with food and clothing being distributed, followed by Salam and Doctors of the World in 2007-2008, then Terre d'Errance Flandres Littoral in 2010.

The first eviction was recorded on 9 September 2008, without the mayor “giving his consent”, explains Franck Dhersin, pinning the blame on the CUD for the operation. The camp was immediately rebuilt. To curb their presence, the mayor asked the sub-prefecture to close the Tétéghem rest area, which alternated between being open and closed.

Up to 2008, the period was characterised by police omnipresence, controlling and arresting exiled people on the one hand, and destroying their living spaces on the other. Aid was organised by the church and associations. The municipalities, under pressure from the State, were hesitant to get involved, and their actions, when they did, were kept hidden to avoid contributing to the “pull factor”. However, the winter of 2008 saw the launch of a series of municipal measures to support exiled people, against the State.

b. The “big tops” of winter 2008: “Outlaw mayors”

"BIG TOPS", THE STEENVOORDE PRECEDENT

Steenvoorde (4,300 inhabitants) is a municipality in the Nord department, in the Flandre Intérieure region. Jean-Pierre Bataille (UMP) has been the mayor since 1999. Exiled people (mainly Eritreans since 2006) attempted to climb aboard heavy goods vehicles from the Saint-Laurent rest area, 30 minutes from Dunkirk. They first lived in a wood on the edge of Becque, receiving assistance from some residents.

On 29 July 2008, a settlement of around sixty Eritreans on privately-owned land was dismantled. The State then advised the mayor against reacting: “Don’t do anything, if you give them a better welcome, you play into the hands of the traffickers.”⁸⁷ Residents were aware that people were sheltering there, but the number of people involved mobilised the population, with 150 people then congregating in the parish.

87. “Six ans après Sangatte, les clandestins sont toujours là”, *Le Parisien*, 4 September 2008.

In November 2008, some sixty volunteers founded the association Terre d'Errance Steenvoorde⁸⁸. The mayor and the association came to a compromise and, on 28 November 2008, installed two big tops on municipal land until 11 May 2009. The mayor imposed conditions: a maximum of 20 people in the two big tops "to avoid any pull factor", "no distribution of food, just a few commodities", no regular showers. A minimal reception was put in place, and was based on a negotiated cap on numbers, a partnership with the police and the agreement of the Dunkirk Sub-Prefect, Jean-Régis Borius: "For the time being, we can see that their number is strictly limited to the figures announced (...) But once the winter period has passed, this reception will have to cease."⁸⁹ Jean-Pierre Bataille specified the time-limited nature of the reception: "Our intention is clear: we do not want a camp to become established in Steenvoorde year-round."⁹⁰

The experiment, repeated during the winters of 2009, 2010 and 2011, was established as a political marker by Jean-Pierre Bataille, communicating in the media on the matter. He explained that the experiment proved that the reception did not create a "pull factor", that he had acted with the agreement of the state: "The Sub-Prefect told me: 'you can do what you want again whenever you want.'" The arrangement therefore made it possible to shelter a limited number of exiled people and, according to the authorities, combat the smuggling rings. He then put forth the idea of developing the system: "Would twenty small camps in Calais not be able to meet humanitarian needs without encouraging the establishment of Mafia networks?"⁹¹

During the particularly harsh winter of 2008, the three towns of Tétéghem, Grande-Synthe and Loon-Plage agreed to put in place an arrangement for the emergency reception of exiled people present on their territory – following the example of Jean-Pierre Bataille in Steenvoorde (see box opposite). This reception was supplemented with assistance for the exiled people, which varied depending on the involvement of the local elected officials and the ownership of the occupied sites (municipality, private owner, etc.). Each mayor also developed his or her own strategy, varying between a political position on reception and denying their presence in order to encourage discreet management, and *ultimately* avoid any political disagreements on a sensitive topic.

In Tétéghem, the first political discourse around the presence of exiled people emerged in 2008. This presence was not perceived as a "problem" by the town's mayor, Franck Dhersin⁹², who explained that 20 to 30 exiled people were present, "at most": "It is the smallest migrant camp in Dunkirk, solely Afghans" (author's note: There were also Iraqis, then Vietnamese). The mayor then organised a public meeting in his municipality, explaining his decision to "tolerate" their presence due to their small numbers and the "victim" status of exiled people.

In 2008, Franck Dhersin's strategy fluctuated between tolerating reception and basic "humanitarian" actions (water points, shower once a week, freedom given to associations),

88. Separate from the association Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes, but sharing similar objectives.

89. "Migrants à Steenvoorde, tolérance pour l'hiver", *La Voix du Nord*, 24 January 2009.

90. "L'accueil des migrants à Steenvoorde cessera avec la fermeture du camp le 11 mai", *La Voix du Nord*, 5 April 2009.

91. "La réponse humanitaire d'un maire UMP face aux migrants", *Le Monde*, 17 October 2009.

92. "Franck Dhersin veut rassurer les Tétéghemois", *La Voix du Nord*, 9 September 2008.

as long as the number of exiled people remained low. Maël Galisson explains that “the mayor of Tétéghem was not ‘driving them out’, but the basic needs... were about survival.” In addition, Franck Dhersin also managed his electorate, “by refusing any political position, he refused to let his name appear anywhere, he did not want any talk about the fact that there were camps in his town.”

During the winter of 2008, Franck Dhersin recommended dividing the reception between the different territories of the CUD, requesting that its president, Michel Delebarre, intervene. Delebarre spoke on 21 December 2008, explaining that he “does not wish to replace the State” in terms of the accommodation of exiled people, while agreeing to finance associations providing food, blankets, tents and clothing. At that point, he refused to build “permanent structures”, stating: “We all know that this is not the solution.”⁹³ Éric Rommel, mayor of Loon-Plage, also rejected the construction of permanent structures, explaining: “The associations are fed up, I understand, but I can’t do anything on my own”,⁹⁴ shifting responsibility to the State and the CUD.

On 26 December 2008, the mayor of Tétéghem, Franck Dhersin, took the opposing view to Dunkirk’s elected representatives and decided to open a sports hall to provide shelter from the cold for exiled people. This stance was reminiscent of that taken by Jean-Pierre Bataille, UMP mayor of Steenvoorde (see box above). This was followed by other Dunkirk area municipalities taking action.

In Loon-Plage, the forty exiled people removed from the coast and “sheltered” by the State a few days earlier came back and rebuilt a camp. On 28 December, the mayor of the town, Éric Rommel, followed the example of Tétéghem and had a heated 96 m² “big top” installed on the port site, and stated: “I have overstepped my rights, it’s true, but I’m tired of being the good obedient child.”⁹⁵

Damien Carême, mayor of Grande-Synthe, did the same the next day, installing two heated “big tops”, one for men, the other for women and children. At that time, the Basroch camp was mainly home to Afghans, Iraqi Kurds and Syrians. He also made the premises of an association available for twice weekly access to showers.

The concurrent reception offered by Jean-Pierre Bataille in Steenvoorde and Franck Dhersin in Tétéghem, two right-wing UMP members, politically neutralised the decisions of Eric Rommel and Damien Carême, situated on the left of the political spectrum. However, this emergency reception provoked criticism from the State, according to Damien Carême:

“And here, I’m going to start getting the first telling off from the sub-prefect of Dunkirk at the time, who told me that I can’t do this, that as a result I’m encouraging the work of the smugglers, that I’m creating insecurity, that I’m going to create a pull factor, that they’re all going to come, etc., in short, the clichés that we have heard from that time.”

Indeed, on 11 January 2009, Sub-Prefect Jean-Régis Borius declared that “mayors who welcome migrants are outlaws.”⁹⁶

In Loon-Plage, the “big top” was home to between 15 and 30 exiled people until mid-January 2009, whilst almost 100 people had settled on the Basroch site in Grande-Synthe up to the end of April 2009, when the “big tops” were dismantled by the town

93. “Michel Delebarre ne veut pas se substituer à l’État”, *La Voix du Nord*, 21 December 2008.

94. “Migrants : ‘seuls, je ne peux rien faire’”, *La Voix du Nord*, 25 December 2008.

95. “L’arrivée du froid oblige les élus à faire un geste pour les migrants”, *La Voix du Nord*, 29 December 2008.

96. “Les maires qui accueillent les migrants sont hors la loi”, *La Voix du Nord*, 11 January 2009.

hall, raising concerns from associations and exiled people, as indicated by Aïssa Zaïbet of MRAP (Movement against Racism and for Friendship among Peoples):

“The migrants were a little sad when they saw these major logistics disappear, they wondered if the associations would continue to help them.”⁹⁷

The creation of these three spaces – in permanent big tops, such as the use of a municipal hall – allowed associations to organise care and the distribution of meals to exiled people during this period. These spaces, often small in size, nevertheless provided some respite for exiled people in two ways: on the one hand, because they had access to additional comfort, although still very rudimentary, and, on the other hand, because police checks were much less present. Unlike the open spaces where people were scattered and the associations had less of a presence, the police could not personalise the checks, entering “municipalised” sites, even precarious ones, less frequently.

c. Between tolerance and the municipalisation of living spaces

This experience of emergency reception inaugurated a period of hospitality towards exiled people, but the trajectories of these local policies differed based on the strategies adopted by the three elected officials and the existing power relations between the State, the CUD and the municipalities. Depending on the period, varying degrees of tolerance can be seen, up to and including the creation of permanent living spaces.

In Grande-Synthe, the disappearance of the big top once again made exiled people vulnerable. A Jungle was recreated on the 21 hectares of Basroch. Waste management continued to be provided by the town, while the camp now had a supply of drinking water and the town provided several showers, managed by the associations.

The Basroch camp remained a precarious place for exiled people, as Claire Millot, a volunteer for the Salam association since 2009, tells us, describing the “Jungle”:

“They were in a pasture, full of water where pallets were placed, but it wasn't terrible. They walked on paths to get to the tents placed on pallets.”

With Salam, Claire Millot organised distributions of meals, among other things: “At first, there weren't many, so it was fine, but I remember one day we counted them, there were 70 and I thought, we're never going to cope.” To organise the collection of food and preparation of meals, in 2009 the association secured a parish hall in Grande-Synthe.

In Loon-Plage, in April 2009, Éric Rommel invited local associations to a meeting on exiled people, in order to collectively come up with solutions, but reiterated that the town did not own the port, which was under the authority of the State. The pressure from the State was evident on 17 June 2009, when another demolition of the camp took place, against a backdrop of wide-scale dismantling: the police emptied the camp by arresting the exiled people present, before once again a “bulldozer enters into action and destroys shelters, food, clothing, including personal effects, papers, money, family photos...”⁹⁸ The camp was subsequently rebuilt, where some forty exiled people were counted.

97. “À Grande-Synthe, les deux chapiteaux ont été démontés”, *La Voix du Nord*, 21 April 2009.

98. “À Loon-Plage, des campements de fortune dans les dunes”, *Le Monde*, 28 September 2009.

In September 2009, the dismantling of the Pashtun Jungle in Calais had repercussions for the towns of Grande-Synthe and Loon-Plage and police operations aimed at apprehending exiled people were also carried out in the two municipalities. Exiled people were regularly faced with police checks and arrests. However, Grande-Synthe town hall, which owned the Basroch site, had not, despite pressure from the State, sought an eviction. This municipalisation of the space therefore provided respite to the people living in these makeshift camps. In Loon-Plage, there were around sixty people, mainly Afghans, Iranians and Iraqis.

In October 2009, the municipality of Loon-Plage agreed to provide exiled people with showers (10 minutes per person), an arrangement managed by the associations and accessible twice a week. The showers "are intended to be kept as long as there are migrants"⁹⁹, informed Éric Rommel. But on 17 November 2009, another eviction of the Loon-Plage jungle took place, and this time it was excavators from the Grand Port Maritime de Dunkerque that carried out the "cleaning".

In Tétéghem, after the winter of 2008, a space had also been rebuilt, based on the idea of a cap regarding the municipality's capacity to accommodate people, as Paul Christophe, Director General of Services of the municipality of Tétéghem, stated:

"There is tolerance on the site, within the limits of what we know about how to manage for a municipality of our size. Even the associations were overwhelmed by the sudden influx of migrants. If we want proper support, the situation must remain manageable."¹⁰⁰

Winter 2009 helped with recognition of the Basroch camp as a municipalised space. Indeed, the mayor of Grande-Synthe decided to renew his emergency plan, with the re-erection of two heated "big tops", until March 2010. This repeated investment by the municipality gives it an official existence, on which the Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk relied, at this time asking the town hall of Grande-Synthe to "manage the cold" via the "provision of heated shelters for migrants"¹⁰¹. However, relations remained tense with the State, which renewed and reinforced its policing.

d. Pressure from police and the connections between the Dunkirk territories

Despite municipal investment, exiled people remained under pressure from police authorities. An emergency "reception" was allowed by the State, while the actions of the associations were criticised by the Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk, Jérôme Gutton, who considered them responsible for the development of the smuggling rings: "Reception capacities must be kept to a strict minimum."¹⁰²

At the beginning of 2011, the number of exiled people was estimated at 200 in Dunkirk. A year later, it fell to 70 under the combined pressure of the police, the opening of new migratory routes and the "dismantling of smuggling rings", states Jérôme Gutton, who explains his strategy:

"I'm staying the course, that of ultimately eliminating these camps and doing nothing to encourage the smuggling rings."¹⁰³

99. "Les migrants ont pris leur première douche à Loon-Plage", *La Voix du Nord*, 27 October 2009.

100. "Brusque décrue de migrants à Tétéghem", *La Voix du Nord*, 24 November 2010.

101. "Les associations gèrent le grand froid, mais ne veulent pas tout assumer seules", *La Voix du Nord*, 5 December 2010.

102. "Faire disparaître les camps de migrants", *La Voix du Nord*, 11 February 2011.

103. "Faire disparaître les camps de migrants", *La Voix du Nord*, 11 February 2011.

In Grande-Synthe, during the summer of 2011, there were still about fifty exiled people on the Basroch camp and police pressure did not let up. It was not until the end of 2011, and the publication of a report by the Defender of Rights on police violence on the coast, that tensions were reduced.

In Loon-Plage, in March 2010, 80 exiled people were living in the camp near the ferry terminal. Living conditions were precarious, without drinking water and in makeshift shelters, while the municipality remained largely uninvolved, apart from short-lived access to showers. On 21 July 2010, Doctors of the World installed a 5,000-litre water tank, which was dismantled a few days later by the Grand Port Maritime de Dunkerque, on the pretext that it “encourages the settlement of migrants”:

“We cannot allow a settlement that aims to perpetuate a site that goes against what the State is doing in terms of migration.”¹⁰⁴

On 15 September 2010, the Loon-Plage camp was dismantled once again, while around ten exiled people were present:

“This destruction is like the previous ones, the umpteenth offensive by the state services in the war of attrition launched against migrants to prevent them from returning to settle permanently, this winter, near the ferry terminal.”¹⁰⁵

This destruction highlighted the connections between the territories of Dunkirk. Indeed, at the same time, the Lac de Tétéghem camp “grew” from 30 to 150 exiled people. Franck Dhersin then requested an “urgent” meeting with the Nord Prefect, Jean-Michel Bérard, stating: “For our small town, not everything is bearable”, while adding that he was ready to “assume his share of solidarity in the face of this primarily humanitarian issue (...) and I am not asking for an expulsion.”¹⁰⁶ After his meeting with the prefecture, he explained that he would “not necessarily be warned when an action was triggered on the ground”¹⁰⁷ and “feared a dismantling that would not solve the problem.” He was assigning responsibility to the CUD here, which owned the land and would initiate any eviction.

The crafting of a crisis narrative around the presence of exiled people combined with increased police pressure (checks and arrests) had the direct effect of reducing their numbers. In several days, rumours about an operation to dismantle the camp reduced the number of exiled people from 150 to around forty. There were “self-evictions” by exiled people, fearing police checks, arrests, forced removals as well as the destruction of their personal belongings. Most of the exiled people present moved on “by themselves” from Lac de Tétéghem, to Calais or Paris, or attempted to reach Great Britain, according to the volunteers interviewed.

At the Municipal Council meeting of 30 November 2010, Franck Dhersin confirmed this cap on numbers explaining that the town “can accommodate 30 to 40 migrants in this camp.” During the winter of 2010, he decided to renew his winter arrangement by installing four heated, 10-person “big tops”, like in Grande-Synthe.

However, this cap on numbers had the effect of triggering evictions when the number of people increased, as on 30 June 2011, when dismantling was organised under the

104. “Eau des migrants : le Port de Dunkerque s'explique”, *Libération*, 4 August 2010.

105. “La Jungle de Loon-Plage, presque déserte, a été mise à bas par les pelleteuses”, *La Voix du Nord*, 16 September 2010.

106. “La Jungle de Tétéghem grossit, le maire tire la sonnette d'alarme”, *La Voix du Nord*, 17 November 2010.

107. “Le préfet promet une réponse rapide pour la jungle de Tétéghem”, *La Voix du Nord*, 18 November 2010.

supervision of the local authority (without the agreement of the CUD). This operation attracted criticism from associations:

“Migrant support associations, through the Carrefour des Solidarités, denounced the ‘violence’ of the operation and the “excessive-marginalisation” of people driven from the camp.”¹⁰⁸

Police pressure contributed to the self-eviction of exiled people. In a small area like that of Dunkirk, a “see-saw phenomenon” was at work, with exiled people moving from one territory to another, in search of some respite from the authorities.

e. The “permanent” municipalisation of living spaces

In early 2012, a new arrangement was developed in Grande-Synthe and Tétéghem. At the initiative of the CUD and MDM, eight 10 m² huts were financed and installed in Basroch, and two around Lac de Tétéghem.

These huts were heated in winter via convection heaters and each offered six bunk beds. But there were not enough of them, since only half of the exiled people present in Basroch moved inside, with the other half continuing to live in tents near the huts. Living conditions remained precarious, as Maël Galisson of GISTI points out:

“When I went to the camp, I thought, it’s still the bare minimum, they’re huts... But if you compare to others, you put things into perspective... it’s something at least.”

At Tétéghem, two huts were able to accommodate a maximum of 20 people. Both there and in Grande-Synthe, the erection of tents around the huts was tolerated. Nevertheless, in Tétéghem, a new operation to destroy the camp was organised on 13 April 2012, at the initiative of the CUD: “it was decided to destroy the makeshift camp nestled among the trees.”¹⁰⁹ The cap on numbers was lowered from 40 to 20.

In Tétéghem, the associations and exiled people had to follow the shifting rules of the game as power relations between the municipality, the CUD and the State changed. In addition, the presence of exiled people around Lac de Tétéghem fluctuated between tolerance, eviction and a cap on numbers, which evolved based on a living space allocated to them by the public authorities and in which they were confined.

However, these huts offered a certain amount of respite to exiled people:

“These rudimentary shelters, sort of prefabricated bungalows, have, according to MDM, changed the attitude of the police during identity checks: ‘Instead of shining a torch into the tent, the police now knock before entering.’ With these shelters, it has also become more difficult for the police to destroy the camps as has happened in the past.”¹¹⁰

The construction of these huts, a project supported by MDM and financed by the CUD, was carried out in agreement with the prefect, explains Michel Delebarre, its president: “The Prefect has agreed to the shelters not being compromised in the context of police interventions.”¹¹¹

108. “Le camp de Tétéghem en partie détruit”, *La Voix du Nord*, 5 July 2011.

109. “Un camp de fortune de migrants rasé, hier, à Tétéghem”, *La Voix du Nord*, 14 April 2012.

110. “À Dunkerque, climat moins tendu entre migrants et policiers”, *Le Monde*, 1 August 2012.

111. “À Dunkerque, climat moins tendu entre migrants et policiers”, *Le Monde*, 1 August 2012.

Like in Norrent-Fontes, the emergence of “permanent” huts represented the municipality providing reception for exiled people. These huts offered respite to their occupants, through a reduction in crackdowns by police. This space, on the outskirts of the town and close to a crossing point, concentrated and demarcated the living space of exiled people. However, this reception remained precarious and limited. The objective remained the same: not to go too far for fear of creating a pull factor and therefore going against the strategies of the state. These measures relied on the mobilisation of local elected officials, which could be put in doubt at any time by changes in government or the mobilisation of residents. Moreover, for exiled people and their supporters, the rules of the game were set by local actors, and were shifting.

III. IN CHERBOURG-OCTEVILLE, FROM AN ANTI-SQUAT POLICY TO A MUNICIPALISED SPACE

The city of Cherbourg-Octeville (35,000 inhabitants) is located in the Manche department, in Normandy. It is situated at the northern end of the Cotentin Peninsula. Exiled people were using the Port of Cherbourg-en-Cotentin to cross to Great Britain as the ports of Nord-Pas-de-Calais became less accessible and since the closure of the Sangatte camp. The city had had a PS mayor since the 1970s, and most notably Bernard Cazeneuve from 2001 - when Cherbourg and Octeville merged - to 2012. Also an MEP for the Manche department (between 1997 and 2002 and between 2007 and 2017), he handed over the reins to his deputy, Jean-Michel Houllegate, in 2012, when he became Minister for European Affairs, Minister of the Interior in 2014 and Prime Minister in 2016. He dealt, among other things, with Calais' “Great Jungle” and Grande-Synthe's La Linière camp. In this section, we discuss how associations compensated for the failures of the State and the municipalities (1), while, at the same time, the municipalities jointly created deterrence through an active anti-squat policy (2). Faced with the failure of this policy, the municipalisation of a living space for exiled people emerged (3).

TIMELINE – 2002-2012 – EVICTION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF LIVING SPACES IN THE CHERBOURG-OCTEVILLE URBAN AREA

9 August 2002: Dismantling of a squat located in an abandoned building. 30 to 40 exiled people, mainly Iraqi Kurds, are evicted.

Summer 2004: Iraqi Kurds settle in a camp in Tourlaville, located on Boulevard Maritime.

Summer 2005: The Tourlaville camp is burned down.

22 September 2006: An eviction order is issued for the Tourlaville camp.

22 September 2006: Exiled people settle on former SNCF premises belonging to the town hall of Cherbourg-Octeville.

14 January 2007: At the initiative of Bernard Cazeneuve, an eviction order is issued concerning the former SNCF premises.

14 January 2007: 60 exiled people settle on land belonging to the Société Hérouvillaise d'Économie Mixte d'Aménagement (SHEMA), near the parish hall.

25 July 2007: At the initiative of SHEMA, an eviction order is executed.

25 July 2007: Exiled people settle behind the Jean-Nordez sports hall at the foot of Montagne du Roule on municipal land.

3 October 2007: Bernard Cazeneuve calls for the evacuation of the Nordez camp, home to some sixty people.

3 October 2007: A new squat is created on Boulevard Maritime.

December 2007: The squat on Boulevard Maritime is evacuated. Bernard Cazeneuve advises that the exiled people – mainly Afghans – can settle behind the Jean-Nordez sports hall.

January 2008: A municipalised and tolerated squat is set up behind the municipal sports hall, which becomes the Nordez camp.

.....

1. From indifference to charity-based assistance to exiled people

Before the closure of the Sangatte camp, Cherbourg-Octeville was already a transit point for exiled people, in the same way as Ouistreham and Dieppe, port towns located in Normandy (read about them in the two boxes below). The first squats reported in Cherbourg date from the summer of 2002, with between thirty and forty Iraqi Kurds sheltering in a disused business premises belonging to the Urban Community of Cherbourg. On 9 August 2002, they were evacuated, arrested and released without any rehousing solutions (THOMAS, 2012). The next day, the building was demolished to prevent it being reoccupied.

Other spaces were occupied that year: informal camps around the maritime area, in disused spaces or even private land. Exiled people “move several times as evacuation measures occur” (THOMAS, 2012). Between 2002 and 2007, exiled people moved at least six times.

OUISTREHAM: UNTIL 2014, A SIMPLE CROSSING POINT

Ouistreham (9,000 inhabitants) is a town in the Calvados department in Normandy, located 20 minutes from Caen and 1.5 hours from Cherbourg. Its port has attracted exiled people since the late 1990s. An increase in attempts to cross had been seen with the closure of the Sangatte camp. The town was run by the PS from 1983 to 2014, then by Romain Bail (LR) from 2014. Between 2002 and 2003, exiled people sheltered in dunes near the port, digging trenches and using tarpaulin for cover. They were evicted in 2003 during preparations for the 60th anniversary of the Normandy landings. Temporary squats were subsequently built. Work began in 2004, but “the fences do not seem very difficult to get past; at certain corners and in several places between the two rows of fencing, it seems quite easy to climb them, especially as there are trees along the fence” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 109). Ouistreham was mainly a point for crossing the Channel, which was organised in the town or further away, in motorway rest areas. The crossing was quick and, in a certain way, precluded the establishment of living spaces. As we will see in the third part, from 2014, the presence of exiled people increased in the town, while the period of time before a crossing became longer. Volunteers organised themselves to support them.

At the request of local actors, police reinforcements were sent by Nicolas Sarkozy, which went hand in hand with the securing of the maritime area. This security influx drove up the numbers: in 2002, the PAF recorded 1,000 attempted crossings. Jean-François Lequoy, from the charity Conscience Humanitaire, which helps exiled people, testifies to the police practices:

“The CRS increased the number of checks, took foreigners tens of kilometres from Cherbourg and abandoned them to fend for themselves. They booby-trapped the squats by spraying tear gas on the blankets.”¹¹²

However, the presence of exiled people – mainly Iraqi Kurds – continued in the town, but remained invisible. Residents at the time referred to the “ghosts of Cherbourg, as the presence of migrants relegated to squats on the outskirts of the urban area could go unnoticed” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015). In 2004, they established a camp on Boulevard Maritime in Tourlaville, near the port area. They received, among other things, food aid through the charity La Chaudrée, which provides meals to the homeless and undocumented immigrants. A hall in the parish of Maupas was also used as a distribution centre. The squat, where a dozen people lived, was burned down in the summer of 2005. By making their presence visible once again, this event remobilised residents.

Support was first organised around local associations (the Red Cross, Collectif Contre le Racisme, Conscience Humanitaire) and Pastorale des Migrants, a Catholic Church organisation. In 2005, several awareness-raising measures were organised to mobilise the local community. In January 2006, a “World Day of Migrants and Refugees” was organised in Cherbourg-Octeville, where Pastorale des Migrants denounced the State’s policy: “This hunt is no accident but the implementation of directives given by the Minister of the Interior to the prefects.”¹¹³

The politicisation of the situation of exiled people aroused the interest of the local press, which went to meet them. Articles described the squat sites:

“A hut made of pieces of wood, perforated metal sheets, an old plastic tarpaulin. At its centre is a clapped-out stove around which fifteen young people warm up.”¹¹⁴

The site was nevertheless threatened by a real estate project. The mayor of Tourlaville, André Rouxel, explained that he was going to “ask the prefect to take all necessary steps to free up this land as soon as the application for planning permission is official”¹¹⁵, specifying:

“I’m taking advantage of these circumstances to once again ask the State to find a solution to move the squatters somewhere else. For as long as the Iraqi conflict is not resolved, they must be offered decent living conditions.”

The State was being made aware of its responsibilities with regard to the management of exiled people, without any commitment from the municipality. Faced with the risk of dismantling, the associations mobilised and called for the opening of an overnight reception centre for homeless and exiled people. Local political actors refused: “the fear

112. “Sangatte fermé, les réfugiés tentent sur toute la côte de passer en Angleterre”, *Libération*, 26 February 2003.

113. “La Journée mondiale du migrant et du réfugié”, *Ouest-France*, 7 January 2006.

114. “Le squat de Tourlaville abrite toujours des Irakiens”, *Ouest-France*, 16 January 2006.

115. “Une résidence de standing sur le squat irakien”, *Ouest-France*, 1 April 2006.

for them was to open a second Sangatte¹¹⁶, explains Pascal Besuelle, a volunteer for the association Réseau Éducation sans Frontières, and who participated in the creation of Itinérance Cherbourg during the summer of 2006.

While the number of exiled people increased – around one hundred at certain times – from September 2006, police reinforcements were requested by the UMP MP for Cherbourg, Jean Lemière: police operations were being carried out to move them away from the town, some towards Paris, others to Toulouse. Moving them away was mainly about preparing for the dismantling of the Tourlaville squat, announced on 22 September 2006. An eviction order for the Tourlaville squat was issued to the exiled people, who self-evicted themselves on the advice of the associations.

This initial period gives us an understanding of, on the one hand, the local organisation of voluntary support for exiled people, and, on the other hand, the indifference of the local authorities towards them. The associations were not hindered by the municipalities, which did not want to take responsibility for the exiled people and were enlisted by the State in the policy of deterrence. The Sangatte camp episode continued to be raised and reduced the room for manoeuvre of local elected officials. Bernard Cazeneuve, mayor of Cherbourg-Octeville, found a form of compromise: between “humanity” and “firmness”, between support for associations and a policy of deterrence.

2. Humanity and firmness, the credo of Cazeneuve

At the end of September 2006, following the self-eviction of the Iraqi Kurds, a new living space was occupied on former SNCF premises belonging to the town hall of Cherbourg-Octeville, located on Avenue de Paris. Close to La Chaudrée and the Port of Cherbourg-Octeville, the location, precarious and unsanitary, had the advantage of enabling them to be close to their supporters and the crossing points. At this time, the number of exiled people fluctuated around twenty.

However, the site was soon threatened by Bernard Cazeneuve, who announced on 11 December 2006 that he would “clear, but humanely”, stating:

“These premises, which are in danger of collapsing, are a threat to the lives of those who have found refuge there (...) I will have to ask for their evacuation, but we won’t act like brutes. There are a few days left to try to find a solution and avoid leaving them to fend for themselves, which the State is not currently guaranteeing.”¹¹⁷

The evacuation took place on 14 January 2007, without any rehousing solutions. The exiled people then found refuge near the parish hall. Sixty exiled people settled on land belonging to the Société Hérouvillaise d’Économie Mixte d’Aménagement (SHEMA) in Cherbourg. At the same time, the associations mobilised and called for dialogue with local elected officials and the State in order to open an overnight reception centre, but the General Council and the State refused to participate. The site lasted for six months, before SHEMA requested its eviction by applying for an administrative injunction, executed on 25 July 2007.

Once again, the exiled people thought ahead and self-evicted, settling on land belonging to the town hall of Cherbourg-Octeville, behind the Jean-Nordez sports hall, at the foot

116. “SDF : un centre d'accueil de nuit réclamé”, *Ouest-France*, 18 May 2006.

117. “Mobilisation autour du squat des réfugiés”, *Ouest-France*, 11 December 2006.

of Montagne du Roule. Bernard Cazeneuve stated that “he would not issue an eviction notice without informing them beforehand. He reiterated that the problem fell under the responsibility of the State.”¹¹⁸

On 17 September 2007, Bernard Cazeneuve, accompanied by Jacky Hénin, mayor of Calais, and Michel Delebarre, mayor of Dunkirk and President of the CUD, called on the State via a letter. In it, they reiterated that “the disappearance of the Sangatte camp did not make the refugees disappear, who are left to their own devices, wandering around the towns, facing extreme precariousness (...) and exposed to hygiene, health and nutrition problems. (...) At a time when the government is asking its prefects for figures, the mayors are asking them for ways to deal with the growing influx of migrants seeking to reach Great Britain.”

The State’s response was swift and strictly security-focused. On 18 September 2007, Brice Hortefeux, Minister of Immigration, dispatched two CRS units to Cherbourg-Octeville to secure the port, and stated:

“In Cherbourg, a few dozen migrants are looking to reach England and we need to strengthen police presence. I would like to see an increase in the number of arrests of smugglers and foreigners in an irregular situation.”¹¹⁹

Under pressure from local councillors and accused of being “lax”, Bernard Cazeneuve channelled the government and called for the evacuation of the Nordez camp. 50 exiled people had settled there, and the mayor of Cherbourg-Octeville justified his decision on safety and hygiene grounds, while stating:

“I don’t have a choice, I’ve been very patient. I don’t want to see xenophobic instincts given free rein in the town.”¹²⁰

On 3 October 2007, the eviction order was issued to the exiled people, who self-evicted themselves and moved to a squat on Boulevard Maritime. Bernard Cazeneuve stated that “clearing the squats is pointless insofar as they are immediately recreated in another part of the town” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015). The squat was nevertheless evacuated in December 2007. During the operation, some sixty exiled people were arrested, half of whom were locked up in the Rennes administrative detention centre (CRA) and nearby police stations.

Bernard Cazeneuve's policy here involved crafting a narrative that combined “humanity” and “firmness”, he says. It involved a policy of challenging the State with a view to reducing migratory flows in his town, securing transit sites and obtaining police reinforcements, while actively participating in the policy of evicting squats of exiled people. It was about being part of the State's deterrence policy without contesting it, but asking the government to intervene to “maintain order”. On the other hand, he supported the associations, through grants and the lending of halls, “tolerated” living spaces for short periods and enlisted the associations in the “self-eviction” of exiled people in order to avoid evictions being undertaken by the police. At the beginning of 2008, however, he changed his policy: a municipalised living space was created.

118. “Les clandestins lèvent le camp et se déplacent”, *Ouest-France*, 25 July 2007.

119. “Afflux clandestins : renfort CRS à Cherbourg”, *AFP*, 18 September 2007.

120. “Le maire PS de Cherbourg demande l’expulsion d’un squat d’Irakiens”, *Le Figaro*, 20 September 2007.

IN DIEPPE, “SOCIAL PEACE” REQUIRES A “CAP ON NUMBERS”

Dieppe is a town of 28,000 inhabitants located in Seine-Maritime, in Normandy. It was run by the PCF from 1971 to the present, except from 2001 to 2008, when it had a UMP mayor, Édouard Leveau. It is home to a port where exiled people have been trying to cross into Great Britain since the late 1990s. The number of exiled people, mainly Iraqi Kurds, increased with the closure of the Sangatte camp.

From 2002 to 2007, the more or less unsanitary buildings in which living spaces were temporarily organised were, after being evacuated, quickly bricked up to prevent them being reoccupied by exiled people. In 2002, they moved into bunkers and an old trawler, the Saint-Germain, before it was destroyed. They found refuge in the caves of the Pollet cliffs from 2002 to 2006, but these were bricked up and made off-limits by the prefect. In September 2007, they moved into an abandoned house in the Talou area, but this was bricked up at the request of the prosecutor.

The association Information Solidarité Réfugiés (ISR), founded in 1992 and headed by Érik Schando (dentist by profession, but also volunteer director of the Dieppe CADA since 2004 and the Dieppe Samu Social, provided support to exiled people. In December 2005, while 40 people were sleeping on the docks, the association put pressure on the sub-prefect of Dieppe to organise reception. The State’s representative agreed to give his permission by assigning them a floor in the former Michel Hospital for a period of three months, with “the discreet assistance of the town hall and the DDASS [departmental directorate of health and social affairs] (...) The prefecture and the police looked the other way for ‘the sake of social peace’” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 117).

From 2007, a “tacit agreement” was put in place between the ISR association, the town hall, the prefecture and the police so that exiled people could settle in a former Vinco factory, near the port and on the outskirts of the town. This was an unsanitary premises of 30 m², with an outdoor water point and a basic electrical system installed by the town hall. ISR distributed food and brought the exiled people to showers in the basement of a bandstand lent by the town, near the central police station.

The terms of this “tolerance” were that “the number of exiled people was not to exceed 40”, explains Érik Schando (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 117), “It would be the maximum that the town would tolerate.” This “cap on numbers” would avoid any public disorder when exiled people tried to enter the port to cross: “The tolerance towards exiled people would therefore entail the quantitative limits set by this agreement not being breached” (AKOKA, CLOCHARD, 2008, p. 118).

At the same time, the deterrence policy was still in place. When arrests were made, exiled people were sent to the PAF in Rouen and to CRAs far away from Dieppe. In addition, exiled people seeking asylum could not be accommodated in the Dieppe CADA.

3. Tolerance and support for Itinérance: an association that is changing its activities

After the evacuation of the squat on Boulevard Maritime in December 2007, Bernard Cazeneuve “informed the associations that, if migrants rebuild a squat on the Nordez site, it will not be removed” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015). A camp was set up with the “tolerance” of the mayor, who had toilets and a water point installed. A room was also made available to the association Itinérance, one kilometre from the camp, where breakfast and meals were served. They received grants. A daily medical consultation was organised. Between 50 and 100 people settled in the camp, mainly Afghans, while the presence of Iraqi Kurds decreased.

For one activist from the association Itinérance Cherbourg, “while it’s far from a full reception centre, the living conditions are starting to improve a little. The fear of losing rare personal belongings, papers and photos is fading” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015).

The association Itinérance was gradually moving away from emergency action, and changed how it worked in the area of defending the rights of asylum seekers. The association tried to raise awareness among exiled people about asylum procedures so that they could remain in France. Volunteers were trained by La Cimade. French language lessons were offered and exiled people were provided with support with their asylum procedures.

From 2 to 3 applications registered in 2009, 19 exiled people applied for asylum in Cherbourg-Octeville in 2010, but access to the CADAs was limited. In 2009, the departmental directorate for social cohesion (DDCS) decided to accommodate all asylum seekers in hotels, before restricting such access to families.

The camp in Nordez continued to exist and became institutionalised: a kitchen was installed, a large tent reserved for asylum seekers was erected and individual tents for other exiled people were also set up. The existence of an institutionalised site recognised by the municipality was part of a form of delegation of state services regarding the reception of exiled people and asylum seekers, with the former being entitled to being unconditionally accommodated in emergency reception facilities, and the latter in a CADA.

The population of the camp changed. Various nationalities were identified between 2010 and 2012: Sudanese, Eritreans and Afghans. In 2012, the camp was still in place, with between 30 and 40 people still living in precarious conditions: tents and huts constructed from pallets, reclaimed wood and tarpaulins.

By tolerating a place for exiled people in Cherbourg-Octeville, Bernard Cazeneuve acknowledged the failure of the deterrence policy implemented against them by the State, in which he had been involved as mayor since the early 2000s. However, the municipalised camp remained precarious, with just tents and the bare necessities: water, food, medical care, showers. Fearing that a better-quality reception would turn Cherbourg-Octeville into a “new Sangatte”, no permanent building was envisaged – without state funding. Against this backdrop, Itinérance changed how it worked, from a strictly “emergency” association to one providing legal assistance, going so far as to take responsibility for asylum seekers to make up for the deficiencies of the State’s systems.

This second part came back to how the French State had perfected its deterrence policy. It was designed by the Ministry of the Interior, which, gradually encroaching into other ministries, had pre-empted all immigration powers. It specifically targeted exiled people and took the form of a series of measures aimed at: preventing access to asylum procedures, fabricating their irregular status, institutionally bringing about a refusal to grant refugee status, arresting, locking up and removing – from the country and the Franco-British border. However, this policy at the border was disputed by associations, local elected officials and by the arrangements made with local government representatives. Peripheral power was one of the levers for the emergence of alternative policies for the management of exiled people. However, the room for manoeuvre remained limited, and the autonomy of local actors remained relative. After ten years of management of migration issues by the UMP and Nicolas Sarkozy, the victory of François Hollande in the May 2012 presidential elections suggested a change in how it was framed. Bernard Cazeneuve, socialist mayor of Cherbourg-Octeville, formulated a means of management combining “humanity” and “firmness”. As we will see in the following section, this socialist antonym was a particular feature of François Hollande’s term of office, where these two concepts coexisted in a balancing act between the reception of exiled people and guarantees regarding combating irregular immigration.

PART 3

“HUMANITY AND FIRMNESS”, THE SOCIALIST ANTONYM AS A DOCTRINAL GUIDELINE (2012-2017)

PART 3

On 6 May 2012, François Hollande brought an end to Sarkozy's five years of office by becoming President of the Republic. The arrival in power of a socialist leader suggested a renewed understanding of migration issues. Indeed, for ten years, first as Minister of the Interior and then as President of the Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy had encouraged a mindset of "controlling migratory flows" and "combating irregular immigration". Exiled people were targeted and subject to the "target-based policy": checks, arrests, detention, removals. In the first two years of Hollande's five-year term, the Ministry of the Interior was seen to be fumbling. He kept a tight rein on migration issues and followed the rhetoric of "controlling migratory flows". A series of initiating and shutting down dialogue with local actors followed. The limits and contradictions of the mindset of "maintaining public order", as formulated by the Ministry of the Interior, very soon became apparent as the number of exiled people increased on the coast of Nord-Pas-de-Calais (Chapter 7). During a "crisis" period, the Ministry of the Interior cobbled something together and revived an emergency arrangement similar to that which had spurred the creation of the Sangatte camp: the Jules Ferry Centre in Calais. At the same time, in Grande-Synthe, a municipal humanitarian camp was set up as an emergency facility, designed to accommodate exiled people whose numbers were too great for Basroch. Through a series of dismantling operations, the State sought to concentrate exiled people in one place and make them invisible, "accidentally" creating the largest shanty town that it attempted to reduce by combining "humanity" and "firmness" (Chapter 8). These living spaces, which had become too visible and too political, were subject to criticism in the run-up to the presidential elections. For the State, it was a matter of removing these camps and re-initiating a policy combating the "fixation points" (Chapter 9).

CHAPTER 7: THE LIMITS OF “MAINTAINING PUBLIC ORDER”: THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR CAUGHT UP IN ITS OWN CONTRADICTIONS

In 2012, the election of François Hollande as President of the Republic opened a window of opportunity for a change in the understanding of migration issues on the Franco-British UK border. But the first two years of his term appeared, in many ways, contradictory and dependent on electoral timescales. Indeed, there was an initial period of openness with local elected officials and associations supporting exiled people; an era of construction of permanent living spaces was initiated, while Calais remained the subject of a jointly created policy of deterrence, via an active anti-squat policy. The Dunkirk area remained a place of state “tolerance”, where local elected officials managed to preserve municipalised living spaces. However, Manuel Valls, Minister of the Interior, retained control over immigration powers, while, at the same time, the perception of “controlling migratory flows” of immigration was replicated (I). After the poor performance of PS in the 2014 municipal and European elections and a significant increase in the number of exiled people on the coast, the Ministry of the Interior could be seen to be fumbling, institutionalising a space for women in Calais, shutting down dialogue with the associations and local elected officials and reviving an active anti-squat policy before calling it into question when the objectives of invisibility and maintaining public order were not achieved. In the Dunkirk area, the municipalised living spaces were gradually being compromised as the numbers of exiled people increased and the media coverage of these spaces threatened the local political order (II).

I. THE ELECTION OF FRANÇOIS HOLLANDE: BETWEEN OPENNESS AND ENSHRINEMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF “CONTROLLING MIGRATORY FLOWS”

“I will grant the right to vote in local elections to foreigners legally residing in France for five years. I will lead a relentless fight against irregular immigration and illegal labour networks. I will secure legal immigration. Regularisation will be carried out on a case-by-case basis based on objective criteria.”(Agenda of François Hollande in 2012)

The election of François Hollande as French head of state represented a window of opportunity for elected officials and associations supporting exiled people “amenable” to renewing the management of the presence of exiled people on the border. During the first two years of François Hollande’s term of office, under the impetus of local elected officials, a dialogue was established that suggested a change in the way the situation of exiled people would be considered. However, in Calais, this dialogue coexisted with the joint creation of a deterrence policy, where evictions continued (1). In the Dunkirk area, the tolerated living spaces continued, while the elected officials managed to influence

the policies of the local government in favour of generating a reception for exiled people (2). However, the country's shift to the left did not challenge the perception and framing of exiled people as a security issue. There was a revival of the rhetoric of "controlling migratory flows", for which the Ministry of the Interior retained responsibility (3).

1. Discuss and evict: Calais, a symbolic city

"It has everything, including firmness, including respect for the law but also all the integration work, all the social support work" (Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault, on the Circular of 26 August 2012)

During the summer of 2012, a series of dismantling operations was organised in France: "Two to three thousand Roma were removed from the land they were occupying (...) without any proposal for alternative accommodation"¹²¹ being proffered. These evacuations were accompanied by removal measures via standardised procedures. In other words: the situation of the people was not examined, merely being present in the shanty towns justified a removal order.

These repeated evictions aroused controversy and encouraged the government to "regulate" them via the Circular of 26 August 2012 relating to anticipating and supporting operations to evacuate illegal camps. This interministerial circular aimed to satisfy "the dual objective of firmness in terms of security and humanity in managing people". It was a compromise between the Interior and Housing Ministries. For the PS Minister of the Interior Manuel Valls, it was a question of applying a policy of "firmness consisting of applying the court decisions requiring the immediate evacuation of the camps when the limits of insalubrity or danger have been crossed"; for the EELV Minister for Housing Cécile Duflot, a policy of "humanity": "no eviction should be carried out if alternative solutions, particularly in terms of housing, have not been examined."¹²²

This Circular tried to combine these two concepts, specifying that "respect for court decisions cannot be questioned. It is up to the prefect to carry these out, when the judge orders that an end be put to the illegal occupation of land, with the assistance of law enforcement, if necessary", but that it is necessary "to ensure equal and dignified treatment of any person in a situation of social distress. It is therefore your responsibility, by initiating the work as soon as possible before the court decision, to offer solutions for support."¹²³

For GISTI¹²⁴, this Circular "might be misleading"; however, the prerequisites required were non-existent or not applicable, stating that: the "diagnosis (...) may be more or less complete", that management "without delay and to ensure continuity for the children present" was called into question by the fact that "evacuations obliterate schooling efforts" while access to employment continued to be dependent on a work permit. GISTI concluded by stating that this "Circular reflects the constant use of this dual language which clearly shows that the objective of "humanity" assigned to the prefects remains theoretical, due to the lack of measures and means to achieve them in practice."

121. "Évacuations de campements de Roms : brutale 'humanité'", *GISTI*, 11 September 2012.

122. "Roms : une circulaire de compromis", *Libération*, 29 August 2012.

123. Extracts from the Circular of 26 August 2012.

124. "Évacuations de campements de Roms : brutale 'humanité'", *GISTI*, 11 September 2012.

At the same time, the REH organised and brought together around 150 elected officials - mainly EELV, but also from the PS, PCF and UMP. The REH helped with setting up permanent shacks in Norrent-Fontes, Grande-Synthe and even Tétéghem. It played a lobbying role with the State and the Ministry of the Interior. Drawing on the number of elected officials it represented and the experience gained, it became an important actor.

The first meeting took place on 20 July 2012, at which H  l  ne Flautre, EELV MEP, Marc Boulnois, EELV Mayor of Norrent-Fontes, Damien Car  me, PS Mayor of Grande-Synthe and Majdouline Sbai, EELV Vice-President in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region, were received by Thomas Andrieux, Deputy Chief of Staff to Manuel Valls and Fadela Benrabia, Ministerial Advisor in charge of integration and asylum issues. The aim during the meeting was to address "the issue of police violence and the situation of accommodation and reception in the region."

Marc Boulnois explained that at this meeting, Manuel Valls' director of office said that he "understood the situation, but was sticking to his position on the control of migratory flows, relations with England and the Touquet agreements."

The minutes of the meeting show that "the two cabinet representatives proposed that any act of police violence observed be reported to them directly (in order to) bypass the hierarchy in order to react more quickly to police misconduct and excesses."

In Calais, mayor Natacha Bouchart pursued a policy of deterrence through an active anti-squat policy: direct relationship between the town hall and the State, appeal for tip offs, communication about her policy. Since the arrival of Manuel Valls at the Ministry of the Interior, this policy had not been challenged, with the State assisting the town hall with carrying out these evictions. In this way, between 10 May 2012 and 20 July 2012, nine evictions, followed by the destruction of spaces, were carried out.

To put an end to this situation, the local elected officials got Manuel Valls' office to stop evictions that were being carried out by the State:

"They also ensured that there would be no further destruction of the camp at the behest of the State. However, if a local authority requests intervention, the State will be obliged to carry out this destruction."

This first meeting allowed for progress without calling into question the policy for evicting camps. After a few weeks of respite, during the month of September, five squats were dismantled: the "Africa House", the "White House", the "Paradise House", the "Palestinian House" as well as the distribution centre made available by the town hall of Calais to Secours Catholique.

At the meeting, a commitment was made to "establish a forum for discussion bringing together the State, local authorities and the associations." The principle of regional commissions was enshrined in the Circular of 26 August 2012, which specifies that the prefects will ensure "close involvement of the territorial authorities concerned (municipalities, inter-municipalities, general council and regional council), as well as associations likely to provide any kind of support with assisting people."

This Circular was a key element in the structuring of a dialogue with associations supporting exiled people, as explained by Ma  l Galisson, coordinator of PSM from 2011 to 2014:

"Hollande seized on this Circular, which was more oriented towards the Roma camps (...) And the prefect of Pas-de-Calais [Denis Robin] seized on it to say: 'We will create a space for discussion with the associations' to talk properly about migrant camps in Pas-de-Calais."

This space for dialogue renewed the interaction between the State and associations, since "under Sarkozy, there were very few exchanges, or it was rather limited, in a top-down logic, it was the prefect of Calais who called in the associations" explains Maël Galisson. Marc Boulnois wholeheartedly agrees, stating:

"We had created a steering committee with the prefect, which brought together all the stakeholders, safety, local authorities and associations, and we were trying to deal with the issue of the presence of exiled people in the region (...) The idea was to coordinate between the associations, the police, to have sanitary facilities. There were a few meetings that helped move things forward, but our positions were still quite far apart. The State was not changing its migration policy."

However, the logic of territorial "turf" and the "good will" of a prefect prevented the discussion from being extended to other territories, explains Maël Galisson: "You are faced with inertia, with the bureaucracy of the administration where, in fact, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais has dug his heels in to widen the discussion to Grande-Synthe, Tétéghem, Steenvoorde and the camps in Nord." As Marc Boulnois confirms: "During these steering committee meetings, we mainly talked about Calais."

The associations' relationship with this area was initially cautious, in particular, associations managing "the emergency" on a daily basis. The PSM and REH, as actors further removed from emergency assistance to exiled people, were particularly involved in these meetings. From the second half of 2012, questions emerged about the direction this forum for dialogue should take. For Nathanaël Caillaux, from Secours Catholique, the "desire between the associations at that time was to say: 'We can't simply demand what the State has to do, we must also have proposals.'"¹²⁵

Based on experiences abroad, around people in transit and their management by the public authorities, one group came up with a "Migrant House" (Maison du Migrant) project, says Nathanaël Caillaux: "This was the name of the project carried out in Mali and Mexico, the Casa de Los Migrantes (...) This project was then collectively approved." Migrant House aimed "to put in place reception facilities which ensure fundamental rights, the right to access water, food, accommodation, information on asylum, health" says Maël Galisson, who coordinated the development of the project for the PSM.

It took time for the local government to take on the project. In fact, it was presented at the Arras prefecture in early 2013 but "this was somewhat ignored, while evictions continued", says Maël Galisson, continuing:

"On the one hand, we have this kind of little bubble of consultation with the State which suggests that we could do better. On the other hand, the camps remain, the extreme precariousness of the exiled people remains, evictions continue to take place in certain places, particularly in Calais. There is a kind of disastrous daily routine with regards to the exiled people and their rights."

125. Interview conducted on 26 April 2021.

Despite the implementation of the Circular of 26 August 2012 regulating the dismantling of living spaces, in Calais, there were (at least) 18 evictions in 2013 followed by the destruction of living spaces. The implementation of these evictions drew criticism in September 2013 from Dominique Baudis, then Defender of Rights, who explained:

"Too often evacuations occur without a prior court decision. Too often the three-month period between the judgement and the dismantling is not respected [The eviction operations are] very numerous and fulfil the stated intention (...) to avoid any gathering of migrants in Calais."¹²⁶

In December 2013, the situation changed. Manuel Valls travelled to Calais and gathered together the local elected officials and the associations. During this meeting, a volunteer told us that "Calais remains off-limits": "He didn't say anything about Calais, no concrete answer, other than the reinforcement of a CRS unit."

However, a desire to "experiment" was emerging, via accommodation facilities, as one volunteer tells us:

"Manuel Valls addressed the prefect and told him: "there needs to be arrangements that allow for the accommodation of exiled people." The prefect turned to the DDCS, which developed what would be a Migrant House. And, in fact, he used the association's project word for word, but without necessarily saying it. But in fact, he practically comes out with the project. And then Manuel Valls says: 'The Migrant House, we should think of doing it in the north of France.'"

Following the meeting, the Director of the departmental directorate for social cohesion (DDCS), Serge Szarzynski, declared that "it is not a question of replicating Sangatte or the Calais Jungle (...) The Migrant Houses will not be a major fixed point. There will be several reception centres spread across several municipalities."¹²⁷

During the same meeting, Manuel Valls said "yes to everything", explains Majdouline Sbai, who continues:

"Manuel Valls says yes to everything, to renegotiating the Le Touquet agreement, yes to the Migrant House, he said he would ask for an agreement between the State and the local authorities. He defended the idea that the region was right not to evacuate the port facilities without solutions despite the pressure from Natacha Bouchart."

The Migrant House project was organised, but "it was a nightmare", explains Maël Galisson:

"You come up against competition between state departments, there are meetings with or without all the associations, people from the REH. We're supposed to reflect as a group, in a multi-party set-up, about how we're going to create the Migrant House, there are cancelled meetings, it's a nightmare. Between December 2013 and May 2014, nothing much happened."

126. "Roms : le Défenseur des droits accuse le gouvernement de ne pas appliquer sa propre politique", *AFP*, 27 September 2013.

127. "Maisons des migrants : un appel à candidatures pourrait être lancé aux communes du Calais", *La Voix du Nord*, 18 December 2013.

The associations were working on plans for the future Migrant House, they were looking for premises, but had to work within the shackles restricting the Ministry of the Interior, and, in particular, fears of “creating a pull factor”, as Marc Boulnois tells us:

“I remember the discussions with the State: ‘Yes, but should we do it in Norrent-Fontes? Isn’t it too close to the crossing point?’ There was no enthusiasm. There were a few ideas, but everything was still very restricted, where you could sense the pressure from central government.”

Faced with the constraints of discussions with the State, Marc Boulnois went looking for parallel funding to complete the setting up of the Migrant House in Norrent-Fontes: “We even found space in Norrent-Fontes, it was a possibility that could have been realised.” Work was undertaken with the association Habitat Insertion, “where the idea was for the association to buy the space to provide reception”, concluding: “We had put it on our municipal agenda in 2014.”

Between the election of François Hollande and the beginning of 2014, a new “era” emerged, where dialogue was established between the State, local authorities and associations supporting exiled people. But Calais remained a “symbolic” place, where there were still many exiled people in transit, regularly evicted from their living spaces. Outside Calais, municipalised living spaces continued to exist, but an initial increase in the number of exiled people called into question the “cap on numbers” set by the amenable mayors of the Dunkirk area.

2. In the Dunkirk area, state tolerance continues

In the Dunkirk area, in Tétéghem and Grande-Synthe, the municipalised reception continued. In the case of the former, it was based on a cap on numbers regarding the municipality’s capacity to shelter exiled people. In Grande-Synthe, Basroch received exiled people without limitation. In both cases, there was a very direct link with the local government, which “tolerated” these living spaces.

In early 2012, the CUD installed two 10 m² huts around Lac de Tétéghem to accommodate around twenty exiled people. When the number of people increased, an initial eviction took place in April 2012. For the mayor of the town, Franck Dhersin, reception was based on a “cap on numbers” regarding the size of the town, at that time set at 20 people.

Until 2013, the situation stabilised, even though the number of people increased significantly. A water tank was installed and the associations provided assistance to the people living there, with hot meals at midday and in the evening. The town made a premises available to the associations. The cap on numbers increased rapidly, and up until the beginning of 2014 there were between 40 and 60 people.

In October 2014, the number of exiled people increased to 200. The mayor was “unable to manage”, called for the evacuation of the camp and had a new living space set up to accommodate fifty exiled people, “not one more”, he said. On the new site, seven containers were set up and financed by the CUD, where the priority was to accommodate women, children and families. The space was designed to create a closed camp. Two objectives were pursued: “reducing the influx of illegal immigrants while offering them acceptable hygiene conditions”,¹²⁸ explains Franck Dhersin.

128. “À Tétéghem, des conteneurs aménagés pour les migrants”, *La Voix du Nord*, 19 November 2014.

The living space of the exiled people was then confined within the containers, where the structures outside were subject to destruction. The Tétéghem “model” was then mobilised by support associations, in particular Salam, which called for the opening of similar spaces and approved the “cap on numbers”.

IN STEENVOORDE, RECEPTION IS CALLED INTO QUESTION

Since 2008, the town hall of Steenvoorde had been providing heated big tops on a municipal site to provide shelter for exiled people during the winter. The rest of the year, they lived in a grove of trees and had a parish day centre.

In July 2014, the mayor of Steenvoorde, Jean-Pierre Bataille, announced that he wanted to “stem the flow of migrants to Steenvoorde” by no longer tolerating any living spaces. The cap of 25 exiled people was exceeded; 100 people were present in Steenvoorde, explains Jean-Pierre Bataille: “The influx was too large, even for Terre d’Errance” and required the State to intervene for “firmness, the dismantling of the smuggling rings and the movement of migrants to be less fluid.”¹²⁹

In October 2014, a security guard was hired by the Saint-Laurent service station to deter exiles from climbing aboard heavy goods vehicles. Around a hundred exiled people remained present, settling in a makeshift camp in a grove of trees. This calling into question of the tolerated living space and increased surveillance around the rest area had implications on the increase in the number of exiled people in other territories, such as Grande-Synthe and Tétéghem.

In Grande-Synthe, like Tétéghem, the CUD installed shacks on the Basroch site in 2012. They were home to “a few dozen people, there was almost no one”,¹³⁰ says Olivier Caremelle, Chief of Staff to Damien Carême’s at the time: “On the Basroch plain, which is quite wide, there were some shacks, woods, tents, but it was really a flow.”

For Henri Jean, sub-prefect of Dunkirk from 2012 to 2016, this presence “did not really pose a problem, either in terms of managing it, or for the municipality, or for the neighbourhood, or in terms of public order.”¹³¹ He continued and explained his perception of the management of migratory flows when he arrived in Dunkirk:

“It was a subject that was certainly a little intense at times, but which was ultimately of little importance, in terms of numbers in any case and in terms of local concerns, it was nothing like Calais.”

The Basroch camp was tolerated by the State, where “a link was maintained with the associations and the town of Grande-Synthe”, says Henri Jean, “but we were not funding the Basroch camp, which was a municipal initiative, supported by the charity organisations.” It amounted to a distancing by the State, which “did not want to replace the municipal and association initiative” which would appear to be contrary to combating irregular immigration and smugglers, as he points out:

129. “Steenvoorde : les migrants deviennent indésirables”, *La Voix du Nord*, 5 July 2014.

130. Interview conducted on 2 June 2021.

131. Interview conducted on 25 May 2021.

“If they take direct responsibility, or in any case financial responsibility, they very well know that they’ll find themselves caught in things that are unsolvable, right between concern for the fate of migrants and, in a certain way, encouragement to stay put and supply the smugglers.”

The aim here was to “apply international commitments, whatever they were, apply the law as far as possible (...) Our job is to make public transport, private transport and road hauliers secure”, explains Henri Jean.

The function of sub-prefect involved “adapting” to situations, that there was no “well-defined doctrine, these are situations that must be managed, but without necessarily having keys and ready-made solutions”, he tells us. The challenge for the function was to ensure there were “as few national reports and problems as possible, so to manage the situation (...) There was really no doctrinal apparatus, we were trying to respond and manage day to day.”

In the Dunkirk area, we observe the development of a dialogue between local actors and associations, which allowed for experiments with municipalised reception, then their institutionalisation, “as long as problems don’t emerge.” Here, the mindset was still about maintaining public order, where the Tétéghem and Basroch camps, places of sanctuary, were used to concentrate exiled people, to confine them to a pre-defined space and to avoid exiled people “wandering” around the city.

In the Dunkirk situation, the concept of “peripheral power” was prominent. It made it possible to consider “the abilities of local actors (officials, local and national elected representatives, economic managers) to respond to a central initiative” (GREMION, 1976). In other words, local actors (including the local government and local politicians) were able to influence national policy depending on specific political and territorial configurations and the interactions between local actors.

This contrasted with the situation in Calais, where the mayor of Calais was jointly creating deterrence by pursuing an active anti-squat policy with the local government. Despite the beginning of a dialogue with local actors, in Calais, the State replicated a policy of “controlling migratory flows”, combining asylum reform and pre-emption of their management by the Ministry of the Interior.

3. Replicating a policy “controlling migratory flows” of the Ministry of the Interior

“6,000 was Nicolas Sarkozy’s figure. He expected 20,000 cases, 20,000 applications; there were more than 30,000 and the decision was still to regularise 6,000. Where is the ‘case-by-case’? Where is the humanitarian examination of situations? It is simply a policy of quotas. A Minister of the Interior engaged in arbitrary policy; he had determined the number of people who were to be regularised; no matter what was to happen to the others! Reduced to hiding, abandonment, relegation. Because we are now in a country where there are thousands of people who can neither be regularised or deported. This is not a policy, it’s an inhuman charade which is, today, causing women and men to go into hiding. Which, in the French Republic, is not acceptable.” (Speech by François Hollande, First Secretary of the PS, 20 September 2006)

Whereas previous socialist governments had carried out a series of regularisations of people in an irregular situation after each election, François Hollande broke with this practice, establishing a “case-by-case” basis depending on the person’s level of “integration”. The Circular of 28 November 2012 – known as the Valls Circular – specified that regularisation was “exceptional” and for people present in the territory for more than five years.

For Karine Parrot, this Circular “denounces the stricter approach to certain criteria that calls into question ‘the naturalisation of deserving people’. Because the essential point remains: the attribution of French nationality has to be earned” (2019, p. 40).

François Hollande replicated a policy “controlling migratory flows” exemplified by this Circular of “regularisation on a case-by-case basis” by highlighting the “worth” of people in an irregular situation. As stated by Emmanuel Blanchard and Claire Rodier, this policy was organised around a “constant volume (around 30,000) of new permissions to stay” (2013), renewing the practice of “quotas”.

This mindset echoes the use of the term “misuse” when referring to asylum in France. Indeed, as soon as Manuel Valls arrived at the Ministry of the Interior, he put asylum reform on the agenda, declaring that “asylum is blowing up because it is used for immigration purposes”, and went even further:

“Asylum has increased in our country since 2007 by almost 70%, we had 61,000 applications in 2012. It therefore needs to be fundamentally reformed. Today it averages around 16 to 17 months. We must at least, by 2015, reduce the time needed to examine applications to 9 months” (Manuel Valls, 28 November 2013)

Despite being passed in 2015, this reform was being managed by Manuel Valls’ office, as explained to us by Lucie P., a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior:

“The asylum procedures were not up to the challenge. There was the lengthy examination, redundancies, the OFPRA didn’t have all the resources in terms of reception. We had an asylum system that was very poorly managed, nobody was responsible (...) Manuel Valls and President Hollande wanted to transform the asylum application, to make it a firm, humane process, to have basic control over what was happening.”

For Lucie P., it was a question of combating the “misuse” of the asylum system, of “people who come in illegally and seek asylum... our process is so long, by the time their application is examined, they have vanished into thin air, perhaps they have already found illegal work. And it is the right to asylum that serves as a pretext, actually.”

Prepared under Manuel Valls, the law was passed on 29 July 2015, and was mainly driven by the “EU directives” of June 2013, which entailed an “average target of nine months” for processing asylum applications. To achieve the objective, an “accelerated procedure” was put in place for the OFPRA. The single judge of the CNDA was given an “accelerated suspensive appeal procedure”, allowing the appeals of rejected asylum seekers to be assessed in five weeks, and requiring them, in a normal procedure, to rule in five months. Asylum seekers that had been given accommodation would no longer be able to refuse the accommodation offered without losing their benefits, and would only be able to work after nine months.

The PS complied with the concept of “controlling migratory flows” developed by Nicolas Sarkozy and driven by the EU. At the same time, the government sphere associated with immigration remained virtually unchanged, and thereby took over the structure developed

during the previous term, as Matthieu P., a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, tells us:

“Neither the left, which came to power in 2012, nor Macron, who was elected in 2017, made any changes to the ambit of the Ministry of the Interior, apart from development policy, which was returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

The discussions between ministers were “tense”, says Matthieu P., where the “reluctance” of certain ministries to get involved in the asylum issue emerged. According to him:

“Social affairs were delighted to have a specific field, separate from asylum. They didn't want, on top of all their problems, to take on asylum.”

Lucie P. wholeheartedly agrees:

“Asylum accommodation is handled by the Ministry of the Interior, because it is a significant cost, particularly for the CADAs. The social ministries spent their time saying: ‘Yes, but we already accommodate lots of people, because we have a rule, it's the unconditional nature of reception, but how do we do it for irregular migrants? We can no longer just provide reception for the poor.’”

The battle over “asylum” was fought in the manner of a “hot potato”, where the lack of visibility on the financial (and political) costs it represented encouraged the Ministry of the Interior to take control of the issue. By retaining asylum, the Ministry of the Interior retained authority over the OFPRA, whose powers and obligation to combat irregular immigration remained unchanged.

Lucie P. explains that “discussions on ministerial allocation” also took place over integration, where the Ministry of Social Affairs, where this competence had historically been rooted before it was moved to the Ministry of Immigration in 2007, tried to take it back:

“In fact, for Integration topics, what was not possible, what was not desired, was to put in place a treatment of integration that was much too social and not sufficiently demanding (...) Requirements were needed in terms of firmness. It was kept at the Ministry of the Interior in an attempt to bring some clarity to it.”

In addition, the Ministry of the Interior was less “subject to the pressure from the non-profit sector”, says Lucie P.: “Social ministries are more sensitive to that”, she continues, questioning this “ministerial arbitration”:

“Maybe the subject will rest at some point... (...) Many associations said that it had nothing to do with the Ministry of the Interior, that asylum and integration should be taken away from it, and that it was necessary to create a specific ministry for integration.”

In ministerial arbitration, the Ministry of the Interior retained control over asylum and integration issues for budgetary and “firmness” reasons. In addition, politically sensitive, Matthieu P. explains “that the ministers were happy to let the Ministry of Interior take care of it... The subject only causes headaches”. Emmanuelle Cosse, EELV Minister for Housing from 2016 to 2017 wholeheartedly agreed, explaining that social ministries “didn't fight, everyone wanted to distance themselves from this by saying: ‘It's too much trouble, it's too complicated, I'm not going there.’”¹³²

132. Interview conducted on 29 June 2021.

This pre-emption of migration issues by the Ministry of the Interior was reflected in the establishment of the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration, created in 2010 when the Ministry of National Identity was abolished. On 12 August 2013, this “secretariat” became the Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France (DGEF), as Lucie P. tells us:

“The name was changed to give it a real direction. Some of the responsibilities were reshaped, re-named. It contained Integration, Asylum, Immigration, with specific directorates in each case. And to combat irregular immigration, it was also expanded with a support mechanism for prefects in the territory for questions relating to legal texts.”

Marc Bonnefis was secretary of the CGT trade union in the former Ministry of Immigration. In an opinion piece dated 2 October 2013, he explained that despite the criticisms made to the Ministry of the Interior regarding this takeover of Immigration, Asylum and Integration, the creation of the DGEF “results in the formal, total absorption of missions relating to foreigners by the Ministry of the Interior”, specifying:

“This new directorate will be close to the Directorate-General of the Police and the National Gendarmerie, the signal being sent is absolutely clear: it is the “security” approach to managing foreigners, driven by Nicolas Sarkozy, which is being definitively applied.”¹³³

This “security” mindset was reflected in the Circular of the Ministry of the Interior of 11 March 2014 on “combating irregular immigration”. In it, Manuel Valls highlighted the “effectiveness” of the measures in 2013: “the number of forced returns outside the European Union was 4,676 (...) even though this number, in absolute terms, remains low”. He then asked his departments “to ensure a determined implementation” of this policy to combat illegal immigration via a series of “coercive” measures: targeted identity checks, arrests of people in their homes or in the homes where they are accommodated, imprisonment in detention centres, house arrest with an obligation to sign in at a police station, strongly encouraged “voluntary returns”, remand in custody, criminal conviction of recalcitrants, deportation of rejected asylum seekers.

The first two years of the newly appointed socialist government combined “dialogue” with the associations and local elected representatives, while specifically deploying its deterrence policy in Calais. The application of the concept of “controlling migratory flows” and the Ministry of the Interior as the sole ministry for migration could also be seen. Following the 2014 municipal elections, dialogue ended, while the fight against squats intensified in Calais. However, the increased visibility of exiled people renewed the policy of deterrence, calling into question the State’s strategy towards them.

II. WHEN THE VISIBILITY OF EXILED PEOPLE CALLS INTO QUESTION THE ANTI-SQUAT POLICY

In Calais, from 2014, the increase in the number of exiled people revealed the contradictions in how it was perceived by the State and the town hall. A squat opened in 2013 was threatened with eviction, before its politicisation by its residents - exiled women - pushed the State to encourage the establishment of a subsidised housing facility: the Women’s House (Maison des Femmes) (1). At the same time, the defeat of the PS in the municipal

133. “Le ministère de l’Intérieur prend la main sur l’Intégration”, *L’Humanité*, 2 October 2013.

and European elections ended the dialogue with the associations and local elected officials in Calais around the Migrant House. At the same time, the State revived and intensified its anti-squat policy, ordering a series of dismantling operations during the summer, before stopping them when the invisibility objectives were not achieved (2). In the Dunkirk area, a significant increase in exiled people gradually called into question the municipalised living spaces, turning the tide on the relationship between tolerance and the absence of media coverage (3).

1. The Women's House: from squat to subsidised accommodation

In Calais, from 2009, the No Border movement had developed a policy of actively opening squats¹³⁴. The aim was to occupy vacant housing in order to house exiled people. In June 2013, the Victor Hugo squat was opened. This vacant house was initially intended as a day centre and accommodation for the sick. The project evolved and the collective decided to turn it into a reception centre for women and children.

The centre was based on self-management, involving local residents and activists. In inclusive living spaces, women are regularly dominated by men. Here, in this house, it was about making it a place of solidarity and protection for women with or without children.

Soon, the owner of the property - who owned several houses - complained and applied for an eviction order. On 19 November 2013, the court granted the order, which had to be executed no later than 21 February 2014. Faced with this court decision, the residents of the house decided to publicise their situation. They wrote press releases, journalists were invited and associations got involved. This media coverage politicised the centre, helping to make it a symbol of the anti-squat policy being implemented by Natacha Bouchart in Calais.

At the same time, the associations mobilised, calling for solutions from the prefect, as Nathanaël Caillaux explains:

"A discussion took place with the associations, in particular Secours Catholique, MDM and others and the State, to say: 'You can't evict this place, it's a place of protection for women, you're proposing nothing.'"

In early February 2014, under pressure from the media, the State announced that it would not ask for the eviction order to be implemented without a rehousing solution. Meetings were held with the associations, from which the No Border movement was excluded at the request of the State. Given the media coverage of the centre and the characteristics of the people housed – women and children – the prefecture made proposals and reinvested its housing competence – rarely activated in relation to exiled people.

During a meeting with associations, the State proposed the establishment of a housing scheme for women, supervised by social workers and funded by the DDCS. Faced with this proposal, the No Border movement and the exiled women, through the invited associations, laid down five principles: that the facility be located in Calais, that the women not be separated, that their freedom to come and go be guaranteed, that no files be kept and that it be open seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day.

The conditions were accepted by the prefecture, and the Solid'R association was chosen by the State to manage the scheme. But the choice of location soon became problematic. The prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Denis Robin, announced that the Victor Hugo squat had to

134. According to the Communauté d'agglomération du Calaisis, in 2011, 10.37% of housing in Calais was vacant.

be evacuated no later than the “end of June 2014”. An initial location was found, close to the squats in the city of Calais. The aim was to facilitate women’s access to their spouses. A mobilisation of local residents, for which the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, was the spokesperson, put a stop to this location:

“No one consulted me! I refused the location because this place is located 250 m from the dining area, 350 m from the future cloakroom and in the heart of Calais-Nord where there are already many problems with migrants.”¹³⁵

Natacha Bouchart then decided that the premises of Secours Catholique - made available by the town hall and used as a day centre - would become the “Women’s House”. The centre was located on Route de Saint-Omer, 3 kilometres from the city centre.

The Women’s House opened on 4 July 2014. It was designed as an accommodation centre with limited places, for a specific community – women and children – without the possibility of “outdoor” reception in tents or huts. Residents were assisted by social workers, delineating their living space and their daily lives. Far from the city centre, the site satisfied the strategy of invisibilisation, removal and avoiding potential mobilisation by local residents.

In contrast, the Migrant House Project had a distinct trajectory. Designed as an inclusive reception centre, it was called into question by the State after the 2014 elections, which subsequently ushered in an intensification of the anti-squat policy.

2. The 2014 elections as an intensification of the anti-squat policy. Dialogue ends.

In 2012, the PS attempted to “depoliticise” the issue of immigration, and make it a “technical” subject, as Emmanuel Blanchard and Claire Rodier explain:

“During the 2012 presidential campaign, reducing immigration policy to a simple technical issue allowed the Socialist Party (PS) to avoid broken promises (excluding the right to vote), and not to appear in favour of improving the condition of foreigners – an objective explicitly called for during the 1981 campaign” (2013).

The PS’s fear was to “play into the National Front’s hands.” When local elected officials met Manuel Valls’ staff in July 2012, he had already travelled to Calais three times, without the media being informed. During the meeting, his two representatives explained that the strategy was “to act discreetly”:

“The government is not ready to communicate (and therefore publicise) on the subject of immigration for fear of ‘playing into the National Front’s hands’. The strategy therefore seemed to be to act (or try to act) very discreetly.”

During the first two years, Manuel Valls played a “firm” role. He made numerous comments about avoiding “laxist justice”, such as on 24 September 2013, when, in relation to the Roma population, he stated:

“These populations have lifestyles that are extremely different to ours and which obviously conflict with local populations (...) It’s fanciful to think that we will solve the problem of Roma populations solely through integration (there is) no other solution than to gradually dismantle these camps and deport (these populations).”¹³⁶

135. “Calais : le squat Victor-Hugo sera libéré la semaine prochaine”, *La Voix du Nord*, 28 June 2014.

136. “Pour Valls, ‘les Roms ont vocation à rentrer en Roumanie ou en Bulgarie’”, *AFP*, 24 September 2013.

In early 2014, while the number of evictions was down and regularisation was up, Manuel Valls was criticised by the right, accused of being “lax” and “creating a pull factor.”. He then positioned the “target-based policy”, put in place by the previous government, which set advance targets for deportations, at the heart of his strategy. In addition, the Circular of 11 March 2014 on combating irregular immigration was perceived by the media as “an external communication tool”¹³⁷.

The aim here was to show that the PS had complied with combating irregular immigration through the use of quantified indicators and “firm” directives. This strategy was part of an electoral environment in which immigration became one of its central topics.

In the 2014 municipal and European elections, the debates focused on immigration, the number of foreigners in France and the closure and control of borders. A race to offer the best security took place between the right and the far right, where proposals emerged regarding the abolition of state medical aid and social assistance for foreigners. Immigration appeared as a distinctive political marker, with the PS appearing “lax”.

In these two elections, the PS lost 121 towns with more than 15,000 inhabitants, while the FN won 14 and, in the European elections, the FN achieved a “historic” result with nearly 25% of votes, the right securing 21% and the PS 14%. After this defeat, Manuel Valls, who embodied “firmness”, became Prime Minister and Bernard Cazeneuve replaced him at the Ministry of the Interior, which changed how migration issues were perceived, explains Majdouline Sbai, EELV vice-president in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region:

“We felt, after Valls left - I don't care at all about his politics - but I have to admit there was still a change after he left. This change I think was due to a takeover by the prefectures and the State and the administration of the issue. It was no longer politicised in any way, it was simply administrative, police and security management of things.”

At the same time, this PS defeat and the appointment of Bernard Cazeneuve as Minister of the Interior reinforced the deterrence policy already in force in Calais, as Maël Galisson explains:

“For the PS it was a kind of enormous political slap in the face. In Calais, during the summer, there were very harrowing evictions, quite massive, violent, with a rather heavy police presence, with people being sent to detention centres. There was a U-turn there in the space of a few weeks.”

In the weeks following the municipal elections, the evictions intensified. From January to March 2014, there were (at least) three evictions followed by the destruction of living spaces. From April 2014, the State took the initiative to order evictions. Thus, three days after the European elections, on 28 May 2014, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Denis Robin, requested the evacuation and destruction of three camps housing nearly 700 people.

On 2 July 2014, the port area was evacuated and 540 exiled people were detained, including 121 minors. This operation was challenged before the Administrative Court of Melun, which found that it was “a ploy in reality intended to empty a squat, which constituted an ‘abuse of power’” (ALAU, 2015).

While the Women's House was recognised by the State, the Migrant House, designed to be inclusive and to which Manuel Valls, Minister of the Interior, had agreed, was called into question following the March 2014 elections, as Maël Galisson explains:

137. “Immigration illégale, le grand écart de Manuel Valls”, *Le Monde*, 13 March 2013.

"After the elections, the PS abandoned all possibilities of conceiving anything but the baton and the cops to manage what was happening in Calais and in the region. We no longer heard anything about the Migrant Houses, no more consultation with the State."

Against an international backdrop of a rise in conflicts (particularly in Libya and Syria), the number of asylum seekers at European level rose from 435,000 in 2013 to 626,000 in 2014.

In Calais and the region, Nathanaël Caillaux from Secours Catholique explains that "we went from 2,000 people in 2009 to 3,000 in 2014, which had not happened since Sangatte." He continues:

"We were in a situation where there was a significant increase in the number of people on the coast, with large camps (...) The State was no longer proposing the opening of any facility, even an experimental one, such as the Migrant House."

However, at the beginning of August, the government changed its policy. While the anti-squat policy continued, on 4 August 2014, Denis Robin, prefect of Pas-de-Calais, announced that he was not planning any police operation against squats in the short term, stating:

"I would like them to be informed first of the different alternatives available to them in terms of asylum applications, requests to return to their country and requests for emergency accommodation."¹³⁸

The increase in the number of exiled people and the policy of dismantling squats increased their visibility in the city of Calais, with "too great a presence in the city"¹³⁹ declared Natacha Bouchart, concerned by "peace for Calais residents". A pattern similar to that of Sangatte in 1999 could be seen here, where the increase in the number of exiled people in the city of Calais led to "public disorder" for the communist mayor at the time, Jean-Jacques Barthe.

In the Dunkirk area, a similar situation was observed, with the number of exiled people increasing, making them all the more visible. The modus operandi based on tolerance by the local government as long as the situation was "under control" was then undermined.

3. "In Dunkirk, what the ministry didn't want was for it to become a new Calais, Calais was enough" (Henri Jean, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk from 2012 to 2016)

"The situation is currently under control in the Dunkirk area and Steenvoorde. The Grande-Synthe camp currently has about 70 migrants, while the number fluctuates between 100 and 150 in Tétéghem. There was an increase a few weeks ago but the situation has stabilised since then. We know that we can't eradicate the phenomenon, so what matters to us is to control the number so that the reception conditions are the least inhumane possible for these migrants, victims of smuggling rings" (Henri Jean, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk, 19 January 2015¹⁴⁰)

138. "Calais : le préfet n'évacuera pas les squats de migrants avant plusieurs semaines", *La Voix du Nord*, 4 August 2014.

139. "La maire de Calais plaide sa cause Place Beauvau et menace de bloquer le port", *Le Figaro*, 2 September 2014.

140. "Migrants: la situation stabilisée", *La Voix du Nord*, 19 January 2015.

In contrast to Calais, between late 2014 and spring 2015, the Dunkirk area did not attract media and political attention. The number of exiled people present in Tétéghem and Grande-Synthe had “stabilised”. In 2014-2015, two projects emerged to improve the living space of exiled people.

The first was developed in June 2015, when fewer than 100 people were present. Célia David-Mauduit, an architect, worked with her students to build a permanent living space: the “Halte de Belleville”. The space was conceived as an experiment of what a Migrant House could be, as Claire Millot from Salam tells us: “people could meet there, a sort of common room or meeting room.”¹⁴¹ But at the same time, the camp was seeing an increase in the number of people, she explains:

“People were starting to arrive. They squatted in the place. People arrived with their duvets because at least, there, they were dry. It was a place where they didn't have to sleep in the mud.”

Although the State no longer wanted to fund the scheme, a Migrant House project was still underway in Grande-Synthe, driven by the town hall, but in a constrained context, as Damien Carême explains:

“With the associations, we thought it might be interesting. There were architects working on it. The discussion was about how many people. What I was saying to them was: ‘To work well and ensure that it doesn’t upset the community, it shouldn’t be a place for too many people.’ The limit was set at 80 people.”

In 2015, plans were drawn up by architect Cyril Hannape. The local authority and the associations looked for funding, “but at no time did the State express any desire to co-finance the project, nor did it express the idea of vetoing it”, says Nathanaël Caillaux, who continues: “It was difficult to find funding for such a project, if not from the non-profit sector, like the Abbé Pierre and Emmaüs Foundation, which was keen from the start.”

However, the project was aborted in the summer of 2015, when the number of exiled people increased in Basroch, as Claire Millot explains:

“A great project was aborted because of a massive influx against no one could do anything about, and to which no one was able to respond on the ground. It raised the question of who would be entitled to be housed in the place, who would be chosen? The first arrivals? The most vulnerable?”

IN ANGRES, THE MIGRANT HOUSE PROJECT COLLAPSES

The analysis carried out within the PSM from the end of 2012 in relation to the Migrant House helped with rolling the project out in different territories where exiled people were present. In Angres, the PCF mayor had tolerated a living space since 2008, where a Vietnamese community was established. The association Fraternité Migrants, the associations in the PSM network, the REH and the town hall worked to improve the camp, nicknamed “Vietnam City”.

141. Interview conducted on 5 May 2021.

The project was carried out between October 2014 and January 2015, in consultation with a school of architecture, the associations and the exiled people themselves. It involved starting with their needs, considering self-management. Plans were drawn up and provided for the creation of 9 modules, which would enable 60 people to be accommodated in permanent structures, including common rooms, toilet blocks, a kitchen and a storeroom. A budget of €100,000 was provided to implement the project.

However, the project was halted by the difficulties encountered in raising the money needed to complete the construction of the Migrant House.

In Tétéghem, reception in containers continued, in a space in which people were confined. Nevertheless, the number of exiled people increased. In the summer of 2015, the town's mayor, Franck Dhersin, publicised the situation. He highlighted the "violence" taking place in his camp, due to the "presence of smugglers".

In order to politicise the situation, Franck Dhersin threatened to "block the A16" and criticised the Minister of the Interior who did not come "to see the situation" in his town. He then reiterated that his camp "can only operate with dignity with a limited number of migrants", continuing:

"We have proved for seven years that this camp is manageable under the most humane conditions possible, with the acceptance of the community."¹⁴²

He requested a meeting with the sub-prefect of Dunkirk, from whom he obtained additional police resources. At the end of August 2015, 200 exiled people were recorded near Lac de Tétéghem.

This media coverage and influx of people undermined the objectives of the Ministry of the Interior. Indeed, the challenge was to prevent the Dunkirk area from being put on the political agenda, as Henri Jean, sub-prefect of Dunkirk, explains: "In Dunkirk, what the ministry didn't want was for it to become a new Calais, Calais was enough." The work of the sub-prefect was to reconcile "three pillars", he explains:

"First of all, public order, managing when there were many people, illegal crossings, intrusion attempts, opening of lorries (...) Then, combating the smuggling rings and finally the fate of migrants, who were difficult to support, because their situation didn't fit into any legal category."

In other words, it was a question of mobilising the police at the crossing points, intervening in the event of public disorder, arresting the smugglers, but also of "getting" exiled people "to fit into boxes". The issue of the "fate of migrants" was complicated here by a policy of deterrence that hampered access to asylum procedures, the Dublin system and the securing of the Franco-British border. The work of the state representative was aimed at working two contradictory orders at the same time, he says:

"If there are no asylum applications, there's no legal existence nor any legal category, we have people who are trying to cross to England at all costs (...) And I admit, we too, all public officials, were extremely helpless in this situation, because we knew that it's not right, we knew that the response was not the right one (...) We knew that there was no ideal solution and that we had to navigate between these three often contradictory objectives."

142. "Migrants : Franck Dhersin, maire de Tétéghem, lance un ultimatum à l'État et menace de bloquer l'A16", *La Voix du Nord*, 1 September 2015.

For Henri Jean, the objective was “to empty the camps”, “to get the migrants out of the camps”, and that his method of managing exiled people who “don’t fit in any box” was aimed at promoting asylum, he says: “With the OFII and OFPRA, we agreed to develop this response to asylum as much as possible.” He continues:

“We set up a help desk at the sub-prefecture with the OFII and the OFPRA to process their asylum applications... And we agreed not to apply the Dublin Regulation to the few people who did apply for asylum. It was an exceptional measure, outside the strict rules... so we didn’t talk about it officially... We organised outreach missions to get people out of the camps (...) But we were faced with a situation in which people came back and wanted to cross to England.”

IN NORRENT-FONTES, THE MUNICIPALISED SPACE CHALLENGED BY THE ELECTORAL TIMESCALE

From March 2012, four huts were installed on a municipal plot by the town hall of Norrent-Fontes, surrounded by a dozen tents. The mayor, Marc Boulnois, was then supported by the REH (of which he was a member) and the Nord-de-Pas-de-Calais region. The State tolerated the space, and agreed to fund heating for the shelters and one social worker.

During the municipal elections of March 2014, Marc Boulnois was defeated, replaced by the miscellaneous right Bertrand Cocq. He threatened to remove access to drinking water before going back on his decision.

In April 2015, two huts were accidentally burned down. Due to the increase in the number of exiled people in Norrent-Fontes, they moved into tents nearby, but the farmland being used was precarious. In July 2015, the association Terre d’Errance Norrent-Fontes began the construction of a new hut. Immediately afterwards, Bertrand Cocq issued a municipal decree prohibiting it, on the pretext that the “land is non-buildable land”, with the support of the State. Fabienne Buccio, prefect of Pas-de-Calais, declared that “this camp is illegal”. On 10 October 2015, the association organised a “Build Hospitality” event in the living space of the exiled people. During the day, concerts were held while volunteers took the opportunity to build a new hut.

The mayor’s hostility towards the presence of exiled people revived the use of neighbouring municipalities for access to showers, while the State decided to finance two social workers in the camp from winter 2016.

To relieve congestion in the Basroch camp, the experiment with the asylum access mechanism only enabled a few people to be granted a status. However, Basroch remained a transit area, where exiled people continued to settle. The increase in exiled people in the Dunkirk area reshuffled the cards in this relationship between tolerance and the absence of media coverage.

In the next chapter, we will see that municipalised living spaces were threatened, while, at the same time, the Calais and Dunkirk situations were interlinked. We see the emergence of a form of state management based on the concentration of exiled people in fewer, enclosed spaces. The aim was to confine them to limited spaces in a strategy of “maintaining order”. This strategy helped to fabricate the image of a migration “crisis” in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, reduced to two living spaces: the Jules Ferry Centre, in Calais, and Basroch, in Grande-Synthe.

CHAPTER 8:

“HUMANITY” AND “FIRMNESS”, THE SOCIALIST ANTONYM AS A DOCTRINAL GUIDELINE

While the number of exiled people present on the coast was increasing, the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, put the “visibility” of exiled people in the city centre on the agenda. Against a backdrop of “crisis”, Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior, revived a facility similar to that of the Sangatte camp in 1999, the Jules Ferry Centre. This facility followed the same logic that had spurred the creation of the Sangatte camp: concentration and invisibilisation, security and “humanity”. Through a policy of dismantling, exiled people were forced to settle in this new living space, where they were “tolerated” by the State. In this way, the State “accidentally” created a shanty town of several thousand people, which it tried to reduce in size through deterrence and the promotion of asylum. By “tightening up Calais” while dismantling the living spaces in the Dunkirk area, the State also helped to make Basroch in Grande-Synthe a place of retreat for exiled people who still wanted to cross the Channel. By seeking to concentrate and make exiled people invisible, the State made the “refugee crisis” a reality (I). In Calais, the Jules Ferry Centre led to the creation of a state shanty town of up to 10,000 people, which became the “largest shanty town in Europe”. This shanty town, even though it remained precarious, very quickly became a space of possibilities, a place for structuring the social life of exiled people and the associations supporting them. This collective dynamic was a focal point for reminding the State of its obligations in terms of respecting fundamental rights. The state intervened and created a new facility, the Temporary Reception Centre, designed as a tool for the governmentality of exiled people, while organising the disappearance of this shanty town that had become too political and too publicised in the media to endure (II). In Grande-Synthe, the Basroch camp had become an “emergency” situation, where the local authority and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) created a humanitarian camp: the La Linière camp. This facility, created as an emergency arrangement, was initially established without the State, before it got involved through the Ministry of Housing. However, the Ministry of the Interior nevertheless imposed its own conditions: the camp’s closure “eventually”. By anticipating the closure of the humanitarian camp, the State prevented any capacity for adaptation. When the Calais shanty town was dismantled, the arrival of new exiled people at the La Linière camp transformed its social structure, quickly generating heightened tensions (III).

I. FROM THE JULES FERRY CENTRE TO BASROCH: BETWEEN CONCENTRATION STRATEGY AND CREATING THE MIGRATION “CRISIS”

*“Bernard Cazeneuve talked about the ‘refugee crisis in Calais’ when there wasn’t one. Calais is a peculiarity that has existed since at least the 1990s, but in fact, it’s just that, really, there have been a little more people than usual, but these camps, these shanty towns existed long before. There was Sangatte, there’s a poor track record, there’s a peculiarity at this border which means that you can’t say that it’s a refugee crisis. This refugee crisis was a political creation”
(Maël Galisson, member of GISTI).*

In Calais, the anti-squat policy implemented by the State helped to make exiled people visible, undermining the policy of maintaining public order. In this context, the State was “fumbling around” and revived a “half-humanitarian, half-security-focused” emergency facility: the Jules Ferry Centre. The strategy was to concentrate and make exiled people invisible on the outskirts of the city (1). By confining them and pushing them to settle there, the State “accidentally” created a shanty town. Through a policy of deterrence that combined dispersal, detention and removal, the State attempted to relieve congestion in a living space that had become too visible (2). The deterrence policy implemented in Calais and the Dunkirk area had the consequence of creating a new “fixation point” at the Basroch camp in Grande-Synthe, where nearly 2,000 exiled people were recorded (3). These two living spaces represented a “crisis” that the State was helping to manufacture.

1. Concentrating and invisibilising: the Jules Ferry Centre as a method for managing “migratory flows”

“The political decision was made at the time, that we would try to maintain control, for the Minister of the Interior, it was a decision to be seen with the Calais situation, and to manage the Calais situation, not to let it go off track and to be in contact with the elected officials, Cazeneuve would make a totally unreasonable number of visits to Calais. We went there every two months, it was exhausting (...) There was a political aspect, he didn’t want to leave this issue unaddressed, with, in particular, the risk of it being taken up by the far right, which had a very strong presence at the time. Marine Le Pen also regularly visited Calais” (Matthieu P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior).

The summer of 2014 saw a succession of contradictory state decisions: institutionalisation of the Women’s House, the ending of dialogue with the associations concerning the Migrant House, intensification of evictions and the undermining of this anti-squat policy by Denis Robin, prefect of Pas-de-Calais. Given the increase in the number of exiled people (between 2,000 and 3,000) and their visibility in the city of Calais, the State was “cobbling together” political responses, seeking an “emergency” solution, as Matthieu P., a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, told us, having closely followed the situation in Calais:

“From 2014, the situation became very complicated because there was an initial migration crisis movement, there were very large arrivals of migrants in Italy, some of whom headed towards Calais. So, in Calais we had migrant camps that were getting bigger. Which on each occasion required an adaptation of strategies to try to resolve the situation, an adaptation that was very complicated because, obviously, nothing was planned.”

This increase was mainly due to the increasing number of exiled people disembarked in southern Italy, made possible by rescue operations organised by Italy via the Mare Nostrum operation. To address this, two strategies emerged.

On the one hand, Bernard Cazeneuve travelled to various capitals in order to put pressure on Italy “to get it back in line” (ALAUX, 2016): “Priority must once again be given to interceptions at sea with a view to pushbacks at the expense of rescues that have the disadvantage of leading to the survivors being disembarked in Europe” (ALAUX, 2016), as Bernard Cazeneuve stated:

“This rescue operation by the Italian Navy has enabled the rescue of many migrants at sea, but has also resulted in the creation of fixation points for migrants in northern

France, encouraging the activities of smugglers and increasing the risk of human tragedy at sea."¹⁴³

On the other hand, Natacha Bouchart, UMP mayor of Calais, proposed a reception facility managed by the State. This was a strategy of concentration and invisibilisation to put an end to the presence of exiled people in the city centre and to "empty the squats". She formalised this proposal on 21 August 2014, by proposing a reception centre for 400 people, which she said made it possible "to keep smugglers and No Borders away from migrants (...) and to rid 80% of the city of this phenomenon."¹⁴⁴

On 28 August 2014, Bernard Cazeneuve rejected the proposal, explaining: "I do not want to create a reception centre that is a new point of convergence for migrants (...) I cannot both dismantle irregular immigration networks and create the conditions for trafficking to continue."¹⁴⁵ On 2 September 2014, Bernard Cazeneuve went back on his refusal and proposed creating a day centre in Calais: the Jules Ferry Centre.

This facility revived the same logic that spurred the creation of the Sangatte camp in 1999, appearing as a "half-humanitarian, half-security-focused" emergency facility (CARRERE, 2003). The rhetoric used by Bernard Cazeneuve aimed to conflate "humanity and firmness", combining a reception system and the mobilisation of police forces in a form of house arrest.

The site chosen was located several kilometres from the city centre, in a former public landfill located in a flood zone and with partial Seveso classification. The facility planned to accommodate 200 women and children in a closed centre, and 1,300 people in tents nearby. Only one meal per day was to be provided and funded by the State. Claire Millot from Salam explains Natacha Bouchart's strategy: "She wanted to rid her city of migrants. The idea was to put them on the outskirts, by having them looked after by the State."

According to one of his inner circle at the time, Bernard Cazeneuve's decision to create the Jules Ferry Centre was a "decision to be seen with the Calais situation, to manage it, not to let it go off track and to be in contact with the elected officials. Cazeneuve was going to make a totally unreasonable number of visits to Calais." For him, it was also about not being "outflanked by the far right":

"He didn't want to leave this issue unaddressed, with, in particular, the risk of it being taken up by the far right, which was very present at the time. Marine Le Pen regularly visited Calais."

The logic behind this facility was to bring together, in one place, the Women's House and all the existing facilities in the city of Calais: "There would no longer be any services offered to exiled people anywhere else than around the Jules Ferry Centre, showers, food distribution and the Women's House", says Nathanaël Caillaux.

The Jules Ferry Centre provided sanitary facilities, dining rooms, washing machines and mobile phone chargers, but was only designed for 200 people; people outside did not benefit from the centre's services.

The Jules Ferry Centre officially opened in March 2015, and management was entrusted to the medico-social association AFEJI, which replaced Solid'R, which had been in charge of the Women's House. AFEJI was an association that initially specialised in social housing

143. Report of the Council of Ministers, 3 September 2014.

144. "Calais : contre toute attente, la maire Natacha Bouchart propose de créer un centre pour migrants", *La Voix du Nord*, 22 August 2014.

145. "Migrants/Calais : Cazeneuve s'oppose au centre", *AFP*, 28 August 2014.

for the homeless, minors and the elderly, with no specific expertise in relation to exiled people.

This set-up was accompanied by a change of personnel at the head of the Pas-de-Calais prefecture. Denis Robin was appointed Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior and was replaced by Fabienne Buccio in February 2015. Buccio was tasked with implementing the Ministry of the Interior's watchword: "there will be no more tolerance of wild jungles in Calais" (ALAUX, 2015). Nathanaël Caillaux wholeheartedly agrees:

"From the beginning of 2015, there was strong pressure on exiled people to leave their living spaces, with an indication that they would be evicted starting from the end of the winter break. However, they would be tolerated at the Jules Ferry Centre."

In May 2015, the State, under pressure from local elected officials and, in particular, the mayor of Calais, evicted and destroyed the jungles and squats where exiled people had grouped themselves together into communities, forcing them to settle around the Jules Ferry Centre. The combination of these two political actions had a direct effect, Nathanaël Caillaux tells us:

"In a few days, we went from almost nobody to several hundred people on this particular site, then a few thousand, really at the instigation of the State and the municipality (...) This was the creation of a state shanty town."

In June 2015, 3,000 exiled people were living around the Jules Ferry Centre. As conflicts intensified in the Middle East and the dismantling operations continued, new exiled people arrived: more than 6,000 exiled people were recorded in October 2015. Established public policies helped to make a "migration crisis" a reality by concentrating exiled people in one place, "accidentally" creating a shanty town.

In the face of this "influx", the government attempted to "relieve congestion" in the Jungle via two measures: detention and deportation on one hand, and creation of the reception and orientation centre (CAO) on the other.

2. Dispersing and removing: the failure to "relieve congestion" in the Calais slum

"The political choice was based on three points: the first was maintaining France's position since 2004 as having a hard border, a border with effective controls and obstacles for migrants to cross to the United Kingdom. The second choice was to ensure minimal humanitarian care on the coast to avoid tragedies, which is what would lead to the creation of the Jules Ferry centre. And thirdly, it was necessary to encourage access to migrants who wished to do so, to try to keep migrants away from the coast, by encouraging access to asylum applications in France. As soon as they access the asylum application in France, they clearly no longer have any reason to remain in Calais and therefore conditions for accommodation must be provided" (Matthieu P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior).

The aim of the Jules Ferry facility was to "fix" and "invisibilise" exiled people in one place, far from the centre of Calais. However, through a policy of evictions and destruction of living spaces, combined with reinforcing the Franco-British border and at the same time and the intensification of conflicts in the Middle East, the State managed to "fix" and strand people, while making them visible. Given this intensification, the policy and

communication from the Minister of the Interior revolved around protecting the border, dispersal, detention and removal.

On 20 August 2015, Bernard Cazeneuve announced that 1,300 police and gendarmes were being mobilised in Calais, in order to “prevent the intrusion of migrants into the Tunnel.” In addition, operations to secure the Franco-British border were launched by the two countries: preventing access to the Tunnel, a new control room, additional freight search teams and the recruitment of security guards. At the same time, hotspots were set up in Italy and Greece in order to reduce migratory flows upstream.

This increased security had the direct effect of lengthening the time spent by exiled people in the Calais shanty town, thereby increasing their number and the precariousness of their daily lives.

Bernard Cazeneuve had simultaneously been operating a Calais removal system since March 2015. An article from the online media outlet Streetpress states that the State chartered a “private jet” making three flights a week in order to empty the Coquelles administrative detention centre (CRA) and distribute the detainees between the different CRAs in France, “released a few days later”: “all the refugees transferred by plane were then released, often after just a few days (The objective) is to distribute the pressure from migration throughout the country.”¹⁴⁶ In December 2015, “1,200 people were imprisoned, before taking the first train to Calais”¹⁴⁷, prompting criticism from the Chief Inspector for Prisons, Adeline Hazan, declaring that it was “an abuse of the law”, calling for “an end to these serious violations of fundamental rights.”¹⁴⁸

THE OFPRA'S “OUTREACH MISSIONS”: “PAPERS IN 48 HOURS”

After the creation of the reception and orientation centre system (CAO), a specific arrangement was put in place, organised by the OFPRA, and specifically aimed at Eritreans, according to Pascal Brice, director of the office from 2012 to 2018:

“It was at the very beginning, in Calais no one was applying for asylum, so I wanted to provoke something. The Eritreans, no one saw them, especially young people and women. But it was a country at the time that almost 100% of Eritrean asylum seekers were protected given the situation over there.”

In a period of “crisis”, where the objective was to “empty Calais”, Pascal Brice obtained “rapid access to the procedure, and on its heels, accommodation” from the Minister of the Interior.

Claire Millot, present during these activities, explains that “the volunteers were involved in the arrangement. They were told: ‘Eritreans who ask to stay in France, we will receive them within two days, they will have their refugee status and we will bring them to a CAO.’” She continues: “We went around the communities, of Eritreans. Within 48 hours they had their papers and were taken by bus to a centre.” By the end of the activity, “123 were gone”, she told us.

146. “Air Sans Pap’ : quand l’État affrète un jet privé pour vider Calais”, Streetpress, 19 October 2015.

147. “À Calais, l’interventionnisme de Bernard Cazeneuve en échec”, *Le Monde*, 31 December 2015.

148. “À Calais, l’interventionnisme de Bernard Cazeneuve en échec”, *Le Monde*, 31 December 2015.

In October 2015, the CAO (reception and orientation centre) was set up, a system where “each migrant can benefit from shelter, without it being conditional on filing an asylum application.” These centres housed exiled people for 3 to 4 months when they arrived in France. During the stay, administrative support allowed them to start (or otherwise) the asylum application process. Once people agreed to start the asylum process, they could be referred to a CADA.

In December 2015, 1,800 exiled people had benefited from this, but for *Le Monde*, “this measure, which could have been popular, was ruined by massive placements of migrants in detention centres.”¹⁴⁹ In fact, following the announcements concerning the creation of the CAOs, Bernard Cazeneuve stated:

“Those who refuse our outstretched hand and continue their vain attempts (to reach Great Britain via the Channel Tunnel) run the risk of deportation and criminal sanctions.”¹⁵⁰

Within two weeks, “600 people were detained in seven CRAs in France (but) 99% of those locked up were released within the first five days.” This policy was then demanded by the office of the Minister of the Interior to “empty Calais”: “We decided to take a highly deterrent measure, which is what placement in CRAs is.”¹⁵¹

This deterrence policy had the effect of reducing the number of exiled people settled around the Jules Ferry Centre, from 6,000 people in October 2015 to 4,500 in January 2016. It was combined with a pervasive media and political presence by Bernard Cazeneuve.

Indeed, from March 2015 to December 2015, Bernard Cazeneuve occupied the media and political space, enlisting the concepts of “humanity” and “firmness”, combining discourse on securing the border, citing the police forces mobilised, the number of people deported or the smuggling rings dismantled, while promoting the reception of exiled people. These statements acted as guarantees of “good behaviour”, a demonstration that the PS had effectively converted to “controlling migratory flows”.

A few kilometres from Calais, in the Dunkirk area, this “tightening up” policy was seen to have an effect on the increase in the number of exiled people. By making access to Calais and the crossing points harder, while pursuing a policy of dismantling, Basroch and the Ports of Dunkirk and Loon-Plage appeared to be places of respite, less visible, but where living conditions deteriorated as the number of exiled people there increased.

3. Dispersal and dismantling: turning Basroch into a “fixation point”

“Basroch had become a major concern. I was constantly told about it, both by local elected officials and by a variety of contacts. It was extremely complicated, on a subject on which we had no training or debriefing... it was a situation that we were managing on an emergency basis for the time being, bearing in mind that the solutions were extremely difficult” (Henri Jean, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk from 2012 to 2016).

149. “À Calais, l’interventionnisme de Bernard Cazeneuve en échec”, *Le Monde*, 31 December 2015.

150. “Pour vider la ‘jungle’ de Calais, une politique ‘cynique’ et ‘couteuse””, *Libération*, 4 November 2015.

151. “Pour vider la ‘jungle’ de Calais, une politique ‘cynique’ et ‘couteuse””, *Libération*, 4 November 2015.

In the summer of 2015, the Jules Ferry Centre brought together 3,000 people and pushed the State to tighten up the system: boosting police resources, securing crossing points, arrests, detention and removal of exiled people. By attempting to “relieve congestion” in Calais, the State was indirectly contributing to a transfer of people to the camps at Basroch in Grande-Synthe and around Lac de Tétéghem, as Henri Jean, sub-prefect of Dunkirk explains:

“That's also why the numbers swelled considerably at that time because the arrivals continued but Calais was a bottleneck.”

In the Dunkirk area, the number of people went from several dozen to a few hundred, undermining these municipalised living spaces that appeared, in this case, to be inadequate. The containers at Tétéghem were able to accommodate 80 people, while at the Basroch camp, the associations lacked the means to feed and clothe all of the people present. In addition, living conditions deteriorated due to overcrowding and weather conditions.

In August 2015, the situation in the Basroch camp sparked an emergency meeting convened by Damien Carême with the associations. Discussions were “tense”, says a volunteer who participated in them:

“Carême started the meeting by berating the associations, saying that it was their fault if there were 500 people. That if MDM had not given them tents, they wouldn't be there. The meeting ended. We had to explain things to him again; that if tents were given, it was because there were people... But quite quickly, he understood, he heard and he changed his tune and told us: ‘We'll have to work together to find a solution.’”

The increase in the number of exiled people at Grande-Synthe brought about a change in the discourse of Damien Carême, moving from a strictly local mode of organisation to a strategy of calling out the State in order to encourage intervention, as Damien Carême explains:

“I started to question the Sub-Prefect, the Prefect, the Minister of the Interior, the Prime Minister, the President of the Republic, to say: ‘What are you doing? What do you propose?’ and... nothing.”

In Tétéghem, Franck Dhersin also alerted the public authorities, speaking of a situation “that is no longer manageable”, which saw “between 20 and 30 people per day” arrive and pointed out the deterioration in living conditions. On 20 September 2015, nearly 400 exiled people were recorded in Tétéghem. At a public meeting, Franck Dhersin announced that he was requesting an eviction, stating: “I have asked for this camp to be removed, humanitarian aid no longer makes sense, the migrants are being terrorised, we can no longer protect them.”¹⁵²

Facing the risk of the situation in Dunkirk becoming politicised, Bernard Cazeneuve met with the various mayors of the territory. Damien Carême, who attended, tells us about the meeting:

“Cazeneuve gave me the tally made that very morning at Basroch, he told me: ‘545 people’. There were 190 in August. And he replied: ‘We don't really know... I'm going to send in law enforcement to prevent any overflow’ and things like that. A few days later, CRS units turned up even though there was none until then.”

152. “Tétéghem : Franck Dhersin compte sur les habitants”, *La Voix du Nord*, 20 September 2015.

The response from central government took the form of additional police in order to contain the public disorder represented by the camp, and, here, was in keeping with the demands of the mayor of Tétéghem. For Henri Jean, the “situation had become unmanageable, and the mayor himself was under pressure from his community.”

The objective of the public authorities was to reduce the size of the camps, via a system similar to that implemented in Calais.

On the one hand, police operations were organised in Tétéghem in order to “avoid too great an expansion”, via arrests and destruction of tents, delaying the dismantling of the camp. At this point, 200 police checks were carried out daily at the Tétéghem crossing point on the A16.

On the other hand, the aim was to “empty the camps” through access to asylum. An OFPRA unit was set up in Dunkirk in November 2015, which was combined with the organising of outreach missions in Tétéghem and Grande-Synthe. Here, the CAOs were used to remove exiled people from the camps, to empty them, while constituting a rest period.

On 18 November 2015, Franck Dhersin nevertheless requested the eviction of the Tétéghem camp, in agreement with the Dunkirk sub-prefecture. Given the lack of police personnel that could be mobilised, the decision was made to strictly confine exiled people from Dunkirk in Basroch, as Henri Jean explains:

“We made this decision to close this camp because at that time Basroch was growing a lot. We wanted to prevent the creation of new camps all over the Dunkirk area. The Basroch situation was enough on its own. So, in Tétéghem, which was smaller, the mayor's request to close the camp addressed our concerns.”

To avoid a direct influx to the Basroch camp, a “sheltering” operation was organised. 250 exiled people were transferred by bus to CAOs far away from the coast, in the Cantal and the south-west of France.

The aim was “to permanently close this camp” with the organisation of police patrols to prevent new settlements, as Henri Jean explains:

“The authorities would ensure that any new settlements were prevented by a strong police presence near the jungle. Any new settlement attempt would be systematically hindered to avoid any rebuilding of the jungle. This would last as long as it took.”¹⁵³

This policy also applied to Loon-Plage and other Dunkirk territories, where daily operations took place to “remove migrants who would like to occupy the lands of the autonomous port”, explains Henri Jean, who continues: “We've had attempts of course, all of it hasn't been communicated in the press, but there's been a lot of initial settlements.”

The reduction in the number of living spaces for exiled people, coupled with the systematisation of evictions in Dunkirk, contributed to turning Basroch into a “fixation point”, as Nathanaël Caillaux explains:

“After the eviction, a few hundred people were suddenly added to the several hundred already present in the Basroch camp. In the end, there was only one place left.”

153. “Le démantèlement de la ‘jungle’ de Tétéghem en quatre questions”, *La Voix du Nord*, 18 November 2015.

Moreover, the dispersal organised via the CAOs in Tétéghem was a failure, as Henri Jean reveals:

“Most of these people didn’t stay in the CAOs for long; they stayed for a few days, a week or two, time needed to recover and then they came back, to a large extent, most likely, to Basroch.”

In December 2015, between 2,000 and 2,500 exiled people were recorded, therefore worsening their living conditions, as Nathanaël Caillaux tells us: “The huts could accommodate 80 people at most, there were still tents, the camp had become unmistakably disgusting, with mud everywhere.” Claire Millot of Salam wholeheartedly agrees:

“The grass was flooded with water, a giant puddle of mud, it was awful... We handed out thousands of rubber boots. I spent two shifts there, those from 8 am to 8 pm, socks became sodden, skin damaged, fungal infections, rashes, it was completely unhealthy.”

The scale of the camp “prevented any possibility of action, even humanitarian... The situation deteriorated in the extreme and everyone knew that it could not last like that”, says Henri Jean, who continues: “Evacuating more than a thousand people would require very significant resources. It would be difficult to find reception places in the accommodation centres.”¹⁵⁴

In an attempt to reduce the size of the camp, the asylum access mechanism was reinforced, as Henri Jean tells us:

“With the CAOs, we were trying to get them out of the camp immediately to accommodate them. Because we realised that the people who could be convinced, if we lost sight of them, they didn’t show up to the appointment at the sub-prefecture because the opposite work was being done by the smugglers (...) We worked very closely with the CUD, which provided us with buses and temporary reception. We made use of the CADAs, the ordinary emergency shelters, Emmaüs, the Dunkirk mosque.”

The urgency of the situation in Basroch and the visibility of exiled people became a public issue. This situation was put on the agenda by local elected officials, in particular Damien Carême, calling on the government and speaking in the media, calling Basroch a “camp of shame” due to the disengagement of the State. Against this backdrop, the aim of the public authorities was to reduce this visibility, to move the exiled people away from the Dunkirk area. This strategy only “marginally” curbed the number of exiled people present.

For the local government, the lack of places available prevented any attempt at an evacuation operation that would be followed by “sheltering”. The “tightening up”, which continued in Calais, produced “an explosion in numbers” in early January 2016, explains Henri Jean, which had the effect of undermining the “maintenance of public order”, he tells us:

“It caused a whole series of problems, nuisances, but also attempts to get into the lorries (...) And then a large number that was more visible as a result, which raised questions or fears locally. Although I have to say that there were very few direct public safety issues related to the presence of migrants.”

The increase in the number of exiled people in Nord-Pas-de-Calais therefore prompted an emergency response from the State via the Jules Ferry Centre in Calais. By eliminating living spaces in the region, the facility very quickly appeared to be inadequate. The Jules

154. “Le démantèlement de la ‘jungle’ de Tétéghem en quatre questions”, *La Voix du Nord*, 18 November 2015.

Ferry Centre became a veritable state shanty town, where 1,500 and then 3,000 settled before hitting 6,000 exiled people in October 2015. In wanting to concentrate people in this space and make them invisible, the State created a “fixation point” that had become too visible politically and in the media. At the same time, in seeking to “relieve congestion” in the Calais shanty town through the implementation of a policy of deterrence and dismantling the camps in the Dunkirk area, the State created a second “fixation point” in Basroch. Through this policy, the state made this migration “crisis”, embodied by these two living spaces, a reality, where, in December 2015, nearly 8,000 exiled people had settled because they were not tolerated elsewhere by the State.

While the living conditions of the exiled people were “awful”, according to the volunteers interviewed, under pressure from the courts and associations, the State was required to improve the Jules Ferry facility, which had become a veritable stateless shanty town. This engagement by the State was accompanied by a desire to schedule its closure.

II. CREATING A SHANTY TOWN, TRYING TO GOVERN IT: THE JUNGLE OF CALAIS

Through its policy of concentration and eviction, the State “accidentally” created a state shanty town. Far from the police, this site offered a space of respite for exiled people. This shanty town became a space of possibilities where the social life of exiled people and the associations and support groups were structured (1). However, living conditions remained precarious and the exiled people deprived of their fundamental rights. Assisted by the associations, they put their situation on the agenda, reminding the State of its obligations. Through the creation of a temporary reception centre (CAP), the State attempted to govern them politically (2), before aspiring to govern them spatially by reducing the size of a shanty town that had become too large, too publicised in the media and too political to endure (3).

1. A shanty town as a space of possibilities

“The shanty town is a social space where no legitimate authority intervenes to ensure compliance with the ordinary laws applicable on French territory or provide the public services usually guaranteed” (AGIER et al., 2018, p. 129).

When Bernard Cazeneuve created the Jules Ferry Centre in March 2015, the facility was designed to accommodate 200 people – women and children – in the building. Exiled people settled nearby, with state tolerance, giving birth to a shanty town.

Through a policy of dismantling the camps and encouragement to settle around the Jules Ferry Centre, almost 1,000 people were initially counted, then 3,000, until hitting 6,000 in October 2015 before an initial attempt at “relieving congestion” in the camp was executed. In December 2015, some 5,000 people were still there, giving rise to a stateless shanty town. This initial period ushered in a space of possibilities, where exiled people (mainly men) organised themselves, while community life was built and expanded.

As soon as the Jules Ferry Centre was created, a shanty town formed nearby. Exiled people organised themselves to create their living space with the support of long-established coastal humanitarian organisations. “A small town was created in a few weeks”, says

Nathanaël Caillaux. He continues: "People were completely self-organised, helping each other to cross as a group." There was an organising of the social life of exiled people, with the creation of restaurants, hairdressers, barbers, shops, schools, places of worship and care, a theatre, a library and even a nightclub.

A veritable parallel economy was established, where traders organised themselves and paid wages to other exiled people. But they remained dependent on the public authorities, who were likely, at any time, to request the destruction of the site (in July 2016, there were 72 shops, before the State requested their destruction, despite the action brought by the shanty town traders).

"Houses" were erected using recovered materials, "wooden shelters, waterproof, with tarpaulins. L'Auberge des Migrants had set up a workshop where they prepared wooden panels. The guys built shelters with pallets, boards, shelters they could stand up in!" says Claire Millot of the Salam association.

The organisation of the space in the shanty town depended on the space available, but also on the ethnic and linguistic communities present. Pashtun, Oromo, Kurdish and Iranian neighbourhoods emerged. Mutual protection was observed within these communities, with the sharing of kitchens and meals. Reception centres were created by some communities to welcome newcomers to the shanty town. Mechanisms were organised to regulate disputes between exiled people and/or with the involvement of volunteers.

By being tolerated in a specific place, "people had a little respite and were able to organise themselves", says Maël Galisson, continuing: "There wasn't a cop on their back all the time, it gave them a semblance of stability and normality." "They had the right to be there, they were left alone", explains Claire Millot: "Despite the CRS roadblock, the migrants came and went as they pleased." The only times when police entered the shanty town was for investigations, namely to arrest smugglers. A "public peace patrol" was requested by the exiled people, without success.

In a few months, this shanty town became a new "neighbourhood" of Calais, but "you couldn't forget that it was a shanty town", says Maël Galisson. In other words, this shanty town was based on a process of relegation and exclusion, far away from the town centre, concentrated and where the intention of the public authorities was to make them invisible. This living space soon attracted the media, articles and new activists.

At this time, the Jules Ferry Centre facility was inadequate, assistance being provided almost exclusively by the associations. These were overwhelmed and few in number, like *Secours Catholique* and *Doctors of the World*, which mainly relied on local volunteers, "and with resources that are in no way in keeping with the needs of a small town being created around the Jules Ferry centre. At that time, there was a kind of non-profit burnout", says Nathanaël Caillaux from *Secours Catholique*.

In 2015, a protest was organised to publicise the site and call for new volunteers. British and German groups answered the call, giving structure to assistance for exiled people. British activists helped to create new associations that emerged during this period and are still in existence today, such as *Refugee Info Bus*, *Care4Calais*, *Refugee Women's Centre* and *Choose Love*, and assisted with the "daily survival of thousands of inhabitants of the shanty town to whom they distributed ready meals, food, clothing, tents and blankets" (AGIER et al., 2018, p. 137). This dynamic brought about changes in the local non-profit landscape, says Nathanaël Caillaux:

“In Calais, there were people arriving from all over Europe, from all over the world, coming to increase this momentum. The non-profit sector was changing completely. There was a real split from summer 2015 compared to the previous ten years.”

In September 2015, Doctors of the World opened a health clinic and Gynécologie Sans Frontières provided care to women, while MSF built a few hundred huts.

Volunteers and activists were ubiquitous in the shanty town. Some lived in the shanty town, asking exiled people about why they were living there, when they were forced to do so. The shanty town was also the subject of forms of “humanitarian tourism, where people come to “study, film or photograph for a report, an art project or simply to make memories” (AGIER et al., 2018, p. 147). Certain bars, like the Kabul Café, became their meeting place:

“We are struck in Calais by the buzz in the Jungle. At weekends, volunteers and activists flock in their hundreds, distributing meals, clothing, running workshops or giving legal advice” (AGIER et al., 2018, p. 135).

This organising of the social life of exiled people and the non-profit sector continued until January 2016 with almost no state presence. However, living conditions were precarious and there were only minimal water points. The associations mobilised and made their living conditions a public issue, requesting that the State intervene. It created a new facility, the temporary reception centre, designed as a tool for the governmentality of bodies and space.

2. Creating a temporary reception centre, governing exiled people

In the shanty town, living conditions remained precarious and health problems abounded. The associations regularly appealed to the public authorities. A series of reports, forums and press releases were published, while legal action was brought. The associations put the public issue of the Jungle on the agenda, with the objective of pushing – forcing – the State to intervene to protect the fundamental rights of exiled people.

From 1 July 2015, the Vignon-Aribaud report highlighted the precarious conditions in which exiled people were living and suggested “an overall improvement in the Jules Ferry centre and its surroundings (...) and a gradual improvement in the satisfaction of vital needs in this place ultimately sets the objective of shelter, as broad as possible.” Following the report, Manuel Valls, Prime Minister, announced the creation of a new system, but it was slow to emerge. On 10 September 2015, MSF referred to “organised neglect”, criticising “the absence of water points, showers, no maintenance of meagre sanitary infrastructure, it is organised neglect.”

On 6 October 2015, Jacques Toubon, then Defender of Rights, published a report that highlighted “insufficient access to water” and “violations of human rights”, revealing the contradictions of the State:

“The government was caught up in its own contradictions that consisted of trying, on the one hand, to make the Franco-British border absolutely watertight and, on the other hand, to ensure a minimum of humanitarian aid to people who were being kept against their will on our territory.”¹⁵⁵

The report highlighted that the “unconditional nature of the right to emergency accommodation” was not being respected and recommended “decent living conditions, including accommodation”. It called for “a number of meals equivalent to the number of people currently living in the shanty town”, the creation “of at least ten water points” and “a waste collection service”.

Several associations seized on this report, in particular Secours Catholique and MDM, to file an application for registered freedom on 26 October 2015 before the Administrative Court of Lille. This legal action sought to force the State to take emergency measures to stop violations of the fundamental rights of exiled people in the shanty town.

On 23 November 2015, the State and the city of Calais were condemned. From then on, “the courts forced the State to recognise the existence of the shanty town, and to take even more responsibility for what it was already taking responsibility for through the Jules Ferry Centre”, Nathanaël Caillaux tells us. Following this action, the State appointed the *NGO Acted* to manage an informal site, to coordinate the site with exiled people and associations, to install water points, sanitary facilities, access to emergency services, to organise the collection of waste and the cleaning of the site.

Under pressure from associations and the courts, in January 2016, a temporary reception centre (CAP) was opened near the Jules Ferry Centre. This system was managed by La Vie Active - already in charge of the Jules Ferry Centre. The CAP was intended to accommodate 1,500 people while the Jules Ferry centre increased its capacity to 400 women and children. For Fabienne Buccio, prefect of Pas-de-Calais, the CAP was “a balance between humanity and firmness (...) Currently, France has a system that allows each person in the camp to have a dignified solution.”¹⁵⁶ At that time, the shanty town was home to nearly 5,000 people.

The 1,500 exiled people were accommodated in 125 14 m² containers, each housing 12 people in six bunk beds. They were equipped with radiators, towel rails and power outlets. There were water and sanitation points nearby. Three “common room” containers were installed in the space.

A logic of self-organisation followed a governmentality of the body, imposed by the State, understood as the “multiple modalities of the intrapersonal and interpersonal within a framework defined by codes and regulations, standards and values, relationships of authority and legitimacy, of interactions with the State and with the law” (FASSIN, MEMMI, 2006).

Indeed, an enclosed fence was soon erected around the CAP. Exiled people had to have an access code to enter, while use of a 3D hand scanner was implemented. The objective was to control exiled people while forcing cohabitation. La Vie Active, manager of the centre, determined the allocation of places, creating conflicts between exiled people. As the service was inadequate, the association selected exiled people based on their fragility and vulnerability, as well as their engagement in the asylum process. Social workers were

155. “Tribune, Jacques Toubon : ‘Défendre les droits, à Calais aussi !’”, *Libération*, 19 October 2015.

156. “Calais : un camp en dur inauguré au sein de la ‘Jungle’”, *Le Point*, 11 January 2016.

delegated the task of controlling, while having to arbitrate between those who were being hosted and those relegated to the outside, in shelters and tents.

We can see here how state intervention was based on a logic of control and governmentality of the exiled people present in the space. By undersizing the system, the State created a “minimal” emergency reception, combining “humanity” and “firmness”, half “humanitarian” and half “security-focused”. The objective of the public authorities here was not to contribute to the “pull factor” that the Ministry of the Interior was driving.

In January 2016, alongside this formal shanty town, an informal shanty town continued to exist, where nearly 3,000 exiled people lived. The logic of relegation continued, especially as a series of dismantling operations gradually reduced their living space. By destroying the camps and squats in the city of Calais, the State “accidentally” produced an informal shanty town, the size of which it was trying to reduce.

3. Reducing a slum, governing the space

In January 2016, the State tried to take control of the Calais shanty town. Through the creation of the CAP, it created 1,500 reception places, which were added to the 400 places available in the Jules Ferry Centre. 3,000 exiled people were still living in the informal shanty town next to it. To reduce its size, the State deployed four strategies at the same time: coercion, work to protect the Franco-British border, asylum as a removal tool and the spatial reduction of the informal shanty town.

The State deployed police resources to arrest exiled people and detain them in CRAs far away from the Calais area. This was based, among other things, on the creation of new offences by the State, as explained by Olivier Cahn, Senior Lecturer in Law:

“Christiane Taubira, Minister of Justice, signed a Circular on the legal harassment of migrants, with the Public Prosecutor's Office being asked to issue requests and to systematically prosecute intrusions into port and railway facilities. This makes it possible to turn migrants who try to cross into offenders and justify their obligation to leave the territory.”

This Circular is dated 24 November 2015 and is “related to the Calais situation, to combating organised irregular immigration and related crime.” It was mainly justified by Christiane Taubira to protect exiled people “who take major risks for themselves and those who accompany them.”

For Laurence Blisson, General Secretary of the Union of Magistrates and a sentencing judge, this Circular “calls for firmness in the criminal response to acts committed against law enforcement by inhabitants of Calais or migrants.” Judges were “invited” to use fast-track proceedings in order to speed up forced removal procedures, she explains (BLISSON, 2017).

The deployment of this deterrence policy is illustrated by the resources allocated to combating irregular immigration. In this way, between 2011 and 2017, dedicated spending on this policy increased from €61 million to €93 million, while the PAF saw its budget increase from €688 million to €945 million over the same period. Overall, the State dedicated €1.038 billion to combating immigration in 2017, when in his last full year in office, Nicolas Sarkozy dedicated €749 million to it (the complete data is attached).

Expenditure on the fight against irregular immigration from 2008 to 2017 (source: DPT ¹⁵⁷)										
Type of expenditure	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Combating irregular immigration (Waiting area, detention, removal, CRA)	€73 M	€75 M	€67 M	€61 M	€71 M	€64 M	€78 M	€94 M	€85 M	€93 M
PAF	€610 M	€640 M	€638 M	€688 M	€692 M	€665 M	€1,081 M	€738 M	€866 M	€945 M
Total	€683 M	€715 M	€705 M	€749 M	€763 M	€729 M	€1,169 M	€842 M	€951 M	€1,038 M

These budgetary expenses were, moreover, reflected in the practices of detention in CRAs as well as the expansion of house arrest. Between 2011 and 2017, the house arrests increased from 373 to 8,745, while detentions in a CRA fell from 39,405 to 36,811. In total, nearly 53,292 people were monitored or locked up in 2017 (49,926 in 2011). However, these figures do not include people in waiting areas, which amounted to 8,198 people in 2016 (NB: despite our research, we were unable to obtain the data for other years).

Forced removals, placements in CRAs and house arrests (2011-2017) Source: DGEF							
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Forced removals (mainland France)	12,547	13,386	14,076	15,161	15,485	12,961	14,270
Forced removals (abroad)	26,858	23,978	19,632	21,257	20,225	23,545	22,541
Forced removals	39,405	37,364	33,708	36,418	35,710	36,506	36,811
Placements in CRAs (mainland France)	25,544	23,394	24,176	25,018	26,267	22,573	25,264
Placements in CRAs (abroad)	24,009	16,595	14,090	16,301	13,828	21,167	20,383
Placements in CRAs	49,553	39,989	38,266	41,319	40,095	43,740	45,647
House arrests	373	668	1,618	2,274	4,020	4,687	8,745
Total CRAs and house arrests	49,926	40,657	39,884	43,593	44,115	48,427	54,392

These figures illustrate two things: on the one hand, a desire by the State to deter exiles from staying on the coast and, on the other hand, to objectify, through the production of statistics, the “refugee crisis” and the State’s firmness towards them. Indeed, against a backdrop of a state of emergency and pressure on police to “make the numbers” by controlling, arresting, locking up and removing exiled people, the increase in statistics was consistent, as Emmanuel Didier explains in relation to “measuring crime”:

157. Document de politique transversale (cross-cutting policy document) (2008-2019): Presented as a tool for steering and modernising public administration, these “documents” were driven by the Loi Organique relative aux Lois de Finances (organic law on finance laws (LOLF)) of 1 August 2001, and produced in relation to immigration policies from 2008.

"It's not the increase in the number of criminal acts that explains the increase in the police statistics, but the activity of law enforcement (...) In this way, if the Minister considers that one or another criminal act becomes a priority or, on the contrary, is no longer a priority, the police forces rightly adapt their activity to these instructions – which varies the measurement regardless of the actual or assumed variation in the number of criminal acts committed."(DIDIER, 2015)

In other words, the statistics produced regarding combating immigration are more a reflection of police activity and the priorities they are being instructed to follow than an increase in the number of exiled people in an irregular situation on French territory.

The second strategy put in place by the French State – in collaboration with the UK – aimed to strengthen the protection of the Franco-British border through new bilateral agreements.

A Franco-British agreement was therefore signed on 20 September 2014, and included a contribution of €15 million from Great Britain over three years to "improve infrastructure and security in Calais." It was supplemented on 20 August 2015 by a new agreement to "secure the perimeter of the Tunnel entrance" via new technologies and barriers, as well as the deployment of further police resources.

For a member of Bernard Cazeneuve's inner circle, behind this agreement, it was a question, in a "tense migratory context", of asking the English to finance security and therefore to strengthen border control, with "a threat: if you don't help us, we can also ask your Border Force to leave Calais (...) But what was part of our strategies was the hardening of the border." For Olivier Cahn, with this agreement, a "policy of joint management of the border" was being put in place:

"There was even a constitutional problem because there was a real issue in terms of French sovereignty. Because joint management means letting the British work on French territory to deter migrants from applying for asylum in the United Kingdom, thereby encouraging them to apply in France."

The Franco-British agreements were framed as "indispensable" and contributed to a logic of self-reinforcement. The dynamic of protecting the border, initiated in the 1990s, acted incrementally, step by step, and via a ratchet effect, with no return possible. Indeed, the same objectives to seal the border were being repeated for fear of the "pull factor", as Bernard Cazeneuve declared at the National Assembly on 18 February 2016:

"If tomorrow we opened the border, it would not be a few thousand migrants in Calais, it would be tens of thousands (...) So we took the decision to make this border watertight."

On 3 March 2016, François Hollande took the same position. He announced an enhanced sealing of the border. It was, he said, "to further intensify the actions undertaken to reduce migratory pressures in Calais by continuing to secure the port and the Tunnel."

From 2012 to 2017, nearly €300 million¹⁵⁸ was spent to seal off the Nord and Pas-de-Calais coastline, close to the ports and railway areas (see table opposite), including nearly €139 million in investments to install fencing, barbed wire, video surveillance cameras and for the purchase of drones and scanners.

158. The amounts referred to are low estimates, due to a lack of exhaustive official figures.

TIMELINE: 2012-2017
SECURING OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER ON THE COAST
IN NORD AND PAS-DE-CALAIS: ALMOST €300 MILLION

INVESTMENTS: €139 MILLION

- 1 January 2013:** Security at the Port of Calais for one year – €2 million¹⁵⁹.
- 21 April 2013:** Port of Calais, installation of five new scanners – €3 million¹⁶⁰.
- 1 January 2014:** Detection dogs for three years in the Port of Calais – €4.5 million¹⁶¹.
- 7 September 2014:** Installation of 20 km of NATO barriers in Calais – €3 million¹⁶².
- 1 January 2015:** Franco-British agreement over three years, securing of the Port of Calais and its car park - 3 km double fence - €15 million¹⁶³.
- 1 January 2015:** Installation of 65 km of fencing around the Channel Tunnel – €17.3 million¹⁶⁴.
- January 2015:** Fencing off of the Calais shanty town, installation of containers, video surveillance, security - €18 million¹⁶⁵.
- 4 September 2015:** SNCF and Eurotunnel install 4 km of 4-metre-high fencing in Calais – €10 million¹⁶⁶.
- 1 November 2015:** UK Border Force fleet acquires night vision equipment to monitor the Channel - €1 million¹⁶⁷.
- 1 January 2016:** Port ring road secured by 300 metres of barriers in Calais - €0.7 million¹⁶⁸.
- 27 June 2016:** Eurotunnel enhances its security by purchasing two drones – €0.8 million^{169, 170}.
- 9 September 2016:** Installation of a 1 km green wall in Calais - €2.7 million¹⁷¹.
- 24 October 2016:** 1-year private security contract in Calais - €31 million¹⁷².

159. "Entreprises collabos", *Calais Research* [online].

160. "Au port de Calais, un nouveau scanner pour détecter les migrants cachés dans les camions", *La Voix du Nord*, 25 April 2013.

161. "Entreprises collabos", *Calais Research* [online].

162. "Immigration : le gouvernement britannique propose à Calais des barrières métalliques pour protéger le port", *France Info*, 7 September 2014.

163. Joint statement by Theresa May and Bernard Cazeneuve, 20 September 2014.

164. "Calais : comment 65 km de grillages ont poussé les migrants à prendre la mer", *La Voix du Nord*, 29 September 2020.

165. "À Calais, des renforts sécuritaires et des moyens pour 'humaniser' l'accueil des migrants", *Le Monde*, 21 October 2015.

166. "Intrusions de migrants dans le tunnel sous la Manche : Londres débloque 10 millions d'euros, Cazeneuve tacle Eurotunnel", *La Voix du Nord*, 29 July 2015.

167. "Entreprises collabos", *Calais Research* [online].

168. "Calais : un mur végétal le long de la rocade portuaire contre les intrusions de migrants", *La Voix du Nord*, 28 April 2016.

169. "Eurotunnel se dote de drones 'militaires' de surveillance", *20 minutes*, 29 June 2016.

170. "Eurotunnel", *Technopolice* [online].

171. "Migrants de Calais : le mur végétalisé terminé 'avant la fin de l'année'", *La Voix du Nord*, 9 September 2016.

172. "Britain picks up £36 million bill for closure of the Jungle – money comes on top of £80 million to pay for security guards in French ports", *Daily Mail*, 24 October 2016.

19 January 2017: New command station at the Eurotunnel - €3 million¹⁷³.

28 February 2017: Private security around the Port of Calais, Dunkirk and the Eurotunnel – €26.76 million¹⁷⁴.

OPERATING COSTS: €160 MILLION:

2012-2017: Port of Calais security operating costs - €60 million¹⁷⁵.

2012-2017: Eurotunnel security operating costs – €100 million¹⁷⁶.

NB: To create this database, we relied on press articles, academic work and activity reports from the companies concerned. On the one hand, this list is not exhaustive and, on the other hand, the amounts obtained do not always specify what they are made up of (in particular, whether or not operating costs are included), and therefore this is an estimate. Lastly, the security measures put in place since 1998 are not solely intended to control migratory flows and exiled people, but they are regularly justified in the name of combating irregular immigration.

.....

The protection of the Franco-British had the effect of stranding exiled people within the shanty town in Calais for longer, as Emmanuelle Cosse explains: "Why did it become very difficult in France in 2016? It was also because the Franco-British border was increasingly secure." She went on to explain that Great Britain was sending back exiled people who had managed to cross the Channel: "There were more and more people being sent back. (...) England started sorting, sending them back."

In January 2016, in order to prevent crossing attempts, the State destroyed a 100-metre strip of shelters in the informal shanty town to facilitate the work of the police. Three kilometres of barbed wire were subsequently installed, before a four-metre concrete wall was erected on the site.

This initial destruction of shelters led to a reduction in living spaces, encouraging overcrowding, which worsened as the State deployed a third strategy: the dismantling of the southern area of the informal shanty town. On 12 February 2016, the prefect of Pas-de-Calais, Fabienne Buccio, announced the State's intention to dismantle the southern area, where 2,000 people lived at the time. Exiled people organised themselves and filed an appeal before the Administrative Court of Lille, and were partially successful. On 19 February 2016, the court ordered the destruction of the southern area, while maintaining community facilities, such as places of worship, schools and huts offering care or legal information.

On 16 March 2016, as the southern area was dismantled, exiled people relocated to the northern part of the informal shanty town, increasing overcrowding. There were tensions between exiled people, some places became forbidden, while an informal real estate market was established. The reduction in living spaces and shelters forced newcomers to pay rent or to buy a shelter to live in from other exiled people. This situation was encouraged by the reduction in available land and the ban on associations bringing in construction equipment or caravans.

173. "Pas-de-Calais : Eurotunnel s'offre un poste central de sûreté tout neuf", *20 minutes*, 19 January 2017.

174. "Migrants : 40 agents privés déployés sur la côte française au profit du Home Office britannique", *Ouest-France*, 28 February 2017.

175. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

176. "Eurotunnel se dote de drones 'militaires' de surveillance", *20 minutes*, 29 June 2016.

The reduction in living spaces was aimed at gradually “reducing the size” of a shanty town over which the State did not have control. However, it also had the effect of undermining the fourth strategy deployed by the State: the promotion of asylum.

The installation of containers accommodating 1,500 people was part of an airlock approach, which made it possible to “go to people and not wait for people to go to the centres themselves”, explains Emmanuelle Cosse, who continues: “Pascal Brice at the OFPRA conducted outreach missions, he went to people, and that’s why we opened the CAOs.”

Pascal Brice, director of the OFPRA, coordinated the system in Calais – as well as in Grande-Synthe – he explains, continuing: “I made sure that people had access to the asylum application process as quickly as possible so that they had the right to accommodation, support and prompt processing of their application.”

The CAOs enabled exiled people to be “sheltered” for three to four months. When Emmanuelle Cosse arrived at the Ministry of Housing in February 2016, she “took control of the issue”, with the intention of “taking on the system” with the Ministry of the Interior, “not very credible on housing”, she said:

“In February 2016, part of the camp was razed to the ground. The associations were furious. I invited all the Calais associations to a discussion with the Ministry of the Interior in my ministry. It actually went quite well, and we set the stage for something we were going to do for a year.”

The scheme took the form of social outreach teams, with the creation of a one-stop shop opened to promote asylum and register them. However, the scheme involved work to “check people’s documentation, whether they had taken up their entitlements but also to take their fingerprints”, explains Emmanuelle Cosse.

This requirement was a fear for exiled people, whose fingerprints may have been recorded earlier, in other EU countries. The Dublin system represented the risk of being returned to another country, of being removed from Calais and casting doubt on a crossing to Great Britain, while preventing the granting of asylum in France.

In addition, the container approach relied on a “flow”: as the exiled people entered the CAOs, they freed up spaces for other arrivals. However, places in the CAOs were running out, saturating the CAP. At that point, there were 500 new arrivals each week.

At the end of summer 2016, nearly 10,000 people were living in the Calais shanty town. Exiled people lived in a reduced space. The community-based organisation was called into question while social spaces were being destroyed one by one by the State. By attempting to govern this space, state policy contributed to increase tensions between exiled people. The advent of the “largest shanty town in Europe” was generating media and political interest outside France and had become too big to endure.

Forty kilometres from Calais, the fixation point that had become the Basroch camp was put on the agenda, requiring an emergency response. Alongside the creation of the CAP, the creation of a humanitarian camp at the initiative of the municipality and MSF was observed: La Linière.

III. THE MUNICIPAL CREATION OF AN EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN CAMP: LA LINIÈRE

The situation in Calais had a very direct impact on the situation in Dunkirk. As Calais was “tightened up” and the Tétéghem camp was dismantled, the number of exiled people increased in Basroch. The town hall of Grande-Synthe and MSF developed an emergency reception system: the La Linière humanitarian camp (1). Reluctant to intervene, the State, via the Ministry of Housing, got involved and financed the camp, changing the system from “flow” management to “stock” management. For the Ministry of the Interior, the challenge was to plan, in advance, for the closure of the camp (2). This move to close the La Linière episode as quickly as possible took the form of a reduction in the shelters available to exiled people. When the Calais shanty town was dismantled, La Linière saw the arrival of new people, without the political possibility of accommodating them. These new arrivals reconfigured the social life of the camp, heightening tensions between exiled people (3).

1. The municipal creation of a “humanitarian” camp

“It's still a camp and it's truly a camp of people. People are between the motorway and the railway line” (Nathanaël Caillaux, Secours Catholique)

In the summer of 2015, Damien Carême, mayor of Grande-Synthe, took steps with the long-established associations of Calais to create a reception system for a few hundred exiled people present on the Basroch site.

Local associations called for the intervention of humanitarian NGOs. For Nathanaël Caillaux, from *Secours Catholique*: “We were in a situation where the State was incapable of managing a humanitarian crisis.” *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF), which did not operate on the coast – or in France – wanted to get involved again.

MSF and Damien Carême worked bilaterally on a humanitarian camp project, presented to the coastal associations in autumn 2015. For Damien Carême, this solution emerged at a time when “the State had no solution: I didn't want us to end up with something completely crazy like Calais”, he says. “We did it to respond to a humanitarian emergency because we had scabies, suspected tuberculosis, rats everywhere.”

The agreement between MSF and Damien Carême was based on an emergency scheme, “a temporary camp, not a reception solution. It was about putting people in healthier conditions. We were really afraid of the concept of a camp”, explains Franck Esnée¹⁷⁷, who coordinated the project for MSF. In addition, MSF explained that they were building the project, but later withdrew, leaving its management to the local authority.

In the winter of 2015, following a police crackdown around the Jules Ferry centre in Calais, nearly 3,000 exiled people were counted on the Basroch site, which Damien Carême wanted to turn into an eco-neighbourhood. In addition, the presence of exiled people caused public nuisances, undermining the logic of making them invisible and maintaining public order. According to Olivier Caremelle, director of the office of Damien Carême, the future site “could not be Basroch and not in the town centre.” The area found was near an old factory, La Linière, located between a railway line and a motorway, isolated

177. Interview conducted on 28 April 2021.

from the community. One part of the land was rented by MSF, the other belonged to the local authority. "It limited the prefecture's involvement, since it was a private lease and a municipal property", explains Franck Esnée.

The prefect of Nord, Jean-François Cordet, was "deeply hostile, he totally rejected the idea. Cazeneuve, a little less so", says Olivier Caremelle. Damien Carême explains that Bernard Cazeneuve forced the Prefect to tolerate the La Linière camp, whereas officially the State did not want to get involved:

"The Prefect said to me, 'No, you can't, it's between the SNCF station and the motorway.' I told him: "We will find solutions." And Bernard Cazeneuve told him: "Work with the mayor to make it possible."

For Henri Jean, still Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk until the opening of La Linière, he explained that "the situation in Basroch was becoming increasingly unmanageable", continuing:

"When Damien Carême presented his project to us, no one jumped with joy or enthusiasm. But obviously, we could not stand by and do nothing, which is why this initiative of La Linière, we took it with caution. He asked us for a financial contribution, so the State initially responded that it did not want it."

However, the plan to build a humanitarian camp satisfied the objectives of the local government, namely "to prevent new camps from being set up", explains Henri Jean:

"This is also why the La Linière initiative, in a way, made it possible to provide an immediate response to the situation, which was dramatic in Basroch of course, but also to avoid an increase in wild camps that would not have helped anyone (...) This municipal initiative deserved credit for putting an end to Basroch."

Here, La Linière was in keeping with the sub-prefect's mission to avoid public disorder and the increase in living spaces. It made it possible to concentrate exiled people and make them invisible, thereby reducing the police resources needed in the territories. Nevertheless, the State did not want to take on the scheme, fearing the potential political costs and the "pull factor" that it represented. The cost of the operation in this case was born entirely by MSF (€2.6 million), the town of Grande-Synthe and the CUD (€500,000).

The project was designed to accommodate 2,500 people, via 375 wooden cabins of 9, 10 and 11 m²: "This was a very intensive project. We had to excavate the land, drain it, bring in water pipes, redo the mains drainage, bring in electricity, the volumes were huge", explains Franck Esnée.

The State tried to prevent the opening of the site "for security reasons, the spacing between the huts, the wood that was not fireproof", says Franck Esnée, "finally, we came to a deal where the criminal liability of the safety commission would be municipal." He continues: "There was a real fear from the State with this initiative, especially as the English were putting pressure on them."

Before the camp opened, the challenge was to convince the exiled people present at Basroch to go to the La Linière camp. The associations were included in the scheme, explains Franck Esnée:

"For three months, with all the associations that were part of the project, we worked with the exiled people to raise awareness, inform them, reassure them, tell them that this will be an open camp with unconditional reception."

The camp opened on 7 March 2016, when there were 2,500 exiled people on the Basroch site. 1,700 people joined La Linière, “all the others who did not want to join this scheme, went to Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, Paris, to try to cross in a different way, says Franck Esnée.

In order to encourage the concentration of exiled people at the La Linière camp, the municipality prevented any resettlement on the Basroch site, Henri Jean tells us:

“The town hall took care of it, since it was a municipal plot, securing access and preventing attempts to resettle. It was also a bit of a gamble, the risk was ending up with two camps.”

In a few days, 1,700 people moved into a municipal shanty town, with access to laundry rooms, hot water, showers and hot meals. There was access to a dispensary, a classroom, a canteen, community spaces and free shops that the exiled people set up. But “it was still a camp, extremely precarious, people had a hut, it was planned for 4-5 mattresses, stacking them on top of each other during the day... but it was dignified,” says Claire Millot of the Salam association. Reception was unconditional; exiled people could enter and leave without limitation or control.

Following a call for applications, Utopia 56, an association managing the Festival des Vieilles Charrues at the time, was chosen to manage the site. Utopia 56 had to coordinate all of the associations involved in the camp, and relied almost exclusively on volunteers to operate it. However, the limitations of such management quickly became apparent, according to Claire Millot: “We didn't have the support, neither I nor the local associations. We were pensioners, it required expertise and we didn't have the availability.” Tensions emerged with Utopia 56, which was seen as an outside player interfering in the long-standing work of the associations working on the coast: “They wanted volunteers to get involved and do what they said”, criticises Claire Millot.

The municipal creation of the La Linière camp revealed a method of managing emergency “migratory flows” that moved exiled people away from the homes and centre of Grande-Synthe. It was based on an emergency humanitarian system, in coordination with MSF. Until the end of April 2016, this municipal space relied on the engagement of the local authorities and the associations invested in the site. The State was “in the background” and did not want to get officially involved. At the same time, the fear that the camp would become permanent and the investment of the Minister for Housing, Emmanuelle Cosse, pushed Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior, to accede to the requests of Damien Carême. However, this intervention was subject to conditions.

2. When the Ministry of Housing reassumes responsibility for accommodation

*“It's so regulatory, you just have to want to do it. To the extent that these are people in transit, not asylum seekers, or seeking anything, the states are entirely independent and free to organise and design the systems they want to create”
(Lucie P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior)*

When getting involved in Grande-Synthe, MSF had announced from the outset that it would be withdrawing from the La Linière humanitarian camp scheme after the first year, transferring all of the contracts to the local authority, including the costs relating to flow management, i.e. a sum of €4 million. Damien Carême looked for new funding,

since the “municipality alone cannot finance the camp, the State has to get involved at some point”, agrees Franck Esnée.

For Damien Carême, the challenge was to create a form of social acceptability of the camp among his community, as he indicates: “I always told residents, because I was completely transparent throughout: ‘We’re going to put this amount, but I’m fighting to get it back... Yes, I wanted the State to come.’ Letters were sent to the local community on a regular basis explaining the project, its progress, its implementation, its operation and the expenses incurred. The strategy was to reassure the community and avoid the emergence of a NIMBY movement.

In February 2016, Emmanuelle Cosse (EELV) returned to government and became Minister for Housing. She was quickly informed of the opening of the La Linière camp, she said:

“Damien Carême told me: ‘We’re going to open a humanitarian camp.’ And he asked me for help in getting an appointment with Cazeneuve. And we were actually in agreement for the most part, even though we were quite doubtful about the technical solution that had been put in place.”

Emmanuelle Cosse subsequently became involved in the issue and tried to release budgets to finance the scheme. This commitment by the new Minister for Housing was explained by an arbitration won when she entered government on the subject of exiled people. Between 2012 and 2015, emergency accommodation was at the crossroads of the Ministries of Housing, Health and Social Cohesion. The Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL) was in charge of coordinating policies on emergency accommodation, housing for Roma, unaccompanied minors and exiled people. It “answered to the ministries but reported to the Prime Minister”, explains Emmanuelle Cosse, who continues:

“When I was a minister, I had emergency accommodation within my remit, i.e. I fought to have it, to be able to work on accommodation in housing (...) And that it would be accountable to me.”

By assuming this competence, Housing became the decision-maker in terms of budget allocation, says Emmanuelle Cosse:

“Until July 2017, the financing of the CAOs, the Jules Ferry Centre, the La Linière camp, was therefore attached to the accommodation programme operational budget (BOP), and it was therefore Housing that financed, that controlled the budget.”

Emmanuelle Cosse explains that the Ministry of the Interior did not want the La Linière camp to be opened, “not Cazeneuve”: “The mayor said: ‘Whatever happens, I’ll do it’, so we acted as intermediaries, saying: ‘In this case, it’s better to do it and to organise a kind of recognition by the State.’”

A meeting was organised at “Beauvau” through Emmanuelle Cosse, bringing together Damien Carême, Bernard Cazeneuve, the prefect of Nord, Jean-François Cordet, and Olivier Caremelle, who describes the scene:

“Cazeneuve got into a cold rage: ‘Mr Mayor, we acknowledge your humanism...’, and ended up telling Damien that he should never have done it, but that the State would be there.”

For a close associate of Bernard Cazeneuve, Bernard Cazeneuve’s investment in the La Linière issue was an “exception to the position” that he wanted to hold, “but faced with an emergency, 2,000 people at the time... in very harsh conditions”, he agreed with

the opinion “of the Ministry of Housing, which was prepared to pay, even if it was not its initial inclination:

“He didn’t want to create an accommodation centre on the coast... As much as we can do minimal humanitarian work [Jules Ferry and the CAP], we can create an accommodation centre, it's absurd. We're not going to accommodate people so that they stay, so that they try to cross a border that we also control.”

According to the people interviewed, the Ministry of the Interior – and, in particular, the Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France – opposed the project, unlike Bernard Cazeneuve. By making this decision, against the advice of his ministry, he pushed the ministry to comply with it, subject to conditions, which were reflected in the agreement signed on 30 May 2016.

The scheme had to be “temporary”, “social outreach” had to be organised so that exiled people entered the asylum process and were directed to the CAOs or the “airlock” accommodation in the event that the CAOs no longer had available places, “the systematic removal from the camp of people who cause public disorder but also “the gradual reduction of the La Linière camp as migrants leave and its eventual closure”.

For Bernard Cazeneuve, the La Linière camp had to be closed “eventually”. The choice of wording was negotiated and a source of ambiguity for Olivier Caremelle:

“For them, the objective of the agreement was obviously to close it on a date that wasn't specified, but to say: ‘The camp will be closed eventually’, and for us, that was saying: ‘The camp is open, as much as needed, because the people are there.’”

The agreement was tacitly renewable, but the State applied pressure from the outset, says Olivier Caremelle: “To close the camp, there must be fewer people. If there are fewer people, there must be fewer cabins.”

This objective of gradually closing the La Linière camp was shared by Damien Carême, implemented by the appointed management association, the AFEJI, and under continuous pressure from the local government. This involvement by the State brought about a change in the scheme, undermining the unconditional nature of the site by controlling the entrances and by reducing the available shelters. It was a move from a mindset of “flow” management to “stock” management, making any possibility of adaptation obsolete. This gradual reduction in living space and the closure of the Calais shanty town caused tensions among the inhabitants of La Linière.

3. Reducing living spaces, preparing for closure

“When the State decided to take back control, what was not said is that the State decided to close this camp. It was willing to pay to close it.” (Franck Esnée)

The State’s involvement in the La Linière camp was conditional, with the aim of closing the camp. To ensure that the objective was achieved, Bernard Cazeneuve required, on the one hand, that Utopia 56 be replaced by a medico-social association and, on the other hand, that the heads of the local government be changed.

For two months, Utopia 56 managed the camp and coordinated the associations involved in the La Linière camp, creating tensions between volunteers. “After two months

of operation, we saw that they were not equipped to operate the camp”, explains Olivier Caremelle. Damien Carême explains that when the call for projects was organised, “Utopia 56 was unable to respond, they didn’t have the resources”, continuing: “given the populations that were in the camp, with families, children, that there was a medico-social structure... there were no regrets in relation to Utopia 56.”

The association selected was an association from Nord, AFEJI, led by Daniel Fouillouse and whose president was the former PS mayor of Dunkirk and president of the CUD, Michel Delebarre. The association, which was from the medico-social sector, was initially involved in providing reception services for people in difficulty and people with disabilities, before gradually getting involved in the elderly care market.

AFEJI was one of “the operators who became known at that time on the matter of the CAOs, the CAESs, the reception of exiled people, the reception of unaccompanied minors, etc., operators that, in principle, were more focused on other areas than on exile” – like La Vie Active in Calais – says Franck Esnée.

The association – with a budget of €175 million – got involved in a new market here by becoming manager of the La Linière camp. The mission of AFEJI was to coordinate the non-profit network and the volunteers present in the camp, switching from strictly voluntary management to an operation based on paid employees. New operating practices soon emerged, heightening tensions in the camp, as Franck Esnée explains:

“Damien Carême was increasingly at odds with the other associations that increasingly denounced these attempts to have closing times for the camp. AFEJI denied entry to the camp to people. They even tried to introduce bracelets to identify who lived in the camp or who did not.”

The unconditional nature of the space was undermined, with exiled people being controlled and rejected. AFEJI employees “guarded” the site and “also managed access to showers, toilets and the allocation of cabins”, reveals Claire Millot of Salam. In addition, distributions of food were not paid for by the State, and were left to the associations.

At the same time, to ensure adherence to the agreement and the closure of the camp “eventually”, Bernard Cazeneuve changed the local government personnel. On 25 April 2016, Éric Étienne replaced Henri Jean as head of the Dunkirk sub-prefecture, while on 4 May 2016, Michel Lalande, director of the office of Bernard Cazeneuve, became prefect of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and replaced Jean-François Cordet. The “peripheral power” that had been established when Henri Jean was sub-prefect of Dunkirk was terminated, and transformed relations between the municipality and the State, explains Olivier Caremelle:

“The obsession of the new sub-prefect was to remove the cabins. Every Tuesday there was a meeting in his office with AFEJI. The sub-prefect’s belief, it was that he was the one who ran the camp, he gave instructions to AFEJI, he removed the cabins. And Caremelle and Carême, they accepted it. It was a battle and dialogue of the deaf. He told us: ‘There are fewer people, the cabins are empty, so let’s take them away.’ ‘Yes, but new people are arriving, so we can’t.’”

This reduction of the camp via the dismantling of the cabins was assumed by Damien Carême, who specified that “it was out of the question for me to set up a long-term camp with 1,500 reception places, that was my choice, I am not in favour of the camps.” This situation created tensions with the associations working in the camp, since people were refused entry to the camp via a policy of regular dismantling of the cabins. For Olivier Caremelle, the aim of the camp “was not to create a town next to the town!”

The switch from Utopia 56 to AFEJI revealed a conflict between voluntary “humanitarian” management and “professional” management of social issues at the instigation of the State. There was a change from a logic of unconditionality and access to the claimed rights, to a policy of regulation and management of comings and goings. The social workers present in the camp were put in a difficult position, between a “social” role and a “control” role, creating tensions with exiled people (DUYTSCHAEVER, TISSERAND, 2017).

In addition, this declared firmness was mainly explained by the regular presence of smugglers in the camp: “The Grande-Synthe camp has always been run by smugglers, with a mainly Kurdish population, people don’t settle there without paying something”, says Claire Millot. In the camp, there was “very high levels of violence by smugglers, violence against minors, against women”, says Nathanaël Caillaux. Feminist groups explained that “women were afraid to go out at night, they didn’t want to go to the bathroom at night, they were afraid of being attacked.” The local authority was helping to combat the phenomenon, explains Damien Carême:

“We fought them, we helped arrest 33 smugglers in the camp, but the smugglers were there before we made a camp, the smugglers will be there after, the smugglers are everywhere. It’s not a reception system that creates smugglers, but the policies of closing borders and border guards.”

Until September 2016, this policy of reducing living spaces operated via systems for accessing rights and priority access for exiled people from the La Linière camp in the CAOs. Exiled people also continued to cross to Great Britain. At this point, between 600 and 700 people were in the camp.

At the same time, the dismantling of the La Chapelle camp in Paris, the shanty town in Calais, followed by the revocation of priority access to the CAOs caused a sudden increase in the number of exiled people present in La Linière.

In summer 2016, a series of evacuations were organised in Paris. As CAO places were limited, evacuated people were prioritised, slowing down the desired dispersal at La Linière, Damien Carême tells us: “There were 300 people in the camp who requested to go to a CAO at that time, but all the available places were reserved in Paris.”

At the same time, preparations were being made for the evacuation of the Calais shanty town, of which Franck Esnée informed Damien Carême, who explained to him: “He was told that we had to maintain an “accordion” capacity: ‘If you reduce capacity, you need to maintain the possibility of increasing it again.’ And this is where Damien Carême was very ambiguous, he was very eager to close the camp. He didn’t listen to us.”

On 23 October 2016, as the Jungle was dismantled, La Linière went from 700 to 1,700 exiled people, without any huts being rebuilt. The camp was able to accommodate 500 to 700 people at that time. “It was an explosion”, says Franck Esnée, who continues: “There was no longer any infrastructure to accommodate 1,500 or 1,700 people, since they had removed the huts. We had people sleeping in the showers, at the entrance, and AFEJI had to turn people away.” Olivier Caremelle explains that under pressure from the State, “reinstating huts was out of the question.” The community kitchens were then transformed into shacks by exiled people. Conflicts between communities soon emerged.

The hasty desire to reduce and close the humanitarian camp at La Linière, coupled with access to the CAOs being put in doubt and the successive dismantling operations in Calais and Paris, disrupted the social structure of the camp. The La Linière camp, which was based on unconditionality, was transformed into a controlled space. Designed as a

humanitarian emergency facility, La Linière was part of managing the “stock” of exiled people already present in Grande-Synthe, without anticipating the “flows”, namely the arrival of new exiled people.

We can see here how the situations in Calais and Grande-Synthe intersected and can only be examined together. The two living spaces were interconnected despite being 40 kilometres apart and having distinct origins: municipal and state. Their operation and mode of management were based on similar dynamics: control, flow management, dispersal, reduction of shelters and manufacturing overcrowding among exiled people. Schemes that were initially conceived to be unconditional were moving towards closure. In both cases, the State was anticipating and planning their dismantlement.

CHAPTER 9: “FRANCE IS NOT A FRANCE WHERE THERE WILL BE CAMPS (...) THERE CAN BE NO CAMPS IN FRANCE” (FRANÇOIS HOLLANDE, 24 SEPTEMBER 2016)

On 24 September 2016, François Hollande declared that “France is not a France where there will be camps (...) There can be no camps in France.” The speech came at a time when the Calais shanty town had become a campaign issue as the presidential elections approached. The timeline for dismantling the shanty town was accelerating. In the weeks that followed, the CAO became a tool for breaking up a shanty town that had become too visible and too political. The exiled people were dispersed, the shanty town dismantled and cleared in a show of force by the State. At La Linière, the situation became tense as the scheme facility appeared to be inadequate. The camp was burned down and precipitated an early and organised closure since the State had taken over in May 2016. These two spaces disappeared several few months apart, with the symbol of a “refugee crisis” that the State was resolving, as Nicolas Sarkozy had resolved the “Sangatte problem”. In the process, the State revived a policy of combating fixation points, aimed at preventing any construction of camps (I). This situation could be seen beyond the coast. The symbol of Calais was used as the fear that a situation would become “unmanageable” for local elected officials, who complied with state directives. Tolerance and municipal reception were no longer appropriate inland from Nord-Pas-de-Calais as in Normandy (II).

I. THE “JUNGLE” DISMANTLED, LA LINIÈRE BURNED: THE STORY OF A PLANNED DEMISE

In October 2016, the State dispersed and dismantled the Calais shanty town. By showcasing the strength of the State, it tried to close an episode perceived as getting too much media attention and being too political to continue (1). In Grande-Synthe, under pressure from the State, tensions between exiled people led to a fire in the camp, which

put an end to a state-sponsored municipal experiment. La Linière disappeared, and with it, the vague hope of establishing it as a reception model for exiled people in transit (2). The State, by making these two spaces symbols of the “refugee crisis”, prevented the emergence of any discourse on the “reception crisis”. By reviving a policy of deterrence through the systematic dismantling of “fixation points”, the State tried to prove that it had “solved” these two “problems” (3).

1. Dispersing exiled people, dismantling the Calais jungle

“For several months, hundreds of migrants had lived in a makeshift camp at La Lande, in unacceptable conditions. (...) The establishment of the Jules Ferry Centre, the temporary reception centre (CAP), the organisation of humanitarian outreach missions, the securing of the ring road and transport infrastructure in Calais are all measures that we have implemented over the last two years to provide initial responses to the distress of migrants, but also to the growing concern of Calais residents. Obviously, such a situation could not last, it was certainly not sustainable in the long term, everyone agreed. (...) There was a real humanitarian emergency. (...) Similarly, it was also our duty to guarantee the residents of Calais the peace to which they legitimately aspired, as well as the security to which they are entitled, in the town and its surroundings” (Bernard Cazeneuve, 7 November 2016).

On 24 October 2016, the CAP, the Jules Ferry Centre and the Calais shanty town were dismantled and cleared by the State in a show of its “firmness” and “humanity”.

This State decision was being prepared as soon as the CAP was created in January 2016, which accelerated from the spring as the shanty town grew, attracting the attention of the media, politicians and provoking local and national opposition. This process of dismantling was based on the creation of discourse questioning the existence of the shanty town, an organised process of dispersal through the CAOs around which certain associations were recruited in order to encourage acceptance by the exiled people.

The creation of the Calais shanty town relied on a process of relegation and concentration of exiled people. By creating undersized living spaces via the CAP and the Jules Ferry Centre, while reducing the space in the informal shanty town twice, the State encouraged overcrowding among exiled people, of which there were more in a smaller space. For Bernard Cazeneuve, these choices “were all measures that we implemented over the last two years to provide initial responses to the distress of migrants, but also to the growing concern of Calais residents.”¹⁷⁸

For Emmanuelle Cosse, “the situation in Calais was no longer tenable”: “the situation in Calais had deteriorated significantly throughout the summer of 2016, including with increasing tensions, guys who were crossing with traffic accidents that were quite terrible.” She continues: “I was quite relieved that Calais was closed, because it really was a shanty town and it was horrible.”

However, it was a state shanty town, that it had created and tried to dismantle, via humanitarian discourse, as Maël Galisson of GISTI explains: “They were overwhelmed,

178. Statement by Bernard Cazeneuve, 7 November 2016.

and then they sorted it out in a forceful manner... even though it was them who created the shanty town. And then they came up with the rhetoric of the state as guarantor of the rule of law and security."

The decision to close Calais was taken in the spring of 2016, at the initiative of Bernard Cazeneuve, who tried to convince Emmanuelle Cosse to "assume" the decision together, and to prepare for its dismantling, she tells us:

"For Bernard Cazeneuve, it was no longer tenable. He told me: "We cannot continue like this, I want Calais to be closed, it's no longer possible, I'm no longer OK with it, it's over!" He set two conditions, that I agree with him and that we finance it together. Me, I wanted everyone to be housed. We were both selling this to the Prime Minister, then to the President of the Republic, who was not opposed, but he was a little doubtful about the success of the venture."

To successfully carry out this "venture", Bernard Cazeneuve and Emmanuelle Cosse hoped to enlist the associations and exiled people, she explains: "We went to see the associations because we could see that it was endless." The aim here was to avoid the failure of the dispersal organised from October to December 2015, and the tensions during the dismantling of the southern area of the shanty town in February-March 2016.

Consultation meetings were held with associations from the spring. They secured a commitment from the State that exiled people would be housed without being required to apply for asylum, a particular focus on unaccompanied minors as well as a guarantee that exiled people applying for asylum would not have their fingerprints registered in the Dublin system. Four associations were involved in organising the dismantling: Salam, L'Auberge des Migrants, Secours Catholique and Care4Calais. The latter were regularly invited to interministerial meetings.

Claire Millot, from Salam, explained that while it was "in favour of the evacuation", it was "because Cazeneuve had promised that there would be no fingerprinting and... In Calais, it couldn't be for life. When there are 10,000 people per 60,000 inhabitants, you can understand that people feel overwhelmed. And we knew there was trafficking at night and violence."

The enlistment of certain associations in the process to dismantle the shanty town created tensions in the non-profit sector, according to Claire Millot: "Terrible tensions, we were called collaborators." For Nathanaël Caillaux:

"The associations challenged the closure of the camp because no suitable solution was proposed. Going to a CAO was suitable for some people, but not all, and, in any event, people would come back, to an even more precarious space. They were not fighting for the existence of informal, unworthy living spaces, but if these places disappeared, what would replace them?"

Tensions were high, all the more so because the State and the associations were also trying to enlist exiled people in the dismantling operation.

Indeed, "the OFPRA came to the site to talk to all the tent leaders, it was three weeks of intense work", says Emmanuelle Cosse. The aim here was to find representatives within communities acting as intermediaries with the exiled people. They were tasked with disseminating information provided by the State to their respective communities, appealing for calm and for assistance with the dispersal measure. The shanty town mosques were used. To encourage their involvement, the State promised that minors would be entitled to an accelerated process for transfer to Great Britain.

Until early September 2016, no date had yet been announced for the dismantling of the shanty town. The timeline accelerated as objections over its existence emerged. On 29 August, employers' organisations and trade unions – in particular, hauliers – announced a demonstration, saying that the situation was having adverse economic effects on their commercial activities.

As the 2017 presidential election approached, candidates were campaigning, like Nicolas Sarkozy, candidate in the primaries on the right. He went to Calais on 21 September 2016, denouncing the inaction of the public authorities. He promised dismantlement before the summer of 2017 if elected. This political agenda setting accelerated the timeline for the dismantling of the Jungle. On 26 September 2016, François Hollande declared: "We have to dismantle the jungle for good. Methodically and with determination. It will be necessary to have a sense of humanity, as soon as we have to make these transfers."¹⁷⁹

To evacuate the shanty town, the State's strategy was based on dispersal, through the creation of CAO places throughout France. For Emmanuelle Cosse: "the idea was, we house them, we stabilise them, we look at their entitlements, and then they make their asylum applications. After that, if the asylum process does not work, they can be sent back. It's clear that there was no indication of regularising them all."

An instruction was sent to the prefects to create 12,000 CAO places by December 2016. It specified that "the list must be forwarded without first seeking agreement with the local elected officials." As Emmanuelle Cosse explains, "we used a lot of holiday centres, the CGT and CFDT trade unions and the national training centre AFPA... they lent us a lot of holiday centres that we took on from October to March." The CAO was designed as an emergency mechanism, paying the organisations that were involved: €25 per day per person. The prefects were put under pressure: "Every week, I summoned them, I filled in Excel files, I recorded the places, the number of beds, the associations that managed them", says Emmanuelle Cosse.

An internal map of the CAOs was created, "leaked by someone who worked at the Ministry of the Interior, a Sarkozyist" (Emmanuelle Cosse). Drawing criticism from mayors who launched the movement: "Ma commune sans migrants". The right-wing and far-right opposition, in an electoral context, seized on this, criticising the State's imposition of CAOs.

Faced with the upcoming eviction, the Calais associations mobilised. A demonstration was organised for 1 October 2016. Volunteers and activists wanted to challenge the destruction of the shanty town and support the exiled people, but the planned protest was banned by the State. An administrative appeal was lodged, but the court authorised the expulsion, justified by the "sheltering" organised by the State.

As the dismantlement drew nearer, the State failed to achieve the target of 12,000 CAO places. Only 8,000 places were created, while there were 10,000 exiled people in Calais. The State attempted to reduce the number of new arrivals, by mobilising police forces upstream from Calais, particularly in the Lille and Paris train stations. From 10,000 inhabitants in September 2016, the number fell to 8,000 in October 2016, during the dismantling.

Against the backdrop of terrorist attacks, a state of emergency was in force, and was relied upon to justify "the eradication of a camp where more than 10,000 people live: "given the state of emergency, the security forces must first and foremost be committed to preventing the terrorist threat" and "cannot be distracted and mobilised in very large

179. "À Calais, Hollande promet de démanteler définitivement la Jungle", *AFP*, 26 September 2016.

numbers to combat recurrent public order linked to the occupation of the camp" (PARROT, 2019, p.187).

The day before the dismantling operation, the prefect decreed a "protection zone" around the camp. Access was prohibited for external persons without accreditation from the prefecture. The prefect justified the opacity of the operation to prevent the presence of No Border activists:

"Given the high risks of serious public disorder and the need to protect migrants (sic), charities working in the camp, State personnel and journalists from the violent actions of 'No Border' extreme-left activists, access to the area is prohibited to any potential opponent" (PARROT, 2019, p. 186).

The dismantling operation began on 24 October 2016 and lasted four days. It was designed as a show of force by the State, and of its "humanity" by "sheltering": "The camp was too large to be destroyed in an uncontrolled manner and the destruction was even intended to be publicised as a showcase of a strong State that controls its territory" (PARROT, 2019, p. 186).

Indeed, a reception hub was set up to accommodate more than 700 accredited journalists and technicians, accompanied by guided tours of the facility, "everyone wanted to see that we were closing Calais", Emmanuelle Cosse tells us. 1,200 gendarmes and police officers were mobilised, while a hangar was requisitioned to act as a bus station.

In order to ensure the success of the measure, the State had already enlisted exiled people and certain associations in the process, but also attempted to encourage groupings based on ethnicity on the buses. The associations Salam, L'Auberge des Migrants, Secours Catholique and Care4Calais helped with the dispersal by controlling queues and supporting exiled people.

In addition, a coercive mindset was also put in place. Exiled people who refused to go on buses were warned that checks would be carried out on their administrative situation, followed by detention and possible removal. During the operation, since the Coquelles CRA was full, buses were organised to transfer them to the different CRAs around France.

5,132 adults were accommodated in CAOs while 1,932 minors were looked after, some of whom were transferred to Great Britain. According to OFII figures, almost half of those sheltered had already applied for asylum, but were waiting for accommodation (AGIER, et al, 2018 p. 180).

The CAO facility, designed as an emergency mechanism, established a logic for controlling individuals, making it possible to avoid the "mass effect", where a case-by-case mindset prevailed. In addition, the reception in the CAOs was temporary and indefinite. If the asylum application was refused, the person rejected would be obliged to leave the territory.

For Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020, even if it was in keeping with a logic of sheltering people, the CAO involved "not taking into account the situation of people, but taking into account the interests of the State, the territory, of the permanent inhabitants. "

On 1 November 2016, the State brought the Calais shanty town episode to a close by razing it to the ground, as Bernard Cazeneuve declared on 7 November 2016:

"The dismantling is final and I will maintain the appropriate resources in Calais to avoid any reestablishment of a camp or squat. Police and gendarmerie forces will be kept on site to combat irregular immigration and trafficking."

Like the closure and destruction of the Sangatte hangar in 2002, the staging of a show of force of the State was observed. The Calais shanty town, built as an emergency response to the “refugee crisis”, was not intended to be long term. A “crisis” is, by definition, exceptional, and calls for “exceptional” measures. By razing the Calais shanty town, the State sought to put an end to exceptionalism by ending the “refugee crisis”. Through this system, the State sought to manage “stock” without taking into account the “flow”. Behind this destruction, the aim was also to prevent the emergence of discourse on a “reception crisis” (LENDARO et al., 2019, CAREMELLE, 2020), which this shanty town symbolised.

2. The La Linière fire, anticipation of an organised closure

“The camp is no longer manageable with 1,700 people in it, while there is room for 500. Obviously there is conflict between the communities, and obviously fire, because it’s certainly going to fizzle out. The fire is not political, it’s clear that the exiled people have put themselves at risk, it’s clear that there were wooden huts, poorly fireproofed, assembled quickly, they were not sustainable conditions, it’s obvious” (Franck Esnée, MSF coordinator at the time of the creation of the La Linière camp).

On 10 April 2017, in Grande-Synthe, the fire at La Linière brought the existence of another symbol to a close, that of a nationalised municipal reception, created as an “exceptional” reception, to respond to an emergency with a negotiated and uncertain time frame. Before the fire, bringing this episode to a close had also been planned “eventually”, and was based on a similar logic to Calais: reduction of living spaces and intention to disperse exiled people via the CAOs. The destruction of the Calais shanty town and the absence of places in the CAO system increased the number of exiled people in La Linière from 500 to 1,700 in several days. The system had been designed for an emergency, managing the people present, and not the new arrivals for whom the CAO was not a solution: they still wanted to get to Great Britain.

Here, we wanted to study the way in which this increase in the number of exiled people increased tensions, of which the fire at La Linière was the result. This elimination of the humanitarian camp was accompanied by emergency “forced sheltering” of the people present, but remained constrained and precarious.

In October 2016, following the dismantling of the Calais shanty town, the La Linière humanitarian camp saw its population increase from 500 to 1,700. During the State’s show of force in Calais, several hundred exiled people – mostly Afghans – had agreed to be sent to the CAOs for fear of being checked and detained in a CRA, and potentially being forcibly removed. They returned and settled at La Linière, in transit to Great Britain. Under pressure from the State, the huts were removed, reducing the possibility of reception in the camp.

The arrival of the Afghans reconfigured the social structure of the space. “Held” by the Kurds, they relegated the Afghans in the camp, who settled in shared spaces, as Claire Millot from Salam explains: “There started to be more Afghans. The Kurds didn’t give them access to the huts. So they settled in the communal kitchens.”

Tensions rose in the camp, prompting criticism from Bruno Le Roux, the new Minister of Interior following the appointment of Bernard Cazeneuve as Prime Minister. On 15 March 2017, he declared that he wanted to “dismantle the Grande-Synthe camp as quickly as possible”, explaining that he had observed “unacceptable phenomena”. He saw La Linière

as a “draw”, thereby contributing to the pull factor for exiled people wishing to cross to Great Britain.

On the night of 10-11 April 2017, an altercation between Kurds and Afghans in the camp resulted in the camp being set alight and destroyed, precipitating a closure that the State had wanted. Damien Carême explains that he had not anticipated these tensions: “We didn't pay attention to it, nobody raised the alarm about it either. Within four hours, the camp had disappeared.”

As Emmanuelle Cosse explains: “all those who were against, they were happy, they were delighted.” Olivier Caremelle agrees: “Prefect Lalande greeted me and said: ‘I told you, you are responsible’”, just like Damien Carême: “Cazeneuve didn't want it, but he didn't stop me from doing it. He was glad that it spelled the end of it.” The deputy mayor of Saint-Pol-sur-Mer, Christian Hutin (LR), campaigning in the parliamentary elections, declared the day after the fire: “Such generosity was naive. La Linière had become a supply ship for smugglers.”¹⁸⁰ A close associate of Bernard Cazeneuve, who had followed the State's intervention at La Linière, explains that this “was not a good idea, as shown, moreover, by history.” In other words, “this fire now serves as proof for the State of the ineffectiveness of the mayor of Grande-Synthe's reception policy” (TISSERAND, 2017).

An emergency system was put in place to provide shelter for exiled people. 1,200 places were opened in Dunkirk gymnasiums, with a separation of communities. A few hundred exiled people found themselves homeless, “wandering”, as Olivier Caremelle tells us: “For a week we tried to get back the people who were scared, to put them in the gymnasiums, with recreating a camp being prohibited.”

The new Minister of the Interior, Matthias Fekl, who visited the camp, buried the symbol of La Linière, saying: “There are dignified accommodation solutions that are being found, we will not allow the Grande-Synthe camp to be rebuilt.”¹⁸¹ When 200 Kurds tried to rebuild a camp in Le Puythouck, a protected area of Grande-Synthe, they were evicted by the police and “sheltered” in gymnasiums.

The CAO system was then redeployed, via “forced sheltering”, Damien Carême tells us: “The Prefect turned up with all the services of the State to rehouse people. In four days, 1,200 places were found.” While the fingerprints of exiled people were not taken during the dismantling of the Calais shanty town, they were in the case of Grande-Synthe. When buses were chartered to transfer them, the associations were prevented from meeting them, explains Claire Millot: “The police didn't want us to tell the guys: ‘If you get on the bus, your Dublin prints won't be erased.’”

The La Linière fire put an end to an emergency system that the State, in the run-up to the presidential election, wanted to bring to a close. It also put an end to a “symbol” of unconditional reception on the coast, close to crossing points. With the Calais shanty town and the La Linière camp razed, a deterrence policy was reinstated, taking the form of combating fixation points.

180. “Christian Hutin: ‘On sentait arriver l'inéluctable à la Linière’”, *La Voix du Nord*, 11 April 2017.

181. “On ne laissera pas se reconstituer le camp de Grande-Synthe” promet Mathias Fekl”, *AFP*, 13 April 2017.

3. “When they hear La Linière and Jules Ferry, their ears perk up”

“As always, the associations challenged the closure of the camp because no suitable solution was being proposed. They believed that the proposals made were suitable for some of the people, that leaving for the CAOs was suitable for some of the people present in the shanty town, but not for all and that therefore, in any case, the people would come back, and they would come back to an even more precarious space, and that is exactly what happened.”
(Nathanaël Caillaux, Secours Catholique)

Like the closure of Sangatte, the fire at La Linière and the dismantling of the shanty town served as symbols aimed at putting an end to the pull factor that these places represented for the public authorities, as Claire Millot notes: “It was Sarkozy’s plan in November 2002, the hangar was destroyed and there would be no more migrants. It was nonsense. People didn’t leave Kabul because they knew there were hot showers in Calais and Salam was making some food.”

Following the dismantling of the shanty town in Calais, Emmanuelle Cosse, Minister for Housing, explained that she had tried to have the Jules Ferry Centre retained in order to transform it into a reception centre:

“And that’s something I never managed to get approved by the Ministry of the Interior, or by the local prefect. Nobody wanted to admit that there was a need for a CAO before people arrived close to the border... And that’s why in Calais, people came back very quickly.”

Against the backdrop of presidential elections, the police’s task was to prevent “any fixation point” in the city, preventing the setting up of squats and camps. While the Calais shanty town represented a precarious space, it was also a place of respite, where solidarity existed between exiled people, with the associations and with the inhabitants of Calais, united in a single location.

As of December 2016, there were 400 exiled people present, 800 in April. But they were no longer able to receive aid from humanitarian organisations and hid to avoid the police checks. These checks were increased in stations and on the streets. New forms of solidarity emerged among the Calais population, through the development of solidarity housing, mainly available to women, families and minors.

The associations reconfigured their activities, preferring outreach missions to go out to meet exiled people scattered throughout the city. In February 2017, when Secours Catholique tried to install showers in its Calais premises, the local authority prevented access by installing a skip, before the courts ordered it to be removed.

The distribution of food was organised on the outskirts of the city, but was soon stopped by the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart. In March 2017, she issued two orders prohibiting gatherings and specifically targeting food distribution sites. Following legal action, both orders were suspended.

In both cases, the police countered the court rulings: they carry out increased checks and arrests near the Secours Catholique premises and distribution sites. The police arbitrarily set end times, checking and arresting exiled people as well as volunteers present.

According to Maël Galisson of GISTI, "if we reached this policy of zero fixation points, it was because the State, the government, had been so overwhelmed by this Jungle that it said: 'never again'. They deployed a kind of hyper-violent spiral, psychologically and politically indefensible."

Like Calais, Grande-Synthe had become a symbol, while the La Linière experiment was not over, as Franck Esnée explains: "In October, there were only 750 migrants, while there were 1,700 when it was opened. In other words, we can demonstrate – as Sangatte did – that providing permanent reception does not create a pull factor. With or without reception, there aren't more exiled people."

In the wake of the fire, exiled people were prevented from re-building living spaces. When 200 Kurds tried to rebuild a camp in Le Puythouck, they were quickly evicted by the police. This policy was affirmed by Mathias Fekl, the new Minister of the Interior, on 11 April 2017: "There will be no more camps in La Linière, either in this form or another (...) Everything will be done to prevent wild camps being set up."¹⁸²

They soon came back and tried to move into Le Puythouck again, says Olivier Caremelle: "They were scattered throughout Le Puythouck, a large nature reserve, which would become a new Basroch." In summer 2017, the number of people increased from 200 to 400 in this living space, Nathanaël Caillaux tells us:

"New living spaces appeared in this vast area. They were evicted several times, or transferred to other sites, which the exiled people somewhat accepted. It was a completely crazy period, the municipal team was very inconsistent from one moment to the next."

Olivier Caremelle explains that Grande-Synthe became an "almost daily battle": "A ban from the President of the Republic, from everyone, no more camp, done, prohibited (...) We couldn't get them to understand that the people were there, that they would continue to come and that since the reception was not being dealt with, there would be successive camps."

Once the shanty town in Calais and La Linière had been closed, the Ministry of the Interior took back control, alone, and framed it as a security issue, as Franck Esnée can confirm:

"Now, the only message from the Ministry of the Interior was: 'Yes, we are outside the law in Calais and Grande-Synthe because these are situations that concern internal security (...) Currently, there's zero tolerance of camps, the denial of any refuge space, at the height of violence in terms of reception.'"

For Emmanuelle Cosse, this security perception of the camp situations in Calais and Grande-Synthe was due "in large part to the failure of the State, it created all the guys on the street... because there was no policy of initial reception. (...) Because they didn't want to assume a supervised, reasoned immigration policy."

Following the dismantling of the shanty town in Calais and the fire in the La Linière camp, the State drew a line under it and revived a policy of combating fixation points. The State wanted to show that it had "solved" the Calais and Grande-Synthe problems, just as Nicolas Sarkozy had "solved" the Sangatte problem in 2002.

Against the backdrop of the increased visibility of exiled people in Calais and Grande-Synthe, the State and the municipalities helped to establish systems that revived mindsets

182. "Il n'y aura plus de camp de la Linière, ni sous cette forme, ni sous une autre", *La Voix du Nord*, 11 April 2017.

similar to those that spurred the creation of the Sangatte camp in 1999: concentrating and invisibilising in the name of public order. In times of “crisis”, the State reactivated emergency systems developed as “exceptional” and “temporary”. The aim of these systems was to govern the people present and the living spaces through a policy of gradually reducing the space allocated to them. Since they did not anticipate new arrivals, the Calais state shanty town and the La Linière humanitarian camp were overwhelmed, making the living conditions of exiled people even more precarious. By creating a shanty town “by accident” and encouraging the “overflowing” of the La Linière camp, the State created “crisis” situations that rendered any inclination to continue it obsolete. Like the strategy employed by Nicolas Sarkozy to close Sangatte in 2002, the State repeated the same logic: a showing of force of the State through a policy of dispersal and dismantling that, in this instance, was meant to combine “humanity” and “firmness”. By redeploing a policy of “combating fixation points” immediately afterwards, it was about, in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections, showing that the State had solved the Calais and Grande-Synthe “problems”, as Nicolas Sarkozy had solved the Sangatte “problem”. In the shadow of Calais and Grande-Synthe, a policy of deterrence was already in place. As the presidential elections approached, it became more pronounced and was a response to François Hollande’s directive: “France is not a France where there will be camps (...) There can be no camps in France” (24 September 2016).

II. CALAIS AS A “BOGEYMAN”: THE CAMPS TESTED BY THE SYSTEMATIC COMBATING OF FIXATION POINTS

The presence of exiled people was particularly evident in Calais and Grande-Synthe. This was mainly due to the significant media attention. However, in the shadow of these two symbolic towns, camps continued to exist inland and along the Franco-British border. Inland from Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the State’s deterrence policy was deployed via two strategies: the dismantling of living spaces and the closure of motorway rest areas (1). In Cherbourg, municipalisation was no longer happening, while the associations were no longer supported by the town hall. The new mayor complied with the objectives of the State, namely to prevent the emergence of new squats (2). Lastly, in Dieppe, tolerance towards exiled people, which was based on a cap on numbers, was no more. The increasing visibility of exiled people led to the combating of fixation points driven by the town hall of Dieppe, the General Council of Seine-Maritime, the Normandy region and the State (3).

1. In the shadow of Calais and Grande-Synthe, removing camps, removing motorway rest areas

TIMELINE – 2016-2017: EVICTIONS AND CLOSURES OF MOTORWAY REST AREAS IN NORD AND PAS-DE-CALAIS (EXCLUDING CALAIS)

1 June 2016: The Chocques camp, located on land belonging to the SNCF, is dismantled. Around twenty people are evicted and refuse to be “sheltered” by the State, finding refuge in an Emmaüs hostel.

24 June 2016: The miscellaneous right mayor of Norrent-Fontes, Bertrand Cocq, calls for the eviction of 250 exiled people from the once municipalised camp.

30 June 2016: The motorway rest area in Chocques, La Grande Bucaille, is closed due to works.

11 July 2016: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp, affecting 65 exiled people.

12 October 2016: The court refuses the eviction sought by the town hall of Norrent-Fontes, finding that “the applicants did not propose any concrete and sustainable solution for rehousing the migrants.”

5 January 2017: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp, affecting fifteen exiled people.

23 February 2017: The Nortkerque, Saint-Hilaire-Cottes (Norrent-Fontes), Grande Bucaille (Chocques) and Commanderie (near Berck) rest areas, all in the direction of Calais, are closed by the State.

8 March 2017: A prefectural order prohibits heavy goods vehicles from parking in the Saint-Laurent rest area located on the A25 in the direction of Lille-Dunkirk at Steenvoorde, for a period of three months (one month, extended by two months).

10 March 2017: Closure of the BP service station in Grande-Synthe.

6 April 2017: The court again refuses to evict the Norrent-Fontes camp.

19 May 2017: A new camp forms in Steenvoorde where there are 400 exiled people.

11 July 2017: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp, sixty exiled people are evicted.

18 September 2017: The State dismantles the Norrent-Fontes camp, 85 exiled people are “sheltered” in a CAES.

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In the shadow of the Calais shanty town and the La Linière camp in Grande-Synthe, exiled people continued to live in the areas around the motorway rest areas in the direction of Calais. Although less visible, these spaces remained precarious. Spaces once tolerated or municipalised were being challenged and subject to expulsion eviction. At the same time, local media reported “violence” and “attempts” to climb aboard heavy goods vehicles in motorway rest areas, where there were camps located nearby. These “news stories” were treated by the State as public disorder. In the run-up to the presidential elections, the State demonstrated its authority by dismantling the Calais shanty town. Inland, the State applied a similar policy, by evicting and destroying living spaces, while closing off access by heavy goods vehicles to a series of motorway rest areas in the direction of Calais. The objective was threefold: “empty” the camps, remove the transit sites and prevent the “problem” of exiled people stranded on the Franco-British border being put on the political agenda again.

In Steenvoorde, in the Flandre Intérieure region, following the first attempt at dispersal organised in the Calais shanty town, in early January 2016 there were one hundred exiled people, whose length of stay increased as the border was secured. Their living conditions were particularly precarious, in tents in a grove of trees.

Even though, up to that point, the city’s UMP mayor, Jean-Pierre Bataille, had tolerated a living space and allowed Terre d’Errance to support exiled people in the Saint-Joseph parish hall, in April 2016, he issued an order prohibiting the parish hall from being used as an overnight reception centre for injured people and pregnant women, and limiting access to the day centre to 50 people at any one time. Work to secure the premises was required at the instigation of the local government.

On 11 July 2016, 65 exiled people were evicted from their living space, followed by “forced sheltering” in a CAO in Saône-et-Loire, as Damien DeFrance from Terre d’Errance explains: “They forced everyone to get onto the bus. They were even threatened with being taken to a detention centre and sending them back to their country. They were told they were free. But in fact, they didn’t have a choice. It was outrageous.”¹⁸³ In the meantime, Jean-Pierre Bataille stated that in the event of a new occupation, the police would carry out “an immediate evacuation”¹⁸⁴, while prohibiting access to municipal showers.

On 5 January 2017, another eviction was carried out and involved around fifteen exiled people, including 11 minors. Taken to a CAO, they soon returned. Éric Étienne, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk, explains the failure of this eviction policy: “Three times in recent months we have had to evacuate wild camps near Steenvoorde and each time we have offered accommodation. But the problem is recurring.”¹⁸⁵

In Norrent-Fontes, in the Pas-de-Calais region, Marc Boulnois, an “amenable” EELV mayor until 2014, was replaced by the miscellaneous right Bertrand Cocq. The latter attempted to undermine the reception established by Marc Boulnois. Following a fire at the camp where Marc Bounois had had four huts built, two huts were destroyed. After failing to prevent the construction of a new hut, Bertrand Cocq took the matter to court and launched eviction proceedings in June 2016. At that time, 250 exiled people were living in huts and tents nearby. On 12 October 2016, the court refused the eviction sought by the mayor, finding that “the applicants did not propose any concrete and sustainable solution for rehousing the migrants.”¹⁸⁶

In Chocques – near Norrent-Fontes – a camp of exiled people had been established since – at least – 2014 on land belonging to the SNCF. The site occupied was less than two kilometres from the Grande Bucaille motorway rest area, which is located on the A26 motorway in the direction of Calais. Volunteers provided them with wood for heating and with food. Round trips were organised so that they could shower. At the beginning of 2016, the SNCF initiated eviction proceedings against them, at which time there were around twenty exiled people on the site. On 2 March 2016, the court ruled in favour of the SNCF and ordered them to leave the site within one month. On 1 June 2016, the police carried out the eviction. The 20 people evicted refused to be “sheltered” and were accommodated in an Emmaüs hostel.

Faced with the failure of the dismantling operation – via the re-establishment of living spaces or via court refusals – the State revived the strategy of closing motorway rest areas in the direction of Calais. This strategy, already used in Saint-Georges-sur-l’Aa in 2008, and alternately in Tétéghem and in Moères since 2009, was first tested indirectly in Chocques in 2016. On 1 June 2016, the Grande Bucaille motorway rest area was closed due to works. It did not reopen.

183. “Démantèlement du camp de migrants de Steenvoorde”, *La Voix du Nord*, 11 July 2016.

184. “La réaction de Jean-Pierre Bataille”, *La Voix du Nord*, 12 July 2016.

185. “À la station BP, sur l’A16, le parking poids-lourds en cours de fermeture”, *La Voix du Nord*, 11 March 2017.

186. “Les commerces de la ‘Jungle’ seront démantelés, pas le camp de Norrent-Fontes”, *20 minutes*, 12 October 2016.

Indeed, in early 2017, the local press covered a series of news stories close to motorway rest areas: violence between exiled people, violence towards lorry drivers (and vice versa) and towards the police (and vice versa). These reports showed that despite the dismantling of the Calais shanty town, the “problem” of exiled people remained in the region. In the run-up to the presidential elections, the State was trying to prevent “public disorder” and media coverage of them by closing a series of motorway rest areas.

Thus, on 23 February 2017, a prefectural order banned heavy goods vehicles from parking in the Nortkerque, Saint-Hilaire-Cottes (Norrent-Fontes), Grande Bucaille (Chocques) and Commanderie (near Berck) rest areas, all in the direction of Calais. On 8 March 2017, the same order was issued concerning the Saint-Laurent rest area in Steenvoorde, and on 10 March 2017 at the BP service station in Grande-Synthe. These orders were in effect for one month, before being extended by two months. For Damien Defrance, from Terre d’Errance Steenvoorde:

“This order was part of an overall policy being pursued by the State in the region. It was like banning associations from distributing food to migrants in Calais or banning them from taking showers. All these orders were part of a policy aimed at getting them to go somewhere else. But where?”¹⁸⁷

This strategy “moved” the problem according to Joël Devos, mayor of Steenwerck. Located upstream of Steenvoorde, the Steenwerck rest area became “a new drop-off point for migrants” and “called for its closure”, specifying: “The situation remains stable for the time being.”¹⁸⁸ Éric Étienne, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk, envisaged the creation of a “secure area”, like the stations located in Dunkirk and Calais.

Despite the measures taken by the State, around a hundred exiled people lived at the Norrent-Fontes camp. Eviction was still sought by the city's mayor, again denied by the court on 6 April 2017. Even though Emmanuel Macron had just been elected, during the summer, the State gave the town hall of Norrent-Fontes formal notice to dismantle the Norrent-Fontes camp. This was carried out on 18 September 2017, during which 85 exiled people were “sheltered”, before returning a few days later to settle in a grove of trees, with the tolerance of its private owner.

In Steenvoorde, a new camp was formed in May 2017, despite the closure of the Saint-Laurent rest area. On 11 July 2017, an eviction via “sheltering” was carried out, involving around sixty exiled people. In the process, police forces were mobilised to prevent any resettlement, via identity checks near the day centre and in the town. The police mobilisation was permanent, with continuous checks, every tent erected being systematically destroyed and its “resident” checked, arrested and removed.

In Steenvoorde, like Grande-Synthe and Calais, we see the deployment of a deterrence policy aimed at preventing any fixation point in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. “Sheltering” became an instrument of “humanity” serving the “firmness” of the State. Its sole objective was to disperse exiled people and move them away from the territory, before their return.

187. “Les poids lourds interdits de séjour sur l'aire de Saint-Laurent”, *La Voix du Nord*, 9 March 2017.

188. “La fermeture de l'aire de Saint-Laurent est prolongée de deux mois”, *La Voix du Nord*, 8 April 2017.

2. “There is a squat again in Cherbourg. We don’t want it on our territory” (Frédéric Bastian, Deputy Mayor for Social Development)

The city of Cherbourg is situated in Normandy. There have been exiled people present since the late 1990s. After the closure of Sangatte, the number of them trying to cross to Britain from the port of Cherbourg-Octeville increased. Until 2012, the town's mayor was the socialist Bernard Cazeneuve. When he entered government, he handed things over to his deputy, Jean-Michel Houlligate. The municipality continued to operate based on the municipalisation of a living space for exiled people, while the association Itinérance Cherbourg took action to encourage applications for asylum. As the number of exiled people increased, the local authority gradually questioned this municipalised space and the “permanent” reception of asylum seekers.

From 2008 to 2012, exiled people settled on municipal land in Nordez. The local authority funded the association Itinérance Cherbourg, while certain basic necessities were provided: water point, access to showers, waste collection. In December 2012, around forty exiled people were living in this living space, in huts made from pallets and tarpaulins. Local associations tried to publicise the existence of this “squat of shame”. The aim was to obtain better living conditions, even though the majority of those present were asylum seekers.

In January 2013, while the winter was harsh, the parish of Octeville lent a hall for four months. Immediately afterwards, people were forced to “go back to the Nordez squat, everything is wet and mouldy, the tents and makeshift facilities have not withstood the winter storms” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015). Local associations mobilised and tried to get the town hall to provide permanent housing, which they achieved in December 2013. An agreement was signed between the town hall, the State and the associations Coalia and Itinérance Cherbourg to house asylum seekers in apartments in the Urban Community of Cherbourg. Fifteen families and forty single asylum seekers were housed, but the scheme was designed to be “exceptional” and was not intended to be extended to new arrivals. The Nordez squat was then destroyed.

In June 2015, the association Itinérance counted around five exiled people without a roof, without the possibility of permanent housing. As the crossing points were secured, the length of stay for exiled people increased. There were between 60 and 80 at the beginning of 2016 who were housed in a disused church in the city of Cherbourg.

In mid-May 2016, the sale of the church forced the exiled people to leave the premises and move back to the Nordez squat. From this point on, we observe the application of a policy combating fixation points. As Frédéric Bastian, Deputy Mayor of Cherbourg-en-Cotentin in charge of social development, explained, the tolerance that existed until then was called into question:

“There is once again a squat in Cherbourg and our policy is not changing. We don't want it on our territory. Why? Because people in an irregular situation are living there, and it seems contradictory to us, in spirit, to create this type of reception conditions while the State is securing the port. The smuggling rings are taking over these squats.”¹⁸⁹

This policy took effect on 18 May 2016 with an initial police operation at the Nordez squat, with 11 arrests. Immediately afterwards, the local authority requested the evacuation of the squat, which it obtained in court on 13 June 2016. On 18 June 2016, some thirty

189. “Migrants : comme un air de déjà-vu sur le terrain Nordez à Cherbourg”, *Ouest-France*, 13 February 2017.

exiled people settled in the old Gazelec stadium owned by Enedis, which applied for and secured its eviction on 7 July 2016. The camp was dismantled and 18 people were arrested. They returned to the Nordez camp immediately after, before that was dismantled on 18 August 2016. At this time, exiled people opened squats that were barely visible, before setting up a new camp in Nordez on 5 February 2017, which was dismantled once again on 11 April 2017.

We can see how the city of Cherbourg revived an anti-squat policy led by Bernard Cazeneuve from 2002 to 2007, before he declared that “the evacuation of squats is pointless insofar as they are immediately recreated in another part of the city” (RAULT-VERPREY, 2015). Municipalised reception was no longer appropriate, and in a national climate of combating fixation points, the municipality complied with national directives, and jointly created deterrence with regard to exiled people. In Dieppe, even though reception was primarily based on “tolerance”, this was also called into question.

**TIMELINE – 2012-2017:
OCCUPATIONS AND EVICTIONS IN CHERBOURG AND DIEPPE**

January 2013: During a harsh winter, the parish of Octeville lends a hall to exiled people for four months.

Spring 2013: Exiled people reoccupy the Nordez site.

December 2013: Asylum seekers are accommodated in apartments managed by the association Coalia. The Nordez squat is destroyed.

June 2015: Several dozen exiled people are “on the streets” in Cherbourg-Octeville.

January 2016: 60 to 80 exiled people occupy the disused Church of Saint-Marie-Madeleine-Postel, pending the sale of the site in mid-May 2016.

1 April 2016: Four living spaces are dismantled in Dieppe at the request of the Normandy region, manager of the port area, with the support of the local authority. Exiled people re-establish a makeshift camp nearby.

16 May 2016: New camp on the Nordez site. Around fifteen exiled people settle there.

18 May 2016: Police intervention at the Nordez squat, 11 arrests.

23 May 2016: The city of Cherbourg-Octeville calls for the evacuation of the Nordez squat.

2 June 2016: Following bad weather, MSF intervenes in Dieppe and provides 20 large humanitarian tents, 100 blankets and 100 camp beds.

13 June 2016: The Administrative Court of Caen gives exiled people five days to leave the Nordez site.

18 June 2016: New camp at the old Gazelec stadium in Turlaville, owned by Enedis.

29 June 2016: At the request of the town of Dieppe, the “MSF” camp is dismantled.

7 July 2016: Dismantling of the Gazelec camp following a request from the owner, Enedis.

10 July 2016: New camp on the Nordez site.

18 August 2016: Eviction of the Nordez squat.

5 February 2017: New camp on the Nordez site.

11 April 2017: Eviction of the Nordez squat.

3. “That Dieppe doesn’t become Calais” (Sébastien Jumel, PCF Mayor of Dieppe)

In Dieppe, until 2014, there was tolerance towards exiled people. But as the coast of Nord-Pas-de-Calais was secured, the number of exiled people in the town increased, becoming more visible. The cap on numbers in force became obsolete, while a deterrence policy was implemented by the communist municipality and the local government. The rhetoric employed by the local elected representatives was to ensure “that Dieppe doesn’t become Calais”¹⁹⁰.

Dieppe is a town of 28,000 inhabitants located in Normandy. It was run by the PCF from 1971 to the present, except from 2001 to 2008, when it had a UMP mayor, Édouard Leveau. From 2008 to 2017, the mayor was PCF’s Sébastien Jumel, who was also an MP for Seine Maritime. The town is home to a port with a link to England. Once Sangatte was closed, exiled people attempted to cross the Channel. The crossings were brief. Exiled people settled near the port, in bunkers, an old trawler, an abandoned house, in caves in the cliffs, but were regularly evicted.

The town had tolerated their presence since 2007 and applied a cap of 40 exiled people, which allowed the ISR association to distribute meals and provide access to showers. Living spaces, albeit precarious, were tolerated. For Nicolas Legrand, a member of Itinérance Dieppe, “There have been Albanians in Dieppe since the late 90s, but it was about ten people who came, who went through Dieppe, but it remained a relatively invisible phenomenon.”¹⁹¹

Against the backdrop of tightening up the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast, from 2015, exiled people had been trying to cross to Great Britain via other transit points, particularly on the Normandy coast. The police and managers of the port of Dieppe helped to put the phenomenon on the agenda by regularly informing the press of the number of arrests and attempted crossings. This objectification was mainly explained by the prevailing state of emergency with additional police resources and therefore an increase in controls. The result was a lengthening of the time exiled people were stranded in Dieppe, making them all the more visible.

Between the end of December 2015 and the beginning of January 2016, the association Itinérance Dieppe was formed in order to distribute food and clothing to the approximately 180 exiled people present. They had settled along cliffs, in tents or in blockhouses and in several abandoned houses. There were still many Albanians, but also Somalis, Eritreans, Syrians, Yemenis and Afghans. They were more visible, explains Nicolas Legrand: “There were groups of about ten people, walking around the town, trying to get through, it was very visible in the town.”

In addition, the organisation of food distributions around the port “led to gatherings that created tensions with the locals”, says Nicolas Legrand, who continues: “We had up to 150, 180 people, in addition to thirty volunteers, on a quay that the whole town saw... And worse next door, the communist town hall published a town hall diary highlighting the Albanian mafia. It said: ‘Albanians are the mafia, we don’t want them.’”

190. “Sébastien Jumel : ‘La question est que Dieppe ne devienne pas Calais’”, *France 3*, 13 April 2016.

191. Interview conducted on 25 May 2021.

Relations with the town hall were “strained”, as it feared “playing into the hands of the National Front”, says Nicolas Legrand. The town hall pressured the long-established associations not to get involved in the issue of exiled people, he tells us: “One winter, it was -7, -8 degrees, I called the parish, the Red Cross, the local associations, all supported by the town hall, they sent me packing.”

Itinérance Dieppe attempted to “nationalise” support, appealing to Doctors of the World, Médecins Sans Frontières and the Abbé Pierre Foundation. At this time, exiled people were still occupying the cliffs, in the port area, but their living conditions were precarious. MDM then set up a mobile healthcare service.

At the same time, the situation in Calais and the increased visibility of exiled people in Dieppe triggered a series of evictions of living spaces and the securing of the port area. Hervé Morin (Nouveau Centre), President of the Normandy region, thus declared “that the State must assume its responsibilities to ensure that Dieppe doesn’t become Normandy’s Calais”¹⁹², calling on the State to secure the port. On 1 April 2016, four living spaces (corresponding to different communities) were dismantled, while fences were installed to prevent any further resettlement. Given advance notice of the impending eviction by the local government, Itinérance Dieppe warned the exiled people, who moved a few hundred metres before the operation.

On 13 April 2016, Sebastien Jumel met with the Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, as he stated:

“I asked Bernard Cazeneuve to act with humanity and pragmatism. But also to act firmly towards the mafia networks. (...) I asked for the reinforcement of the number of police. A scanner to check lorry trailers. The presence of the office for illegal immigration. I obtained a weekly meeting with the prefecture to review this subject. Dieppe is not Calais, but the issue is to ensure that Dieppe does not become Calais. And that I act with humanity towards asylum seekers. (...) I am on the left, with humanist values. But I have to protect my community from a mafia network. The eviction from the port, decided by the president of the region, does not solve everything.”¹⁹³

The framing of the presence of exiled people in Dieppe as a strictly security issue can be seen here. The aim was to prevent “Dieppe from becoming a new Calais” by securing the port area, by dismantling the living spaces to avoid contributing to the “pull factor” through a municipal or association-based reception in the town.

This framing was evident on 1 June 2016 when the new camp was “ravaged by bad weather”, said Nicolas Legrand. The association asked the town hall to intervene, which refused, while the sub-prefecture agreed to shelter around fifty people in the concourse of the train station “for one night”.

The next day, MSF intervened and provided 20 large humanitarian tents, 100 blankets and 100 camp beds in order to rebuild a new camp, on land belonging to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, along the cliffs. A wooden hut was erected to serve as a kitchen, with the aim being to encourage the exiled people to manage themselves, while the association negotiated with the technical services to organise a waste collection service.

192. “Expulsion des migrants de Dieppe réclamée par les présidents de Normandie et de Seine-Maritime”, *AFP*, 24 March 2016.

193. “Sébastien Jumel : ‘La question est que Dieppe ne devienne pas Calais’”, *France 3*, 13 April 2016.

On 29 June 2016, following a request from the mayor of Dieppe, the camp was dismantled, as Nicolas Legrand tells us: "The camp lasted barely a month. The camp was evicted by force in the run up to the La Solitaire du Figaro and Tour de France à la voile yacht races... they thought it made a bad impression seeing the large tents of exiled people at the entrance to the port", adding:

"The dismantling was orchestrated entirely by the Ministry of the Interior, over the head of the sub-prefect of the time, who was sidelined immediately afterwards."

A new sub-prefect was appointed afterwards in August 2016, who implemented a policy of deterrence in three ways, explains Nicolas Legrand. Firstly, securing the port of Dieppe with an investment of €800,000 from 21 June 2016. "After that, it became really difficult to cross." Secondly, combating fixation points: "the town hall fenced off all the places that could be used for shelter, they even bricked up a large auditorium where exiled people slept." Lastly, pressure put on the association Itinérance Dieppe: "all the premises that we had found at the time, the town hall or the State, behind our back, went to see the owners to discourage them from renting out these spaces to us."

This policy of combating fixation points, implemented in Cherbourg and Dieppe, did not prevent the presence of exiled people; it made them invisible. Indeed, despite this policy, there were still around sixty exiled people in Dieppe at the beginning of 2017. They were scattered and more difficult to access for local associations, making the living conditions of exiled people all the more precarious.

"WE ARE ENSURING THAT NO SQUAT, NO HUMANITARIAN AID HAPPENS. I AM GOING TO EVACUATE WITHIN 24 HOURS" (ROMAIN BAIL, LR MAYOR OF OUISTREHAM, 4 MARCH 2016)

Ouistreham is located in Normandy, 20 minutes from Caen. Exiled people have used its port since the late 1990s. Until 2014, the presence of exiled people was barely visible. The town was mainly a transit point, while exiled people settled in squats in Caen. In 2014, during the municipal elections, Romain Bail, the LR candidate, put the presence of exiled people, who were still relatively invisible in the town, on the agenda: they were living in beach huts and in the dunes.

At the end of 2015, as transit sites in Normandy and the coast of Nord-Pas-de-Calais were secured, exiled people became increasingly visible in Ouistreham, the port being "easier" to cross, explains René C., a former member of the municipal majority. He explains that the mayor "summoned associations that received grants or had access to town hall premises to prohibit them from helping migrants, saying: 'If I ever learn that you are helping migrants, then I will remove the grant and we will see whether or not we'll continue with the premises.'"

In early 2016, the migrant support organisation Collectif d'aide aux migrants de Ouistreham was formed and attempted to organise support for exiled people through distributions of food and clothing. These distributions were made in places that were not very visible. The associations were accompanied by René C., who explains that he was looking for "places where the community can't tell us that it's causing a disturbance there... and we turned a blind eye."

On 4 March 2016, mayor Romain Bail asked the State to send additional police resources, while declaring: "We are ensuring that no squat, no humanitarian aid happens. I am going to evacuate within 24 hours."¹⁹⁴ The mayor subsequently decided to close the public toilets to prevent access to exiled people. These were opened again when the mayor was absent, "on the sly", explains René C.

In the summer of 2017, some fifty exiled people moved into squats. Romain Bail then regretted "that the town's charities distribute food to these young migrants. And on the public highway, even though it's prohibited", specifying that he wanted to avoid "Ouireham becoming a new Sangatte or Calais."¹⁹⁵

Like Natacha Bouchart in Calais, Romain Bail jointly participated in an active way in deterring exiled people, while sanctioning the volunteers who supported them. He built his political career and reputation by trying to embody the fight against irregular immigration, attracting criticism from support associations as well as his political camp.

194. "Crise des migrants : Paris et Berlin affichent leur unité", *Paris Normandie*, 4 March 2016.

195. "Ouireham, la nouvelle route des migrants", *Paris Match*, 19 October 2017.

On the Franco-British border, the closure of the Sangatte camp sounded the death knell for any possibility of state reception for exiled people. A little more than ten years later, in a “crisis” situation, the government of François Hollande revived a similar measure to that of the Sangatte camp. It supported the creation of two emergency facilities perceived as “exceptional”: the Jules Ferry Centre in Calais and La Linière in Grande-Synthe. Similar to what followed the closure of Sangatte, the demise of these two spaces revived the same rhetoric: “never again”. The same deterrence policy was deployed immediately afterwards and aimed to make exiled people invisible through a combination of dispersal, harassment, detention and removal. Analysis of public migration policies over a long period reveals a State caught up in its own contradictions and the options it determined and confined itself to. Past choices influence future choices and act as a path of dependency. Uncertain, constrained by electoral timescales and without any pre-established doctrine, the State derived “solutions” from past actions, hoping for a different outcome. In other words, the same remedies for the same problems. The last year of François Hollande's presidency nevertheless set the tone for the management of exiled people on the Franco-British border. It laid the foundations for a deterrence policy that it made systematic and that Emmanuel Macron industrialised. As Gérard Collomb, new Minister of the Interior, pointed out to Damien Carême: “We want to make them not want to come here.”¹⁹⁶

196. “L'accueil, une politique locale”, *Politis*, 10 October 2018.

PART 4

THE DETERRENCE POLICY THE INDUSTRIALISATION OF A STATE DOCTRINE (2017-2021)

PART 4

“We must remember that immigration is part of the world we live in. (...) These movements will increase because geopolitical uncertainties, climate destabilisation will continue to affect regions that are very close to ours. We must not lie to our fellow citizens: immigration is not something we can rid ourselves of” (Emmanuel Macron, on the campaign trail, 1 May 2017, responding to an interview with La Cimade)

By dismantling the shanty town in Calais, Bernard Cazeneuve, Minister of the Interior under François Hollande, revived a policy of deterrence aimed at preventing the rebuilding of living spaces. With the fire at La Linière, the Ministry of the Interior took back control, alone, and used this symbol to affirm the inability to accommodate exiled people in transit. The policy of combating fixation points that was put in place in the days following these two reception “closures” was continued and amplified by Emmanuel Macron and his successive ministers of the interior. Exiled people were “undesirables”. They were targeted by European policies and by the Member States as well as by France, which, against the backdrop of a “refugee crisis”, had only reinforced the security-oriented framework. In this section, we would like to retrace how these three political levels combined and formed a whole with regard to the management of “migratory flows”. Indeed, the EU’s objective was to “protect” the Schengen Area by building a wall around it: it pushed back, detained, sorted and evicted the “undesirables”. The French State fabricated the irregular status of exiled people via a deterrence policy in order to prevent them from settling in France (Chapter 10). As the French State did not want them present, it attempted to evict the people that had been made irregular in this way. More precisely, because many of these people could not be deported, the State created a hostile environment to encourage their “self-deportation” (Chapter 11). At the same time, the French and British States protected their common border to prevent them from leaving the Schengen Area (Chapter 12). The exiled people were stranded “on the border”.

CHAPTER 10: PREVENTING EXILED PEOPLE

PEOPLE FROM SETTLING IN FRANCE:

SORTING, LOCKING UP, REMOVING

European and State policies were intertwined and complemented each other. On the one hand, the EU pursued a logic of closing the borders of the Schengen Area. This was based on a “Fortress Europe” project, the aim of which was to “protect” the Member States from “undesirables”. The EU deployed mechanisms to push them back, lock them up, sort them and send them back. The 2015 “refugee crisis” only reinforced the security-oriented framework, which the “Afghan crisis” confirmed (I). On the other hand, for exiled people who managed to cross the threshold at the gates of the EU, they were forced to wander. In France, the State created a policy aimed at preventing “undesirables” from accessing asylum procedures and, when they did, the State institutionally ensured a refusal of status. Exiled people were “made illegal” and “criminalised”, which then justified doing everything possible to deport them (II).

I. “WE ARE INVOLVED IN A POLITICAL PROJECT THAT IS A FORTRESS EUROPE PROJECT” (SENIOR OFFICIAL AT THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR)

“In the hierarchy of texts, it is Europe first, then the nation. When directives exist, European law therefore applies and it is therefore in your interest to transpose it. (...) The domain of national autonomy almost no longer exists. What remains is nationality, access to residency and procedures for organising the fight against irregular immigration” (Lucie P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior).

The situation of exiled people stranded “on the border” between France and Britain was decided as soon as they tried to enter the Schengen Area. The EU’s policy was marked by a “Fortress Europe” project aimed at preventing access to Member States by “undesirables”. The 2015 “refugee crisis” accentuated a policy of closure by strengthening the Frontex agency and the inauguration of new camp schemes in Greece and Italy on European soil, and in Turkey and Libya via border outsourcing practices. Member States set objectives at EU level to push back, lock up and sort undesirables (1). For exiled people who succeeded in entering the Schengen Area, the EU provided states with mechanisms for removal, negotiated readmission agreements and tasked Frontex with deporting exiled people (2). The Afghan situation arising from the US withdrawal from the country strengthened this approach to border security, accelerating the conclusion of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, the direction of which remained the same: protect the border (3).

1. Pushing back, locking up, sorting: the “walled” Schengen Area

The 2015 “refugee crisis” was a window of opportunity for European leaders to build a “Fortress Europe.” The aim was to prevent “undesirables” from entering the Schengen Area. Faced with an increase in the number of exiled people, the EU put the “security”

of Member States on the agenda by pushing back, locking up and sorting exiled people. These objectives took effect in strengthening Frontex and outsourcing the border and camp via hotspots.

Since its creation in 2003, Frontex has continuously increased its control over the management of the external borders of the Schengen Area (see: Chapter 4). Frontex is the expression of the security considerations of European leaders, which are maintained, on the one hand, by Frontex, which supplies countless statistics aimed at demonstrating the permeability of the border, and, on the other hand, by the weapons and surveillance industries (RODIER, 2012).

The weapons and surveillance industries are taking advantage of the increase in resources allocated to Frontex and its independence in terms of weapons purchases to open up a new market equivalent to €5.6 billion for the period 2021-2027, as explained in the report by Corporate Europe Observatory:

“It’s a dream come true not only for Frontex, but for the entire security industry. Anticipating the opportunity of a potential major new customer, since 2010 the industry has been calling for the establishment of an EU border force.”¹⁹⁷

In October 2016, the agency changed and became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Its powers were expanded, while it was given a specific legal personality and independence, leaving it with sufficient room for manoeuvre to avoid being subject to democratic control.

It can therefore sign agreements with non-EU countries without the approval of the European institution and the Member States, as well as initiate cooperation missions, land and sea border control operations, disembark – push back – people intercepted outside European territory, organise return flights, border surveillance, the training of border guards, production of data on the migratory movements of the countries concerned.

It carries out external border control missions and has a direct link to the police authorities of member countries and international agencies, such as Europol. It therefore collects information on the persons concerned in order to be able to deport them.

Frontex missions are carried out in an opaque manner, as stated by Brigitte Espuche, “there is no way to guarantee respect for the rights of the people deported because no post-deportation monitoring exists at State level” (2020).

Several independent media reports have reported pushbacks of exiled people attempting to enter the Schengen Area. In 2020, the German NGO Mare Liberum counted “at least 9,000 refugees pushed back on the Turkish coast”¹⁹⁸, stating:

“Since March [2020], there has been more than one pushback per day on average. The Greek coast guard has developed several strategies, each crueler than the next (...) The Greek coast guard forces refugees to board rafts or lifeboats, drags them into Turkish waters and lets them drift.”

197. Corporate Europe Observatory, Lobbying Fortress Europe, The making of a border-industrial complex, 5 February 2021.

198. “Comment les pays européens et l’agence Frontex persécutent les exilés qui se présentent à leurs frontières”, *Bastamag*, 16 March 2021.

The agency has invested “massively” in the purchase of drones, “a way of spending money without taking responsibility to save lives.”¹⁹⁹ In April 2021, a consortium of European media outlets revealed that the agency had enabled the Libyan coast guard to intercept boats of exiled people and bring them back to Libya via the transmission of the “geographical coordinates of certain boats”²⁰⁰, thereby preventing exiled people from reaching the Schengen Area or being helped by NGOs or nearby vessels.

To relieve Frontex, the EU developed an emergency system on its territory: hotspots. The aim was to place exiled people who managed to enter the Schengen Area in camps in enclosed, overcrowded spaces. In 2015, nine hotspots were created, three in Greece and six in Italy. In March 2021, the EU institutionalised this system by making it permanent. It financed the construction or renovation of five new camps in Greece at a cost of €276 million.

The purpose of these detention centres was to identify exiled people upon arrival (fingerprinting); to sort asylum seekers, economic migrants and dUBLINED people; to examine their asylum applications; to detain asylum seekers pending “relocation” and rejected persons pending a return to their country of origin or to another outsourced camp, such as Turkey.

To “relieve congestion” in these hotspots, on 18 March 2016, the EU published an agreement with Turkey. In return for €6 billion – plus €500 million more in 2020 – Turkey agreed to “receive” exiled people deported from Greek hotspots while strengthening its border controls. The agreement stated that Turkey must “take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for irregular migration from Turkey to the EU.”

In 2021, with the agreement with Turkey coming to an end, the European Commissioner in charge of migration “urge[d] Turkey to urgently readmit (returned) migrants from Greece”²⁰¹, while renegotiating an extension of the agreement with Turkey, signed by the EU in June 2021.

The agreement with Turkey had the direct effect of creating new migratory routes from Libya. To counter this, a similar agreement was signed by Italy with Libya on 2 February 2017 with the objective of “curbing the influx of illegal migrants” in exchange for €237 million in development aid. The Libyan coast guard was therefore “trained” by Frontex and equipped militarily by the EU. Its mission was to prevent exiled people from reaching Italy, making “Libya Europe’s policeman”²⁰².

Italian and Frontex ships were then deployed in the territorial waters of Libya, while NGO ships were prohibited from entering them:

“The sea rescue NGOs were such a hindrance because they were the last obstacle preventing the Libyan coast guard from intercepting migrants with impunity, and were able to bear witness to the fate of those who escaped the Libyan hell.”²⁰³

199. “Revealed: the great European refugee scandal”, *The Guardian*, 12 March 2020.

200. “Migrants : le jeu trouble de Frontex en Méditerranée”, *Libération*, 29 April 2021.

201. “Îles grecques : l’UE va allouer 276 millions d’euros pour les camps de migrants”, *Infomigrants*, 29 March 2021.

202. “Garde-côtes libyens vs ONG : l’Italie et l’UE ont choisi leurs alliés”, *Migreurop*, 20 March 2018.

203. “Garde-côtes libyens vs ONG : l’Italie et l’UE ont choisi leurs alliés”, *Migreurop*, 20 March 2018.

For Roger T.²⁰⁴, a senior official within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior: “we were in a stranglehold with this obsession with not letting anyone in. We’re therefore supporting regimes that, to say the least, are not democracies. And so they have us and make us abandon fundamental values such as hospitality.”²⁰⁵

The closure of the EU had the effect of increasing the risky boat crossing attempts made by exiled people. The work of the NGOs was hampered. Frontex’s operations were not aimed at “saving” exiled people but at preventing them from accessing the Schengen Area. For the period 2014-2020, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 20,000 people who died or were reported missing while attempting to reach the EU.

We can see how the 2015 “refugee crisis” reinforced the process of walling in the EU that had been underway since the late 1990s. This “crisis” constituted a window of opportunity for reinforcing the framing of the border as a security issue, driven by Frontex and the weapons and surveillance industries. The objective of the Member States was to prevent “undesirables” from entering the Schengen Area by increasing coercive measures: outsourcing of the border, detention, filtering and sorting of exiled people. For exiled people who managed to enter the Schengen Area, the EU arranged for their deportation by putting pressure on the countries of origin.

2. Sending back “undesirables”

The objective of making the EU and the Member States impermeable was a political display demonstrating their ability to control, secure and protect the Schengen Area from “undesirables”. The aim here was to strengthen the legitimacy of the European institutions and to build a European identity through a show of strength and through exclusion. The EU created an “us” versus “them – “us” within the borders and “them” outside. When exiled people managed to cross this border, as physical, administrative as symbolic, the EU and the Member States informed them that they did not belong to this space through deportation. To return them efficiently, the EU negotiated quasi-coercive agreements with the countries of origin of the exiled people for their readmission.

Faced with the difficulties of Member States in “deporting” undocumented exiled people or those not identified or recognised by their countries of origin, on 26 October 2016, the EU introduced the “European laissez-passer” (LPE), which aimed to “reduce the length of the administrative procedures necessary to ensure the return and readmission” of exiled people.

As a result of the “refugee crisis”, Frontex saw an increase in its resources for the effective deportation of exiled people, and was able to organise “charter” flights with or without the agreement of the Member States. Between 2015 and 2019, its annual “deportation” budget increased from €11 million to €60 million, and the number of deportations from 3,500 to 15,850.

Frontex’s “deportation” mission in terms of cost and numbers (source: Frontex)					
Type	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Number of evictions carried out by Frontex	3,500	10,700	14,189	13,730	15,850
“Eviction” budget	€11 M	€39.585 M	€53.06 M	€47.853 M	€59.642 M

204. Interview conducted in July 2021. We preserved his anonymity at his request.

205. Interview conducted in July 2021. We preserved his anonymity at his request.

At the same time, from 2014 to 2016, the EU developed three policies²⁰⁶ aimed at encouraging readmissions by “rewarding” the most willing countries and sanctioning others by refusing to issue new visas. Development aid emerged as a tool that was conditional on the commitment to combating irregular immigration promoted by the EU. Countries were being pushed to strengthen their borders, “retain” their people and readmit them if they wanted to benefit from cooperation agreements with the EU.

The EU therefore developed its own mechanisms and provided Member States with instruments to deport “undesirables”. Against the backdrop of a “crisis”, they moved towards a coercive and pressured approach on countries of origin to force them to readmit their nationals. The Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been under negotiation within the machinery of Europe since 2016, is part of a similar security-oriented framework, the voting for which accelerated due to the situation in Afghanistan.

3. Afghanistan: anticipating a “migration crisis”, “protecting” the border

The Pact on Migration and Asylum, still under discussion within European machinery, completes the transcribing into European law of already-established practices and tools, with a view to their systematisation and the strengthening of a coercive approach.

Specifically, this Pact focuses on the effective return of exiled people to their country of origin, via four mechanisms.

First of all, it is envisaged that the Member States will be able to “sponsor” those who have been expelled, taking responsibility for their return without the agreement of the countries of origin.

Secondly, the introduction of mandatory screenings of all asylum seekers arriving at the EU's external borders. In practical terms, these screenings would consist of identification, health checks and the taking of fingerprints added to the Eurodac database. According to Roger T., “with screening, we will only allow people to enter the EU who have a potentially high probability of obtaining international protection, with the others not being authorised to enter.”

Then, the establishment of an accelerated return procedure for nationals with a “low chance” of obtaining asylum in the EU, by processing the asylum application “at the border” within a maximum of 12 weeks. Interviewed by the French Senate, Ylva Johansson, European Commissioner in charge of migration, explained that the aim was to avoid “the permanent settlement of migrants, such as professional or social integration, who do not have the right to remain and would therefore facilitate return for the administrations.”²⁰⁷

Lastly, the focus is on negotiating new readmission agreements, which will be effected under the aegis of Frontex. More specifically, this approach provides for “triggering the application of stricter conditions for the processing of visas when a partner country does not cooperate sufficiently for the purpose of readmitting irregular migrants.”²⁰⁸ In other words, countries that refuse to readmit their nationals will no longer have visas to travel to the EU.

206. On 28 November 2014, the Khartoum Process; in November 2015, the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa; and in June 2016, the Migration Compacts.

207. French Senate, Interview with Ylva Johansson, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, 5 November 2020.

208. “Visas : vers des conditions ‘plus strictes’ pour les pays refusant les réadmissions”, *AFP*, 14 March 2018.

For Thierry Le Roy and Delphine Rouilleault of the France terre d'asile association, this pact is "clearly oriented towards returns, preventing arrivals and strengthening border procedures, the pact prioritises a security approach to the detriment of a dignified reception of asylum seekers and a mechanism of effective distribution."²⁰⁹ Roger T., who is closely monitoring the project, believes that "we have embarked on a political Fortress Europe project of closing and making the European border as watertight as possible."

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan represented a window of opportunity here to accelerate the vote and implementation of this "pact". On 31 August 2021, EU Ministers of the Interior met, focusing their discourse on border security, as stated in their press release: "The EU and its Member States stand determined to act jointly to prevent the recurrence of uncontrolled large-scale illegal migration movements faced in the past".

The "crisis of 2015" was being mobilised here to justify strengthening the external borders. The same response mechanisms were proposed, such as the outsourcing of controls, as explained by Josep Borrell, EU foreign affairs chief: "There are limits to Europe's reception capacity. Nothing can be done without strong cooperation. Neighbouring countries will be more involved and before Europe. It also means offering them financial support, as we did with Turkey."²¹⁰ Ylva Johansson, EU Commissioner in charge of migration, agrees, stating that "the best way to avoid a migration crisis is to avoid a humanitarian crisis (...) We must act now, over there and without waiting to have waves of refugees at our external borders."²¹¹

The EU is considering a €1 billion plan to manage this "crisis", including €600 million for "third countries that would open their doors to refugees."²¹² Five countries are listed to replicate the camp in Turkey: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, India, Iran and Tajikistan.

Since the establishment of the Schengen Area in 1985, we have observed the creation of a "Fortress Europe", which is reinforced after each "crisis". The European authorities are following a well-defined path from which no country is straying – except Germany in 2015 – and are working within a strictly security-oriented framework. Each "crisis" sees the emergence of new mechanisms that are part of a self-reinforcing process. In other words, each failure justifies going even further in building walls at the external borders, going so far as to push them back and establish them outside the EU. Each Member State straying from this path is called to order and must comply with the direction taken.

The fact remains that the EU is shaped by its Member States, which help to self-sustain this security approach by deploying similar systems and exploiting the topic of immigration. The two levels are intertwined and interdependent. Indeed, while the objectives pursued by the EU are aimed at preventing exiled people from accessing the Schengen Area, the Member States, such as France, are preventing those who have entered from settling there.

209. "Le 'Pacte sur la migration et l'asile' privilégie une approche sécuritaire au détriment d'un accueil digne des demandeurs d'asile", *Le Monde*, 25 May 2021.

210. "Comment l'UE va tenter d'éviter un flux 'incontrôlé' de migrants", *AFP*, 30 August 2021.

211. "Afghanistan : l'Europe veut s'épargner une crise migratoire", *Les Échos*, 31 August 2021.

212. "Afghanistan : le plan des Européens pour éviter une nouvelle crise migratoire", *Le Figaro*, 31 August 2021.

II. “WE HAVE A PUBLIC POLICY THAT IS NOT A POLICY OF CONTROL, BUT OF PREVENTION” (JACQUES TOUBON, DEFENDER OF RIGHTS FROM 2014 TO 2020)

For exiled people who manage to enter the Schengen Area and are seeking asylum in France – or Great Britain – the State puts in place an “impediment” regarding access to asylum procedures that is coupled with a stricter approach surrounding the conditions for granting asylum. In addition to the closed-door policy coordinated by the EU, the State deploys a deterrence policy aimed at preventing exiled people from settling in France by fabricating their irregular status (1). The State then deploys an administrative, judicial and police arsenal combining detention, house arrest and travel restrictions to facilitate their removal (2). Undermined by the State’s inability to deport exiled people, political leaders have attempted to regain control of the media narrative by associating “terrorism” with “immigration” as the enshrinement of populism assimilated from the far right (3).

1. Deterring exiles from settling in France, fabricating their irregular status

“What Macron wants is to reduce the time frames for applying for asylum, very clearly, today, the decision takes 2-3 years. By definition, when you have been here for 3 years, the chances of being sent home are marginal. And fortunately (...) The challenge for the government, and Cazeneuve since, is to be able to refuse asylum better” (Jean Dussourd, assessor at the CNDA).

In Chapter 5, we have examined how the OFPRA – which is responsible for examining asylum applications – is obliged to apply the policy of combating irregular immigration implemented by the Ministry of the Interior. The Office brings about the refusal to grant asylum applications on an institutional basis. Using a “sieve” mechanism, each asylum seeker is suspected of being a “fraudster” whom officers - constrained by a target-based policy - must “catch”.

Since 1980, the asylum system has been constantly reformed – 17 times – in order to reduce processing times, through discourse that alternately enlists a “crisis” of the asylum system, its “deficiency” or the “misuse” of the system. In 2015, the reform led by Manuel Valls and then Bernard Cazeneuve set the target at 9 months. When Emmanuel Macron became President of the Republic, he instructed Gérard Colomb, the new Minister of the Interior, to reduce it to 6 months to refuse asylum seekers more quickly, he explained to the National Assembly on 3 April 2018: “If we don’t respond, it’ll be hundreds of thousands of people that we will have to accommodate each year in France.”

To achieve this, two laws were passed in 2018: first the Law of 20 March 2018 on the “proper application of the European asylum system” and that of 10 September 2018 on “controlled immigration, an effective right to asylum and successful integration.” In the name of combating irregular immigration and the “misuse” of asylum, these laws deploy administrative and police machinery aimed at bringing about the irregular status of exiled people. They combine measures to “prevent” access to asylum procedures, to reduce the time allowed for exiled people to submit an application, with the strict and systematic application of the Dublin Regulation and the accelerated procedure.

For Pascal Brice, director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018, there is now “a difficulty in accessing procedures, particularly asylum procedures (...) It has become a complete maze.” By reducing legal migratory routes, the State helped to create the asylum “crisis”, which in turn justifies reforming it, as Pascal Brice explains: “There is a blocking of access to the right of residence, people are not accessing the procedures, that is accompanied by an ever-increasing scarcity of legal migratory routes other than asylum.” This blocking has the effect of making asylum the last resort for people wishing to immigrate, says Pascal Brice:

“What is known as the abuse of asylum is linked to a cutting off of legal migratory routes, particularly for work or for situations of humanitarian protection and increasingly for situations linked to environmental displacement. This abuse is mainly the result of a gradual closure of legal migratory routes.”

Impediment was a feature of the Collomb laws, particularly through the implementation of a “paperless system, which was not only technical, but also very political”, says Jean Dussourd, assessor at the CNDA, who continues: “People found it incredibly difficult to get an appointment, only online. It is a strategy of systematic pushback!”

Exiled people who fall within the criteria “do not even have access to an initial right of residence, even people who would be entitled to renewal of a residence permit. There really is a blocking of the system of access to residence”, says Pascal Brice.

As Alexis Spire (2015) explains, there is also a phenomenon of “non take-up” of their rights by exiled people, linked on the one hand to the precariousness of their social situation and, on the other hand, to the complexity of the system and the discretionary power of administrative officials in the processing of applications.

Since 2015, the regionalisation of asylum application procedures means that they are only registered by one prefecture per region. During the period of the Calais shanty town, a special system was introduced, allowing exiled people to apply for asylum at the sub-prefecture of Calais. After the shanty town was dismantled, in October 2016, the system was scrapped, forcing potential asylum seekers to travel to Lille. This transfer provoked criticism from Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights, demanding that a “system derogating from the regionalisation of asylum be put in place again.”²¹³

Here we can see the organisation of non-access to the administration, which was coupled with mobilisation of the police to prevent exiled people from leaving Calais and issuing them with obligations to leave French territory (OQTF):

“To submit an application, you need to be able to go to Lille. But the police stopped all those who approached Calais train station and took them to the offices of the French air and border police.”²¹⁴

Through this policy of deterrence, the State brought about the irregular status of exiled people before they could have their status recognised since it “is not mandatory to have papers in order to file a protection application. However, the unluckiest ones were deported before they could even indicate that they wanted to be recognised as refugees.”²¹⁵

213. Defender of Rights, Recommendations on the situation of migrants in Calais, 22 June 2017.

214. “Le ministre de l'Intérieur envoie des policiers supplémentaires à Calais et adopte une ligne dure anti-migrants”, *Le Monde*, 5 June 2017.

215. “Le ministre de l'Intérieur envoie des policiers supplémentaires à Calais et adopte une ligne dure anti-migrants”, *Le Monde*, 5 June 2017.

In other words, by moving the office away from Calais, the Ministry of the Interior made it more expensive to apply for asylum, while bringing about their irregular status before they were able to apply for asylum in Lille, thereby reducing the number of official asylum seekers on French territory. Without the ability to obtain asylum in France, exiled people saw Great Britain as the final option to obtain legal status.

In addition, the Law of 10 September 2018 reduced the time available to an exiled person to file an asylum application: 90 days instead of the 120 days set by the asylum law of 29 July 2015 (which had already reduced the period). After this period, applications were examined under an accelerated procedure, where refusals were almost systematic, which did not give rise to an automatic right to accommodation and benefits. Exiled people whose applications were rejected had only one month to refer the matter to the CNDA, while legal aid had to be requested within 15 days of the OFPRA decision.

The law pushed asylum seekers to “make a mistake” in order to justify refusing to grant asylum. Indeed, asylum seekers could no longer choose their place of residence or move around without the authorisation of the OFII: “in the event of non-compliance with this obligation, the material conditions of reception are automatically interrupted and examination of the asylum application may be terminated.”

Change in asylum applications from 2012 to 2020 (source: Ministry of the Interior)									
Type	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Number of asylum applications	47,304	51,715	50,680	64,942	71,260	81,185	123,625	132,614	93,475
Via the accelerated procedure	14,800 (31%)	13,254 (26%)	16,922 (33%)	18,452 (28%)	27,654 (39%)	31,561 (39%)	34,302 (28%)	40,677 (31%)	37,440 (40%)
Granting of refugee status	7,453 (16%)	9,143 (18%)	11,068 (22%)	15,130 (23%)	16,832 (24%)	18,443 (23%)	20,055 (16%)	23,421 (18%)	14,002 (15%)
Subsidiary protection	2,575 (5%)	2,285 (4%)	3,521 (7%)	4,376 (7%)	9,667 (14%)	13,521 (17%)	13,275 (11%)	12,854 (10%)	10,116 (11%)

NB: the granting of refugee status and subsidiary protection are the combined totals for OFPRA and CNDA decisions

In order to reduce processing times, the accelerated procedure became the systematic option, used for asylum seekers from so-called “safe” countries, for dUBLINED people (who succeeded in applying for asylum), for people who refused to give their fingerprints or for people whose statement the OFPRA official deemed as “incomplete” or “inconsistent”. In this type of procedure, rejections are almost systematic and allow OFPRA to reduce the processing of applications “on average”, as Karine Parrot explains: “90% of applications processed using the fast procedure are rejected by OFPRA, compared with a refusal rate of around 50% for the so-called ‘normal’ procedure” (2018).

Granting of “subsidiary protection”, a precarious status that grants the beneficiary a multi-year residence permit of four years (instead of 10 with refugee status), was also being granted more and more regularly. Lastly, video hearings were developed, which sped up the processing of applications without the asylum seeker being able to object.

For Roger T., asylum is part of a “Darwinian” logic, he says: “We use all the levers at our disposal to ensure that those who remain deserve to stay.”

This logic was also evident at the CNDA, where assessor judges were under pressure to refuse asylum applications. Management therefore pushed the assessors to reverse and revisit the granting of asylum, by putting them under “pressure to change a ruling”²¹⁶. The changes were made without the judge being informed, undermining his or her independence.

These laws were characterised by a desire to prevent exiled people from applying for asylum, thereby strengthening the “sieving” for which OFPRA is responsible, and which the CNDA supplements by pushing assessors to refuse asylum to exiled people. The laws help to bring about the irregular status of people, which are supplemented by detention and removal mechanisms.

2. Having become “irregular”, exiled people “are destined to be removed” (Gérard Colomb)²¹⁷

“Today, we live in hypocrisy: at every presidential election, we hear candidates promise that they will enforce the law and deport foreigners in an irregular situation from our borders. But the truth is that we have virtually no deportation agreements with third countries” (Emmanuel Macron, 1 May 2017, Interview with La Cimade during the presidential campaign)

At the same time as wanting to reduce the processing times for asylum applications, Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, introduced the Circular of 20 November 2017 aimed at “combating irregular immigration” and obliging accommodation centres for non-nationals to participate in the same agenda.

This Circular foreshadowed the “firmness” component of the two laws on asylum of 2018, since it revolved around the removal of exiled people “representing a threat to public order and persons leaving prison”; rejected asylum seekers who were “systematically the subject of a decision requiring them to leave French territory”; in connection with the OFII and OFPRA, a census of rejected asylum seekers present in accommodation centres and the identification of their nationality; the use of “measures of restriction and deprivation of liberty (placement in detention)”, in particular, for dUBLINED people who could be placed under house arrest in accommodation centres.

This logic of detaining dUBLINED people emerged in 2016. A call for tenders was launched on 26 September 2015 in order to create 5,351 PRAHDA places (regional support and accommodation programme for asylum seekers). This system was aimed at accommodating those who had already applied for asylum and those who intended to do so. The centre would also have to provide for the accommodation of dUBLINED people in accordance with a logic of house arrest and preparing for deportation:

“The PRAHDA is intended for the ‘preparation of the transfer of people under the Dublin procedure’ and the ‘monitoring of people under house arrest in this context.’ The technical document clearly mentions that in the case of the PRAHDA, ‘people placed under the Dublin procedure may be kept in the accommodation centre for as long as

216. “Cour nationale du droit d’asile : des juges dénoncent des ‘pressions’”, *Mediapart*, 3 September 2021.

217. Statement by Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, at the seminar of departmental directors of public security, 29 May 2018.

necessary for the effective implementation of their transfer to the state responsible for examining their asylum application.”²¹⁸.

In 2017, of the 131,200 people who applied for asylum, 36,000 were placed in the Dublin procedure, of which 2,633 were effectively deported to another Member State. Conversely, 1,636 dUBLined people were transferred to France: “This stricter approach to the application of the Dublin Regulation aims, in addition to increasing transfers, to discourage ‘dUBLined’ people from coming to seek asylum in France” (CFDA, 2019).

The arrival of Gérard Collomb at the head of the Ministry of the Interior systematised the arrangement, declaring that “without detention, our policy of removal cannot be effective.” Despite the objection of the Court of Cassation, the Law of 20 March 2018 “legalised the detention of people in the ‘Dublin’ procedure” (CFDA, 2019).

At the same time, house arrests rose via an increase in the number of accommodation places. In these centres, social workers were enlisted by the State in order to make the removals effective: “Professionals in the accommodation centres must facilitate the enforcement of the transfer by informing the people ‘of the need to cooperate with the prefecture and the administrative authorities with a view to carrying out the transfer’ (while) the director of the accommodation centre authorises access to the common areas” to the police (CFDA, 2019).

To give the police more leeway to transfer dUBLined people to the Member State where their fingerprints were recorded, the state put in place a system that pressured dUBLined people into making mistakes: “Many ‘dUBLined’ asylum seekers were placed under house arrest in phantom accommodation centres or those that were overcrowded or difficult to access, with the corresponding obligation to sign in several times a week at the nearest police station or prefecture” (PARROT, 2019, p. 178).

This “obligation” was accompanied by a lack of information, remoteness from the prefectures and police stations, the late sending of summonses and “people generally ended up missing one or more appointments, authorising the prefecture to declare them ‘on the run’” (PARROT, 2019, p. 178). The time period for transferring dUBLined people increased, via this process, from 6 to 18 months, while losing their status as an asylum seeker “to become quasi-offenders, condemned to live on the streets with the fear of police checks” (PARROT, 2019, p. 179).

The Dublin system can be seen here as being mobilised in order to refuse access to asylum procedures, encourage their removal and bring about their illegal status on French territory. The challenge was to “get asylum seekers off official radars, marginalise them, drive them out and, if necessary, criminalise them” (PARROT, 2019, p. 179).

Placements in CRAs between 2012 and 2019								
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Mainland France	23,394	24,176	25,018	26,267	22,730	26,003	25,367	24,358
Abroad	16,595	14,090	16,301	13,828	16,890	17,388	14,040	26,128
Total	39,989	38,266	41,319	40,095	39,620	43,391	39,407	50,486

In addition, people in an irregular situation could now be placed in administrative detention for up to 90 days (instead of the previous 45 days). This “extension of the

218. “La France se prépare à expulser plus de migrants”, *Le Monde*, 5 November 2019.

administrative detention period does not permit more deportations”:

“Invariably for years, the vast majority of people deported from a centre are deported within the first 12 days of their detention (The extension) is primarily an aggravated sentence against undesirable foreigners (which) calls for the opening of new places in the CRAs” (PARROT, 2019, p. 224-225).

As at 1 September 2019, 25 CRAs with 1,926 places had been opened in mainland France and abroad. Two CRAs were being modified to increase the number of places, while four new buildings were under construction providing an additional 434 places (Draft finance laws 2020). These new buildings represented a market for the construction sector, which therefore benefited in 2018 from the release of “around fifty million euros” (PARROT, 2019, p. 227).

Administrative detention was also permitted for families and their minor children. While files were kept on unaccompanied minors. France has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights seven times for these practices of detaining minors. The Court was of the view that the deprivation of liberty of foreign minors amounted to “inhuman and degrading treatment.” In addition, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasised that locking up a child on the basis of their parents’ immigration status is a violation of the rights of the child, and is contrary to the principle of the best interests of the child. The UN Committee has called on states to eradicate this practice²¹⁹.

Roger T. explained that the arrival of Gérald Darmanin at the head of the Ministry of the Interior in July 2020 reinforced this logic of detention and removal: “it involved non-renewal of permits, placements in CRAs, no exceptional residence permit, etc. A real energising of the system in the name of combating irregular immigration. The objective was for there to be no more migrants, no more exiled people on the territory.” This “energising” was also embodied by the use of discourse associating “exiled people” with “terrorism”.

3. The political exploitation of the foreign “undesirable”

“From the right to the left of the political spectrum, at least in politics in the National Assembly there was the same discourse pointing the finger at foreigners, that is to say foreigners from the south. We heard both Giscard d’Estaing, as far back as 91, talk about ‘the invasion of foreigners’, Poniatowski talking about ‘the occupation of France by foreigners’, Édith Cresson saying that there were ‘free charters to chuck out foreigners’, Chevènement declaring ‘that foreigners should be selected when they enter France based on their social status and origin.’ The Communist Party also contributed, saying that it was ‘very concerned about the presence of foreigners in France’ and that it was a response to ‘the questions people were asking.’ And that at the end of the year, in November 1991, there had been 51 proposals from Mégrez on immigration. So, this climate, despite several left-wing governments until 93 and again from 1997, has not changed, it has escalated and every time the left capitulates before the police: not only does it serve the right, but it also serves the far right and it is no coincidence to see that Le Pen is rising rapidly in the polls right now.”
(Maurice Rajsfus, writer, journalist and activist, 3 November 2001)

Just a few weeks after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, the Taliban were

219. CIDE, Joint general comment - Nos. 4 and 23 on State obligations regarding the human rights of children in the context of international migration in countries of origin, transit, destination and return, 2017.

slowly taking over the country, sparking fears among Afghans who were seeking to flee the oppressive regime. Faced with the possibility of an “influx”, Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, declared on 16 August 2021 that it was necessary to “protect ourselves against large irregular migratory flows that endanger those who use them, and feed all kinds of trafficking.” On 19 August 2021, Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin added: “We know that it (Afghanistan) can be a base for terrorism, and therefore we must be careful who we welcome on our soil (...) and not recreate a laboratory for terrorism.”²²⁰

This assimilation between “terrorism” and “foreigners”, initially due solely to the extreme right, has gradually been harnessed by the right and then En Marche from 2017. It is about exploiting the figure of the foreign “undesirable” to better justify the deterrence policy orchestrated by the EU and the French State. In this section, we want to return to the genesis of this “assimilation” to better understand the political logic at work.

In March 2012, two attacks, in Toulouse and Montauban, were politically exploited by Marine Le Pen, who was then in the presidential campaign for the National Front. She linked “terrorist acts” and “immigration issues”, saying: “How many Mohamed Merahs are there on the boats, the planes, that arrive in France every day filled with immigrants?”²²¹ On 10 November 2020, Jérôme Rivière, MEP from Rassemblement National, questioned the Council of Europe on the link between immigration and terrorism, declaring: “Does the Council still think that there is no link between terrorism and immigration? Is the Council prepared to suspend the Schengen Area and give states the freedom to control their borders in order to confront a deadly threat to European countries?”

According to Vincent Geisser, “such anxiety-provoking discourse ultimately contributes to reinforcing a common sense theory that supports the existence of a ‘continuum of threats’ to national security” (2020, p. 5). In addition, the construction of physical, administrative and security barriers at European and French level contributed to validating these theories in a diehard logic. These measures were justified in the name of “combating terrorism” and “combating irregular immigration”, in order to intertwine the two concepts and, therefore, in return, justify “exceptional” measures that became permanent in common law.

From September 2020, a series of exploitations of the topic of immigration by the government of Emmanuel Macron could be seen, where the terms terrorism and irregular immigration were linked. On 29 September 2020, Gérald Darmanin demonstrated this assimilation by publicising a circular addressed to the prefects, in which he expressly requested the “systematic deportation of foreigners who have committed serious offences or represent a serious threat to public order”, specifying:

“I ask you to systematically implement procedures that can put an end to the presence of these people in our territory as soon as possible.”

This circular was accompanied by “pressuring” the local government, via a rendering of accounts, with Gérald Darmanin ordering: “You will personally report to me on a quarterly basis on the removals (...) that you have carried out.”

220. “Interview with Gérard Darmanin”, *BFM TV*, 19 August 2021.

221. Marine Le Pen, *Twitter*, 25 March 2012.

In November 2020, following a terrorist attack in Nice, Gérald Darmanin announced²²² that he was travelling to Malta and Italy “through which the Nice attacker travelled before arriving in France, to talk about terrorism and immigration.” The Minister of the Interior subsequently went to Algeria and Tunisia for a visit “focused on combating terrorism and illegal immigration” to present “a list of irregular nationals suspected of radicalisation that France wishes to deport.”

Forced and assisted removals between 2012 and 2019 (source: Ministry of the Interior)									
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020 (provisional)
Forced removals	13,386	14,076	15,161	14,485	12,961	14,270	15,677	18,906	9,111
Assisted removals	4,971	1,900	1,547	1,118	841	1,078	2,070	2,752	1,658

On 10 November 2020, at a European summit, Emmanuel Macron repeated this rhetoric, stating: “Combating illegal immigration and terrorism should not be conflated in any way, but we must look at the links that exist between these two phenomena in a clear way”, continuing: “We need to work on an overhaul of the Schengen Area (...) so that it is also a space of security.” French borders were then strengthened and security forces redeployed as a priority, with a doubling of police personnel, from 2,400 to 4,800, mobilised “against illegal immigration”.

In his speech, Emmanuel Macron questioned asylum, which was subject to “misuse”, saying: “In all our countries, we are seeing misuse of the right to asylum (which is used) by traffickers, networks or people from countries that are not at war.” This open breach was used by right-wing politicians, such as Valérie Pécresse, LR President of the Ile-de-France region, pointing out: “we can no longer give asylum to our enemies.”

In June 2021, a new sequence opened up in the run-up to the presidential elections. Emmanuel Macron and Gérald Darmanin laid out the fight against irregular immigration by “tightening up the deportation of irregular foreigners”, questioning asylum, as one of Emmanuel Macron’s “advisers” stated: “Asylum applications are increasingly being misused: foreigners are systematically applying for asylum knowing that the examination of their case takes several months and that they are looked after very favourably.”²²³

The objective of the State was then to “target” the “irregular foreigners who perpetrated acts of terrorism or who had been convicted of radicalisation as well as those who had committed crimes and offences and other serious acts”.²²⁴ Gérald Darmanin asked the prefects for “better monitoring of foreigners in an irregular situation who perpetrate serious public disorder in order to prioritise their deportation.”²²⁵ This was then demonstrated through figures, with Gérald Darmanin announcing on 8 July 2021 that over 9 months, “nearly 30,000 withdrawals or refusals of permits have been notified by the prefectures”.

According to Roger T., “there was a phase of accelerated toughening, ‘tightening up’ a few months before the presidential elections, Macron delegating an increasingly harsh policy in terms of reception of migrants to Darmanin, with Macron’s desire to move towards

222. “Lutte contre le terrorisme : Darmanin se rendra en Tunisie et en Algérie à la fin de la semaine”, *AFP*, 2 November 2020.

223. “Macron réclame un tour de vis sur l’expulsion des étrangers irréguliers”, *AFP*, 9 June 2021.

224. “Macron réclame un tour de vis sur l’expulsion des étrangers irréguliers”, *AFP*, 9 June 2021.

225. “Gérald Darmanin demande aux préfets d’expulser en priorité les clandestins auteurs d’infractions”, *AFP*, 13 June 2021.

a systematic rate of deportation. Whereas we were far from it... and it was unrealistic." In addition, Roger T. believes that this policy is "expensive", and that "it puts terrible pressure on the administrations in charge of these issues, be it the PAF, the consulates, the Ministry of the Interior... and in addition it does not work, so you go even further, it's a dead end, and we're continuing down this dead end. And it's not going to be long until we crash."

Over thirty years, the figure of the foreigner has changed from "repulsive" to a "danger" to the nation-state. This development was based on its framing as a security issue due in particular to the pre-emption by the Ministry of the Interior of migration issues and the alignment of government parties with the political agenda of the far right. These messages were put into effect via the deployment of increasingly coercive measures to deter exiles from accessing the Schengen Area, deterring them from not only settling in France but from staying there too. A policy of removal was implemented, and was complemented by a policy of combating fixation points, which was deployed on the Franco-British border, in particular. For the State, it was about pushing exiled people to "self-deport" by creating a hostile environment.

CHAPTER 11: PREVENTING EXILED PEOPLE FROM REMAINING IN FRANCE: HARASSING, EXPELLING, DISPERSING. THE FABRICATION OF A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT.

"France is creating a policy of deterrence. For migrants who are on the coast, whether or not they want to cross to Great Britain, who want to cross into Belgium, the whole system is based on the idea that if we create uncomfortable conditions, conditions that prohibit families, children, from being there, dangerous conditions (...) the thinking is that it is a deterrent for people crossing this way. That's the idea. It is a deterrent via disorganisation and fear"
(Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020).

The majority of exiled people present "on the border" were not, within the meaning of the Geneva Convention, capable of being deported. They satisfied the criteria for obtaining asylum. But, through a logic of impediment and the creation of a system aimed at denying them asylum, they survived in precarious living spaces. In Calais and Grande-Synthe, the State deployed a policy of combating fixation points and created a hostile environment in order to encourage them to self-deport, as Gérard Collomb sums up: "We're going to make them not want to come here" (I). This policy made the "pull factor" a scientific truth: "if exiled people are received under conditions that are too good, there will be more of them." Since their continued presence "on the border" undermined this idea, the policy of systematic destruction of living spaces supported a demonstration of the "strength of the State" as proof that it "controls migratory flows" (II).

I. “WE’RE GOING TO MAKE THEM NOT WANT TO COME HERE” (GÉRARD COLLOMB, MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR FROM 2017 TO 2018)

Unable to “effectively” deport exiled people along the Franco-British border, the State implemented a policy to combat fixation points. Already tested before 2017, this policy of systematic destruction of living spaces took an industrial turn in Calais and Grande-Synthe (1). In Calais, this policy was complemented by the fabrication of a hostile environment, jointly created by Natacha Bouchart, Mayor of Calais. Exiled people and their supporters were targeted, in order to prevent any concentration in the same place (2). In Grande-Synthe, the fire at La Linière – similar to the high profile of the Calais shanty town – acted as a symbol of the impossibility of reception, justifying application of the same policy of systematic dismantling of living spaces. This policy was appropriated by the Mayor of Grande-Synthe, Damien Carême. Expulsions took the form of “sheltering”, developed as a half-security, half-humanitarian system. When he handed over mayor of Grande-Synthe to Martial Beyaert, the system reinforced his coercive approach, while participating in the joint creation of a hostile environment (3). In these different situations, the objectives were the same: encourage the self-deportation of people that the State could not legally expel.

1. The policy to combat fixation points. The industrialisation of a proven practice

“The doctrine of the current government is to eliminate fixation points. Since 2004, this has been the doctrine of all successive governments. It is a doctrine that is not tenable when migratory routes dry up or are controlled. It is a doctrine that is still tenable but more difficult when migratory routes are very extensive.” (Matthieu P. senior official at the Ministry of the Interior)

The election of Emmanuel Macron revived and industrialised the policy of combatting fixation points. As soon as he was appointed Minister of the Interior, Gérard Collomb implemented a policy for the systematic dismantling of camps and squats in the city of Calais, and later in Grande-Synthe. The aim of this policy was to “disperse” exiled people, to “contain” them and to “make them invisible”. These practices took two forms: firstly, evictions followed by “forced sheltering” and, secondly, symbolic evictions of just a few metres, shortly after which the exiled people were able to resettle. This was a policy combining “exhaustion” and the “maintenance of public order”.

It was inspired by the fight against “illegal camps” which was already underway in Calais following the closure of the Sangatte camp. Introduced at the end of 2002, the aim of Operation Ulysses was to systematically destroy living spaces, to arrest their occupants and to remove them from the coast, taking them to police stations or accommodation centres before the exiles returned just a few hours or days later. For Nicolas Sarkozy, the aim was to demonstrate that the “Sangatte problem had been solved” (see: Chapter 3).

However, this system soon proved to be ineffective and costly. It was scaled back, allowing living spaces to be preserved. Evictions then became less frequent, with a more “spectacle-like” dimension. Several hundred people were evicted, arrested, locked up and removed from the coastline before returning. For the government, this was a means of showing its “strength”.

In Calais, the No Border movement established a policy of opening squats between 2009 and 2014. However, this led to the implementation of an aggressive policy by the new mayor of Calais to evict them. Close links were forged between the local authority, the police, the government and the judiciary to enforce systematic evictions. These living spaces existed for varying lengths of time, from a few days to weeks or months, and allowed exiled people to organise themselves and obtain shelter and respite, albeit precarious, between evictions. They also allowed their supporters to distribute food, provide access to water and healthcare and politicise the site in order to create a form of sanctuary (see: Chapter 7).

The fact remains that these places were ephemeral and constantly subjected to evictions or interventions by the police. Such interventions could involve gassing, clubbing or arresting the people who lived there, regardless of their status, in order to detain them in a CRA or a police station from a few minutes to several hours.

In 2015, the creation of the Jules Ferry Centre was accompanied by the demolition of all the living spaces in order to “fix” the exiled people in one place: the Calais shanty town. Its “spectacle-like” dismantling in October 2016 was accompanied by an active government policy to demolish any signs of the beginning of a living space. For the government, the aim was “to destroy anything that might resemble the beginnings of a living space” (PARROT, 2019, p. 186). According to Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020, these policies “consist of never giving people sleeping rough a break and ensuring that these people are always on the move.”

This policy was inspired by Nicolas Sarkozy's policy towards Roma populations in 2010, which Manuel Valls continued in 2012, justifying it with three main arguments: “the evacuation of land is an imperative necessity for security (the fight against trafficking); it is demanded by the inhabitants of working-class neighbourhoods; and, ultimately, the prefects are simply enforcing decisions made by the courts” (COUSIN, 2013). 165 Roma camps were evicted in 2013, and 430 in 2014 (BABELS, 2019, p. 75).

As soon as Gérard Collomb was appointed Minister of the Interior, these dismantling operations began to occur at an industrial pace - between 3 and 5 times a week per living space in 2017 - and involved the government and the municipality working in close cooperation to implement this policy. Each day, up to three or four living spaces were affected by these evictions. The process was the same: the police gained access to the living spaces, created a confined area and prevented associations and exiled people from entering before the municipal services intervened and destroyed or removed personal belongings and shelters. Interpreters or OFPRA officials were rarely present to explain the procedure or suggest entering the asylum process (HRO, 2019, p. 19). By observing police practices, exiles soon learned that every 48 hours a dismantling operation would take place, and they were therefore able to prepare for it. From 6 am onwards, the exiles would move their belongings just a few metres away, wait for the police to leave and then return back to the site to settle there once again.

Between 1 October and 4 December 2017, the association L'Auberge des migrants recorded²²⁶ 48 evictions from living spaces in Calais. In 2018, HRO recorded 452, a figure which rose to 961 in 2019, and 967 in 2020. In Grande-Synthe, the same logic was at work: there were 178 evictions in 2019 and 91 evictions in 2020 - this reduction is primarily explained by the health crisis, which led to a "pause" in evictions gradually initiated over several weeks.

Evictions in Calais and Grande-Synthe - 2018-2021 (source: HRO)				
	2018	2019	2020	2021 (as at 1 December)
Calais	452	961	967	1,080
Grande-Synthe	Unknown	178	91	62

In its report, HRO states that "99.5% of evictions are carried out with an unknown legal basis" and consist of the "forced relocation of living spaces of 2 to 500 metres, and/or their destruction":

"In practice, camp eviction and destruction operations are planned and executed outside of any legal framework; they involve the use of brute force, without a legal filter" (PARROT, 2019, p. 186).

Indeed, according to La Cabane Juridique [Legal Shelter], "the strategy developed by the various actors involved in these operations is to prevent any judicial supervision." The process of daily evictions implemented by Calais town hall, the judiciary, the State and the police adopts the following strategy: the police take note of an illegal settlement, the city council lodges a complaint and requests the granting of public force, which the state grants. During the eviction, the exiles move their belongings several metres away, the police establishes that there is no longer an infringement and informs the public prosecutor thereof, who closes the investigation. Subsequently, the services of Calais town hall clean up the site, and destroy or confiscate any personal belongings, duvets, tents and food left in the living space, believing that the belongings have been "abandoned".

Evictions are carried out in this routine manner and repeated every 48 hours. Such evictions are supported by the sub-prefect of Calais, Michel Tournaire, who explains that "it will last as long as it takes (...) years, if it has to be years"²²⁷, as well as by Gérald Darmanin, Minister of the Interior who, during a visit to Calais, explained:

"The instruction I gave to prevent the people of Calais from having to relive what they experienced a few years ago shows the strength of the police. It's true that this strength goes hand in hand with a very powerful presence and operations occurring every 24 or 48 hours."²²⁸

For Jacques Toubon, the rationale behind these evictions is to ensure that "migration is made difficult, chaotic and dangerous. This is the whole point of the harassment."

226. The recording of the number of evictions carried out by the police reflects the work performed by associations on this issue and the structuring of the HRO project since 2018. However, evictions were taking place prior to 2018 - and still today - without being observed and, therefore, without being quantified. Nonetheless, the number of evictions carried out today is not comparable to past periods.

227. "À Calais, des expulsions un matin sur deux 'le temps qu'il faudra'", *France Inter*, 12 January 2021.

228. "Gérald Darmanin défend 'la seule manière de faire' de l'État", *La Voix du Nord*, 23 July 2021.

These almost daily evictions are accompanied by larger, less frequent evictions when “there are too many people, their bodies too visible and the concept of the ‘migration crisis’ can no longer legitimise what clearly appears to be a public policy of mass homelessness. We must therefore make them disappear” (PARROT, 2019, p. 185).

On 29 September 2020, 800 exiled people in Calais were surrounded and forced onto buses chartered to remove them. In this case, the state mobilised CAESs - which replaced the CAOs - to move the exiled people away from the coast through “forced sheltering”. These “sheltering” operations were not preceded by a social diagnosis or a census of the people present. If they refused, the exiled people were threatened with an identity check, arrest and confinement in a CRA or police station.

But despite these evictions, the exiles kept coming back. And between evictions, their situation became even more precarious. The police began to question the usefulness of their actions, as the BABELS collective reports: “Faced with the inefficiency of their action, the police are no longer simply summoned to carry out tasks deemed unrewarding, they are also confronted with the absurdity of their mission” (2019, p. 44). In her thesis, Camille Guenebeaud was able to document testimonies from police officers about the failure of this deterrence policy:

“At numerous points during the interviews, they said that they feel ‘lost, drowned, (with) (...) a feeling of powerlessness and in some ways uselessness’, they are ‘overwhelmed’, ‘overcome’, ‘not much use’, ‘feeling ineffective’, ‘having to adopt an “every man for himself” attitude’, ‘working for nothing’ or for a ‘lost cause’ and as though they are emptying ‘the sea with a small spoon’” (2017, p. 222).

Even Gérald Darmanin has acknowledged the limitations of the system: “It is true, there is still this feeling of trying to empty something that is filling up, even if it is filling up less. But this is the only way to prevent unacceptable things from happening in Calais.”²²⁹

In addition, the practice of detention in Calais complements the eviction of people from their living spaces, and prioritises those who can be evicted so that the police can meet their quantified targets, reports the Babels collective: “Albanian nationals, who accounted for 53.5% of the people detained in the Coquelles CRA in 2014, have been the most affected by evictions for several years (...) Such a targeted approach makes it possible to meet the quantified targets of immigration policy” (BABELS 2019, p. 66).

Indeed, at the Franco-British border, the majority of the exiled people present cannot be returned to their country of origin: “Since 2006, of the 500 to 1,500 people deported each year after being held in the CRA in Coquelles, near Calais, more than half (55% to 85% depending on the year) have been sent back to an EU country” (BABELS; 2019, p. 65). The fact remains that in 2017, “the prefectures of Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Paris detained more than 3,000 people from countries to which deportation was (at least in theory) impossible” (PARROT, 2019, p. 245).

The policy in Calais and Grande-Synthe aims to “exhaust” the exiled people, but also make them invisible. For the State, the purpose of eviction is to “contain” these “undesirables” that it cannot deport. The practice of detention compounds this deterrence approach, where the aim is to instil fear in exiled people to remind them that arrest and detention are always on the cards. We can observe a form of “government by anxiety” (CHAMAYOU, 2010), whereby the state “seeks to constantly remind them of their illegal

229. “Gérald Darmanin defends the government’s ‘only way of getting things done’”, *La Voix du Nord*, 23 July 2021.

status and deprive them of their capacity for resistance” (BACHELLERIE, 2020). These elements play an important role in creating a hostile environment, particularly in Calais.

2. Joint efforts in Calais to create a hostile environment for exiles and their supporters

“We are not willing to have a fixation point here that would result in 7,000 people being settled here in the long term. This would be totally unbearable and, as you know, neither good for the migrants, nor for the inhabitants of Calais or the economy” (Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior from 2017 to 2018, 23 June 2017)

Since the election of Natacha Bouchart as mayor of Calais in 2008, joint efforts have been made to implement the deterrence policy. Since 2016 and the dismantling of the Calais shanty town, this deterrence approach has been revived and stepped up a gear. For the State and the local authority, the aim is to create a hostile environment to encourage the self-deportation of those who cannot be deported under the Geneva Convention. As we have seen above, this policy involves fighting against fixation points, but is also accompanied by other practices, such as daily harassment, police violence, discrimination, prevention of access to fundamental rights, obstacles and intimidation towards associations and supporters.

According to Jacques Toubon, the aim of this hostile environment is to create “a living situation that they are encouraged to leave or not to come to.” He continues:

“There are some texts, some circulars, which say that people should not remain in one place, and even when it is not explicitly mentioned, the daily instructions given to the police say the same thing.”

The government's strategy is to “make everyday life unbearable” for exiles: “The possibility of police checks at any time makes them all the more vulnerable as nowhere is safe from such interventions. It is a technique of governing by anxiety that aims to push migrants to leave the territory of their own accord” (BABELS, 2019, p. 86).

This strategy of “self-deportation” is used against Roma populations, in particular, as described by Éric Fassin:

“Here we see how self-deportation works: by creating unbearable conditions for those who are claimed to have left of their own accord. But to make life more difficult for Roma people in France than it is in Romania or Bulgaria, you can imagine that the bar must be set very low. Making life unbearable is probably the cheapest way to get ‘those people’ to leave; it is also the most costly for them, by definition” (FASSIN, 2014, p. 45).

This policy is reflected in the blatant and systematic way in which exiled people are denied access to basic necessities. For example, in the six months following the dismantling of the Calais shanty town, between 500 and 1,000 people were recorded to be living in the city. These people were dispersed and their living spaces systematically destroyed by the police. Associations in Calais organised “outreach missions” to distribute meals to exiled people.

In March 2017, Natacha Bouchart issued two decrees prohibiting food distribution in the centre of Calais, and then on the outskirts when the associations decided to move. When the case was referred to the Administrative Court of Lille by the associations, the court suspended these two orders, ruling the mayor to be “seriously and manifestly unlawful in her infringement of the right to freedom of movement” and that it was preventing “migrants from meeting their basic vital needs”.

Despite this court ruling, the Defender of Rights deplored the fact that “only one distribution by an association is permitted per evening, for one hour, which is not enough to feed all those in need.” Furthermore, food distributions that took place in other places and at other times were “forbidden by police, on the grounds of ‘instructions from the prefecture’.”²³⁰

In 2018, the association La Vie Active - which was already involved with the Jules Ferry Centre - was commissioned to distribute meals. Due to the policy of fighting against fixation points, the association carried out distributions in the form of outreach missions, which made it difficult to pinpoint exiled people. To compensate for the government's failings, the associations continued to make these distributions. However, in October 2019, a new municipal decree was introduced that prohibited them from doing so, before it was suspended again by the court in Lille. On 10 September 2020, Gérald Darmanin, the new Minister of the Interior, issued a prefectural decree - still in force in the summer of 2021 - prohibiting the distribution of free food and drink in the centre of Calais.

This is just one example of how the town hall and the government can work together to prevent exiled people from accessing food. The government bypasses court decisions by involving police or issuing a new prefectural decree. A similar approach can be observed regarding access to water and showers.

Indeed, in 2017, the government and the town hall refused to install water points and showers in the town. To address this, in March 2017, Secours Catholique installed showers for exiled people at its premises. The town hall of Calais decided to prevent people from entering, before a court decision obliged it to stop “obstructing” access. Following this, the police stationed themselves near the facility, checking and arresting the exiled people who wanted to use them.

In June 2017, in light of the government's failings, the support associations summoned the government and Calais town hall before the Administrative Court of Lille. The latter issued a favourable opinion regarding their request, prompting an appeal to the Council of State by the Ministry of the Interior, which upheld the court's judgement. The Council of State ruled:

“That the living conditions of the migrants reveal a failure on the part of the public authorities, which is likely to expose the persons concerned to inhumane or degrading treatment and which therefore constitutes a serious and manifestly unlawful infringement of fundamental freedom.”²³¹

The government and Calais town hall were therefore ordered to install water points and toilets, provide access to showers and to organise outreach missions for unaccompanied minors and bus departures to CAOs.

230. “À Calais : le Défenseur des droits pointe ‘une inédite gravité’”, *AFP*, 15 June 2017.

231. Council of State, Conditions of reception of migrants in Calais, Decision of 31 July 2017.

The measures put in place by the State were nonetheless inadequate, as revealed by the CNCDH, which points out the shortcomings in terms of “access to water, food, hygiene, healthcare, means of communication and, above all, decent accommodation.”²³² In addition, these measures were hampered by the police, with increasing numbers of arrests in the vicinity or gassings to make the food unfit for consumption.

In the city of Calais, a discriminatory policy was introduced. This served as a daily reminder that exiled people do not belong there. We can therefore observe discriminatory practices within the spaces and structures that make up the city, where a real “struggle for space” became apparent.

In November 2015, Natacha Bouchart changed the internal rules of the municipal swimming pool and the media library. People wishing to go there were required to present an identity document and proof of address. Exiled people who used these facilities were being specifically targeted. The mayor of Calais, then campaigning for the regional elections, said:

“Above all, it is a question of returning the equipment back to its users. We are calling for tolerance, but we are trying to put a reasonable framework around this situation which is creating tension and behaviour that is disruptive to the smooth running of the pool.”²³³

Other spaces were handled differently, including shops, where exiled people were “chased” out of the premises, before being violated by the police at “the entrance to the shop with batons and tear gas” (LE BERRE, MICHELET, 2021).

On public transport - although free in Calais since 2019 - exiled people are repeatedly discriminated against. They were “..forced to ride at the back (...) or even forced to get off by the inspectors or police officers, without any objective reason and sometimes with physical violence” (LE BERRE, MICHELET, 2021).

In her thesis, Camille Guenebeaud shows how cafés and restaurants also play a part in this discrimination, by treating exiled people differently. She explains that when they enter the premises, they are “separated” from tourists and regulars and sometimes have to pay to use the toilet.

There is an obvious desire on the part of Natacha Bouchart and the government to “separate Calais natives from migrants” (GUENEBEAUD, 2017, p. 340). The aim is twofold: to remind people of the place given to exiles and to show them that they are not welcome in the public sphere. When exiles become too visible, the police step in to take over the regulations and practices established by private and public institutions.

The hostility emanating from the city is complemented by police harassment and violence. As early as 2011, the No Border movement published a report listing a series of acts of violence against exiled people: gassing, beating with batons, insults, nuisance awakenings, destruction of personal belongings, evictions with no legal basis. This report, which was examined by the Defender of Rights at the time, Dominique Baudis, was contested by the Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls, who explained:

“The events referred to in your decision are essentially based on declarations by association leaders relating to unverifiable statements about past events that no objective evidence can support today.”²³⁴

232. CNCDH, Opinion on the situation of exiled people in Calais and Grande-Synthe, 11 February 2021.

233. “Migrants de Calais : des mesures prises pour éviter leur présence à la piscine Icéo” [Migrants in Calais: measures taken to prevent them from attending the Icéo swimming pool], *La Voix du Nord*, 19 November 2015.

234. Correspondence of 6 March 2013.

In 2016, when the shanty town existed, the associations doubled down on their efforts and systematically recorded police violence and evictions from living spaces. New associations emerged to document the abuse of exiled people. Indeed, according to a Refugee Rights Europe survey conducted between 2016 and 2017, "out of 213 exiles, 89.2% have been victims of police abuse since their arrival in Calais"²³⁵: gassing, beatings, insults, destruction of personal belongings, etc. These statements were corroborated by a survey commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior in October 2017, which highlighted "the abusive use of tear gas and the disproportionate, even unjustified, use of force."²³⁶

Thanks to the work of associations, it is possible to regularly raise awareness of this violence against exiled people, particularly through video recordings. But the fact remains that exiled people are doubly penalised in this respect. On the one hand, when they attempt to access the legal system to report the violence they suffer, this access comes at a cost, since it exposes their identity and their irregular situation. On the other hand, because of their (non-)status, their voice is marginalised and disqualified by the public authorities.

Volunteers are also intimidated and harassed, fined²³⁷, subjected to identity and traffic checks²³⁸, searches, pat-downs and insults. The police regularly check volunteers' cars, especially when they are taking exiled people to showers, distribution points or care facilities²³⁹.

Legal action has been taken against volunteers, such as Tom Ciotkowski. During a dismantling operation under a bridge in Calais, Help Refugees observed and reported on the operation. In the arrest report, three officers of the CRS stated that "vehement" members of associations had used violence against them, including Tom Ciotkowski who "allegedly pushed a CRS officer firmly in the chest." He was then indicted on 31 July 2018 for "contempt and violence against a police officer" in Calais.

On 20 June 2019, the court of Boulogne-sur-Mer acquitted him. The videos shown in court and the testimonies of the volunteers proved that it was the police officer who had committed the act of violence, while his colleagues made false accusations against the volunteer. On 2 September 2021, the CRS officer was sentenced to 18 months' suspended imprisonment and a two-year ban on working.

The 2020 lockdown period provided a window of opportunity for further offences. For example, the police routinely fined associations and volunteers for "failure to comply with lockdown rules". Utopia 56 calculated the amount owed to be as follows: "more than 10,000 euros", "despite the production of all the necessary certificates"²⁴⁰. These fines were issued when the volunteers were distributing food, visiting living spaces or observing dismantling operations. The cars belonging to the associations were targeted and subjected to particularly stringent police checks to delay them for as long as possible. The aim of the police - with the support of the prefecture - was to make police practices invisible, obstruct actions of solidarity and criminalise supporters.

235. Refugee Rights Europe, Six Months On, 2017.

236. IGP [French General Inspectorate of the National Police], IGA [French General Inspectorate of Administration], IGGN [General Inspectorate of the National Gendarmerie], Evaluation of police action in Calais and the Dunkirk region, October 2017.

237. L'Auberge des migrants, Utopia 56, Help Refugees, Refugee Info Bus, Calais: the police harassment of volunteers, 2018. Amnesty International, Targeting Solidarity, 2019.

238. "C'est de l'abus de pouvoir : à Calais, les bénévoles en colère face aux pressions policières" ["It's 'an abuse of power': in Calais, volunteers are angry about police pressure], *France Info*, 22 July 2017.

239. "À Calais, les bénévoles auprès des migrants font face aux violences policières" ["In Calais, volunteers working with migrants face police violence"], *Infomigrants*, 17 August 2018.

240. "La solidarité entravée : un documentaire au côté des équipes de Calais et Grande-Synthe" ["Obstructed solidarity: a documentary with the teams in Calais and Grande-Synthe"], *Utopia 56*, 9 April 2021.

The deterrence policy aimed to create an environment that was sufficiently hostile to encourage the self-deportation of exiled people that the State cannot legally deport. In Calais, this policy was implemented jointly through an alliance between the government and the town hall. In Grande-Synthe, the situation was more ambivalent, as the support that Damien Carême wanted to put in place was contested by the State. When he became an MEP, the new socialist mayor gave minimal support due to pressure from the judiciary and associations, yet at the same time allied himself with the government in the deployment of the deterrence policy.

3. In Grande-Synthe: from La Linière to joint efforts towards deterrence

From 2008 to 2016, the Basroch camp was a municipal living space where exiled people could find respite - albeit precarious - from the dismantling operations taking place in Calais. When the number of exiled people increased, an emergency accommodation facility was set up by the Grande-Synthe town hall and MSF in March 2016. Until April 2017, it served as a safe space protected from police activities and evictions, offering shelter and meeting some of their basic needs.

The fire started at La Linière on 10 April 2017 was used to symbolise the impossibility of receiving exiles on the coast. The Ministry of the Interior prohibited any reconstruction of living spaces and promoted a policy of fighting against fixation points, similar to the one in place in Calais. Both Damien Carême and his replacement as mayor of Grande-Synthe, Martial Beyaert, seem to have appropriated this government objective. The "sheltering" arrangement between Damien Carême and the government emerged as a compromise with distinct aims - humanity versus firmness (a), before Martial Beyaert aligned himself with the state's wishes (b). In both cases, the objective was the same: to move exiled people away from the coast.

A. "Sheltering" as a way of managing exiled people

The deterrence policy implemented in Grande-Synthe took the form of an exile management method based on the "sheltering" arrangement. This was an approach that combined "humanity" and "firmness". The idea was to dismantle living spaces, remove the exiles from them and offer them a place of respite before the majority of them resettled in Grande-Synthe in the hope of crossing to Great Britain. However, this policy very quickly evolved into a coercive approach.

The "sheltering" arrangement was created and implemented on 20 November 2015 in response to the Calais shanty town. The aim of the arrangement was to "control and reduce as effectively as possible (...) the population of the camp that has been built around the Jules Ferry day centre." The circular stated that "each migrant present in Calais must be offered shelter elsewhere in the Pas-de-Calais region, if he or she so wishes and if he or she abandons the idea of illegally travelling to the United Kingdom."

In Grande-Synthe, this system was put in place to reduce the number of exiles present. However, the lack of places in CAOs made it difficult to achieve the ambitious goals of the arrangement. The use of "sheltering" as a policy for dispersing exiled people can be seen from as early as the La Linière fire on 10 April 2017. Indeed, following the fire, nearly 1,000 exiled people were accommodated in gymnasiums in the Dunkirk area, and any attempts to rebuild living spaces were prevented. Buses were chartered to evacuate the gymnasiums so that the exiled people could be sent to centres further inland.

In the days that followed, 600 people returned to Grande-Synthe, settling in a protected wooded area called Le Puythouck with no accommodation, toilets or showers. Their living conditions were precarious and municipal facilities basic: eight water points were installed in July 2017. At the same time, the local authority was working with the government to prevent the creation of living spaces in this area, seeking an alternative by creating a camp similar to La Linière, as Claire Millot from the Salam association explains:

"Damien Carême gathered us together and told us: 'I'm going to reopen the La Linière camp. I want migrants to have a place of their own, in peace, where they are accepted, not disturbed' (...) All round, all the associations threw their hands in the air saying: 'Yeah, that's great, good idea, when do we start?' (...) Damien Carême told us that he needed a few days to check."

Olivier Caremelle, director of the mayor's office of Grande-Synthe at the time, confirms these "temptations": "We were tempted to reopen once, twice, we were very close to doing so..." But he continues: "We felt that it was a bit cobbled together, it was all just talk." As Claire Millot can attest: "After a few days of waiting, everything stopped. The sub-prefect proposed a reception centre, but in reality this just meant daily buses to a reception centre... I got the impression that he was messing us around."

The threat to reopen the La Linière camp seemed to be a symbolic way of gaining leverage in the negotiations with the State. Damien Carême explained to us that the emerging reception system "was a power struggle with the prefect, who said: 'There can be sheltering, but only if it is voluntary. And only if the people are not taken to the Basque Country or Limoges. They will only accept it if it stays within the region.'"

Starting in the summer of 2017, when between 400 and 800 exiled people were still present in the Puythouck camp, up to three "sheltering" operations were organised, with the obligation that the exiles be "sheltered" in the region: "The sub-prefect played along. It was in the region, it may have been 60 or 80 kilometres away, but at least it was in the region (...) We would empty it... then it would reappear."

This adaptation of the sheltering arrangement appeared to be a compromise between the mayor and local government representatives. But it was also a kind of government recruitment of Damien Carême in the fight against fixation points. The term "eviction" was replaced by "sheltering", in a logic similar to that of Operation Ulysses, which was deployed in the aftermath of the Grande-Synthe camp: dismantling and dispersal by removal.

On 18 September 2017, when Damien Carême met Gérard Collomb, the new Minister of the Interior, he tried to pressure him into establishing a day centre in Grande-Synthe. Gérard Collomb refused, and then explained to Damien Carême how he would manage exiled people in the future: "We're going to make them not want to come here (...) There is a dividing line all along the coastline that goes towards England. There will never be a reception centre on this coastline!"

The next day, Gérard Collomb declared a state of emergency to evict the Puythouck camp "for humanitarian reasons" without informing Grande-Synthe town hall, as Damien Carême explains: "Without warning, they arranged to carry out a sheltering operation for the people at Grande-Synthe. (...) They had designed the reception facilities thinking that there were 300 or 400 people, but there were actually 700... so they were completely

overwhelmed."In addition, this "sheltering" was compulsory, with exiled people being forced onto buses while their belongings were destroyed by police²⁴¹.

A few days later, almost 400 exiled people resettled in Puythouck. Two new schemes were then introduced. The first was on the initiative of the town hall and involved the opening of a day centre for women and children, which opened at the end of October 2017. The second, on the initiative of the government, was a "day centre" in the form of a bus providing tea and coffee. OFII officers and the Adoma association were also on hand to provide information on asylum application procedures and assisted returns. At the same time, the AFEJI association – which intervened at La Linière – carried out outreach activities to encourage exiled people to move into accommodation centres.

The aim to "empty" the Puythouck camp through discussions was compromised by repeated "sheltering" operations, most notably that of 30 October 2017, when 450 exiled people were removed only to return later on. In November 2017, when nearly 1,000 exiled people were present, their shelters were destroyed, while fathers were threatened with being taken to a CRA and having their children taken away from them for "mistreatment", explains Claire Millot, from the Salam association. Under pressure from the state services, the Puythouck camp was reduced to just over a hundred people at the beginning of December 2017. On 11 December 2017, during a snowstorm, "the police removed the tents and duvets right before our eyes", Claire Millot recalls.

According to Damien Carême, the aim was to "liberate" Puythouck: "to preserve this space and allow the families of Grande-Synthe to continue to enjoy it... it is where they come for fresh air." During this particularly harsh winter period, the town hall made a municipal gymnasium available to the exiled people: the Espace Jeunes du Moulin. The aim was to "shelter" exiled people, while maintaining public order. An agreement was signed with the government to "finance and secure" the gymnasium, says Olivier Caremelle: "We managed to get the government to agree to it, because they needed to fund it too."

In the aftermath, tensions arose with the associations. After all, many exiled people did not want to go to the municipal gymnasium and would have preferred to set up shelters in Puythouck. The associations continued to visit Puythouck, providing the exiled people with food and access to healthcare, among other things. But this was unacceptable to Damien Carême:

"I exchanged some rather harsh words with the associations. I had asked the associations to come and do the distribution and follow-ups in the gymnasium and not to stay at Puythouck so that everyone would come to the gymnasium."

The two spaces coexisted. At the beginning of 2018, there were three evictions every week at Puythouck, while the gymnasium could accommodate between 200 and 400 people. It appeared to be an emergency facility, similar to La Linière, which was limited and with a scheduled closure. It provided a place of respite for exiled people. On 24 May 2018, the gymnasium was evacuated by the police at the request of the town hall: 450 exiled people were sent to the CAOs and CAESs in the region.

241. On 7 March 2019, the matter having been referred by the support associations and exiles, the administrative court of Lille condemned the prefect of the Nord region for this illegal eviction. The court stated that the decision "was flawed by an error of law", and that it was "based neither on a judicial decision ordering the eviction, without right or title, of the occupants from the public domain, nor on a decision of the Prefect of Nord himself." The court also noted that the sheltering operation was carried out "without the consent" of the exile people "before departure and that the tents were destroyed by the police."

In order to prevent exiles from moving back to Puythouck, Damien Carême proposed “a settlement project next to the Air Liquide factory, a SEVESO classified site”, explains Claire Millot, who continues: “He had planned to stabilise the land, build toilets and showers, but the migrants moved in straight away, the work never started and the camp was regularly evacuated by the police.” On 11 June 2018, the site was evacuated completely and fenced off.

On 14 June 2018, a new camp was established near the marshalling yard. The town hall installed a water point, portable toilets and showers on a trailer, while every Thursday, the police carried out “sheltering” operations (11 evictions during the summer). After a few weeks, the exiled people started to move out the day before in order to avoid these “sheltering” operations, demonstrating the coercive nature of the system. On 6 September 2018, 1,000 people were evacuated and “sheltered” by the police, with arrests made in the city in the days that followed.

Following the eviction, Damien Carême published a press release in which he denounced the inadequacy of the “sheltering” system, without protesting the actions of the police:

“For months I have been insisting that sheltering be organised for these people. (...) The operation carried out today by the Prefecture of Nord therefore partly fulfils the requests I made. Everything suggests to me that people were cared for with the utmost respect thanks, in particular, to the commitment of OFII staff. I am happy about this. (...) I would like to take this opportunity today to remind the government that the sheltering policy as it operates in Grande-Synthe is necessary but inadequate.”²⁴²

Each “sheltering” operation makes the situation even more precarious for exiled people who have been refused asylum, dUBLINED or who are in an irregular situation and who see a crossing to Great Britain as an alternative. Indeed, in the wake of this operation, 500 exiled people returned and settled in Puythouck, where they tried to re-establish a living space. Four evictions took place in the following weeks: on 18 and 28 September, and on 1 and 23 October 2018. Between each operation, police officers intervened in the camp, used tear gas during food distributions, arrested volunteers and prevented foreign volunteers from entering.

The evacuation on 23 October 2018 involved 2,000 exiled people. This is the same number as for the Basroch camp, three years earlier. Living conditions were extremely unhealthy: lack of water, difficulties in organising food distributions, limited access to healthcare. For “humanitarian” reasons, a “sheltering” operation was organised, with Damien Carême declaring: “We couldn't go on like that. Everyone had been asking for this eviction for weeks.”²⁴³

As it was impossible to set up a reception facility similar to the one in the humanitarian camp, the exiled people were dispersed, only to return in the days that followed. Puythouck was redeveloped, while a new living space was created near the “Ferme des Jésuites” [Jesuit Farm]. “Sheltering” operations continued in November 2018. According to Claire Millot, “the town hall wanted to carry out a full-scale evacuation to bring the number down to 150 adult men and 50 family members, with the idea of housing some of them in the gymnasium and others in a day centre.”

242. Communiqué of 7 September 2018.

243. “Grande-Synthe : nouvelle évacuation d'un campement de migrants, Castaner affiche sa ‘fermeté’” [“Grande-Synthe: New evacuation of a migrant camp, Castaner shows his ‘firmness’”], *AFP*, 23 October 2018.

Thus, on 27 December 2018, the gymnasium was reopened and accommodated 120 people. Nearby, several hundred exiled people were taking up residence. Sheltering became an option while social workers tried to enrol exiles in the system. Meanwhile, the Puythouck camp remained and was home to about a hundred exiled people.

These two living spaces were treated differently by the police, the government and the local authority. While the gymnasium and its surroundings were becoming a place of respite from police interventions, the Puythouck camp was subject to 33 evictions between January and March 2018. This is a clear example of the tensions that emerged between municipal living spaces and living spaces belonging to their occupants. There was effectively a contrast between a form of management organised and tolerated by the public authorities and a form of organisation subjected to imposed marginality. The former complies with the logic of policing, concentration and making the exiled people invisible; the latter contradicts it.

The gymnasium gradually became institutionalised. 900 exiled people were recorded to be using the facility. But nonetheless, living conditions were precarious, prompting the local authority and associations to take the matter to the Council of State, which “confirmed the failure of the State authorities to provide access to water, hygiene and sanitary facilities. It therefore ordered the Prefect of Nord to install a sufficient number of water points, showers and sanitary facilities, and to set up outreach initiatives to inform exiled people of their rights²⁴⁴.

By recognising the gymnasium as a living space, the courts forced the sub-prefect of Dunkirk, Éric Étienne, to take action. In response, the latter provided very basic accommodation to ensure that it could not be deemed a “fixation point”. Indeed, the associations criticised the inadequacy of the facility:

“Five showers (...) or even ten, for 800 people is not enough (...) Exiled people only have access to these showers for one hour in the morning and two hours in the afternoon, which means that not everyone can have a shower.”²⁴⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the La Linière fire, we can see how a half-security-focused, half-humanitarian approach manifested itself, namely through “sheltering”. Originally intended to be a system based on the voluntary participation of exiled people, it was negotiated and appropriated in Grande-Synthe and transformed into a mechanism for dismantling living spaces. The aim was to achieve three main objectives: offering areas of respite to exiled people, reducing the number of exiled people in Grande-Synthe and preventing “fixation points”. Despite the humanitarian intentions of the arrangement, the strategy of coercive dispersion took precedence over the will of the exiled people, as demonstrated by the fact that they returned within a matter of days. The government and the local authority created delays, forcing exiles to postpone their crossing of the border. These “sheltering” operations displaced, distanced and dispersed exiled people, making their living conditions even more precarious. In turn, these precarious living conditions legitimised the “sheltering” operations. When Damien Carême became an MEP for EELV, he left the town hall in the hands of his socialist deputy, Martial Beyaert. In the days that followed, Beyaert called for the evacuation of the gymnasium, while the fight against fixation points intensified. Consequently, the policy in Grand-Synthé became more aligned with the one in Calais.

244. Council of State, Grande-Synthe: The Council of State orders better information campaigns and the provision of sanitary facilities and water points, 21 June 2019.

245. “Grande-Synthe : la préfecture installe des douches et des sanitaires pour les migrants” [Grande-Synthe: the prefecture installs showers and toilets for migrants], *France Info*, 4 July 2019.

b. Premises under pressure. The creation of a hostile environment in Grande-Synthe

“The government has given me its word: all efforts will be made to ensure that camps do not re-form. The sub-prefect also assured me that sheltering operations will be carried out in Hauts-de-France to prevent the migrants being scattered all over the country and trying to return to Grande-Synthe at all costs.”(Martial Beyaert, mayor of Grande-Synthe, 25 July 2019²⁴⁶)

On 3 July 2019, when Martial Beyaert took over from Damien Carême as mayor of Grande-Synthe, the gymnasium was accommodating nearly 1,000 people. The new socialist mayor began his term of office by holding a meeting with the associations, as Claire Millot from the Salam association explains:

“He was very open, very compassionate, telling us: ‘I, Martial Beyaert, mayor, will not allow anyone to die at the bottom of a building. I am all too familiar with the situation: during evictions, people leave by bus, the next day they come back, it doesn't make sense’. He was on the same page as us. Ten days later, we saw him again with sub-prefect Éric Étienne. The discourse had changed completely: ‘I’m with Mr Étienne. Unlike Damien Carême, who has broken off any discussions with the government We will work hand in hand, so there will be an evacuation.’”

Nathanaël Caillaux, from Secours Catholique, agreed that the new mayor was aligning himself with the government: “He told us: ‘It's not my responsibility, it's the government that has to take charge and so I will respect the government's view and approach.’” Olivier Caremelle, former director of the mayor's office of Grande-Synthe, explained that immediately after their departure (with Damien Carême), the government “took control”.

On Wednesday 17 July 2019, Martial Beyaert requested the evacuation of the gymnasium, where nearly 1,000 exiled people were being housed. To justify his decision, he explained that there was “illegal business” being conducted on the premises, that there were “smugglers”, and he also mentioned his “responsibility” towards the local residents. With the gymnasium overflowing, there are health problems and noise pollution, which I can't ignore²⁴⁷. According to Damien Carême, Martial Beyaert was “pressured by the government”. After obtaining court approval, the gymnasium was evacuated on 17 September 2019. 811 people were evacuated and “sheltered” in CAOs and CAESs.

At the same time, there were still living spaces in Puythouck and around the Ferme des Jésuites. After the evacuation of the gymnasium, the exiled people quickly returned and settled near the former La Linière camp. In October 2019, between 400 and 500 people moved into hangars to protect themselves from the cold.

The lack of a municipal reception centre led to an increase in evictions; meanwhile, a hostile environment was beginning to emerge. At the same time, the fall in the number of places at CAOs and CAESs called into question the system, where restrictions seemed to take precedence over unconditionality. Together, these three phenomena played an important role in reinforcing the commitment to encourage exiled people to self-deport.

246. “Grande-Synthe: ‘On ne peut pas laisser notre gymnase devenir une zone de non-droit où les passeurs font du business’” [“Grande-Synthe: ‘we can't let our gym become a lawless zone where smugglers do business’”], *Infomigrants*, 25 July 2019.

247. “Grande-Synthe: ‘On ne peut pas laisser notre gymnase devenir une zone de non-droit où les passeurs font du business’” [“Grande-Synthe: ‘we can't let our gym become a lawless zone where smugglers do business’”], *Infomigrants*, 25 July 2019.

From 1 January to 1 July 2019, HRO recorded 59 evictions, an average of 10 evictions per month. From 1 July to 31 December 2019, 119 evictions were recorded, i.e. almost 20 evictions per month. HRO, which observed the evictions of living spaces, noted "a shift towards security and repression in policy (...) and an alignment with the situation in Calais" (HRO, 2019, p. 7).

Benoît Ferré²⁴⁸, Martial Beyaert's director of office, followed the evictions in Grande-Synthe. According to him, the practice was based on joint efforts to deter exiled people, with the government setting the pace, as he further explains:

" - BF: It's the owner who asks the government to carry out evictions. Today, they are on our property (...) There is a bailiff coming by to take note. The mayor makes an order, he sends it to the government and the prefecture, saying: 'I authorise the police to carry out an eviction' (...) The government prefers it to be the local authority, as it is more reactive. (...) Afterwards, the government intervenes when it wants, giving us notice beforehand.

- PB: Do you request the evictions, or does the government ask for them?

- BF: Often the government gets in touch with us, saying: 'They are in such and such a place. Can you give us authorisation to evict them?'"

These evictions are carried out under pressure from the government which, given that the land is municipal, implements its policy of combating fixation points in cooperation with the local authority. When Benoît Ferré is asked about the "effectiveness of evictions", he repeats the rhetoric used by the government: "In the words of the French government: "Regardless of whether a camp is illegal or well-regulated, it will attract many people. If we allow this to continue, even more of them will pop up.'" The local authority complies with the recommendations of the government, and participates in the eviction procedures by putting municipal officers at the service of the State, as he explains:

"The police tell them to get on the buses or leave. Then they remove them from the site. If they don't get on, they are removed and the camp is destroyed. (...) Ramery takes care of removing the tents. And we, the municipal service, clean up the smaller waste."

Right from the start of Damien Carême's term of office, the policy of combating fixation points was stepped up a gear and relied upon using joint efforts to deter exiled people. The "sheltering" operations, used as a means of dispersal, were hampered in particular as the number of exiled people in Grande-Synthe increased and evictions intensified.

Indeed, although outreach activities were organised by AFEJI to push exiled people to go to reception centres, places were limited, explains HRO: "People (...) due to a lack of information and/or interpreter, do not show up at the bus in question, as they are unaware that it exists" (HRO, 2019, p. 19). Benoît Ferré expressed his disappointment at the absence of the OFII, explaining that previously "they had interpreters to explain to migrants how to apply to stay in France. They do that much less now."

In addition, when evictions took place, spaces in accommodation centres were few and far between. Exiles who wanted to be taken care of were therefore refused access. Faced with these refusals, a couple and a family took the issue to court. At the hearing of 1 August 2019, the prefecture of Nord explained that "the State's accommodation system is saturated and (there is) no accommodation available for this type of large family." "Single men" were regularly unable to access accommodation, explained HRO.

Faced with a limited number of places, the police actively tried to deter certain people from boarding the buses by increasing the number of identity checks. This created a

248. Interview conducted on 28 May 2021.

sense of “fear and reluctance to come to the bus, but also mistrust of this system” among exiled people (HRO, 2019, p. 21).

In addition to the evictions, the police played an ongoing part in creating a hostile environment for exiled people. In the vicinity of the living spaces, identity checks were regularly carried out, leading to “mass arrests” according to HRO, which reported that on 11 October 2019, “60 people were arrested at six in the morning” and “around 30 people” were arrested on 25 November 2019. The police regularly positioned themselves near water points and food distribution points.

In October and November 2019, when exiled people were arrested and taken to police stations and CRAs along the coast, the police put “wristbands with handwritten numbers around their wrists (...) When they were at Lille police station, the police officers would only call them by their respective numbers and not by their first and last names” (HRO, 2019, p. 15).

As in Calais, in private spaces, exiled people were likely to experience hostility. During the first lockdown in 2020, the Auchan shop in Grande-Synthe created two queues: one for Caucasians, and the other for people identified as exiles because of their characteristics, appearance and mannerisms (LE BERRE, MICHELET, 2021). The guards followed the company's instructions and were supported by the CRS in the vicinity. In January 2021, the same company reintroduced this exclusionary approach by denying exiled people access to the shop²⁴⁹.

Alongside these joint efforts to deter exiled people, the fight against fixation points also included the local authority's contribution to the installation of water points, toilets and showers. However, these “humanitarian” approaches were nevertheless followed by evictions and the dismantling of living spaces.

Therefore, following the removal of the gymnasium facilities, 400 to 500 exiled people settled in the hangars near the former camp of La Linière. In early 2020, the local authority provided a water tank and soap, and 24 showers and 4 toilets were installed in April. Meanwhile, evictions continued, before the final evacuation occurred on 3 June 2020. The hangars were walled up to prevent them from being accessed in the future.

The exiled people moved and resettled in Puythouck. AT that point, as Claire Millot explains, the exiled people “were far away from the only drinking water point, with no toilets, no showers, and some distance from the meal distribution point.” In September 2020, the local authority relocated the water point and installed a rubbish skip and six dry toilets. The CUD provides access to showers in a gymnasium in Dunkirk.

Although the city was offering basic facilities to exiled people, the evictions continued. In 2020, HRO recorded 91 evictions, including 33 between September and December. During these evictions, 149 arrests were recorded for the year, including almost 80 in September and October alone. In the first half of 2021, evictions continued to be a daily occurrence, with 43 evictions recorded up to 1 September 2021.

In April 2021, while the exiled people were still at Puythouck, the town hall wanted to reclaim the site, as Benoît Ferré informed us: “It was almost summer, it's a great place for kids and families. We wanted the migrants to leave before the summer.” The local authority wanted to move the exiled people as it felt they were too visible. A new living

249. “Grande-Synthe : Des migrants interdits d'entrer dans un supermarché par la police” [“Grande-Synthe: Migrants banned from entering supermarket by police”], *France Info*, 10 January 2021.

space was planned in Petit-Prédembourg, about 3 kilometres away. Benoît Ferré explains the operation that took place on 16 April 2021:

“We moved them to Prédembourg. We wanted them to leave the Puythouck (...) We tolerated their presence in Prédembourg, where it's more discreet... We were trying to make it work for everyone (...) The municipal services helped us to transport the bags.”

According to Nathanaël Caillaux of Secours Catholique, this move was made without any prior discussion: “Without anyone being informed, neither the associations nor the exiled people, they saw the town hall's tractors arrive, and the people were told: ‘You're going to have to leave this site, we'll take all your stuff and take it to another site.’”

This new living space consisted of a wooded area large enough to accommodate up to 20 different communities, and has been home to almost 500 people since April 2021. The town hall installed various water and electricity points, and wanted the exiled people to “stay there”, explains Benoît Ferré:

“We wanted them to be somewhere that's reasonably pleasant for everyone. And we put in the basics, electricity for their phones, and water. And we allowed associations to set up shop to distribute food and medical supplies. We wanted it to stay like that. But the government refused, which was unacceptable. I was the one who called EDF, the water union, to ask for electricity boards and 4 water points. Within 48 hours it was done.”

This new living space appeared to be a way of concentrating exiled people in one place and making them invisible. The fact remains that, unlike for municipal living spaces, evictions always took place, as Benoît Ferré informs us:

“ - BF: We had evictions from time to time. In any event, the government warned us the day before...”

- PB: You find them a plot of land, they go there, and finally the police...

- BF: Yeah, I agree with you... it may seem contradictory. But the best thing for the government was that they didn't have to go to Prédembourg. The government didn't want there to be a camp (...) The government didn't want us to make a second La Linière, to have too many migrants in one place.”

Here we see how local actors were controlled by the local government and its objectives to fight against fixation points. Any desire to receive newcomers had to be in line with the objectives of the State, which the municipality was required to comply with. For local elected officials, maintaining order and the peace of mind of local residents remained their priorities. The memory of La Linière is used as a symbol to demonstrate the failure of receiving exiles, of what “should no longer be done”. This “failure” served to revive the industrialised policy of “combating fixation points”, which was perceived as the only possible option, despite its obvious ineffectiveness: exiled people were still there waiting, forced to become nomads by the government and the local authority.

II. SHOWCASING THE “STRENGTH OF THE STATE”

The hostile environment policy created extremely precarious living conditions for exiled people. They were deprived of their fundamental rights, harassed, evicted and dispersed. The government created an inhospitable environment in the name of the fight against the “pull factor”, a political rhetoric that has become a “myth” of public action used by the government for 25 years (1). Since the presence of exiled people “on the border” casts

doubt on this theory and suggests that the country is still “too welcoming”, the government makes a show of dismantling living spaces to demonstrate its strength in a bid to mask its inability to bring its discourse of “controlling flows” in line with reality (2). Since exiled people were “made illegal” (GENOVA, 2019) by the State, they became “non-citizens”, thereby justifying their differential treatment, their exclusion from common law and the fact that they were condemned to live in precarious conditions (3).

1. The “pull factor” as a “myth” of public action: “inhospitality” as a doctrine

“Migrants also do a bit of ‘benchmarking’ to determine the legislation within Europe that is, let's say, the most fragile. For example, you can see that such and such a nationality, which again I won't name, tends to go to such and such a country, not because they are Francophiles, but because they believe life to be easier there” (Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior)²⁵⁰.

The theory of the “pull factor” has unclear origins and questionable evidence. It is based on “common sense” and “evidence” that has never been substantiated. This theory has become a “policy myth”: “neither true nor false”, an “anonymous, authorless narrative” (ALAM, 2010). A “myth” that the State relies on to create a hostile environment with the aim of “controlling migratory flows”.

The theory of the “pull factor” is rooted in the ideological fabric of the far right. It argues that the more welcoming a country is, the more foreigners will be attracted to it. The reception of immigrants is initially understood in a broad sense: social rights, economic attractiveness, possibility of legal status, before being extended to include asylum. In 2003, Marine Le Pen (National Front) declared that “there is another pull factor, another instrument that leads to significant immigration, namely the right to asylum.”²⁵¹

In the name of “controlling flows”, the concept of the “pull factor” was adopted by the right and then by the left to justify reforming the granting of asylum, making access to it increasingly complex: “this explains the inclination, which began on the far right and has even contaminated parts of the left, not to welcome them “too warmly”, so that those left behind are not encouraged to take the same path.”²⁵²

For the French government, this curtailment of the right to asylum is complemented by a desire to “actively produce inhospitable conditions within the country” (LEBRE, 2019). In other words, the more open the borders and the more favourable the conditions of reception, the more exiled people are “encouraged” to settle. This theory is based on the idea that exiled people “benchmark”²⁵³ their choice of host country.

This same logic is applied to the Franco-British border and to exiled people trying to reach Great Britain. Indeed, according to Lucie P, a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, “for migrants in transit, you should provide the bare minimum, so as not to create an anchorage point.” According to Roget T., a senior official within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, this theory of the “pull factor” is promoted by “the dominant thinkers

250. Senate Committee, Statement by Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, 31 May 2018.

251. “Interview with Marine Le Pen”, *Le Grand Jury RTL, Le Monde and LCI*, 26 January 2003.

252. “Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air” [“Refugees, the myth of the pull factor”], *Politix*, 27 April 2017.

253. Originating from the business world, this concept seeks to study the best practices of other companies in order to adopt and adapt them. In the context of migration, exiled people adopting this approach would study the different host countries before their departure in order to choose the one with the best opportunities for them.

in the senior civil service of the Ministry of the Interior", which prevents any other trains of thought from being developed: "So nobody has ever said: 'Let's try something else', no, it's always: 'We won't do that because otherwise this will increase the pull factor.'" Emmanuelle Cosse agrees, explaining that at the Ministry of the Interior, "they are convinced that the better they welcome people, the more people will arrive... the theory of the pull factor, as usual (...) They are convinced of this, I heard it ten years ago and I'm still hearing it today..."

For François Gemenne, the "pull factor" theory "dehumanises migrants" and seeks to portray exiled people as a "problem to be solved". He continues:

"It reinforces the metaphors that aim to dehumanise migrants: the pull factor, the wave, the great replacement, the leak.. all these expressions depict migrants as material things, and migratory flows as problems to be solved, or even domestic repairs to be made."²⁵⁴

The "pull factor" theory was notably used in relation to the Sangatte camp to justify an approach that was "half humanitarian, half security-focused" (CARRERE, 2003). For Lionel Jospin's government, it was a question of providing reception, but a very basic one and with a focus on house arrest. It was believed that receiving migrants "with dignity" would imply that the government had succumbed to the demands of the associations. To combat the perceived "incentive" effect of the Sangatte camp, the state had to "adopt a policy of inhospitality" (LEBRE, 2019). According to Jérôme Vignon, who co-authored a 2015 report on the situation in Calais with Jean Aribaud: the "pull factor" represents the fear of a concentration that can no longer be controlled"²⁵⁵, as illustrated by the comments of Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, in 2017:

"We saw that when we let it happen, it started with a few hundred people, and then we ended up with several thousand people that we didn't know how to manage. Above all, we don't want to repeat the past. (...) That's why we don't want a centre here [on the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast] because every time a centre is built, it increases the pull factor."²⁵⁶

For example, when the Sangatte camp was opened, and then the Jules Ferry Centre, the measures introduced by the government were inadequate and failed to respect the fundamental rights of the exiled people present there: "According to the director [of the Sangatte camp], in any case, we should not have risked creating a 'pull factor' by offering better standards of living" (CARRERE, 2003):

"The government is working based on a capacity of 1,500 people. That is a lot. At Sangatte, we had about 200 people in the hangar at the beginning. Then due to the pull factor there was a rapid increase in the number of refugees being received. When it was closed down by Nicolas Sarkozy, there were nearly 3,000 people present."²⁵⁷

With regard to the Calais shanty town, the prefect of Calais at the time, Fabienne Buccio, raised the question "how can we make the 'camp' environment humane without endangering the situation of the locals by creating a pull factor?".²⁵⁸ As a result, "these camps are kept in a state of maximum precariousness through the absence or destruction of sanitary facilities, the spoilage of food provided by associations, and the confiscation

254. "Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air" ["Refugees, the myth of the pull factor"], *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

255. "Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air" ["Refugees, the myth of the pull factor"], *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

256. "À Calais, Gérard Collomb ne veut pas créer d'"appel d'air" avec un nouveau centre pour migrants" ["In Calais, Gérard Collomb does not want to create a 'pull factor' with a new centre for migrants"], *France 3*, 23 June 2017.

257. "Campement de migrants à Calais : faut-il craindre un nouveau Sangatte ?" ["Migrant camp in Calais: should we expect a new Sangatte?"] *L'Express*, 1 September 2015.

258. Defender of Rights, Exiles and fundamental rights: the situation in the territory of Calais, 6 October 2015.

of personal belongings" (LEBRE, 2019). Through a policy of successive dismantling, the aim was to demonstrate the strength of the government and the enforcement of a policy of inhospitality.

Where "sheltering" operations were arranged, not everybody had access to them. In order to counteract the increased "pull factor" that the accommodation might create, "to comply with the strategy of inhospitality, it is essential that they are poorly housed, that they are not all poorly housed, and that this fact is made known" (LEBRE, 2019). When the Calais shanty town was dismantled, the plan to carry out "sheltering" operations via CAOs was itself contested by the right and the far right, as it was alleged that the plan would result in "a huge pull factor for illegal immigration, with a disregard for the population and elected officials."²⁵⁹

This strategy is still in use today in the makeshift camps on the coast, and is becoming increasingly common. The fight against fixation points aims to systematically evict and destroy living spaces. A hostile environment is created by mobilising the police and preventing access to water, food, healthcare and hygiene. Any attempt to provide fundamental rights is seen as increasing the "pull factor", as is the assistance provided by support associations, demonstrated by the harassment and intimidation they are subjected to. When the government organised food distributions in Calais at the beginning of 2018, the system was inadequate so as not to risk appearing "too welcoming" and was based on an outreach approach in order to avoid establishing a fixation point in a specific place.

A similar logic can be observed with regard to sea rescues of exiled people. In September 2014, Bernard Cazeneuve, the then Minister of the Interior, criticised the consequences of the Italian Navy's exile rescue operation: "Although the Italian Navy's rescue operation has enabled the rescue of many migrants at sea, (it) has also resulted in the creation of fixation points for migrants in northern France."

On 12 June 2018, Marine Le Pen went further and criticised the rescues organised by SOS Méditerranée using the Aquarius: "Beneath their humanitarian façade, NGOs have an objective role as accomplices of the smuggling mafias (...) Allowing migrant boats to dock creates an irresponsible pull factor. They have to go back to where they came from."²⁶⁰ Christophe Castaner, then Minister of the Interior, agreed: "NGOs may have been complicit with the smugglers."²⁶¹

Clearly, we should abolish "any rescue system so as not to create a pull factor(...) their existence [causes] the very situation that they are fighting against" (LEBRE, 2019). In other words, it is claimed that exiled people cross the Mediterranean Sea because they know that NGOs will come to their rescue.

This deterrence policy is based on the idea that by creating a hostile environment, the pull factor will be reduced. However, the "pull factor" is a theory promoted by the far right and adopted by the Ministry of the Interior and successive governments.

According to Jérôme Lèbre, "the pull factor is of course a pseudo-scientific concept (...) based on a vague intuition which is all the more effective as it simplifies reality" (2019). François Gemenne agrees, explaining that this theory is founded on "popular beliefs that are not at all backed up by serious studies (...) but a simple lie is easier to believe than a complicated truth."²⁶²

259. "Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air" ["Refugees, the myth of the pull factor"], *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

260. Marine Le Pen, *Twitter*, 12 June 2018.

261. "Migrants en Méditerranée : 'les ONG ont pu se faire complices des passeurs', estime Castaner" ["Migrants in the Mediterranean: 'NGOs may have been complicit with smugglers', says Castaner"], *AFP*, 5 April 2019.

262. "Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air" ["Refugees, the myth of the pull factor"], *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

For Roger T., within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior: "This is presented as a matter of fact, but the pull factor has never been scientifically proven", as Lucie P, a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, also points out: "The concept of the 'pull factor', all that, is somewhat untrue, it's mostly just political rhetoric driven by the media."

The examples of Sangatte, the Calais shanty town or the La Linière camp are seen as proof that receiving migrants has the effect of creating a "pull factor". According to Franck Esnée, of Doctors of the World, "Sarkozy closed down Sangatte because there were 1,500 people. But outside of the Calais Jungle there have always been 1,500 people in Calais. 20 years later, there are still 1,500 people!"

Moreover, if exiled people settle in these centres, it is also and above all because, at the same time, the government is conducting an active policy of fighting against living spaces, telling them that they will only be tolerated in these government and municipal spaces. By concentrating exiled people in one place, the government gives credence to the theory of the "pull factor", which in turn justifies preventing the reception of exiled people. It goes full circle.

On 11 February 2021, the CNCDH pointed out that criticisms of calls to provide adequate facilities for exiles at the border "can easily be contradicted", continuing: "They reflect a lack of knowledge of the reality of the migration plans of exiled people who are guided not by the quality of their reception but by their desire to go to the UK."

Indeed, on 30 May 2018, Gérard Collomb claimed that "migrants also do a bit of benchmarking to determine the legislation within Europe that is, shall we say, the most fragile." However, as Jérôme Lèbre explained, exiled people "do not leave their country because they are attracted to another, but because they can no longer live where they have always lived. (...) If there is a motive for migration, it is not to seek the greatest net benefit, but rather to escape suffering and death" (2019).

One of the defining characteristics of migration is the wandering that European governments cause migrants to suffer. The closures they face always drive them further away. Exiles are pushed across the Franco-British border partly in the hope that Britain will offer them improved living conditions, as the Defender of Rights pointed out in 2015:

"When setting off from Eritrea, Sudan, Afghanistan or Syria, migrants do not necessarily aim to get to Calais to cross the Channel. Exiled people first and foremost leave to escape countries in the grip of war or a dictatorship. This bottleneck in Western Europe is more the result of wandering linked (...) to deterrence policies implemented by other countries that decided not to receive them."²⁶³

Migration is also influenced by solidarity networks, family, language, economic attractiveness, but also by the constraints of smuggler networks, as François Gemenne explains:

"When you have to use the services of a smuggler, it is obviously the smuggler who is in charge. This is why by closing its external borders, Europe has de facto handed over the reins of its migration policy to the smugglers: they're the ones who decide."²⁶⁴

263. Defender of Rights, Exiles and fundamental rights: the situation in the territory of Calais, 6 October 2015.

264. "Réfugiés, le mythe de l'appel d'air" ["Refugees, the myth of the pull factor"], *Politis*, 27 April 2017.

France's deterrence policy at the Franco-British border is based on a policy "myth" that has never been proven. On the contrary, all of the evidence points to the fact that this theory is based on simplistic "evidence" with political and populist aims. The "pull factor" has become a consensual theory; to oppose it is to risk being called to order, as a forced invitation to comply. The continued presence of exiled people, which should demonstrate the failure of this deterrence policy, instead serves to reinforce it. In other words, if exiled people are still present on the Franco-British border today, it must be because France is still too "welcoming".

For 30 years, this deterrence policy, founded on a "myth", has been imposed on exiled people without it ever being evaluated. On the one hand, an evaluation would risk revealing the policy's failure, resulting in a paradigm shift that would challenge the monopoly of the Ministry of the Interior. On the other hand, an evaluation would shed light on the unintended consequences of the policy: namely, that of reinforcing the decision of exiled people to go to Britain as their last option to flee the hostility inflicted upon them.

The French State – unable to welcome the exiled people, unable to deport them, unable to let them choose their migratory route – stages a sense of order on the Franco-British border to demonstrate the strength of a state confronted with the inevitability of a passage that it can only hinder and slow.

2. Staging a "sense of order"

"It was a debate I had with the chief of police at the time, Michel Delpuech. We were doing evictions every three weeks. And from time to time there were police operations to clear a camp. So I said to him: 'You have to stop. If I do evacuations every three weeks with buses to tell the guys to go back, it's not so that you can evict them in the meantime.' And he said to me: 'It's to give them a sense of order.' So I replied: 'You need to stop. It doesn't give any sense of order.' They were just doing it because the Ministry of the Interior told them to, but it didn't make any sense!" (Emmanuelle Cosse, Minister for Housing from 2016 to 2017).

The deterrence policy implemented by the French government on the Franco-British border is based on the showcasing of its strength. However, this only serves to mask its inability - according to the objectives it has set itself - to achieve a "100% execution rate" for the removal measures implemented and to prevent exiled people on the coast. To ward off criticism, the State reasserts its authority by making a show of dismantling the camps in the name of the fight against smugglers and to show its humanity. In this way, its objective is twofold: firstly, it aims to show exiled people that they are not welcome in order to prevent their arrival or to encourage their self-deportation, and secondly, it seeks to reassure the general public of its ability to maintain order on an issue that continues to dominate politics and the media: illegal immigration.

The increase in police activity relating to the fight against immigration has led to an increase in the production of statistics relating to checks, arrests and the issuing of obligations to leave the French territory (OQTF). In turn, this increase in statistics demonstrates the government's inability to effectively "remove" exiled people.

At the beginning of his five-year term in office, Emmanuel Macron explained that he had set himself the goal of achieving a 100% OQTF execution rate by the end of his presidency. His Prime Minister, Edouard Philippe, believed that "deterring migration depends on a credible removal policy."²⁶⁵ According to Stéfan Le Courant, these evictions "therefore have a symbolic dimension. They must reassure the public that governments are capable of dealing with the immigration 'problem' and at the same time prove to prospective migrants that borders exist" (2018, p. 219), as explained by Yannick Blanc, former director of the general police force at the Paris prefecture:

"Deportation is fundamentally a policy of political deterrence as it demonstrates the existence of a regulated migration policy. We must therefore carry out deportations, and carry out enough of them, regularly, and in a sufficiently significant number so that the threat is credible, so that it demonstrates that borders exist."²⁶⁶

The statistical reality of the removal rate - between 10 and 15% - is an obstacle to the discourse of firmness that the State wants to display, and gave rise to criticism from the opposition. This so-called "inability" to deport is regularly put on the agenda in ministerial reports, draft laws and documents produced by the administration of the Ministry of Interior. The aim is to identify the root causes, and to make deportations more effective.

In this context, "the judicial judge appears to hover in the background as an unwelcome, troublesome figure who, by annulling illegal detention procedures, undermines some of the police work of combating illegal immigration" (PARROT, 2019, p. 232). In a bid to improve this execution rate, the Interior "stripped the judicial judge of their powers and put the fate of the individuals concerned in the hands of the administration" (PARROT, 2019, 233).

The political power became the bearer of these demands and put the subject of immigration on the political agenda, using performative language in the hope that new discourse and laws would make it possible to achieve the objectives that previous laws had not been able to. At the same time, "the desire to reiterate the existence of borders would actually disguise the impossibility of enforcing them" (LE COURANT, 2018, p. 227).

Faced with this apparent "failure", the government deployed, as we have seen, a deterrence policy aimed at encouraging self-deportation on the Franco-British border. But in order to demonstrate that the government is taking action, it stages its efforts by industrialising the dismantling of exiles' living spaces and using state violence against them: "Unable to control all these flows, the State is left with no option but to concentrate all its forces on a limited population" (LE COURANT, 2018, p. 227).

On the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast, the evictions thus take the form of "spectacles", serving as symbols to prove that the government is "solving" "problems". As for the State, "the spectacles at the border seem to demonstrate the zealous 'response' of a state constantly beset by the phantom 'crisis' of the border 'invasion' of desperate hordes of 'illegal' migrants and asylum seekers" (GENOVA, 2019).

In 2002, when Nicolas Sarkozy "solved the Sangatte problem", "the aim was to appear to be in control of the movement of humans across a border, a symbol of an illusory control of 'migratory flows'" (CARRERE, 2003). In 2009, when Éric Besson, Minister of Immigration, ordered the eviction and destruction of the Pashtun Jungle, the media was summoned to

265. Le Monde, "Migrants : le plan du gouvernement fait l'impasse sur les camps de Calais et Paris" ["Migrants: Government plan fails to address Calais and Paris camps"], 12 July 2017.

266. Parliamentary audit of immigration, integration and co-development policies, 2011, p. 212.

publicise the strength of the State, declaring: “We have restored the rule of law without violence.”²⁶⁷ This approach was also adopted by Bernard Cazeneuve when closing down the Calais shanty town. According to Camille Guenebeaud, these living spaces serve as “political backdrops for the State's action, as their destruction is intended to demonstrate its ability to make migrants in Calais disappear” (2017, p. 218):

“Border control is a ritualistic spectacle. When the failure of deterrence policies puts the spectacle in a state of crisis, its orchestrators try to save face, promising a bigger show than the last one” (BROWN, 2009).

For the State, this is a matter of creating a “sense of order”, as Emmanuelle Cosse, Minister for Housing from 2015 to 2016, put it:

“It was a debate I had with the chief of police at the time, Michel Delpuech. We were doing evictions every three weeks. And from time to time there were police operations to clear a camp. So I said to him: ‘You have to stop. If I do evacuations every three weeks with buses to tell the guys to go back, it's not so that you can evict them in the meantime.’ And he said to me: ‘It's to give them a sense of order.’ So I replied: ‘You need to stop. It doesn't give any sense of order.’ They were just doing it because the Ministry of the Interior told them to, but it didn't make any sense!”

In order to give a “sense of order” and demonstrate that the State is “in control of migratory flows”, the State needs to publicise its policy in the media to raise awareness among the general public and the exiled people themselves. Clearly, the policy of deterrence relies on the existence of camps, because their removal would make inhospitality “invisible”, and “the erasure of their [exiled people's] suffering would create a gap in the policy of inhospitality” (LEBRE, 2019).

Moreover, by attempting to make the Franco-British border ever more impenetrable, exiled people must “wait” longer to travel to Great Britain. As a result, their living conditions are further degraded, allowing the State to give substance to the inhospitality it creates.

The images and videos disseminated by associations, the media and exiled people serve as “proof” of the inhospitality created by the State, as Lucie T., a senior official at the Ministry of the Interior, explains:

“[This publicisation] is part of the Interior's strategy. It sends two messages. Firstly, that the State is acting against migrants... it's cynical, but it's cheaper politically to do this than to respect their fundamental rights. Secondly, it sends a clear message to migrants who might be tempted to come to Calais... ‘Look what will happen to you if you come!’”

As the State is unable to effectively remove exiles and prevent them from living on the coast, it uses them to prove its “control of migratory flows”. But what this policy demonstrates is both “its omnipotence and its inabilities” (LE COURANT, 2018, p. 227). In other words, this staging forces the State to repeatedly apply and reproduce this policy of deterrence, not to prevent the presence of exiled people on the Franco-British border, but to prevent the emergence of discourse on its inability to “control migratory flows”. State policy is thus limited to making exiled people wait, hindering and slowing down their movements and creating an environment that is hostile enough for them to decide to leave on their own initiative. However, this policy is only “useful” if the State makes exiled people homeless by refusing to accommodate these “non-citizens”.

267. “Éric Besson assume la fermeture de la ‘Jungle’” [“Éric Besson supports the closure of the ‘Jungle’”], *Le Figaro*, 23 September 2009.

3. “We engineer the fact that people are homeless” (Jacques Toubon)

As we have seen above, the deterrence policy is aimed at a population whose irregular status has been created legally by the state by restricting their access to asylum and implementing a policy of organised closure within the Schengen Area and in line with Franco-British agreements. Nicholas de Genova explains further: “A migrant only becomes ‘illegal’ when legislative or judicial measures render certain migrations or types of migration illegal, in other words, when they make them illegal” (2019).

At the same time, the discourse on exiled people reinforces this legislative approach by classifying them as “illegal”, “undesirable” and “clandestine”. The State legally and discursively produces an “us” and a “them”, a distinction made to bring the border into existence and reassert the authority of the State.

Furthermore, the distinction made has the effect of justifying the differential treatment of citizens and “non-citizens”, as Nicholas de Genova points out:

“All these officially ‘unwanted’ or ‘undesirable’ non-citizens are stigmatised with allegations of opportunism, duplicity and unworthiness. Furthermore, the compulsive denunciation, humiliation and exquisitely refined rightlessness of deportable “foreigners” supply the rationale for essentialising the legal inequalities of citizenship and alienage as categorical differences that may be racialized.”(2013)

Along the Franco-British border, this categorical differentiation is reflected in the existence of camps as a way of demonstrating the state-driven “non-reception” of migrants. As Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020, explains, the State “orchestrates the fact that people are on the streets (...) We are in a phenomenon of organised homelessness”, who continues:

“One of the major pitfalls of this migration policy is that it in no way guarantees the right to accommodation (...) You get the impression that along this coastline, the French government has implemented a completely different policy, which is to leave them on the streets.”

Indeed, the increase in the number of camps can be partly explained by the fact that access to the asylum application procedure is generally impeded. The inadequacy of the national reception system for asylum seekers is also to blame. It is noteworthy that when the Calais shanty town was destroyed by Bernard Cazeneuve and the exiled people sent to the CAOs, half of the people received had already applied for asylum without being granted accommodation in a reception centre (AGIER et al., 2018 p. 180).

However, European and French laws stipulate that exiled people who have lodged an asylum application must be housed by the State while their application is being processed. The Council of State specified that failing to provide access to housing is “a serious and manifestly illegal infringement”, adding “that the serious and manifestly illegal nature of such an infringement is determined by taking into account the means available to the competent administrative authority.”²⁶⁸

For example, in 2018, there were 109,680 initial asylum applications for 90,000 places in CADAs, but only 56,399 exiled people were housed (CFDA, 2019). According to Karine Parrot, “the degree of illegality of an administration's behaviour depends, in part, on the resources that the administration allocates itself to respect its legal obligations” (2019,

268. Council of State decision of 26 April 2021.

p. 183), as confirmed by Pascal Brice, with regard to the OFII, responsible for allocating accommodation places:

"There is one institution that is completely dysfunctional during this period, and that is the OFII. It's mind-boggling (...) It's making it more difficult to gain residency (...) We have an institution that is not doing its job, which is seriously dysfunctional (...) And I'm in a good position to know that when you want an institution to progress, you have to give yourself the means to do so."

In addition, people who have been refused asylum or who are travelling to Britain have a statutory right to "...unconditional emergency accommodation by calling 115 (...) This right has been enshrined as a fundamental freedom" (CFDA, 2019). The Ministry of Housing and the Ministry of Social Affairs, which are responsible for emergency accommodation, have a "prioritisation" approach, explains Matthieu P., a senior official at the Interior who worked in the Social Affairs administration:

"As a priority, the unconditional accommodation system is mainly reserved for families. Single people are excluded from the system [because] there has to be enough places. (...) The objective is to first of all take care of families with children. Single women and single men will follow."

This initial "prioritisation" is complemented by a further distinction between foreigners and French citizens to justify denying them access to unconditional accommodation:

"We put in place a specific follow-up process for these people, who are not in exactly the same situation as a person who is very socially deprived who ends up on the streets. These are people who (...) require special monitoring, in view of their background. In my opinion, it would be ill-advised to send them back to an unconditional common law system."

According to Matthieu P., the decision should be made based on the individual and their legal situation. Indeed, as Pascal Brice, Director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018, pointed out, by receiving migrants unconditionally, the State would be supporting "the idea that people who have no right to stay can stay." In other words, the unconditional housing of exiles would increase the "pull factor".

As we saw in the previous chapter, in Grande-Synthe, "sheltering" operations were carried out to provide temporary accommodation for exiled people via the CAOs and CAESs. The system is also inadequate, not accessible to those who want to use it and constructed as a coercive system to keep such people away and disperse them. Especially because while CAOs would permit a long period of accommodation (one year), CAESs accommodate exiled people for a maximum of one month.

Furthermore, these facilities only provide unconditional accommodation on the condition that the exiled people apply for asylum. These overriding measures exclude exiled people from the unconditional emergency system. Those who have been dUBLINED or who wish to cross into Britain are then forced to return to a precarious living space on the coastline, where evictions regularly take place.

On the Franco-British border, the creation of "non-citizens" helps to justify excluding them from "traditional" unconditional reception facilities, and when facilities are designed specifically for them, they are accommodated temporarily and on a conditional basis. According to Franck Esnée, in Calais "we find ourselves in a lawless space" for exiled people. He continues: "France has been condemned at European level by the Defender of Rights, the United Nations High Commissioners, the European Court of Human Rights..."

For Olivier Cahn, “we are in a period where the Ministry of the Interior no longer respects the decisions of judges, including the Council of State, and when these decisions do not suit the Interior, it sidesteps them.” This disregard for the law is exemplified in Calais, Grande-Synthe and Norrent-Fontes, where a series of evictions have been carried out illegally, without any social diagnosis, without any census and without any real “shelter” to accommodate the evicted people.

For 30 years, immigration has been framed as a security issue, both politically and in the media, thus preventing the development of alternative approaches - with the exception of some local political actors and associations. In fact, the political approach to immigration is assessed according to its ability to “control the flows”, leading the State to engage in a scramble to adopt the most stringent security measures for fear of being out of step with the narrative it constructs and feeds. The EU and the Member States do not want exiles to cross the border into the Schengen Area. The French government does not want them to settle legally on its territory. The government evades its legal obligations by setting up exceptional arrangements to receive exiled people in a limited and conditioned manner, condemning them to live in precarious spaces where their presence is used to show off the state’s “control of migratory flows”. The State, which cannot legally return non-deportable people, creates a hostile environment to encourage self-deportation.

At the same time, the State prevents them from leaving the Schengen Area to reach Britain. The State makes them “wait”, “hinders” their movements and “keeps” them as “non-citizens”, stranded at the border, “waiting” to cross it.

CHAPTER 12: PREVENTING EXILED PEOPLE FROM LEAVING FRANCE. MAKING BRITAIN INACCESSIBLE, “WHATEVER THE COST”

Exiled people, prevented from staying “within the border” by the French authorities, are also prevented from crossing it to reach Great Britain. Since the conclusion of the Touquet agreement in 2003, France has been Britain’s “policing arm”, ensuring that exiled people do not cross the Channel. Britain pays France to deploy surveillance technology, walls and barbed wire, to send the message to exiled people and the general public - in both countries - that the border is “closed”. This policy is based on a staged approach adopted by all successive governments since 2003 (see: Chapter 4). The Sandhurst Treaty, signed in early 2018, is the 19th such bilateral agreement. Like the previous agreements, it represents the failure of the agreements preceding it by continuing to further bunkerise the border (I). Even though this closure is based on a staged approach orchestrated by the two countries, it nevertheless complicates the crossings and encourages the use of new techniques. As such, since 2018, the number of small boat crossings has increased, challenging the narrative constructed by the two states instilling the idea of a closed border (II). The hostile environment policy in force “on the border” is also deployed in Great Britain, which, through its policy, perceived to be “too welcoming” by French political actors, was considered to be contributing to the “pull factor” (III).

I. THE SANDHURST TREATY: THE 19TH ATTEMPT TO STAGE THE CLOSURE OF THE BORDER

"If the UK leaves the European Union, France will no longer retain all of its migrants" (Emmanuel Macron, then Minister of the Economy, 3 March 2016)²⁶⁹.

"(T)he Ministers of the Interior signed a new treaty in front of us—the Treaty of Sandhurst — that will allow us to improve the relationship and management of our common border" (Emmanuel Macron, 18 January 2018).

On 3 March 2016, Emmanuel Macron announced that "if the UK leaves the European Union, France will no longer retain all of its migrants."²⁷⁰ However, he was called to order by François Hollande, for whom "calling into question the Le Touquet agreement on the pretext that the United Kingdom has voted for 'Brexit' (...) makes no sense",²⁷¹ and by Bernard Cazeneuve, who declared:

"We must not encourage the work of smugglers. We must send out a strong message. If we were to open the border tomorrow, what would happen? The British, who control their own border, could close it when the migrants arrive and they would then be deported back to France. In this case I would have increased a flow, created a backlog and made a humanitarian problem worse! I have just one objective: efficiency."²⁷²

The presidential candidate changed his mind on 21 February 2017, explaining that a revision of the Le Touquet agreement was necessary "without undoing everything", stating: "The relationship needs to be rebalanced so that the British make a greater contribution to certain issues [as a means of] better defending French interests."²⁷³

As President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron follows the route taken by his predecessors since 1986. On 18 January 2018, Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, signed the Sandhurst Treaty on behalf of France. This treaty symbolises the dogma upon which the two countries are founded, like a border that cannot be understood in any other way than through a logic of security and closure.

This 19th Franco-British treaty - as of 21 July 2021, two new treaties had been signed - pursues the same objectives: to make the border watertight and to prevent exiled people on the French side from crossing the Channel and reaching Great Britain, as declared by Theresa May, the British Prime Minister:

"We will reinforce the security infrastructure with extra CCTV, fencing and infrared technology at Calais and other border points."²⁷⁴

Great Britain contributed €50 million (supplemented in 2020 and 2021 by a further €93 million) towards the surveillance of the border with new equipment and the additional deployment of British law enforcement officers in France.

269. "En cas de 'Brexit', la France ne retiendra plus les migrants à Calais, affirme Emmanuel Macron" ["If 'Brexit' happens, France will no longer retain migrants in Calais, says Emmanuel Macron"], *AFP*, 3 March 2016.

270. "En cas de 'Brexit', la France ne retiendra plus les migrants à Calais, affirme Emmanuel Macron" ["If 'Brexit' happens, France will no longer retain migrants in Calais, says Emmanuel Macron"], *AFP*, 3 March 2016.

271. Statement by François Hollande after a European summit in Brussels, 29 June 2016.

272. "Interview with Bernard Cazeneuve", *BFM TV*, 4 March 2016.

273. "'Une sortie est une sortie', dit Macron à Theresa May" ["'An exit is an exit', Macron tells Theresa May"], *Reuters*, 21 February 2017.

274. "Paris et Londres renforcent un peu leur coopération sur l'immigration" ["Paris and London step up their cooperation on immigration"], *AFP*, 19 January 2018.

This umpteenth agreement, like the previous ones, showcases the closure of the border and the ability of the governments to control it, with an increasingly coercive strategy. It regurgitates the same words and solutions, like a cyclical repetition of performative language that calls into question the ability of political actors to believe in their own “myths” and “stories”.

Moreover, because it is bilateral, this agreement can disregard European and international legislation, but also Brexit, as Olivier Cahn, Senior Lecturer in Law, explains: “This agreement, like the previous ones, was made outside EU law. So, from a strictly legal point of view, Brexit does not change anything in terms of Franco-British agreements.” However, according to him, the fact remains that through this agreement, “France is violating its European commitments for the benefit of another state.” He continues:

“A British state, which, when it was in the Union, had asked for a special status for the implementation of these measures and therefore used the Dublin Regulation, for example, in a way that was strictly for its own benefit (...) And when it made commitments in this regard, for example in relation to unaccompanied minors, it never fulfilled its commitments, but it has now left the EU...”

Nevertheless, the Sandhurst Treaty “endorses and legitimises the above-mentioned agreements as unshakeable sources, ‘founding texts’, a ‘constitutional framework’ of Franco-British cooperation”, explains Antoine Guérin, a doctoral student in public law, who continues: “it is therefore not intended to rectify the policy of circumventing European and international laws” (2018).

What is interesting about this treaty is that it recognises the failure of previous policies - while continuing in the same direction - by stating in the preamble: “One year after the dismantling of the La Lande camp in Calais, the ongoing strong migratory pressure has led the Parties to reaffirm their common desire for close cooperation in the management of their shared border.”

According to Antoine Guérin, “this admission of failure reveals the existence of the vicious circle that is the Franco-British cooperation policy: the migration phenomenon led to repression; ineffective, the migration phenomenon was reproduced; repression was intensified; ineffective, the phenomenon was reproduced, and so on and so forth” (2018).

As Antoine Guérin explains, this agreement aims to “reduce the number of attempts to cross the border” by:

- “further increasing cooperation in the management of the common border and reducing the number of people attempting to cross it illegally”;

- establishing accommodation centres away from the coastline and making transfers of asylum seekers and removal procedures more “efficient”. He then specifies that Great Britain undertakes to support exiles who are “willing to engage with the asylum system in France”, thus effectively excluding exiled people present “on the border” and hoping to reach Britain. In addition, France undertakes to “carry out voluntary deportations and returns on behalf of the UK” (GUERIN, 2018);

- “combating organised criminal networks, fraud and illegal movements of goods and people, and discouraging illegal immigration, through joint action in countries of origin and transit.” This last objective, by “discouraging” illegal immigration, helps maintain the hostile environment created by the French government at the border, of which Calais and Grande-Synthe are examples.

TIMELINE: 2017-2021 - SECURING OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER - €425 MILLION

INVESTMENTS: €300 MILLION

- 1 January 2017:** Private security in Calais: €62 million²⁷⁵.
- 28 February 2017:** Private security at the Ports of Calais and Dunkirk and the Channel Tunnel: €80 million²⁷⁶.
- 1 July 2017:** Eurotunnel invests in a scanner at Calais-Fréthun train station: €6.4 million²⁷⁷.
- 17 January 2018:** Installation of new barriers and security equipment at the port of Ouistreham: €2.5 million²⁷⁸.
- 31 January 2018:** Video surveillance systems and security barriers at Calais port and train station. €15 million²⁷⁹.
- 31 January 2018:** New security equipment at the Ports of Dunkirk and Le Havre: €3 million²⁸⁰.
- 21 April 2018:** New security centre at the port of Ouistreham: €1.29 million^{281,282}.
- 23 November 2018:** Commissioning of the joint UK-France Coordination and Information Centre, allowing “co-operation and the exchange of information” between France and Great Britain: cost not disclosed.
- 23 January 2019:** Construction of an anti-intrusion wall around the Total service station in Calais: cost not disclosed²⁸³.
- 24 January 2019:** UK-France joint action plan: purchase of drones, night vision cameras, vehicles, etc. for ports along the Franco-British border: €7 million.
- 18 February 2019:** Installation of Parafe facial recognition control gates by Eurotunnel: €15 million²⁸⁴.
- 26 March 2019:** Purchase of surveillance drones to detect departures in the Channel: cost not disclosed²⁸⁵.
- 1 October 2019:** Border inspection station for heavy goods vehicles at the Port of Dieppe: €800,000²⁸⁶.

275. “Britain picks up £36 million bill for closure of the Jungle – money comes on top of £80 million to pay for security guards in French ports”, *Daily Mail*, 24 October 2016.

276. “Migrants : 40 agents privés déployés sur la côte française au profit du Home Office britannique” [“Migrants: 40 private agents deployed on the French coast for the benefit of the British Home Office”], *Ouest-France*, 28 February 2017.

277. “Eurotunnel : un scanner pour contrôler les trains de fret passant en Grande-Bretagne” [“Eurotunnel: a scanner to check freight trains heading to Great Britain”], *France Info*, 29 June 2017.

278. “Ouistreham. Migrants : la Grande-Bretagne donne 2,5 millions d’euros à Ouistreham” [“Ouistreham. Migrants: Great Britain gives €2.5 million to Ouistreham”], *Tendance Ouest*, 19 January 2018.

279. “Pression migratoire : À quoi serviront les 50 millions d’euros promis par les Britanniques ?” [“Migration pressure: what will the €50 million promised by the British be used for?”], *La Voix du Nord*, 31 January 2018.

280. “Pression migratoire : À quoi serviront les 50 millions d’euros promis par les Britanniques ?” [“Migration pressure: what will the €50 million promised by the British be used for?”], *La Voix du Nord*, 31 January 2018.

281. “Migrants : la sécurité se renforce à Ouistreham” [“Migrants: security stepped up in Ouistreham”], *France Info*, 21 April 2018.

282. “Le centre opérationnel de sécurité de Ouistreham” [“The Ouistreham operational security centre”], *Official website of the Ports of Normandy*, Accessed on 15 May 2021.

283. “Calais : un mur anti-intrusions de trois mètres de haut autour de la station essence Total” [“Calais: a three-metre high anti-intrusion wall around the Total petrol station”], *La Voix du Nord*, 23 January 2019.

284. “Getlink : Résultats semestriels 2019” [“Getlink: half-yearly results 2019”], *Zonebourse* [online], 23 July 2019.

285. “Manche : des drones dans le Pas-de-Calais pour repérer les départs en mer” [“The Channel: drones in Pas-de-Calais to detect departures at sea”], *Infomigrants*, 26 March 2019.

286. “La frontière ‘intelligente’ testée au terminal transmanche de Dieppe en vue du Brexit” [“‘Smart’ border tested at Dieppe cross-Channel terminal in preparation for Brexit”], *Paris Normandie*, 10 October 2019.

23 November 2019: Establishment of the France-UK Joint Information and Coordination Centre in Coquelles: €2.9 million²⁸⁷.

2 July 2020: Purchase of surveillance drones to detect departures at sea in the Channel: €1.115 million²⁸⁸.

5 September 2020: Use of the Watchkeeper drone (Thales) to monitor the Channel: €15 million²⁸⁹.

29 November 2020: Franco-British agreement to step up surveillance of the Channel: €31.4 million²⁹⁰.

21 July 2021: Franco-British agreement, police reinforcement, aerial surveillance, equipment, accommodation facilities for exiled people: €62.7 million²⁹¹.

OPERATING COSTS - 2017-2021: €125 MILLION

Port of Cherbourg: €1.6 million²⁹².

Port of Calais: €48 million²⁹³.

Port of Dieppe: €1.2 million²⁹⁴.

Port of Ouistreham: €2 million²⁹⁵.

Channel Tunnel: €80 million²⁹⁶.

NB: To create this database, we relied on press articles, academic work and activity reports from the companies concerned. On the one hand, this list is not exhaustive and, on the other hand, the amounts obtained do not always specify what they are made up of (in particular, whether or not operating costs are included), and therefore this is an estimate. Finally, the security measures put in place since 1998 are not solely intended to control migratory flows and exiled people, but they are regularly justified in the name of the fight against illegal immigration.

.....

This treaty marked the beginning of a new series of security measures deployed on the Franco-British border, with the ever-increasing use of new technologies. Since 2017, €300 million has been invested in walls, barbed wire, cameras, drones, facial recognition devices, private security, control centres, etc., in addition to €125 million in operating costs, making a total of - at least - €425 million.

Since 1998, €1.28 billion has been spent to prevent exiled people from crossing the Channel (see Appendix 6). These investments benefit the industries concerned, putting enough pressure on political actors to reconsider the benefits of a secure border. Indeed,

287. "Crise migratoire : Un centre de coordination franco-britannique verra le jour à Coquelles" ["Migration crisis: a Franco-British coordination centre will be set up in Coquelles"], *La Voix du Nord*, 13 February 2018.

288. "Drone demonstration and development project", *Contracts Finder* [online], 2 July 2020.

289. "UK flies military plane over English Channel in continued effort to make migration there 'unviable'", *Infomigrants*, 11 August 2020.

290. "Migrants : la France et le Royaume-Uni concluent un accord pour freiner l'immigration clandestine par la Manche" ["Migrants: France and UK reach agreement to curb illegal immigration across the Channel"], *AFP*, 29 November 2020.

291. "La collaboration franco-britannique pour renforcer la lutte contre l'immigration illégale fait réagir des associations" ["The Franco-British collaboration to reinforce the fight against illegal immigration is making associations react"], *France Info*, 21 July 2021.

292. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

293. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

294. "La sécurité du transmanche coûte cher au syndicat mixte de Dieppe" ["Cross-Channel security is proving costly for the Joint Association of Dieppe"], *Paris Normandie*, 12 May 2016.

295. "Menace terroriste et afflux de migrants : le port de Caen-Ouistreham renforce sa sécurité" ["Terrorist threat and influx of migrants: the port of Caen-Ouistreham reinforces its security"], *Actu*, 5 February 2017.

296. "Eurotunnel se dote de drones 'militaires' de surveillance", *20 minutes*, 29 June 2016.

Xavier Bertrand, President of the Hauts-de-France region and candidate in the presidential elections, explained that he wanted to break the Le Touquet agreement and “let migrants go to Great Britain”²⁹⁷ in 2015, before declaring in 2019:

“The French defence industry and its British partners must be involved in protecting our border (...) The drones that have been put in place to monitor the coast and infrastructure must be more sophisticated and more effective.”²⁹⁸

Therefore, several companies are taking advantage of the market for border security. According to the Multinationals Observatory²⁹⁹, the global border market was worth €16.9 billion in 2016 and is estimated to be worth €49.8 billion in 2022.

On the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast, this “market” allows multinationals, such as Thales, to deploy surveillance technologies in the Calais port area, as well as drones to monitor the Channel. For example, Vinci was responsible for dismantling the Calais shanty town and also built an anti-intrusion wall; furthermore, the Ramery building and public works group, which carries out operations on behalf of the State, collected the personal belongings of exiled people during dismantling operations. Medium-sized companies are also involved, including Eamus Cork Solutions, a company that signed an €80 million security contract in 2017 in the port areas of Calais and Dunkirk, and “In Group”, which installed a facial recognition system for the Eurotunnel group for a budget of €15 million.

For over 20 years there has been a race to secure the Franco-British border. According to Maël Galisson, from Gisti, this “race” “demonstrates the shortcomings of this policy: each development of the techniques used by exiled people to cross the border has been counteracted by a phase of ‘fortification’ of the border, which, in turn, has led to a new crossing strategy to reach the United Kingdom” (2021).

Indeed, this erection of walls and deployment of surveillance equipment has three effects. Firstly, it showcases the closure of the border as a further attempt by both countries to demonstrate their “control of migratory flows”. Secondly, it makes it more difficult for exiled people to attempt to cross, forcing them to stay longer in the precarious conditions of camps along the border. Lastly, it makes crossings more difficult and dangerous. As a result, the number of crossings in small boats has increased, calling into question the “narrative” promoted by the governments on the effective control of the border.

II. SMALL BOAT CROSSINGS: CHALLENGING THE NARRATIVE OF CLOSURE

“Zero impermeability is an illusion (...) Due to the situation in their countries of origin, it is inconceivable to send 80-85% of the foreigners who come to Calais back home. (...) Sealing the port of Calais will only spread out the crossings along the coast. They will take place in Dieppe, Le Havre, then in Belgium and Holland. We may one day see small boats attempting to cross”³⁰⁰ (Jean Dussourd, Prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001)

297. “Calais: Xavier Bertrand (LR) menace de ‘laisser partir les migrants’ en Angleterre” [“Calais: Xavier Bertrand (LR) threatens to ‘let migrants go’ to England”], *La Voix du Nord*, 2 August 2015.

298. “Migrants à Calais : ‘Il faut une brigade franco-britannique pour gagner en efficacité’” [“Migrants in Calais: ‘we need a Franco-British brigade to increase efficiency’”], *Le Figaro*, 17 February 2019.

299. “Sécurité aux frontières : enquête sur le nouveau complexe militaro-industriel européen” [“Border security: an investigation into Europe’s new military-industrial complex”], *Multinationals Observatory*, 23 February 2017.

300. CCFD survey, “Inimaginable de renvoyer 80 à 85 % des étrangers en raison de la situation dans leur pays d’origine” [“It is inconceivable to send back 80-85% of foreigners due to the situation in their countries of origin”], 13 October 2000.

On 13 October 2000, Jean Dussourd, then Prefect of Pas-de-Calais, explained that as far as the Franco-British border is concerned, “zero impermeability is an illusion”, explaining that “we may one day see small boats attempting to cross³⁰¹.” Sure enough, the first attempts were recorded in 2001 and again in 2014-2016, but the number of attempts recorded by the public authorities remained low at around ten each year.

As the border was secured and public authorities deployed new technologies to monitor the Channel and therefore record the number of crossings, there was a net increase in crossings in small boats. According to the BBC³⁰², there were 539 arrivals on the English coast in 2018, 1,844 in 2019 and 8,400 in 2020. In the period from 1 January to 31 July 2021, the Manche prefecture recorded 12,000 crossings, including 828 crossings on 21 August alone.

This increase in the number of crossings reveals the new strategies undertaken by smugglers to get exiled people to Britain, but is also the result of a more secure border, the absence of legal routes to Britain and the creation of a hostile environment that pushes exiled people to attempt ever more dangerous means of crossing.

The securing of the border further strengthens the smugglers' “market”. Loan Toronde³⁰³, author of a report on Channel crossings, reports prices ranging from €1,000 to €10,000 per person, depending on the equipment used and the likelihood that the crossing will be successful. The smugglers' practices have become increasingly professional, involving the use of different means of transport: stolen fishing or pleasure boats and purchases of “semi-rigid 4-, 5-, 6-metre boats via dealerships or sites for sales between individuals.”³⁰⁴

Attempts to cross are made at a distance from towns and ports, from the beaches of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast, but also from the Bay of the Somme and Belgium. The departures occur at night and are weather-dependent, explains Loan Torondel: “Smugglers' embarkations largely depend on weather conditions, which would explain the simultaneous nature of the departures.” This strategy has proved to be particularly dangerous. Between 2017 and May 2021, “eleven deaths formally attributable to accidents relating to attempted crossings”³⁰⁵ were counted by Loan Torondel³⁰⁶.

These deaths are, on the one hand, due to the lack of legal channels available to exiled people to reach Great Britain and, on the other hand, due to crossings made in precarious conditions. Indeed, according to Loan Torondel, one of the reasons why these crossings are dangerous is that they are “carried out at night”, in a marine area with “strong currents” and in an area with intense maritime traffic. In addition, the boats used are “unsuitable”, “overloaded” and subject to “damage” or have “no engine”.

301. CCFD survey, “Inimaginable de renvoyer 80 à 85 % des étrangers en raison de la situation dans leur pays d'origine” [“It is inconceivable to send back 80-85% of foreigners due to the situation in their countries of origin”], 13 October 2000.

302. “Channel migrants: More than 800 people make crossing in 2020”, *BBC*, 31 December 2020.

303. “Exilés à la frontière franco-britannique : recherche sur les tentatives et les traversées de la Manche par voie maritime, 2018-2021” [“Exiles on the Franco-British border: research into attempts and crossings of the English Channel by sea, 2018-2021”], *Exils.org* [online], 2021.

304. “Premier rapport sur les traversées de la Manche par les migrants : ‘entre 2017 et 2020, j’ai comptabilisé 11 décès” [“Initial report on migrant crossings of the English Channel: ‘between 2017 and 2020, I counted 11 deaths”], *France Info*, 30 June 2021.

305. “Premier rapport sur les traversées de la Manche par les migrants : ‘entre 2017 et 2020, j’ai comptabilisé 11 décès” [“Initial report on migrant crossings of the English Channel: ‘between 2017 and 2020, I counted 11 deaths”], *France Info*, 30 June 2021.

306. Between 1999 and May 2021, at least 302 deaths were recorded on the Franco-British border, according to the report “Deadly Crossings and the militarisation of Britain's borders”.

Crossing by boat appears to be more effective than “traditional” means, i.e. on HGVs crossing the Channel by ferry or through the Channel Tunnel, or on the TGV. The success rate is “between 40% and 50%”³⁰⁷. Although a dangerous practice, crossing in small boats allows exiled people to escape their extremely precarious living conditions on the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast, as Loan Torondel explains:

“Some non-profit actors, and testimonies from exiled people in the press, reveal that the difficult living conditions in the camps and the repeated evictions push migrants into risky behaviours, namely sea crossings³⁰⁸.”

Furthermore, exiled people are dependent on smugglers, who organise the passage to Britain, as François Gemenne explains: “It is now the smugglers who decide who arrives where and via which route.”³⁰⁹ Amidst the COVID crisis and the downturn in the transport of goods between the two countries, the boat crossings allowed the smuggling business to continue and were “a godsend for the smugglers”³¹⁰.

These crossings are accompanied by organised rescues on the English and French sides, but also by assistance to the English coast to prevent capsizing. These operations are given media coverage, as are the statistical data on the number of crossings.

Both of these factors help to challenge the “closed border” narrative that both countries support and insist on with each new treaty. Furthermore, “boat crossings, which are more visible than hiding people in lorries or trains, are inconvenient for those who regard the sea as an impassable barrier” (Corporate Watch, Watch The Channel, 2021).

These crossings are seen as a “crisis”, requiring new mechanisms to “solve” it. On 7 August 2020, Priti Patel, the British Home Secretary, declared that she was working “to make this route unviable”³¹¹ by creating, in particular, a new post of “Clandestine Channel Threat Commander”. The British authorities then put pressure on France to “intercept” the boats to “bring them back to land, or for the French authorities to allow British ships to enter French waters to disembark the people intercepted in France”, explains Loan Torondel.

New technologies are being developed in Great Britain, such as nets to obstruct boat propellers and floating booms. In September 2020, the Watchkeeper drone produced by Thales was deployed in the Channel, presented as a “border technology” to “prevent refugees from crossing”³¹².

To alleviate the “crossing crisis” created by the Franco-British policy of containment, Gérald Darmanin dramatised the fight against crossings by boarding a French navy ship on 24 July 2021, asking for new financial resources from Britain and the use of new surveillance technologies:

307. “Traverser la Manche : derrière le désespoir des migrants, l’histoire d’une honte européenne” [“Crossing the Channel: behind the migrants’ desperation, the story of a European shame”], *Bastamag*, 31 August 2021.

308. “Exilés à la frontière franco-britannique : recherche sur les tentatives et les traversées de la Manche par voie maritime, 2018-2021” [“Exiles on the Franco-British border: research into attempts and crossings of the English Channel by sea, 2018-2021”], *Exils.org* [online], 2021.

309. “François Gemenne : ‘Ce sont les passeurs qui font la politique migratoire de l’UE’” [“François Gemenne: ‘it is the smugglers who make the EU’s migration policy’”], *RCF Radio*, 11 August 2017.

310. “Traverser la Manche : derrière le désespoir des migrants, l’histoire d’une honte européenne” [“Crossing the Channel: behind the migrants’ desperation, the story of a European shame”], *Bastamag*, 31 August 2021.

311. Priti Patel, *Twitter*, 7 August 2020.

312. “Thales police les frontières” [“Thales polices the borders”], *Les Jours*, 31 January 2021.

“The British should pay us to provide security using technical and technological means. I’m thinking thermal binoculars, drones, 4x4s to go into the dunes as well as aerial equipment.”³¹³

He then said he would ask Frontex to intervene: “I have personally referred the matter to Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, which today is more concerned with the south of Europe, and asked them to look after the north of Europe, particularly the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coast.”³¹⁴

According to Cyrille Schott, prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 2001-2004, this appeal to Frontex was contrary to the agency's missions: “This European border and coast guard agency was created to protect the borders of the Schengen Area (...) Therefore, if Frontex intervenes, it will be to protect the borders of a country outside the EU, which does not contribute to its financing.”³¹⁵

The management of exiled people present on the Franco-British border appears to be contradictory in many ways. The creation of a hostile environment on the coast is intended to encourage the self-deportation of exiled people, and yet the French government prevents them from reaching Britain by securing the border. The deployment of new technologies and the practices of containment give rise to new migratory routes, via boat crossings. These crossings increase the visibility of exiled people, thus calling into question the rhetoric of “controlling migratory flows”. To counter this, the French government turns these crossings into a “crisis”, and requests the intervention of Frontex. This agency is tasked with preventing exiled people from entering the Schengen Area. Here, by intervening at the Franco-British border, Frontex would prevent them from leaving. There are European, British and French policies that keep exiled people trapped “at the border”: prevented from coming in, prevented from staying there, prevented from leaving it.

III. GREAT BRITAIN AS A “PULL FACTOR”, THE “HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT” AS A POLICY

“If migrants want to cross, it's because the British themselves are creating the pull factor. They are creating it because they haven't touched their legislation for twenty years, since the Sangatte centre”³¹⁶ (Natacha Bouchart, mayor of Calais, 14 August 2020)

The “pull factor” theory is used to describe the “overly generous” welcome that France supposedly gives to exiled people. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the aim of this theory is to restrict access to asylum, to provide inadequate reception facilities, to prevent exiled people from exercising their fundamental rights and to evict them on a daily basis, all whilst giving them differential legal treatment because of the “non-citizen” status that the government itself gives them.

313. “Calais : une virée en mer pour Gérald Darmanin et des renforts contre les traversées” [“Calais: a trip out to sea for Gérald Darmanin and reinforcements against crossings”], *Nord Littoral*, 25 July 2021.

314. “Calais : une virée en mer pour Gérald Darmanin et des renforts contre les traversées” [“Calais: a trip out to sea for Gérald Darmanin and reinforcements against crossings”], *Nord Littoral*, 25 July 2021.

315. “Immigration : saisie par la France, Frontex peut-elle surveiller la Manche et la Mer du Nord ?” [“Immigration: called upon by France, can Frontex monitor the English Channel and the North Sea?”], *La Voix du Nord*, 5 August 2021.

316. “Migrants : la maire de Calais demande à Boris Johnson de ‘se calmer d’urgence” [“Migrants: Calais mayor asks Boris Johnson to ‘calm down urgently”], *La Voix du Nord*, 14 August 2020.

The proponents of this theory transpose it and apply it to Great Britain, which, in their view, is to blame for the “pull factor” by providing a welcome that is “too generous”.

In 2002, during the negotiations that led to the closure of Sangatte, Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister of the Interior, criticised the economic and legislative attractiveness of Great Britain, calling for “the abolition, in Great Britain, of the right to work, which, until July 2002, was granted to people who had been waiting for at least six months after submitting their claim for asylum” (AL AUX, 2015).

In October 2014, Natacha Bouchart, mayor of Calais, addressed British parliamentarians, asking them to scale back the reception of exiled people, explaining:

“They know that they can easily find work, that they can find housing and that they can get money every week.”

In August 2015, Xavier Bertrand, President of the Hauts-de-France region, addressed the British:

“British people, stop your social dumping and sort out your regulations on illegal work! (...) The British have to take action. Otherwise we’ll have to move the border.”³¹⁷

On 17 February 2019, Xavier Bertrand reiterated his point, stating:

“Let me be very clear: the British pull factor must come to an end. Since the UK government tightened up its legislative arsenal, being an illegal worker in this country is no longer an easy option. But they need to spread the message more clearly, especially in the migrants’ countries of origin.”³¹⁸

Since the 2000s, Great Britain has cracked down on its policy towards exiled people, notably through the practice of detaining asylum seekers and by establishing a list of “safe countries” allowing the return of rejected asylum seekers.

At the same time, Britain has developed and implemented a “hostile environment” policy towards exiled people. It was developed in 2007 by Liam Byrne, a Labour MP, who explained: “We are trying to create a much more hostile environment in this country for those who are here illegally.”³¹⁹ In 2012, this policy was implemented by Theresa May, the Home Secretary, who defined it as follows:

“We’re talking about a very simple proposal: we’re just saying that if you’re not allowed to be in the UK, it shouldn’t be possible to rent a property. This is one of the proposals we are making to make it harder for illegal immigrants to come to the UK.”³²⁰

This “hostile environment” policy has led to a series of laws specifically targeting exiled people. Since 2014, doctors, employers and property owners have been obliged to report people in an irregular situation or face financial penalties. The aim is to prevent access to healthcare, access to the rental market or even the opening of a bank account. Advertisements are displayed on London buses in working-class areas which encourage exiled people to choose between “going home or getting arrested” (MONFORTE, 2016).

317. “Calais: Xavier Bertrand (LR) menace de ‘laisser partir les migrants’ en Angleterre” [“Calais: Xavier Bertrand (LR) threatens to ‘let migrants go’ to England”], *La Voix du Nord*, 2 August 2015.

318. “Migrants à Calais : ‘Il faut une brigade franco-britannique pour gagner en efficacité’” [“Migrants in Calais: ‘we need a Franco-British brigade to increase efficiency’”], *Le Figaro*, 17 February 2019.

319. “Officials launch drive to seek out illegal migrants at work”, *The Guardian*, 16 May 2007.

320. “Theresa May interview: ‘we’re going to give illegal migrants a really hostile reception’”, *The Telegraph*, 25 May 2012.

In 2016, the British government introduced the “Remove first - appeal later” policy, which aims to facilitate deportations and allows for appeal once deported.

Brexit is a window of opportunity to strengthen “border control”. Priti Patel, Home Secretary since July 2019, proposed an “Immigration Act to end free movement and regain control of our borders.”³²¹

Nevertheless, the “crossing crisis” challenges the discourse produced, justifying new hostile policies towards exiled people. On 21 May 2020, the Home Office launched operation “Sillath” aimed at automatically deporting exiled people landing on the English coast to France, without performing a “proper” examination of their case or administrative situation³²². On 18 August 2020, a detention centre was set up for exiled people who arrived in small boats in order to detain them whilst organising charter flights to European countries.

Since March 2021, a draft law on asylum has been the subject of discussion. It states that exiles who have passed through a “safe country” such as France will either be deported or granted temporary protection status with limited rights. On 6 July 2021, a new bill aimed to criminalise Channel crossings in small boats. It sought to introduce sentences of 6 months to 4 years for illegal entry, while sanctioning countries of origin that reject the principle of readmission. Offshore detention centres were also proposed, notably in Rwanda.

On 23 July 2021, Gérald Darmanin explained that this tightening up of British policy had been requested by France: “In return for our tougher stance on crossings, the UK government is committed to taking steps to limit its economic attractiveness.”³²³

According to Corporate Watch and Watch The Channel, the reasoning behind these policies is similar to that developed in France: “The measures mentioned (...) are less about actually stopping the boats and more about gesticulating and pretending to do so” (2021). According to these two collectives, British policy is centred on communicating the country's firmness towards exiled people via “promotional videos in the media”, as they explain:

“The Home Office is more interested in putting on a show than facing the reality of control. Brexit has emboldened anti-migrants and those who claim to speak for them. It has raised expectations - according to the Brexit narrative, the UK should now ‘take back control’” (2021).

Conor James McKinney, of the organisation “Free Movement”, believes that “the government needs to give the impression that it is taking action against boats arriving in Dover because they are very visible, (but) the number of arrivals is not really significant. If they came in a less visible way, not in boats, I'm sure London wouldn't care.”³²⁴

321. “Immigration : le Royaume-Uni veut criminaliser les traversées de la Manche” [“Immigration: UK to criminalise Channel crossings”], *Le Monde*, 7 July 2021.

322. “Home Office deporting migrants who cross Channel in small boats”, *The Guardian*, 21 May 2020.

323. “Exclusif. Migrants : à Calais, Gérald Darmanin défend ‘la seule manière de faire’ de l'État” [“Exclusive. Migrants: in Calais, Gérald Darmanin defends the State's ‘only way of getting things done’”], *La Voix du Nord*, 23 July 2021.

324. “Immigration : le Royaume-Uni veut criminaliser les traversées de la Manche” [“Immigration: UK to criminalise Channel crossings”], *Le Monde*, 7 July 2021.

The same rhetoric is used to describe the misuse of the asylum system and the smugglers, as illustrated by Priti Patel's comments:

"For too long, our broken asylum system has lined the pockets of vile criminal gangs who cheat the system. This isn't fair to the vulnerable people who need protection or the British public who pay for it. It's time to act."³²⁵

This - brief - detour via Great Britain and the creation of hostile environments aims to demonstrate the importance of thinking about the Franco-British border in a dynamic and interactive manner. Public policy and political rhetoric on immigration cross the Channel. The same rhetoric and the same "solutions" can be observed in both countries. Reinforcing the presence of a border "erases the complexity of journeys, of attempts to live in other countries, hesitation, changes, the expectation of being welcomed somewhere" (GUENEBAUD, 2017, p. 85). The figure of the exiled person is "narrated" by the State; he or she is "suspect" and prey to smuggling rings. This narrative construction shifts the blame for their chaotic life trajectories away from the governments.

Without providing proof, Gérard Collomb alleged that exiled people "benchmark" their choice of host countries. In contrast to this allegation, we would instead argue that if "benchmarking" is indeed taking place, it is being performed by governments, who share their "best practices" for deterring exiles and showcasing their "strength".

325. "Immigration : le Royaume-Uni veut criminaliser les traversées de la Manche" ["Immigration: UK to criminalise Channel crossings"], *Le Monde*, 7 July 2021.

By examining the three policy levels of the EU, France and the UK, this section demonstrates how public policies complement each other and work together to prevent exiled people from entering the Schengen Area, from settling in France, from remaining in France but also from leaving. The exiled people stranded on the Franco-British border are neither truly in France nor entirely in Britain. They are “on the border”, where they are marginalised and confined but not tolerated. They are “non-citizens” placed in a lawless area by the State itself, thereby legitimately preventing them from accessing food, water, healthcare, housing and respite. The first four years of Emmanuel Macron's five-year term demonstrate how fundamental rights are sacrificed on the altar of the discourse on firmness and its staging. The coastline is constructed as a “political stage” in a bid to demonstrate that the government is unwelcoming and in control of its borders.

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GENERAL CONCLUSION

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As I complete the field research, the 2022 presidential elections are approaching. The right and the far right are particularly invested in the topic of immigration. These elections appear to be a new window of opportunity for candidates and nominees to enter a pointless race for the best security deal.

The right and the far right take it in turns to call for a constitutional amendment to “stop uncontrolled immigration”³²⁶, to establish “moratoria on immigration”³²⁷, to introduce “immigration quotas”³²⁸, to “suspend the right to asylum”³²⁹, to “purge working-class neighbourhoods”³³⁰. Meanwhile, on the left, candidates are giving substance to the theory of “the great replacement”³³¹; Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, is preparing to take over the presidency of the EU on the topic of immigration.

At the Franco-British border, Gérald Darmanin, Minister of the Interior, calls on Frontex to intervene in the Channel to combat small boat crossings of exiled people to Britain and northern Europe. By the end of 2021, Gérard Darmanin³³² had announced the implementation of “aerial surveillance” organised by Frontex. He took this opportunity to call for the negotiation of a new treaty, this time between the EU and Britain, for what could be the 22nd treaty since 1986 and the Treaty of Canterbury aimed at regulating the Franco-British border.

What this report demonstrates is that these discourses are reminiscent of the way in which immigration and the Franco-British border rely on a cyclical repetition of performative language by political actors.

Each new election is accompanied by ever more vehement speeches against foreigners and exiled people.

326. “Présidentielle 2022 : Valérie Pécresse présente un projet de révision de la Constitution pour ‘stopper l’immigration incontrôlée” [“Presidential election 2022: Valérie Pécresse presents a draft revision of the Constitution to ‘stop uncontrolled immigration’”], *France Info*, 5 October 2021.

327. “Michel Barnier : ‘Pourquoi il faut un moratoire sur l’immigration’” [“Michel Barnier: ‘Why we need a moratorium on immigration’”], *Le Figaro*, 29 July 2021.

328. “Xavier Bertrand souhaite un ‘référendum dès l’automne pour reprendre en main la politique migratoire” [“Xavier Bertrand calls for a ‘referendum in the autumn to get migration policy back on track’”], *BFM TV*, 13 September 2021.

329. “Face à l’info”, *Cnews*, 26 March 2021.

330. “‘Épuration ethnique’ : LR dit tout haut ce que l’extrême droite pense tout haut” [“Ethnic cleansing: LR says out loud what the far right thinks out loud”], *Libération*, 6 October 2021.

331. “‘Grand remplacement’ : Montebourg évoque une ‘peur’ qui ‘correspond à un certain nombre de phénomènes’” [“The Great Replacement’: Montebourg evokes a ‘fear’ that ‘corresponds to a number of factors’”], *Libération*, 6 October 2021.

332. “Question migratoire : Gérald Darmanin met la pression sur Londres” [“The migration issue: Gérald Darmanin puts pressure on London”], *Libération*, 10 October 2021.

Each new government implements an increasingly coercive policy as a demonstration of the strength of a state in “decline” (BROWN, 2009) and erects walls - be they physical, administrative or political - which could be perceived as “symbols of the erosion of state sovereignty” (BROWN, 2009).

Each new treaty and each new security measure are constructed as a way of reconciling the narrative created by the State with what the image of small boat crossings calls into question: the illusion of border control.

In this conclusion, I will first return to the lessons learned from a long-term research project conducted on the Franco-British border. I will then open the discussion and consider the perspectives of this research.

I. LESSONS LEARNED FROM LONG-TERM RESEARCH

For this work, I spent a long time studying the production of a policy of deterrence by the French state and local actors towards exiled people on the Franco-British border while questioning resistance to this doctrine. I wanted to show how this was initially cobbled together, before gradually being formalised into a theory as cracks emerged.

Firstly, I have highlighted the way in which the topic of immigration was put on the agenda in the 1960s, with a clearly declared and enforced desire to “stop immigration”. An entire administrative, legal and police arsenal was deployed and reinforced as the EU and the Franco-British border were constructed. These two events contributed to the reinforcement of a security policy towards foreigners, who are portrayed as “undesirables”. One after the other, the Balkan crisis, the creation of the Sangatte camp, its closure and the implementation of a deterrence policy towards exiled people demonstrate how exiled people are managed when a situation is construed as a “crisis” - via house arrest - or as a marginal phenomenon - via a policy combining harassment, eviction and dispersion.

In the second part, I analyse how this deterrence policy has been strengthened and perfected as the Ministry of the Interior has pre-empted the immigration sector. The Interior produces a series of mechanisms to manage exiled people present in France or on the Franco-British border in order to: prevent them from accessing asylum procedures, fabricate their illegal status, institutionally refuse to grant them refugee status, arrest them, lock them up, remove them and encourage their self-deportation. In response to this policy, associations and a number of local political actors put up resistance and create a local immigration policy, combining the provision of a place to live and municipalisation. The premises remains constrained and relatively autonomous: to accommodate exiled people is to oppose the State.

In the third part, I seek to define the socialist understanding of migration issues during the five years of the Hollande presidency. We can observe the emergence of a management style that combines “humanity” and “firmness”. These two terms symbolise a fine line between welcoming exiled people and ensuring the organisation of a fight against illegal immigration. From 2012 to 2014, the Socialist government dithered between entering into dialogue with local elected officials and associations and pursuing a deterrence policy towards exiled people. When the number of exiled people increased and they became (too) visible in Calais, a system similar to that of the Sangatte camp emerged: the Jules Ferry centre. This involved reproducing an “exceptional” system based on house arrest,

concentration in one place and making the exiled people invisible. In Grande-Synthe, it was the mayor of the town who established a humanitarian camp: La Linière. The State imposed a form of governance of space as a declared intention to organise the closure of these living spaces. When the State closed the Calais shanty town and La Linière was destroyed by a fire, the State used these two camps to symbolise the impossibility of receiving exiled people, thereby justifying the strict enforcement of a systemised deterrence policy.

In the fourth and final part, I discuss Emmanuel Macron's term of office as a period of stabilisation of a doctrine on managing exiled people on the border by industrialising deterrence. This policy is closely linked to European policy, French state policy at national level and UK policy. These policies complement each other and act as a combined whole to prevent exiled people from entering the Schengen Area, from settling in France, from remaining in France but also from leaving. I have been able to show here how these different political levels serve to strand exiled people on the Franco-British border so that they are neither truly in France, nor completely in Great Britain. They are marginalised and confined to a space, but not tolerated there either. They are "non-citizens" placed in a lawless area by the State itself, which seeks to encourage their self-deportation.

II. RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

This field research was carried out over a period of four months. This short period of time allowed a series of hypotheses to emerge which could be put into practice in the field. But several questions remain unanswered: how much does the French government spend on its deterrence policy? Apart from the oral discourse on the theorisation and application of the doctrine of deterrence, how is it formalised, written down and taught to future border police officers in state administration training schools? Political actors are the proponents of this deterrence policy, but the administrative elites are those who advise and execute it. Who are these administrative elites? How did they make the Ministry of the Interior the leading actor in migration issues?

1. Putting a price tag on the deterrence policy on the Franco-British border

Why does this matter? Since 2003 and Nicolas Sarkozy's introduction of the target-based policy, the State has been acting with a lack of transparency with regard to the cost of deportations. Initially withheld, the Court of Accounts attempted to estimate the costs generated by this policy, before giving up because of the administration's "unwillingness to communicate the figures necessary for the calculation" (DE BLIC, 2014). Researchers then took the reins, before handing them over to the Senate's Standing Committee on Finance in 2009.

The deterrence policy that we have described in this research combines a constant police presence at the border, arrests, detention in CRAs, custody procedures, deportations, industrial eviction operations, border protection and surveillance and coordination infrastructures.

The initial aim of this research was to obtain all of this data in order to calculate the overall cost of the deterrence policy on the Franco-British border. As Damien De Blic explained on the subject of calculating the cost of deportations, “the cost argument is frequently used by public authorities to justify the repressive nature of migration policies, yet the cost of these policies is never mentioned” (2014). With reference to the French stactivists, the aim is to “fight against” and “fight with” numbers on the one hand, and to urge the State to account for public spending on the other.

How are the calculations made? However, given the lack of transparency of the Ministry of the Interior regarding the implementation of deterrence measures, the question of quantifying overall costs remains unanswered. Only (incomplete) data on private border protection and surveillance could be obtained. This data was obtained by studying the press, company activity reports and academic research.

From the data produced by associations, such as HRO, it was possible to calculate the number of evictions carried out in Calais and Grande-Synthe since 2017 and 2018. If we were to add up the salaries of the police present, the daily cost of equipment, hotel accommodation for the Republican Security Companies (CRS), the cost of public contracts relating to post-eviction “clean-ups”, the cost of the provision of municipal services by the municipalities, etc., beyond an approximate calculation, it is difficult to quantify the cost of an eviction.

In the longer term, the public authorities need to be transparent about the costs of deterrence incurred on the Franco-British border. If they fail to do so, it would be appropriate to refer the matter to: the Committee on Access to Administrative Documents, whose mission is to facilitate and control access to administrative documents; parliamentarians, who can question the government about their actions or conduct parliamentary work³³³.

2. Going beyond actions and rhetoric: theorising deterrence

The analysis of public migration policies implemented on the Franco-British border over the last 30 years has led to the emergence of a deterrence policy which has been applied there. In this regard, we deploy the notion of incrementalism, to show how this policy has been developed gradually to become a doctrine whose application has been industrialised since 2017 and the start of Emmanuel Macron's government.

To demonstrate the existence of this doctrine, we rely, on the one hand, on interviews with senior officials of the Ministry of the Interior, archives of the Ministry of the Interior and parliamentary enquiries. On the other hand, we rely on academic studies, studies by associations, press reports and press articles. The information gathered makes it possible to reconstruct this doctrine, including the way it is deployed and observed. It makes it possible to link administrative, legal and political discourse and practice.

Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the doctrinal production of this deterrence and its written form. In other words, which administrative and political elites are behind its theorisation? What are the theoretical foundations and academic and administrative

333. Like the parliamentary committee of inquiry on migration which was set up in May 2021.

references for this? The challenge is to understand how this doctrine has become the “only” way for the State to deal with exiled people.

The aim here is to understand the political and administrative trajectory of deterrence. To study the administrative and “academic” manuals of the state’s administrative schools or to access the administrative documents that form the basis of this doctrine. This would allow us to glean whether this doctrine is a well-constructed or cobbled-together puzzle, an administrative theory transmitted orally or studied in the State’s administrative schools.

3. The role of administrative elites in the creation of migration policies

The focus on the Ministry of the Interior and the functions of prefects and sub-prefects has made it possible to understand the trajectories of senior officials specifically involved in issues of migration. Some administrative elites forge a career by moving from one prefecture to another where exiles’ living spaces can be found. Others hold positions specifically related to immigration, before taking up positions as prefects or sub-prefects in Pas-de-Calais or Nord.

These aspects have been identified, without going as far as to carry out a systematic analysis of professional trajectories. By continuing the analysis, adopting a prosopographic approach on the one hand and conducting individual interviews on the other, it may be possible to understand who these administrative elites are. How do they approach migration issues? How can focusing on the topic of immigration be profitable (or otherwise) during a political career?

Furthermore, in his work on the politicisation of senior officials involved in immigration (2006), Sylvain Laurens reveals the way in which these administrative elites politicise this topic. He highlights the porosity between the administrative and political spheres. Clearly, far from being mere implementers, senior officials establish the public problem of immigration, the framework, before putting it on the agenda. His work covers the period from 1962 to 1981, and primarily focuses on the treatment of immigration; it would be worth continuing this work in the 2000s, by examining the role of administrative elites in the manufacturing of deterrence.

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DEFENDER OF RIGHTS (2015), Exilés et droits fondamentaux, la situation sur le territoire de Calais [Exiles and fundamental rights, the situation in Calais], 85 p.

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ONLINE RESOURCES

- <https://neocarto.github.io/calais/> - Census of deaths at the border
- <https://degagemap.info/> - Frieze on evictions
- <https://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com/>
- <https://www.tiki-toki.com/timeline/entry/1560429/Externalisation-Calais/> - Timeline of public policies
- <http://www.25ansbidonvilles.org/> - Objectification of costs

APPENDICES



APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS (20 INTERVIEWS)

- April 2021:** Françoise S.*, former contract worker at the Ministry of the Interior.
- 28 April 2021:** René C.*, former member of the municipal majority of the town hall of Ouistreham.
- May 2021:** Matthieu P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior.
- 3 May 2021:** Yves Breem, Migration Policy Analyst at the OECD and former Statistical Officer at the Ministry of the Interior.
- 10 May 2021:** Marc Boulnois, mayor of Norrent-Fontes from 2008 to 2014.
- 11 May 2021:** Dominique Dupilet, MP for Pas-de-Calais from 1988 to 2002 and President of the General Council of Pas-de-Calais from 2004 to 2014.
- 22 May 2021:** Jacques Toubon, Defender of Rights from 2014 to 2020.
- 25 May 2021:** Henri Jean, Sub-Prefect of Dunkirk from 2010 to 2014.
- 26 May 2021:** Jean Aribaud, Prefect of Nord from 2004 to 2006 and co-author of the report on the situation of migrants in the Calais region.
- 28 May 2021:** Benoît Ferré, director of the mayor's office of Grande-Synthe.
- June 2021:** Lucie P., senior official at the Ministry of the Interior.
- 1 June 2021:** Jacky Hénin, communist mayor of Calais from 2001 to 2008.
- 2 June 2021:** Olivier Caremelle, director of the office of Damien Carême - Mayor of Grande-Synthe from 2001 to 2019 - between 2012 and 2019.
- 3 June 2021:** Pascal Brice, Director of the OFPRA from 2012 to 2018.
- 4 June 2021:** Cyrille Schott, Prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 2001 to 2004.
- 10 June 2021:** Jean Dussourd, Prefect of Pas-de-Calais from 1999 to 2001.
- 15 June 2021:** Damien Carême, mayor of Grande-Synthe from 2001 to 2019 and MEP since 2019.
- 18 June 2021:** Jean Godfroid, director of the ANAEM and then of the OFII from 2006 to 2012.
- 29 June 2021:** Emmanuelle Cosse, Minister for Housing from 2016 to 2017.
- July 2021:** Roger T.*, senior official within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.

NON-PROFIT ACTORS (10 INTERVIEWS)

- 16 April 2021:** Sophie Castellane, member of the Collectif d'aide aux migrants de Ouistreham.
- 20 April 2021:** Maël Galisson, member of the information and support group for immigrants (GISTI) and former coordinator of the Platform of Migrant Support (PSM).

26 April 2021: Nathanaël Caillaux, coordinator of Secours Catholique and former coordinator of the Platform of Migrant Support (PSM).

28 April 2021: Franck Esnée, Regional Coordinator for the Hauts-de-France region for Doctors of the World and former Head of Mission for Médecins Sans Frontières for the opening of the La Linière camp in Grande-Synthe.

3 May 2021: Laurent Giovannoni, head of the reception and rights of foreigners department at Secours Catholique.

4 May and 17 June 2021: Guillaume de Kergunic, social worker for Doctors of the World Caen.

5 and 19 May 2021: Claire Millot, member of SALAM Grande-Synthe (support, help, fight, act for migrants and countries in difficulty).

18 May 2021: Lily Boillet, founder and member of Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes.

24 May 2021: Nathalie Perlin, member of Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes.

25 May 2021: Nicolas Legrand, founder and member of Itinérance Dieppe.

ACADEMICS (FOUR INTERVIEWS)

17 March 2021: Camille Guenebeaud, geography lecturer, Paris 8 University.

17 March 2021: Olivier Clochard, geography lecturer, University of Poitiers.

20 May 2021: Mickaël Neuman, Head of Research for Médecins Sans Frontières.

24 May 2021: Olivier Cahn, public law lecturer, Cergy Paris University.

APPENDIX 2: FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENTS, ARRANGEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS REGULATING THE BORDER SINCE 1986

12 February 1986: Treaty of Canterbury

25 November 1991: Sangatte Protocol

20 April 1995: Signing of the Gentlemen's Agreement for the readmission of rejected persons within 24 hours.

29 May 2000: Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol.

9 February 2001: Joint statement aimed at the creation of a cross-Channel commission to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between France and Great Britain faced with the "problem of illegal immigration".

4 February 2003: Le Touquet Treaty.

24 November 2003: Administrative arrangement for the deployment of new British human detection technology.

4 February 2004: Agreement on the carrying of service weapons by French officers in the UK.

18 June 2007: Agreement amending the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol.

16 August 2007: Amendment to the Franco-British arrangement for the application of the Additional Protocol to the Sangatte Protocol.

6 July 2009: Franco-British administrative arrangement to strengthen the fight against immigration.

2 November 2010: Franco-British administrative arrangement on the reinforcement of the common border.

24 May 2011: Agreement on the carrying of service weapons by British Border Agency officers in France.

20 September 2014: Joint statement by Theresa May and Bernard Cazeneuve on strengthening the common border.

20 August 2015: Joint statement to "reinforce the security" of the border and "further enhance operational cooperation".

3 March 2016: Joint statement on migration aiming to "reinforce border security" and "improve cooperation".

16 November 2017: Joint statement for "reinforced security arrangements", continued "close and constructive cooperation" and "joint management of the common border".

18 January 2018: Sandhurst Treaty on improving cooperation in the coordinated management of their common border.

28 November 2020: Joint statement to "make Channel crossings impossible".

20 July 2021: Joint statement on strengthening cooperation between France and Great Britain in the fight against immigration.

APPENDIX 3: FRENCH PUBLIC MIGRATION POLICIES SINCE 1972

24 January 1972 - 23 February 1972: The Marcellin-Fontanet circulars regulate and codify the entry of foreign workers and their residence in France through controlling restriction of entry into France.

13 June 1974: The government decides to suspend labour and family immigration from outside the European Community.

30 May 1977: Introduction of assisted voluntary return, whereby a person who gives up his/her residence permit receives 10,000 francs (i.e. including inflation, approximately €5,400 in today's money)

1 March 1978: Establishment of a mechanism for the organised and forced return of foreign workers settled in France.

10 January 1980: The Bonnet Law on the prevention of illegal immigration imposes stricter conditions for receiving migrants in France and makes illegal entry and residence grounds for deportation. The law provides for the detention and return of deported foreigners to the border.

2 February 1981: The Peyrefitte Law legalises identity checks.

17 May 1981: Gaston Defferre, new Minister of the Interior, suspends deportations.

11 August 1981: Exceptional regularisation of undocumented foreign workers provided that the following two conditions are met: they must have entered France before 1 January 1981, and they must be able to prove they are in stable employment (with or without an employment contract).

27 October 1981: The Bonnet Law is repealed. Some measures are retained, such as deportations, but are placed within a framework: they have to be ordered by a court, minors may no longer be deported, while people proving their attachment to France may only be deported in the event of "public disorder".

16 September 1982: End of the exceptional regularisation procedure; 105,000 foreigners were regularised during this period.

17 July 1984: Law on the single residence and work permit.

10 October 1984: Border surveillance is strengthened by increasing resources for the air and border police, the centralising of data and the imposing of a ban from the territory in the case of irregular residence.

19 December 1985: Jean-Pierre Chevènement announces measures in favour of children from migrant backgrounds via "success streams".

9 September 1986: Pasqua Law on the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners. It restricts access to a residence permit and reinstates the possibility of deporting all foreigners in an irregular situation.

2 August 1989: Joxe Law on the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners. It allows people subject to deportation to seek legal redress.

1 December 1989: Joxe circulars relax the conditions of entry and residence for foreigners.

10 January 1990: Persons issued with an obligation to leave the territory have 24 hours to lodge an appeal with the administrative court.

19 April 1991: The Council of State states that immigrants should benefit from the Geneva Convention if it is more liberal than French law, while the use of deportations is limited.

19 July 1991: Circular for exceptional regularisation of 25,000 asylum seekers with rejected applications.

6 September 1991: Decree strengthening the conditions for issuing accommodation certificates required by foreigners to enter the French territory.

1 October 1991: Asylum seekers are no longer permitted to work.

31 December 1991: Combating of illegal work by obtaining new rights for undeclared foreigners.

26 February 1992: Marchand Law on the conditions of entry and residence of foreigners, in the context of the application of the Schengen Agreement. Carriers are sanctioned for transporting people in an irregular situation.

25 March 1992: The Ministry of the Interior is found guilty by the Court of First Instance of the illegal detention of asylum seekers.

6 July 1992: The Quilès Law permits the detention in “waiting areas” of foreigners not admitted to the territory.

11-13 May 1993: Reform of the nationality code, which abolishes the automatic acquisition of French nationality at the age of majority and extends the time periods before obtaining French nationality.

10 August 1993: Preventive identity checks are made easier.

24 August 1993: The conditions for issuing a residence permit are made stricter.

30 December 1993: Identity checks permitted in the areas surrounding the internal borders of the Schengen Area.

31 December 1993: Extension of the period for the detention of foreigners from 7 to 10 days.

14 October 1994: Creation of the Central Directorate for Immigration Control and the Fight against Illegal Employment.

27 December 1994: The law on conditions of entry and residence extends the penalties for people directly or indirectly assisting in illegal entry into the territory and extends waiting areas to railway stations and ports.

24 April 1997: The Debré Law allows for the confiscation of the passports of foreigners in an irregular situation, authorises the recording of the fingerprints of foreigners wishing to obtain a residence permit and limits the powers of the courts with respect to detention.

1 June 1997: Partial regularisation of undocumented immigrants.

19 January 1998: Circular that authorises prefects to organise the return of foreigners in an irregular situation to their countries.

Law of 16 March 1998: Automatic granting of nationality to children born in France to foreign parents at the age of 18.

11 May 1998: The Chevènement Law on the entry and residence of foreigners in France requires that reasons be given for visa refusals for foreigners under 21 years of age, enshrines refugee status for “freedom fighters”, reaffirms the competence of the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) in the processing of asylum applications, replaces the accommodation certificate with a reception certificate while extending the maximum duration of administrative detention from 10 to 12 days.

29 August 2002: Law on the orientation and programming of internal security, which reinforces the fight against illegal immigration by increasing police mobilisation.

22 October 2003: Circular from Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister of the Interior, establishing a target-based policy with regard to the number of deportations of people in an irregular situation, which states: "The effective enforcement of deportation orders is a prerequisite for a credible public policy to control immigration."

26 November 2003: Stricter migration policies, with an extension of the period for detaining foreigners (from 12 to 32 days), the creation of a fingerprint file for visa applicants, stricter control of reception certificates and, in particular, stricter conditions for obtaining residence permits.

10 December 2003: "De Villepin/Sarkozy" Asylum Law, which provides for an acceleration of asylum application procedures and a stricter approach to the different stages of the asylum application and its examination, as well as the possibilities of obtaining refugee status.

26 July 2004: Law on the conditions for the deportation of the persons concerned, which increases the cases in which a foreigner can be deported.

10 June 2005: Establishment of the CICI, chaired by Patrick Stefanini, architect of the Ministry of Immigration.

24 July 2006: Law on immigration and integration: commitment to move from "endured immigration" to "selective immigration".

14 November 2006: Law on controlling the validity of marriages.

20 November 2007: Law on immigration, integration and asylum making access to legal status more difficult.

28 July 2010: A government commitment to dismantle more than half of the 300 Roma and Traveller camps in France.

16 June 2011: "Besson/Hortefeux/Guéant" law on immigration, integration and nationality, which provides for the increased repression of people in an irregular situation by speeding up deportation procedures, imposing electronically monitored house arrests, the possibility of creating virtual waiting areas, the prohibition of a return to France and increasing the maximum detention period from 32 to 45 days.

31 December 2012: Valls law on the detention of foreigners and the offence of solidarity.

22 July 2013: Law on higher education and research, on the reception of foreign students.

26 May 2014: Exceptional extension of the CESEDA [Code of the entry and residence regulation, and asylum right] to Mayotte

29 July 2015: Reform of the right to asylum.

7 March 2016: Reform of foreigners' rights in France.

20 March 2018: Law "for the proper application of the European asylum system."

10 September 2018: "Collomb" reform "for controlled immigration, an effective right to asylum and successful integration." Legal retention is increased from 45 to 90 days.

APPENDIX 4: THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR'S PRE-EMPTION OF THE IMMIGRATION SECTOR

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
1926	Creation of the association Soutien, solidarité et actions en faveur des émigrants (SSAE), which helps migrants and their families in France and informs foreigners of their rights.			
1945	Creation of the National Office of Immigration (ONI), which is responsible for the recruitment of foreign labour and the regularisation of foreign workers. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Ministry of Public Health and Population.</u>			
1946		Creation by the UN of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to manage the migratory flows resulting from the Second World War. It is independent of the states.		
1952		Dissolution of the IRO, which is replaced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).		
1952		The French government, critical of the autonomy taken by the IRO, decides to create its own organisation to manage refugees: the OFPRA. The Office hires some of the former staff of the IRO. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</u>	Establishment of the Refugee Appeals Board (CRR). This court rules on appeals concerning OFPRA decisions on asylum seekers. <u>Under the authority of the OFPRA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</u>	
1958	Creation of the Social Action Fund (FAS) for Muslim workers from Algeria in mainland France and their families. It is responsible for the integration of immigrants. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs</u>			

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
1966				Creation of the Population and Migration Directorate, responsible for the organisation of migration, reception, integration and naturalisation. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</u>
1988	The ONI is replaced by the Office for International Migrations (OMI). Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour.			
2001	The FAS becomes the Integration and Anti-Discrimination Assistance and Support Fund (FASILD), thereby expanding its target population. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Social Affairs.</u>			
2005	The OMI and part of the SSAE merge to create the French National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration (ANAEM). <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs</u>			Establishment of the Interministerial Committee on Immigration Control (CICI), chaired by Patrick Stefanini, architect of the Ministry of Immigration.
2006	The FASILD is replaced by the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities (ACSÉ). <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Housing and the Ministry of Immigration.</u>			
2007		<u>The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the OFPRA.</u>	The National Court of Asylum (CNDA) replaces the CRR.	Establishment of the Ministry of Immigration, which takes over the areas of Immigration (previously the Ministries of Labour, Foreign Affairs and the Interior), Integration (previously the Ministry of Social Affairs) and Solidarity Development (previously the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
2007				The Population and Migration Directorate is dissolved and its responsibilities are taken over by the Ministry of Immigration.

	OFII [French Office for Immigration and Integration]	OFPRA [French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons]	CNDA [National Court of Asylum]	GOVERNMENT REFORMS
2007				Creation of the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration (SGII) to organise the administration of the Ministry of Immigration.
2007			<u>The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the CNDA.</u>	
2008	The Ministry of Immigration becomes the supervisory authority of the ANAEM.			
2009	The ANAEM and ACSÉ merge to create the OFII. This institution receives and supports asylum seekers, processes applications for legal immigration (family, professional), organises assisted voluntary return and gives medical advice. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of Immigration.</u>		<u>The Council of State becomes the supervisory authority of the CNDA.</u>	
2010	The SSAE is dissolved.			The Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Accommodation and Access to Housing (DIHAL) for homeless or poorly housed people is created. <u>It falls within the jurisdiction of the Prime's Minister Administration.</u>
2010	<u>The Ministry of the Interior becomes the supervisory authority of the OFII.</u>	<u>The Ministry of the Interior becomes the supervisory authority of the OFPRA, which issues opinions to the Interior on applications requesting access to the French territory in the context of asylum procedures.</u>		The Ministry of Immigration is dissolved and becomes the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration. <u>Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.</u>
2013				The Directorate-General for Foreign Nationals in France (DGEF) is created. It replaces the General Secretariat for Immigration and Integration. <u>It remains a separate directorate of the Ministry of the Interior.</u>

APPENDIX 5: EUROPEAN PUBLIC MIGRATION POLICIES SINCE 1985

14 June 1985: Signing of the Schengen Agreement (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), the aim of which is to gradually abolish common border controls in exchange for the increased surveillance of external borders.

19 June 1990: As a follow-up to the Schengen Agreement, it provides for the transfer of controls at external borders, the development of a common policy on visas and the right to asylum and the strengthening of police, customs and judicial cooperation.

1 September 1990: Establishment of the Dublin Convention which aims to prevent exiled people from seeking asylum in several Member States.

26 March 1995: Entry into force of the Schengen Agreement.

1 November 1997: Entry into force of the Dublin Convention, which aims to identify the Member State responsible for receiving an asylum application.

1 May 1999: The Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force, affirming the “principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights”. In practice, it specifies that the entry, transit and movement of persons who do not hold European citizenship are covered by the common visa policy.

11 December 2000: Regulation on the establishment of the Eurodac system “for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention.”

As of 25 March 2001: 15 countries are signatories to the Schengen Agreement: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden.

28 June 2001: European directive aimed at air, sea and land carriers, which aims to financially sanction carriers transporting people with no valid documents to the EU with a fine of up to €5,000.

1 May 2002: EU Ministers of the Interior discuss the possibility of creating a European Border Police Corps.

21 June 2002: Illegal immigration is the key focus at the Seville European Council.

26 September 2002: Trilateral meeting (England, Belgium, the Netherlands) to extend cross-border controls.

18 February 2003: Implementation of the Dublin II Regulation, which stipulates that only the first country reached by the asylum applicant is authorised to process the application.

19 June 2003: At the Thessaloniki European Council, European countries decide to create a structure to coordinate cooperation projects at the EU's external borders, train border guards, harmonise their equipment and set up common procedures for repatriating illegal immigrants.

6 November 2003: The EU Council approves a text organising charter flights at Community level with a budget of €30 million over two years. The associations launch a petition on these “charters of humiliation”.

1 February 2004: The European Commission proposes that EU Ministers of the Interior contribute financially (€30 million over two years) to charter flights.

19 February 2004: European regulation creating a force of “immigration liaison officers”. These officers are seconded to “assist” their colleagues at airports in emigration countries.

26 October 2004: Creation of Frontex, whose mission is to monitor EU borders from October 2005.

1 December 2005: The EU’s “Asylum” Directive provides that Member States may confine asylum seekers in “special premises” and that an asylum application does not constitute a right to remain in a country. It also provides for the rejection of “manifestly unfounded applications and for accelerated and priority procedures”. This Directive introduces the concepts of “safe country of origin”, “first country of asylum” and “safe third country”. The remedies provided for have no suspensive effect.

15 December 2005: The “global approach to migration” is approved by the European Council, which establishes partnerships with third countries on combating illegal immigration, notably through co-development.

10 July 2006: Action plan for the readmission of emigrants who have entered Europe illegally, the strengthening of judicial and police cooperation and the establishment of financial and tax incentives for African diasporas to participate in the development of their countries of origin.

11 July 2007: “RABIT” (Rapid Border Intervention Team) Regulation, which provides for the emergency mobilisation of border guards in the event of a “mass influx” of migrants.

3 December 2008: Amendment to the Dublin II Regulation.

9 December 2008: European Return Directive, which defines the conditions for the preliminary detention and removal of foreigners. It is dubbed by associations as the directive “of shame”. It harmonises the rules for deportation of people in an irregular situation in the EU. It aims to encourage “voluntary return”, in the event of refusal, and a person may be detained for up to 18 months in the case of “lack of cooperation” by the person or his or her country of origin until his or her effective deportation, accompanied by a ban on entry to European territory of up to five years.

18 June 2009: European Employers Sanctions Directive prohibits the employment of people in an irregular situation.

30 October 2009: The Brussels Summit raises the possibility of joint return flights financed by the Frontex agency.

1 February 2011: Creation of the European Asylum Support Office.

25 October 2011: New resources given to the Frontex agency and expansion of its role. Frontex can now acquire its own equipment.

26 June 2013: Directive laying down standards for the reception of people seeking international protection.

- 26 June 2013:** Legislative resolution to grant and withdraw international protection.
- 19 July 2013:** Entry into force of the Dublin III Regulation.
- 22 October 2013:** Creation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).
- 22 June 2015:** Launch of the EUNAVFOR MED operation to combat the issue of smugglers in the Mediterranean.
- 14 September 2015:** Agreement on the EU-wide distribution of 40,000 asylum seekers.
- 18 March 2016:** Outsourcing agreement between the EU and Turkey for €3 billion.
- 6 October 2016:** Frontex becomes the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, expanding its areas of responsibility and seeing its financial and human resources increase.
- 7 December 2016:** Frontex is given "a rapid reaction reserve of 100 officers" to "protect" external borders.
- 20 November 2017:** Regulation on an entry/exit system and regulation amending the Schengen Borders Code.
- 29 June 2018:** Renewal of the agreement between the EU and Turkey, with an additional €3 billion paid to Turkey.
- 8 November 2019:** Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, which increases the financial and human resources allocated to the agency.
- 23 September 2020:** Review of the Pact on Migration and Asylum.

APPENDIX 6: PROTECTION AND SURVEILLANCE OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH BORDER FROM 1998 TO 2021

To create this database, we relied on press articles, academic work and activity reports from the companies concerned. On the one hand, this list is not exhaustive and, on the other hand, the amounts obtained do not always specify what they are made up of (in particular, whether or not operating costs are included), and therefore this is an estimate. Lastly, the security measures put in place since 1998 are not solely intended to control migratory flows and exiled people, but they are regularly justified in the name of combating irregular immigration.

TOTAL EXPENDITURE: €1.28 BILLION

ONE-OFF INVESTMENTS AND SECURITY COSTS: €483 MILLION

5 August 1998 (Port of Cherbourg): The international area is fenced off and a video surveillance system is installed. Cost: €912,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

1 January 2000 (Port of Calais): First security programme that fences off the port, installs a video surveillance system and builds a security building. Cost: €6 million.

22 August 2001 (Port of Calais): "Zero Tolerance Plan" that strengthens internal fences with steel, installs gates in ports and hires 60 security guards. Cost: €4.5 million³³⁴.

22 August 2001 (Ports of Dieppe, Cherbourg, Roscoff): Implementation of fencing, detection systems and lorry inspection protocols. Cost not disclosed.

19 May 2002 (Calais-Fréthun train station): Installation of 4.5 kilometres of double fencing and barbed wire and purchase of infrared surveillance equipment. Cost: €7.3 million³³⁵.

4 February 2003 (Channel Tunnel): The British Army provides a scanner for checking heavy goods vehicles.

23 January 2004 (Port of Dieppe): Purchase of a heart rate detector for checking heavy goods vehicles. Cost not disclosed.

1 January 2005 (Port of Calais): Second security programme which sees 48 fixed and mobile video surveillance cameras installed. Cost: €7 million (BERSON, 2011).

1 January 2005 (Port of Cherbourg): Reinforcement of fencing and upgrade of the video surveillance system. Cost: €100,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

1 June 2007 (Port of Dieppe): Doubling of the fence around the port. Cost not disclosed.

1 July 2007 (Port of Cherbourg): Expansion of the control area, installation of 2.5 metre fencing, installation of a video surveillance system, obligation to have a badge to access the area. Cost: €850,000 (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

334. "Eurotunnel veut faire fermer le centre de Sangatte" ["Eurotunnel wants to close the Sangatte Centre"], *Libération*, 22 August 2001.

335. "La sécurité encore renforcée" ["Security reinforced further"], *Le Parisien*, 19 May 2002.

1 January 2008 (Port of Calais, Eurotunnel Coquelles Terminal, Port of Dunkirk): Use of detection dogs. Cost: €6 million from 2008 to 2012³³⁶.

28 February 2008 (Port of Roscoff): Erection of a kilometre of fencing, installation of around 15 video cameras, purchase of two CO2 sensors. Cost: €500,000³³⁷.

18 November 2008 (Port of Calais): Purchase of two thermal cameras. Cost not disclosed.

1 January 2009 (Port of Cherbourg): Increased security in the northern car park and international area. Cost: €1.3 million (THOMAS, 2012, p. 335).

24 February 2010 (Eurotunnel): Installation of a network of 340 cameras. Cost not disclosed.

24 March 2010 (Port of Calais): Establishment of a joint Franco-British operational coordination centre.

15 June 2010 (Eurotunnel): Provision by Eurotunnel of a 600 m² building to accommodate the military. Cost: €600,000³³⁸.

31 December 2011 (Port of Calais, Port of Dunkirk, Coquelles Eurotunnel Terminal): Signature of a 5-year contract with a private security company that provides for the searching of freight and the search for, detention and escorting of exiled people. Cost: €3.06 million in 2012.

1 January 2013: Security at the port of Calais for one year – €2 million³³⁹.

21 April 2013: Port of Calais, installation of five new scanners – €3 million³⁴⁰.

1 January 2014: Detection dogs for three years at the Port of Calais - €4.5 million³⁴¹.

7 September 2014: Installation of 20 km of NATO barriers in Calais - €3 million³⁴².

1 January 2015: Franco-British agreement over three years, securing of the Port of Calais and its car park - 3 km double fence - €15 million³⁴³.

1 January 2015: Installation of 65 km of fencing around the Channel Tunnel - €17.3 million³⁴⁴.

January 2015: Fencing off of the Calais shanty town, installation of containers, video surveillance, security - €18 million³⁴⁵.

336. "Entreprises collabos", *Calais Research* [online].

337. "Sécurisation des ports. Très cher, peu dissuasif", *Le Télégramme*, 28 February 2008.

338. "Communiqué de presse" ["Press Release"], *Getlink*, 15 June 2010.

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345. "À Calais, des renforts sécuritaires et des moyens pour 'humaniser' l'accueil des migrants" ["In Calais, security reinforcements and means to 'humanise' the reception of migrants"], *Le Monde*, 21 October 2015.

4 September 2015: SNCF and Eurotunnel install 4 km of 4-metre-high fencing in Calais - €10 million³⁴⁶.

1 November 2015: UK Border Force fleet acquires night vision equipment to monitor the Channel - €1 million³⁴⁷.

1 April 2016: Port ring road secured by 300 metres of barriers in Calais - €0.7 million³⁴⁸.

27 June 2016: Eurotunnel strengthens its security with the purchase of two drones - €0.8 million³⁴⁹.

9 September 2016: Installation of a 1 km green wall in Calais - €2.7 million³⁵¹.

24 October 2016: Private security contract in Calais for one year - €31 million³⁵².

19 January 2017: New command station at the Eurotunnel - €3 million³⁵³.

28 February 2017: Private security around the Port of Calais, Dunkirk and the Eurotunnel - €26.76 million³⁵⁴.

1 January 2017: Private security in Calais over three years: €62 million³⁵⁵.

28 February 2017: Private security at the Ports of Calais and Dunkirk and the Channel Tunnel: €80 million³⁵⁶.

1 July 2017: Eurotunnel invests in a scanner at Calais-Fréthun train station: €6.4 million³⁵⁷.

17 January 2018: Installation of new barriers and security equipment at the port of Ouistreham: €2.5 million³⁵⁸.

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357. "Eurotunnel: un scanner pour contrôler les trains de fret passant en Grande-Bretagne" ["Eurotunnel: a scanner to check freight trains heading to Great Britain"], *France Info*, 29 June 2017.

358. "Ouistreham. Migrants : la Grande-Bretagne donne 2,5 millions d'euros à Ouistreham" ["Ouistreham. Migrants: Great Britain gives €2.5 million to Ouistreham"], *Tendance Ouest*, 19 January 2018.

31 January 2018: Video surveillance systems and security barriers at Calais port and train station. €15 million³⁵⁹.

31 January 2018: New security equipment at the Ports of Dunkirk and Le Havre: €3 million³⁶⁰.

21 April 2018: New security centre at the port of Ouistreham: €1.29 million^{361,362}.

23 November 2018: Commissioning of the joint UK-France Coordination and Information Centre, allowing “co-operation and the exchange of information” between France and Great Britain: cost not disclosed.

23 January 2019: Construction of an anti-intrusion wall around the Total service station in Calais: cost not disclosed³⁶³.

24 January 2019: UK-France joint action plan: purchase of drones, night vision cameras, vehicles, etc. for ports along the Franco-British border: €7 million.

18 February 2019: Installation of Parafe facial recognition control gates by Eurotunnel: €15 million³⁶⁴.

26 March 2019: Purchase of surveillance drones to detect departures in the Channel: cost not disclosed³⁶⁵.

1 October 2019: Border inspection station for heavy goods vehicles at the Port of Dieppe: €800,000³⁶⁶.

23 November 2019: Establishment of the France-UK Joint Information and Coordination Centre in Coquelles: €2.9 million³⁶⁷.

2 July 2020: Purchase of surveillance drones to detect departures at sea in the Channel: €1.115 million³⁶⁸.

5 September 2020: Use of the Watchkeeper drone (Thales) to monitor the Channel: €15 million³⁶⁹.

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365. “Manche : des drones dans le Pas-de-Calais pour repérer les départs en mer” [The Channel: drones in Pas-de-Calais to detect departures at sea], *Infomigrants*, 26 March 2019.

366. “La frontière ‘intelligente’ testée au terminal transmanche de Dieppe en vue du Brexit” [“‘Smart’ border tested at Dieppe cross-Channel terminal in preparation for Brexit”], *Paris Normandie*, 10 October 2019.

367. “Crise migratoire : Un centre de coordination franco-britannique verra le jour à Coquelles” [“Migration crisis: a Franco-British coordination centre will be set up in Coquelles”], *La Voix du Nord*, 13 February 2018.

368. “Drone demonstration and development project”, *Contracts Finder* [online], 2 July 2020.

369. “UK flies military plane over English Channel in continued effort to make migration there ‘unviable’”, *Infomigrants*, 11 August 2020.

29 November 2020: Franco-British agreement to step up surveillance of the Channel: €31.4 million³⁷⁰.

21 July 2021: Franco-British agreement, police reinforcement, aerial surveillance, equipment, accommodation facilities for exiled people: €62.7 million³⁷¹.

OPERATING COSTS FOR SECURITY SERVICES: €796.8 MILLION

Port of Cherbourg: €400,000 per year³⁷² i.e. €9.6 million over 24 years.

Port of Calais: €12 million per year³⁷³ i.e. €288 million over 24 years.

Port of Dieppe: €300,000 per year³⁷⁴ i.e. €7.2 million over 24 years.

Port of Ouistreham-Caen: €500,000 per year³⁷⁵ i.e. €12 million over 24 years.

Channel Tunnel: €20 million per year³⁷⁶ i.e. €480 million over 24 years.

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371. "La collaboration franco-britannique pour renforcer la lutte contre l'immigration illégale fait réagir des associations" ["The Franco-British collaboration to reinforce the fight against illegal immigration is making associations react"], *France Info*, 21 July 2021.

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
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APPENDIX 7: EXPENDITURE ON THE FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR IMMIGRATION FROM 2008 TO 2020

	The fight against illegal immigration (held in waiting areas, detained and deported, CRA)	Ministry of the Interior (including the Directorate-General for foreign nationals in France)	National police (including border police)	Gendarmerie	Total
2008	€73,573,535	€28,016,262	€609,652,637	€66,591,825	€777,834,259
2009	€75,054,712	€60,565,433	€640,704,142	€85,637,210	€861,961,497
2010	€67,039,658	€64,384,936	€638,071,940	€79,430,068	€848,926,602
2011	€61,039,071	€54,900,146	€688,477,971	€37,899,008	€842,316,196
2012	€70,820,488	€60,680,179	€692,513,395	€20,103,010	€844,117,072
2013	€64,570,316	€72,897,241	€665,210,733	€15,396,199	€818,074,489
2014	€77,770,391	€76,673,375	€1,081,736,675	€15,212,589	€1,251,393,030
2015	€93,949,874	€75,909,765	€737,892,644	€13,582,078	€921,334,361
2016	€85,522,816	€81,220,275	€866,032,455	€19,541,799	€1,052,317,345
2017	€93,316,328	€97,112,046	€1,160,080,098	€27,492,308	€1,378,000,780
2018	€100,956,136	€100,586,484	€998,106,019	€25,815,734	€1,225,464,373
2019	€113,591,662	€104,174,577	€1,006,135,026	€29,177,983	€1,253,079,248
2020	€122,882,901	€97,553,342	€1,114,905,202	€29,579,083	€1,364,920,528

Source: Cross-cutting policy document



APPENDIX 8: LIVING SPACES IN CALAIS: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

23 April 1999: Families from Kosovo occupy the Calais port terminal. Following an order from the Prefect of Pas-de-Calais, they are evacuated.

4 June 1999: The Bore Hangar, in which 200 exiles are housed, is evacuated at the request of the CCI, owner of the premises.

Summer 1999: Occupation of the Saint-Pierre-Saint-Paul park by the exiled people evicted from the Bore Hangar.

24 September 1999: Opening of the Sangatte camp.

5 November 2002: The Sangatte camp is closed to new arrivals.

14 November 2002: 99 Iraqi Kurds and Afghans who are occupying the Church of Saint-Pierre-Saint-Paul in Calais are evicted at the request of the town's mayor, Jacky Hénin.

2 December 2002: Nicolas Sarkozy and David Blunkett, French Minister of the Interior and British Home Secretary, respectively, announce the permanent closure of the Sangatte camp by the end of 2002.

30 December 2002: Permanent closure of the camp, followed by its destruction.

January 2003: Implementation of Operation Ulysses by the Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy. This policy combines harassment, arrests, detention, removal and the systematic destruction of living spaces.

Summer 2003: Birth of the Pashtun "Jungle" in Calais.

2003: Opening of the Socarenam squat, Quai de la Moselle in Calais.

24 October 2006: Destruction of the Socarenam squat, Quai de la Moselle in Calais, containing Somalis, Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians.

October 2006: Opening of a new squat in the former Pagniez sawmill in Calais, which is named "Africa House".

22 March 2008: Natacha Bouchart (UMP), who campaigned on the issue of combating squats, is elected mayor of Calais.

21 April 2009: 150 exiled people are arrested in a Calais squat.

22 April 2009: 44 exiled people are arrested at motorway rest areas between Calais and Saint-Omer.

23 April 2009: Éric Besson, Minister of Immigration, says "it is out of the question to let a centre like the one that existed in Sangatte be recreated. The opening of such a centre would lead to the arrival of an even greater number of illegal immigrants and networks, and would only make the humanitarian situation worse."

June 2009: Several hundred "No Border" activists from all over Europe set up a camp in the Beau-Marais district of Calais to denounce the treatment of exiled people by the authorities.

3 July 2009: Evacuation of a building belonging to the French railway network in Calais, where exiled people are staying.

20 August 2009: Evacuation of the Hazara Jungle in the name of scabies control.

22 September 2009: Closure of the Pashtun "jungle" in Calais, sheltering 1,000 exiled people. Arrest of 278 people, with 132 of them stating they are minors.

29 September 2009: Hunger strike by exiled people in Calais begins.

30 September 2009: Destruction of the Hazara jungle in Calais.

30 September 2009: Evacuation of a lock keeper's house occupied by Eritreans since November 2008.

2 October 2009: Destruction of the Eritrean squat. 150 Eritrean and Ethiopian exiles sheltering in three terraced houses.

7 October 2009: Evacuation of the Port Jungle, where exiled people have been living for a year.

15 January 2010: After being re-built, the Hazara Jungle is destroyed once again.

7 February 2010: Eviction of the Kronstadt hangar, an autonomous space for exiled people.

28 May 2010: The Hazara Jungle is destroyed once again.

14 June 2010: Evacuation of the "Africa House" squat located in the former Pagniez sawmill.

October 2010: Creation of two new squats, the first in the former Thélou factory in the centre of Calais and the second in the former Noyon lace factory, located next to the former Pagniez sawmill.

27 June 2011: The squat in the former Thélou factory is evacuated and destroyed.

November 2011: Evacuation then destruction of the Noyon squat in Calais.

16 March 2012: Evacuation then destruction of the new "Africa House", located on Avenue Blériot, in the buildings of the University of the Littoral Opal Coast. In the years that follow, an "eco-neighbourhood" is created on the site that was destroyed.

25 May 2012: Evacuation of the Darquer squat in Calais.

10 May 2012: Evacuation of "Palestine House".

22 May 2012: Evacuation of a squat near the hospital.

29 May 2012: Evacuation of a squat

30 May 2012: Evacuation of the Rue Descartes squat.

28 June 2012: Evacuation of the camp set up around the former customs building.

29 June 2012: Evacuation of the camp set up at the meal distribution point.

5 July 2012: Evacuation of the distribution point and the camp in the former customs building.

9 July 2012: Evacuation of the distribution point.

20 July 2012: Evacuation of a camp under the awning of the Paul Devot hangar.

12 September 2012: Evacuation of the "Africa House" squat.

25 September 2012: Evacuation of the distribution point.

26 September 2012: Evacuation of the "White House".

27 September 2012: Evacuation of "Paradise House" and "Palestinian House".

8 October 2012: Evacuation of the "Dominique" squat and eviction from "Palestinian House".

9 October 2012: Evacuation of the Sudanese Jungle.

10 October 2012: Evacuation of the Sudanese squat.

19 October 2012: Evacuation of the "Pashtu City" squat.

27 December 2012: Evacuation of a camp near the old customs building.

30 January 2013: Evacuation of the Auber squat.

9 April 2013: Evacuation of a new Afghan camp.

12 April 2013: Evacuation of a squat.

22 May 2013: Evacuation of the Egyptians' squat on Rue Descartes.

8 June 2013: Evacuation of the squat on Rue des Salines.

24 June 2013: Opening of the squat at 51 Rue Victor Hugo, a place strictly for women and children.

28 June 2013: Evacuation of the Afghan jungle.

29 August 2013: Evacuation of the squat on Rue des Quatre Coins.

5 September 2013: Evacuation of the squat on Rue Mouron.

6 September 2013: Evacuation of the squat at the former hospital.

9 September 2013: Evacuation of the squat on Rue Duguay Trouin.

11 September 2013: Evacuation of the squat on Rue des Soupirants and evacuation of the "Albanian Hostel".

12 September 2013: Evacuation of the Sudanese jungle.

26 September 2013: Evacuation of a camp near the old customs building.

21 October 2013: Evacuation of the Eritrean squat on Rue Neuve.

31 October 2013: Evacuation of the Sudanese Jungle.

18 December 2013: Evacuation of the Sudanese camp.

19 December 2013: Evacuation of the Sudanese camp.

24 January 2014: Evacuation of two camps.

3 March 2014: Evacuation of a squat at Impasse Leclercq.

9 June 2014: Evacuation of the squat on Rue Masséna.

4 July 2014: Opening of the Women's House at the premises of Secours Catholique.

January 2015: Unofficial opening of the Jules Ferry Centre in Calais. The exiled people are evicted from their living spaces with the understanding that they will be accepted at the Jules Ferry Centre.

13 April 2015: Official opening of the Jules Ferry Centre, used by almost 2,500 people.

21 October 2015: There are nearly 6,000 exiled people at the Jules Ferry Centre and in the nearby shanty town. The government attempts to "relieve congestion" in the shanty town by increasing arrests, detention and removals to CAOs and CRAs outside the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

January 2016: The government creates a temporary reception centre (CAP) near the Jules Ferry Centre, which is designed to accommodate 1,500 exiled people in containers. Meanwhile, the Jules Ferry Centre increases its capacity to accommodate 400 women and children. There are about 4,500 people in the area.

29 February – 16 March 2016: The government dismantles the southern area of the Calais shanty town. The exiled people there move to the northern area, reducing the space available for the 4,000 people already there.

Summer 2016: Although nearly 7,000 exiled people are living in the Calais shanty town, the Jules Ferry Centre and the temporary reception centre, the government prepares to dismantle them by creating places in CAOs.

24 October 2016: The dismantling of the Calais shanty town begins and lasts four days. 7,000 exiles are sent to CAOs outside the Nord and Pas-de-Calais regions.

From November 2016: The State implements a "zero tolerance of migrants" policy. This policy combines harassment, arrests, detention, removal and the systematic destruction of living spaces.

2017: Over 100 evictions from living spaces.

2018: 452 evictions recorded by HRO.

2019: 961 evictions recorded by HRO.

2020: 967 evictions recorded by HRO.

APPENDIX 9: SETTLEMENTS IN GRANDE-SYNTHÉ: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2002-2005: Following the closure of the Sangatte camp, exiled people settle in Grande-Synthe, but are not very visible.

2005: The exiled people settle in Basroch, a wooded area of 21 hectares.

2006-2007: Dismantling operations are organised on the initiative of the State every five to six months.

29 December 2008: On the initiative of Grande-Synthe town hall, two heated tents are erected on the Basroch site to accommodate exiled people, one for men and one for women. The camp mainly houses Afghans, Iraqi Kurds and Syrians. The city provides showers twice a week.

21 April 2009: The two tents are taken down.

Winter 2010-2011: The city installs two heated tents again.

Summer 2011: There are about 50 exiled people on the Basroch site.

January 2012: Eight 10 m² huts are financed by the CUD and MDM and installed on the Basroch site.

June 2015: Around 100 exiled people are recorded to be living on the Basroch site.

Summer 2015: A "House for Migrants" project is launched but abandoned when the number of exiled people suddenly increases from about 100 to almost 500.

December 2015: There are between 2,000 and 2,500 exiled people on the Basroch site.

7 March 2016: Opening of the La Linière camp. It is designed to accommodate 2,500 people across 375 wooden chalets measuring 9, 10 and 11 m². 1,700 exiles, mainly Kurds, settle there.

September 2016: There are now between 600 and 700 exiled people on the La Linière camp as the State and the local authority reduced the number of chalets available.

23 October 2016: When the Calais shanty town is dismantled, the number of exiles at La Linière increases from 700 to 1,700 due, in part, to the arrival of people from Afghanistan. This shift in the social characteristics of the people living there changes the way the camp operates and creates new tensions.

10 April 2017: Following tensions between Kurds and Afghans, a fire breaks out and destroys the camp.

April 2017: Following the fire, more than a thousand exiled people are housed in gymnasiums in the Dunkirk area, before being dispersed by bus to CAOs outside the region.

April 2017: 600 exiles return to Grande-Synthe and settle in a protected wooded area called the Puythouck. They have no shelter, no toilets, no showers.

April 2017: The State and the local authority enforce a policy of eviction from living spaces by dispersing exiled people to reception centres.

Summer 2017: 400 to 800 exiles are living at the Puythouck site. At least three evictions take place during the summer.

19 September 2017: Gérard Collomb, Minister of the Interior, decides to dismantle the Puythouck site and forcibly “shelter” the 700 exiles living there.

End of September 2017: 400 exiles resettle in the Puythouck.

End of October 2017: The town hall opens a day centre for women and children, while the State creates a “drop-in centre” in the form of a bus providing tea and coffee to inform exiled people about the asylum process and assisted return procedures. The AFEJI association conducts outreach activities to encourage exiles to access accommodation centres.

30 October 2017: An operation to “shelter” the inhabitants of the Puythouck site is organised. 450 people are removed, before returning.

November 2017: Several evictions take place, while 1,000 exiles remain at Puythouck.

11 December 2017: During a snowstorm, a dismantling operation takes place. The local authority wants to “liberate” Puythouck.

12 December 2017: The local authority makes the Espace Jeunes du Moulin municipal gymnasium available to exiles. Meanwhile, Puythouck is still in existence.

January-May 2018: There are three evictions every week on the Puythouck site.

24 May 2018: The gymnasium is evacuated at the request of Grande-Synthe town hall, 450 exiled people are sheltered before returning to Grande-Synthe.

24 May 2018: On Damien Carême's proposal, the exiles settle next to the Air Liquide factory, on SEVESO-classified land.

11 June 2018: The “Air Liquide” camp is evacuated and fenced off.

14 June 2018: A new camp is created near the marshalling yard. The town hall provides a water point, portable toilets and showers. Sheltering operations are carried out by the police every week (11 took place during the summer of 2018).

6 September 2018: 1,000 exiles are evicted from the marshalling yard and taken to a shelter. Meanwhile, arrests are carried out systematically to prevent the re-formation of a camp.

September 2018: Almost 500 exiles return and settle in Puythouck.

18 September to 23 October 2018: Four evictions take place at the Puythouck site. During the eviction on 23 October 2018, 2,000 exiled people are affected.

November 2018: Two living spaces are established, one in the Puythouck and the other near the “Ferme des Jésuites”. The evictions continue.

27 December 2018: The municipal gymnasium is opened again, providing indoor and outdoor shelter for nearly 1,000 exiles.

January-March 2018: Alongside the gymnasium, the Puythouck camp is still in existence. Between January and March 2018, exiles are subjected to 33 evictions.

21 June 2018: The Council of State obliges the State to install water points and showers in the gymnasium camp.

From 1 January to 1 July 2019: HRO records 59 evictions.

3 July 2019: Damien Carême, mayor of Grande-Synthe, becomes an MP for the EELV party, leaving his position to his socialist deputy, Martial Beyaert.

17 July 2019: Martial Beyaert, mayor of Grande-Synthe, calls for the evacuation of the gymnasium, where 1,000 exiled people are living.

17 September 2019: The State executes the court order and evacuates the gymnasium. 811 people are "sheltered" in CAOs and CAESs.

End of September 2019: There are still settlements in Puythouck and around the Ferme des Jésuites. After the gymnasium is evacuated, almost 500 exiles are living in the hangars near the former La Linière camp.

11 October 2019: 60 exiles are arrested near their living spaces.

25 November 2019: 30 exiles are arrested near their living spaces.

From 1 July to 31 December 2019: HRO records 119 evictions.

January 2020: The local authority decides to provide a water tank and soap near the hangars of the former La Linière camp.

April 2020: The local authority decides to install 24 showers and four toilets near the hangars of the former La Linière camp.

3 June 2020: The hangars are evacuated and then walled up.

3 June 2020: Following the evacuation, the exiles move back to Puythouck.

September 2020: The local authority moves the water point and installs a rubbish skip and six dry toilets in Puythouck. The CUD provides access to showers in a gymnasium in Dunkirk.

2020: HRO records 91 evictions, including 33 between September and December 2020.

16 April 2021: The town hall moves the exiles from the Puythouck camp to Petit-Prédembourg, located three kilometres away. The town hall installs various water and electricity points.

1 January to 1 September 2021: HRO records 43 evictions.

APPENDIX 10: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN TÉTEGHEM (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

From 2002 to 2007: Exiles settle around Lac de Tétéghem, near a rest area. Their presence is initially barely noticeable.

9 September 2008: Operation to evict the camp around Lac de Tétéghem at the request of the CUD, owner of the land.

Winter 2008: 20 to 30 exiled people are living around Lac de Tétéghem.

26 December 2008: In Tétéghem, mayor Franck Dhersin decides to open a sports hall to provide shelter from the cold for exiles.

Spring 2008: A living space is re-established around Lac de Tétéghem, which is tolerated by the town hall.

Summer 2010: The number of exiles increases from 30 to 150 following evictions in Loon-Plage.

30 November 2010: Franck Dhersin announces that the number of exiled people present will be subject to a cap. The city agrees to accommodate between 30 and 40 exiled people. Winter arrangements are reintroduced with four heated tents that can accommodate ten people each.

30 June 2011: Operation to dismantle the Lac de Tétéghem camp.

January 2012: The Urban Community of Dunkirk funds four huts around Lac de Tétéghem, each of which can accommodate 10 exiled people.

13 April 2012: Exiled people are housed outside the huts in tents. Because the cap on numbers has been exceeded, the CUD requests that the Lac de Tétéghem camp be dismantled.

Until summer 2014: There are between 40 and 60 exiled people near Lac de Tétéghem.

October 2014: The number of exiles increases to 200. The mayor calls for the evacuation of the camp and creates new living spaces in containers for a maximum of 50 people. The priority is to accommodate women, children and families.

Summer 2015: 200 exiles are counted around Lac de Tétéghem, in and around the containers.

18 November 2015: The Tétéghem camp is dismantled.

19 November 2015: Tétéghem municipal services and the CUD remove the containers, mattresses, tents and personal belongings from the exiles. Police patrols are organised to prevent the establishment of new settlements.

APPENDIX 11: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN STEENVOORDE (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

29 July 2008: The Steenvoorde camp, where 60 exiled people live, is evacuated by the police.

November 2008: Creation of the association Terre d'Errance Steenvoorde.

28 November 2008: During the winter period, two tents, each capable of sheltering 10 exiled people, are erected on municipal land. This arrangement is repeated in 2009, 2010 and 2011.

24 July 2010: 23 exiled people are arrested near the Saint-Laurent service station in Steenvoorde.

July 2014: The mayor of Steenvoorde, Jean-Pierre Bataille, announces that he will no longer tolerate living spaces, even though 100 exiled people are present.

October 2014: A security guard is hired by the Saint-Laurent service station, located in Steenvoorde, to deter exiles from climbing aboard heavy goods vehicles.

January 2016: There are about a hundred exiles in Steenvoorde.

April 2016: Jean-Pierre Bataille issues a municipal decree prohibiting Saint-Joseph parish hall from being used as a night shelter for injured people and pregnant women, and limits access to the day centre to 50 people at a time.

11 July 2016: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp. 65 exiles are evicted and forcibly "sheltered" in a CAO in Saône-et-Loire.

5 January 2017: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp, which is home to some 15 exiles, including 11 minors. They are taken to a CAO, but return within a few days.

19 May 2017: A new camp forms in Steenvoorde where there are 400 exiled people.

11 July 2017: Dismantling of the Steenvoorde camp. Sixty exiles are evicted and "sheltered".

12 July 2017: Introduction of a deterrence policy. The police are mobilised to prevent any resettlements by performing identity checks around the day centre and in the city. Police are permanently on duty, carrying out continuous checks. Any tent that has been pitched is systematically destroyed and its "inhabitant" checked, arrested and removed.

31 March 2021: Following the end of its partnership with Secours Catholique, exiles are no longer allowed to access Saint-Joseph Parish Hall.

APPENDIX 12: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN LOON-PLAGE (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2002-2006: Following the closure of the Sangatte camp, living spaces were created less than three kilometres from the terminal, on land belonging to the Autonomous Port of Dunkirk, under the authority of the State.

2002-2006: Little information specifically about the evictions is available, except for the existence of squats and the camp near the port, which are regularly walled up and destroyed by the police.

10 January 2006: The camp in Loon-Plage is destroyed by bulldozers that cover the exiles' belongings in earth and sand. The camp is rebuilt shortly afterwards, with about 50 exiles present.

16 December 2008: Destruction of a camp in Loon-Plage, where about 50 exiles from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan are counted.

25 December 2008: The PRG [Radical Left Party] mayor of Loon-Plage, Éric Rommel, explains that he refuses to accept the construction of facilities for exiles, stating: "Alone I can do nothing."

28 December 2008: Eric Rommel goes back on his decision and has a 96 m² heated tent built at the port, stating: "I have overstepped my rights, it's true, but I'm tired of being the good obedient child."

17 June 2009: Destruction of the Loon-Plage camp.

27 October 2009: The mayor of Loon-Plage agrees to make showers available to exiles, a facility managed by the associations and available twice a week.

17 November 2009: Destruction of the Loon-Plage camp, where 60 exiled people live.

March 2010: 80 exiles are living in the camp near the ferry terminal.

21 July 2010: Doctors of the World installs a 5,000 litre water tank. It is removed a few days later by the Grand Port Maritime de Dunkerque, on the pretext that it "encourages the settlement of migrants".

15 September 2010: Dismantling of the Loon-Plage camp, which is home to about ten exiles. Police presence is stepped up to prevent the re-establishment of settlements.

APPENDIX 13: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN NORRENT-FONTES (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2002-2006: Little information is available for this period. Exiles are not very visible.

2006: The first squat is identified and the parish organises support.

20 December 2007: Destruction of the Afghan camp in Norrent-Fontes.

January 2008: Creation of the association Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes.

March 2008: Marc Boulnois (EELV) becomes mayor of Norrent-Fontes.

April 2008: Norrent-Fontes town hall provides exiled people with municipal land.

September 2008: To end conflicts with the neighbourhood, Marc Boulnois grants a new piece of municipal land, which becomes the "La Marlière" camp.

December 2010: The prefect of Pas-de-Calais issues a formal notice to Norrent-Fontes town hall to destroy the "La Marlière" camp. Marc Boulnois refuses.

29 January 2011: A demonstration of support is organised, bringing together nearly 200 people.

29 January 2012: The prefecture of Pas-de-Calais destroys the "La Marlière" camp, without the agreement of the town hall.

March 2012: The town hall has built four huts with the support of Doctors of the World, Terre d'Errance, the REH and the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region.

March 2014: Marc Boulnois is defeated in the municipal elections. Bertrand Cocq, miscellaneous right, becomes mayor of Norrent-Fontes. He threatens to cut off the exiles' access to drinking water, before going back on his decision.

April 2015: Two huts are accidentally set on fire.

July 2015: The association Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes starts to build a new hut. Bertrand Cocq issues a municipal decree prohibiting this rebuilding.

10 October 2015: Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes organises a "Building Hospitality" initiative to build a new hut.

June 2016: Bertrand Cocq takes legal action to demand the eviction of the Norrent-Fontes camp. At that time, 250 exiles were living there.

12 October 2016: The court forbids the eviction.

Winter 2016: The State funds two social worker positions in the camp.

23 February 2017: A prefectural decree prohibits heavy goods vehicles from parking in the Saint-Hilaire-Cottes area, located near Norrent-Fontes.

18 September 2017: The Norrent-Fontes camp is dismantled. 85 exiles are "sheltered", before returning a few days later to settle in a grove of tree, with the permission of its private owner.

24 September 2019: The personal belongings of the exiles are disposed of at the waste disposal centre.

6 November 2019: Evacuation of the Norrent-Fontes camp by the Isbergues gendarmerie. Around ten exiles are evicted.

APPENDIX 14: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN CHERBOURG-OCTEVILLE (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

9 August 2002: Dismantling of a squat in an abandoned building, 30 to 40 exiles - mainly Iraqi Kurds - are evicted.

Summer 2004: Iraqi Kurds settle in a camp in Tourlaville, located on Boulevard Maritime.

Summer 2005: The Tourlaville camp is burned down.

22 September 2006: An eviction order is issued for the Tourlaville camp.

22 September 2006: Exiled people settle on former SNCF premises belonging to the town hall of Cherbourg-Octeville.

14 January 2007: At the initiative of Bernard Cazeneuve, an eviction order is issued concerning the former SNCF premises.

14 January 2007: 60 exiled people settle on land belonging to the Société Hérouvillaise d'Économie Mixte d'Aménagement (SHEMA), near the parish hall.

25 July 2007: At the initiative of SHEMA, an eviction order is executed.

25 July 2007: Exiled people settle behind the Jean-Nordez sports hall at the foot of Montagne du Roule on municipal land.

3 October 2007: Bernard Cazeneuve calls for the evacuation of the Nordez camp, home to some sixty people.

3 October 2007: A new squat is created on Boulevard Maritime.

December 2007: The squat on Boulevard Maritime is cleared. Bernard Cazeneuve advises that the exiled people – mainly Afghans – can settle behind the Jean-Nordez sports hall.

January 2008: A municipalised and tolerated squat is set up behind the municipal sports hall, which becomes the Nordez camp.

January 2013: During a harsh winter, the parish of Octeville lends a hall to exiled people for four months.

Spring 2013: Exiled people reoccupy the Nordez site.

December 2013: Asylum seekers are accommodated in apartments managed by the association Coalia. The Nordez squat is destroyed.

June 2015: Several dozen exiles are "on the streets".

January 2016: 60 to 80 exiles are living in the disused Church of Saint-Marie-Madeleine-Postel, pending the sale of the building in mid-May 2016.

16 May 2016: New camp on the Nordez site. Around fifteen exiled people settle there.

18 May 2016: Police intervention at the Nordez squat, 11 arrests.

23 May 2016: The city of Cherbourg-Octeville calls for the evacuation of the Nordez squat.

13 June 2016: The Administrative Court of Caen gives exiled people five days to leave the Nordez site.

18 June 2016: New camp at the former Gazelec Stadium in Turlaville, owned by the company Enedis.

7 July 2016: Dismantling of the Gazelec camp following a request from the owner, Enedis.

10 July 2016: New camp on the Nordez site.

18 August 2016: Eviction of the Nordez squat.

5 February 2017: New camp on the Nordez site.

11 April 2017: Eviction of the Nordez squat.

Since summer 2017: The Nordez squat is occupied by about ten exiles. Others benefit from solidarity accommodation.

APPENDIX 15: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN OUISTREHAM (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2002-2003: Exiles take shelter in dunes near the port of Caen-Ouistreham. They dig trenches and use tarpaulins for cover.

2003: Exiles are evicted from the dunes as preparations for the 60th anniversary of the D-Day landings approach.

2003-2014: The town of Ouistreham is essentially a place of passage for exiles. Some squats appear, but there is little information about them. Exiles are mainly located in squats in Caen.

2014: In the shadow of the Calais shanty town, the number of exiles in the city is increasing, making them even more visible.

April 2014: Romain Bail (LR [The Republicans]) becomes mayor of Ouistreham.

2014: The public authorities announce that in the past year, 650 exiles have been arrested near the port.

January 2015: On the initiative of the parish of Ouistreham, several events take place to discuss the situation of exiles in the town.

October 2015: During the regional elections, Nicolas Bay, a member of the National Front, tries to politicise the issue of exiles in Ouistreham.

Summer 2017: A camp of about fifty exiles appears in Ouistreham.

28 September 2017: The Ouistreham migrant support collective (CAMO) is formed. The main tasks of this informal collective are: to provide regular assistance by supplying food through the organisation of meals; to offer clothing as and when needed by means of collections and donations; to ensure that the exiles do not have any major health problems and, if necessary, to establish a framework with healthcare professionals; to monitor their physical and mental health in order to anticipate any deterioration.

9 December 2017: Opening of a squat on the initiative of CAMO, the purpose of which is to “shelter the dozens of migrants in Ouistreham, who are mainly Sudanese, from the winter cold.” That evening, the police evacuate the site at the request of the mayor of Ouistreham, Romain Bail.

17 December 2017: A rally of nearly 1,000 people takes place in Ouistreham.

19 March 2019: The town hall has closed access to toilets and water points to the fifty or so exiles in Ouistreham. Demonstrators demand the opening of a gymnasium.

Summer 2019: The exiles settle in a small area of woodland on a piece of land belonging to the syndicat mixte des ports normands [joint union of Normandy ports].

29 April 2019: On the initiative of CAMO and the general assembly against all evictions, a squat is opened at the foot of the Pegasus bridge. Five asylum seekers settle there.

20 March 2020: During the lockdown period, the State makes the Tailleville Manor located in Douvres-la-Délivrande (15 kilometres from Ouistreham), available to exiles. About sixty exiles settle there.

11 May 2020: When lockdown ends, some of the exiles leave Tailleville and settle on the Pommiers roundabout, on the outskirts of Ouistreham.

13 May 2020: The gendarmes intervene to remove the camp from the roundabout and transfer the exiles to Tailleville.

6 June 2020: Nearly 200 people gather in Ouistreham to protest against the inspection conditions and the arrests made since lockdown.

4 November 2020: The Tailleville centre reopens, but the exiles refuse to be transferred there.

6 November 2020: The State dismantles the "petit bois" camp on the banks of the Ouistreham canal. The aim is to encourage exiles to settle in Tailleville.

March 2021: There are about fifty exiled people in Ouistreham.

1 June 2021: The Tailleville centre is closed. The exiles resettle in the "petit bois" camp.

9 June 2021: The syndicat mixte des ports normands demands the eviction of the "petit bois" camp.

18 June 2021: A hundred or so people gather to protest against the possible evacuation of the "petit bois" camp.

25 June 2021: The administrative court rejects the request to evacuate the "petit bois". The court "does not consider itself competent. In its view, the wooded area concerned does not belong to the public maritime or river domain."

APPENDIX 16: OPENINGS AND EVICTIONS OF LIVING SPACES IN DIEPPE (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2002: A number of arrests in the port of Dieppe are recorded.

2002: Exiles - mostly Kurds - settle in a stranded ship or concrete blocks in the harbour pier and bunkers, before the living spaces are destroyed or walled up.

2002-2006: The exiles find refuge in the crevices of the Pollet cliffs, before they are walled up and prohibited from accessing them by the prefect in 2006.

December 2005: 40 exiles are sleeping on the quays. The association Information Solidarité Réfugiés (ISR) calls on the sub-prefect of Dieppe to provide shelter. The State gives its authority to provide them with a floor of the former Michel Hospital for a period of three months.

September 2007: The exiles settle in an abandoned house in the Talou area before it is walled up at the request of the public prosecutor.

End of 2007: A “tacit agreement” is reached between ISR and the public authorities to allow exiles to settle in a former Vinco factory near the port, on the outskirts of the city. ISR distributes food and takes exiles to the showers in the basement of a bandstand on loan from the local authority. A quota of around 40 exiles is put in place.

January 2016: The association Itinérance Dieppe is established to organise the distribution of food and clothing to the 180 exiles living along the cliffs in tents or blockhouses, but also in several abandoned houses.

1 April 2016: Four living spaces are dismantled in Dieppe at the request of the Normandy region, manager of the port area, with the support of the local authority. Exiled people re-establish a makeshift camp nearby.

2 June 2006: Following bad weather, MSF intervenes in Dieppe and provides 20 large humanitarian tents, 100 blankets and 100 camp beds.

29 June 2016: At the request of the town of Dieppe, the “MSF” camp is dismantled.

Start of 2017: There are still about sixty exiles in Dieppe. They are more spread out and difficult for local associations to reach.

APPENDIX 17: CLOSURES OF MOTORWAY REST AREAS (NON-EXHAUSTIVE LIST)

2007: Closure of the Nortkerque service station (A26, direction Reims-Calais).

June 2009: The motorway service stations of Tétéghem-Nord (A16, direction Belgium-France) and Moères (A16, direction Belgium-France) are closed alternately, as is the Saint-Georges-sur-l'Aa service station (A16, direction Belgium-France).

30 June 2016: The Grande Bucaille motorway service station at Chocques (A26, direction Reims-Calais) is closed for works.

23 February 2017: The service stations of Nortkerque (A26, direction Reims-Calais), Saint-Hilaire-Cottes in Norrent-Fontes (A26, direction Reims-Calais), Grande Bucaille in Chocques (A26, direction Reims-Calais) and Bois de la Commanderie in Berck (A16, direction Paris-Calais) are closed by the government.

8 March 2017: A prefectural decree prohibits heavy goods vehicles from parking in the Saint-Laurent service station in Steenvoorde (A25, direction Lille-Dunkirk) for a period of three months (one month, extended by two months).

10 March 2017: Closure of the BP service station in Grande-Synthe (A16, direction Paris-Calais).

5 April 2018: Closure of the service stations of l'Épitre in Beuvrequen (A16, direction Boulogne-sur-Mer-Calais), Bois de la Commanderie in Berck (A16, direction Paris-Calais) and Fond de la Commanderie in Conchil-le-Temple (A16, direction Paris-Calais), Grande Bucaille in Chocques (A26, direction Reims-Calais), Villefleur in Mametz (A26, direction Reims-Calais) and Nortkerque (A26, direction Reims-Calais).

30 June 2021: A prefectural decree announces the closure of the service stations of Saint-Georges-sur-l'Aa (A16, direction Belgium-France), Tétéghem-Nord (A16, direction Belgium-France), des Moères (A16, direction Belgium-France) and Beau Marais in Marck (A16, direction Belgium-France).



GRAPHIC DESIGN & FORMATTING:  dumkit-graphic.com
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La Plateforme des Soutiens aux Migrant.e.s (PSM) (The Platform of Migrant Support (PSM)) supports a network of associations present throughout the "Grand Nord" region, from Cherbourg to Dunkerque, which work to assist exiles at the French-British border.

The PSM was created to help associations improve dialogue and coordination between them in order to pool experiences, resources and skills and thus better defend the rights of exiled people.

This report is the result of a research mission, commissioned by the PSM, within the framework of its "Advocacy Commission", and as part of a process of "Thinking and acting differently to achieve a policy along the Franco-British border that respects rights".

Since 2019, the members of the network have met as part of the "advocacy commission" in order to work together on an advocacy strategy to ensure that the fundamental rights and dignity of exiles are respected at the border.

Today, it is not a campaign plan with well-defined final demands that the commission has adopted, but rather a methodology, implying a real change of mindset. It is based on three main aspects: the survey of people in transit; a critical analysis of public policies - the result of which is this report; and the creation of citizens' alliances on the subject with the intention of developing solutions that respect fundamental rights at the Franco-British border.